A meditation on the nature of self‐healing and personality change in psychotherapy based on Gendlin's theory of experiencing

Abstract

From a humanistic point of view psychotherapy is a creative transformational process in which therapists assist clients’ intrinsic self‐healing tendencies. However the nature of the self‐healing process is poorly understood. I briefly consider two theories of self‐healing, Rogers’ self‐actualization theory and dialectical theory, but focus on Gendlin's theory of experiencing as providing a more complete explanation. I consider the fundamentally implicational nature of change and portray personal change as “paradigm evolution” rather than paradigm revolution. I conclude with an examination of the self‐healing process in therapies that provide minimal prosthetic assistance to the client: client‐centered therapy, eye movement desensitization and reprocessing, and focusing‐oriented therapy. I conclude that the self‐healing/self‐change process occurs when intellectual, “top‐down” cognitive and self‐critical activity is interrupted, and when clients adopt a receptive, listening attitude towards inner experience.     

Feedback from research participants: are member checks useful in qualitative research?

It is often assumed that use of so-called “member checks” improves the credibility of qualitative research. Published literature mentioning member checks was reviewed to identify the purposes and procedures for seeking feedback from research participants as well as outcomes reported from member checks. Four themes reflecting underlying assumptions about the purposes of research that have implications for member checks were identified: theory generalisation, representation, participation, and change. Member checks are unlikely to be relevant to research focussed on theory development and generalisation. For other types of research, member checks might be justifiable, but there was little evidence that member checks improved research findings. Member checks can be useful for obtaining participant approval for using quotations or case studies and where anonymity cannot be guaranteed. In evaluation, stakeholder reviews of draft reports can be seen as good research practice. In participatory or collaborative research, ongoing contact might include member checks.     

Recollection and phantasy: The problem of the truth of memory in Husserl’s phenomenology

The epistemological problem of the truth of memory cannot be resolved without establishing a clear distinction between recollection and phantasy. Husserl’s position in this regard is both paradoxical and compelling. It is paradoxical because Husserl repeats his antiskeptical intention many times; but nevertheless in his phenomenology, recollection and phantasy are almost completely identical. Perhaps no philosopher has so radically approached the experience of remembering and the experience of fantasizing as Husserl. But at the same time, the recognition of this fundamental similarity is precisely what allows the phenomenologist to avoid empiricist misunderstandings and thus approach the problem of the distinction between recollection and phantasy in a much more persuasive way than the traditional one. In this paper, I will first try to show how and why Husserl approaches recollection and phantasy. Then I will try to show how it is possible to establish a clear distinction between these two phenomena without misunderstanding the possibility of false memory.     

The source of the truth bias: Heuristic processing?

People believe others are telling the truth more often than they actually are; this is called the truth bias. Surprisingly, when a speaker is judged at multiple points across their statement the truth bias declines. Previous claims argue this is evidence of a shift from (biased) heuristic processing to (reasoned) analytical processing. In four experiments we contrast the heuristic‐analytic model (HAM) with alternative accounts. In Experiment 1, the decrease in truth responding was not the result of speakers appearing more deceptive, but was instead attributable to the rater's processing style. Yet contrary to HAMs, across three experiments we found the decline in bias was not related to the amount of processing time available (Experiments 1–3) or the communication channel (Experiment 2). In Experiment 4 we found support for a new account: that the bias reflects whether raters perceive the statement to be internally consistent.     

Jivanmukti in Neo‐Hinduism: The case of Ramana Maharsi

Jivanmukti or ‘living liberation’ has been identified as a distinguishing feature of Indian thought; or, upon drawing a narrower circle, of Hindu thought; and upon drawing an even narrower cocentric circle of Vedānta—of Advaita Vedānta. In some recent studies the cogency of its formulation within Advaita Vedānta has been questioned—but without reference to the testimony of its major modem exemplar, Ramana Maharsi (1879–1950). This paper examines the significance of the life and statements of Ramana Maharsi for the current debate in the context of neo‐Hinduism     

Solicited diary studies of psychotherapy in qualitative research–pros and cons

Diary studies are scarce within the field of qualitative psychotherapy research. In this article arguments for and against the employment of solicited diary studies in qualitative psychotherapy research are investigated. The strengths of diary studies are presented along with arguments concerning their pertinence to the field. Limitations and potential critiques regarding the use of diaries are also addressed.     

The antisocial phenomenon in adolescence: What is literature telling us?

Our paper offers a reflection on the state of the art of antisocial behaviors in adolescence, seeking to review and synthesize relevant conclusions from developmental investigation on this subject. We begin by identifying the peculiarities of the antisocial phenomenon in adolescence, with particular focus on social and family aspects that may influence social behaviors at this stage, as well as on individual variables that undergo considerable development in adolescence and may play an important role in risk behaviors, such as psychosocial competence, personality, self-concept, and intelligence. The general conclusion points out questions that remain unanswered. Therefore, work seeking to address some of those questions is presented.     

Johannes Kepler’s computer simulation of the universe: Some remarks about theory in psychology

Computer simulation may be an overly seductive way of formulating theory in the social sciences. The capability of constructing complex computer simulation models may remove some of the incentive for finding simple laws. This point is illustrated via a fantasy in which the sixteenth century astronomical theorist, Johannes Kepler, uses Ms computer instead of his mind to account for extant data on stellar and planetary motion. Similarities between sixteenth century cosmology and twentieth century psychology are discussed.     

The reproduction of Jamaat‐i Islami in Britain

Maulana Mawdudi founded Jamaat‐i Islami in 1941 to give an organized form to his idea that Muslims needed an Islamic state in order to carry out the requirements of their religion fully. The influx of Muslim migrants from the sub‐continent throughout the 1960s enabled organizations that were closely allied to Jamaat‐i Islami to be established in Britain. The following article was written as a result of research undertaken amongst Jamaat‐i Islami sympathizers in both the sub‐continent and Britain. The intention was to monitor the process of change as the organization moved from one cultural milieu to another. In particular I wanted to investigate the idea put forward by many British sympathizers that the kind of Islam they practised was free of any ‘cultural accretion’ and therefore uniquely adaptable to the situation of Muslims born and educated in Britain.     

The Place of Self‐Respect in a Theory of Justice

This essay provides a critical examination of Rawls' (and Rawlsians') conception of self‐respect, the social bases of self‐respect, and the normative justification of equality in the social bases of self‐respect. I defend a rival account of these notions and the normative ideals at stake in political liberalism and a theory of social justice.

I make the following arguments: (1) I argue that it is unreasonable to take self‐respect to be a primary social good, as Rawls and his interpreters characterize it; (2) secondly, drawing on a distinction made by Darwall, I argue that recognition respect provides a far more suitable notion of respect for a theory of justice than Rawls' notion of appraisal respect; (3) thirdly, I argue that Rawls' treatment of self‐respect and the social bases of self‐respect as empirical conceptions should be rejected in favor of normative notions of a reasonable or justified self‐respect and equality in reasonable social bases of self‐respect; (4) I argue that Rawls' notions of political liberalism and public reason provide a way of grounding a notion of the reasonable social bases of self‐respect in political ideals of the person implicit in modern economic institutions, and family relations, ignored by Rawlsians—but as central to reasonable social bases of self‐respect and justice, as Rawlsians' ideal of persons as free and equal citizens.     

Al‐Dhimma: The non‐believers’ identity in Islam

The question as to the status of non‐Muslim minorities in Muslim states under an Islamic aegis has assumed importance once again in our times. The article argues that since dhimma status is secondary to the status of non‐believers, it is necessary that the theoretical basis of this latter relationship should be explored further. The article also points to the need of a fresh analytical understanding of the qur'anic term ‘the people of the Book’ and the possibilities of its wider application. The article reverts to the basic qur'anic distinction between din or faith and shir^ca and minhaj or code of conduct and way of life. The accommodative possibilities inherent in the distinction are briefly referred to.     

There is an ‘I’ in truth: How salient identities shape dynamic perceptions of truth

This research examined the hypothesis that people judge as true those claims aligned with the normative content of their salient social identities. In Experiment 1a, participants’ social identities were manipulated by assigning them to ‘inductive-thinker’ and ‘intuitive-thinker’ groups. Participants subsequently made truth judgements about aphorisms randomly associated with ‘science’ and ‘popular wisdom’. Those with salient inductive-thinker social identities judged science-based claims as more truthful than popular wisdom-based claims to a greater extent than those with salient intuitive-thinker social identities. Experiment 1b was a preregistered replication, with additional conditions eliminating an alternative semantic-priming explanation. In Experiment 2, American Conservatives and Liberals judged as more true claims associated with the ideological content of their social identities. This difference was attenuated through a manipulation that framed participants as more moderate than they had originally indicated. Overall, these experiments suggest an identity-truth malleability, such that making salient specific social identities can lead to related perceptions of truth normatively aligned with those identities.     

The psychology of telling murder stories: do we think in scripts,exemplars, or prototypes?

According to the story model of Pennington and Hastie, jurors collect information at trial and modify it with general knowledge to create case stories. Schank and Ableson argue that human memory is organized to tell and understand stories. However, Finkel and Groscup questioned the use of manipulated, experimenter-constructed narratives to demonstrate the existence of multiple prototypical crime stories. We interviewed 76 jury eligible, death qualified citizens and asked them to imagine a first-degree murder scenario, describing the events that led to the killing. We coded the presence of dichotomous variables in the resulting stories and identified at least three shared story prototypes using cluster and profile analysis. We conclude that people do not store crime stories as simple prototypes and comment on the implications of this finding for legal decision-making.     

Sensuality and venality in Bangkok: The dynamics of cross‐cultural mapping of prostitution

The dynamics of cross‐cultural cognitive mapping is examined, from a Schuetzian perspective, on the example of the changing images formed by farangs (white foreigners) of Thai girls engaged in “open‐ended” tourist‐oriented prostitution, a vaguely‐defined, gray area lying between “full‐fledged prostitution” and “straight” sexuality. The newcomer farang, unable to grasp this culture‐specific category, initially tends to refuse to label the girls as “prostitutes,” but, with growing experience, tends to apply that label to them, without, however, thereby resetting the boundaries of his cognitive map. He thus fails to make the transition from strangeness to familiarity with the host culture, as conceived by Schuetz—since he continues to impose the crisp categorizations prevalent in his culture of origin, on a situation which is fuzzily conceived in different categories by the hosts. The case study exemplifies the difficulties of a cross‐cultural definition and identification of prostitution.     

The role of practice and habituation in Socrates’ theory of ethical development

ABSTRACT

The goal of this paper is to challenge the standard view that Socrates of the early Platonic dialogues is an intellectualist with respect to virtue. Through a detailed analysis of the educational theory laid out in the early dialogues, it will be argued that Socrates believes that the best way to cultivate virtues in his interlocutors is not to convince them of ethical truths by way of reason and argument alone, but to encourage them to participate in the practice of virtue. Habit and practice are essential to the cultivation of virtue because they mould the desires and dispositions of the agent and promote a kind of knowledge that cannot be achieved discursively – craft-knowledge. Only when agents have achieved craft-knowledge can they be counted on to act virtuously on every occasion; and craft-knowledge can only be achieved by way of practice and habituation.     

The multisensory base of bodily coupling in face-to-face social interactions: Contrasting the case of autism with the Möbius syndrome

The perennial question of how we understand others’ emotions and mental states has undertaken an “interactive turn,” emphasizing the crucial role of low-level bodily coupling and second-personal engagements with others as opposed to the individualistic procedure of mental state attribution or “mindreading.” This raises the important question of what counts as foundational for socio-emotional understanding: high-level mentalistic abilities, low-level bodily coupling, or an integrative combination of both? Recent findings on face-based emotion-recognition in individuals with Möbius syndrome (MS) – a rare form of congenital facial paralysis which prevents facial mimicry – cast doubt on the idea that bodily coupling is the foundational component for socio-emotional understanding. Here we argue that the MS case does not pose a threat to the idea that low-level bodily coupling processes are foundational for social cognition. Rather, despite their lack of automatic facial mirroring, MS patients might benefit from spared multisensory integration processing which allows them to establish alternative channels of bodily coupling via different sensory modalities. We contrast MS- and autistic persons’ lack of automatic facial mimicry and argue that this comparison might help us to shed light on the constitutive and foundational role of low-level bodily coupling for socio-emotional understanding.