CREATORS AND CREATURES: THE CREATION ACCOUNT IN GENESIS AND THE IDEA OF THE ARTIFICIAL HUMANOID

Science fiction, this article argues, provides an imaginative domain which can offer a unique understanding of the interaction between science and religion. Such an interaction is particularly present in the idea of the artificial humanoid as brought to life in Mary Shelley's Frankenstein and the recent television series Westworld. Both revolve around the theme of a moral relation between scientist creator and humanoid creature in accord with a norm that first took shape in the biblical account of God's creation of the first human beings. At the same time, these works of fiction cast light on the contrast between the biblical account and the Mesopotamian myths of creation. In the manner of Frankenstein and Westworld, science fiction can integrate the perspective of science with that of the biblical tradition.     

Facing the Pariah of Science: The Frankenstein Myth as a Social and Ethical Reference for Scientists

Science and Engineering Ethics - Since its first publication in 1818, Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus has transcended genres and cultures to become a foundational myth...     

Cross-Cultural Reflections on the Feminine “Other”: Hebraism and Hellenism Redux

This paper addresses two of the most famous “others” in human history: Hellenism in relation to Hebraism and man in relation to woman. The development of modern psychiatry and psychology has been fundamentally informed by classical Greek thought, leaving the Bible epistemologically maligned as a valid alternative source-text for development of metatheory. This historical dominance of classical Greek thought has likewise directly contributed to the “otherness” status of women, establishing an implicit misogynistic undercurrent in Western history. The biblical worldview offers a destigmatized conception of the woman that affirms her independent status as a psychologically complete individual. This difference dramatically plays out in contrasting biblical and Greek views of women through comparing the story of Prometheus and Pandora with that of Adam and Eve. Pandora is described as a curse to man in retaliation for Prometheus stealing fire for man. In stark contrast, Eve is described as a blessing to man and as a helpmeet-opposite (ezer kenegdo). The biblical narrative of Adam and Eve represents a truly egalitarian approach to women. Despite Freud’s materialistic treatment of religion, the privileged position that classical Greek thought has enjoyed in the West has in fact acted as an illusion, serving as an existential tranquilizer and distracting the scientific conversation away from the life-affirming, hopeful message promoted through the biblical tradition. We can no longer afford to keep the Bible in the “other” category—we must mobilize the biblical tradition in the service of inductively developing a robust new conception of mental health.     

Speaking with Frankenstein

This collaborative essay experimentally applies the insights of Mary Shelley's 1818 gothic fantasy Frankenstein to clinical interactions between present-day physicians and the patients they, akin to Shelley's human protagonist, so often seem to bring (back) to life. Because that process is frequently fraught with unspoken elements of ambivalence, disappointment, frustration, and failure, we find in Shelley's speculative fiction less a cautionary tale of overreach than a dynamic parable of the role that the unspoken, the invisible, and the unknown might play in contemporary physician/patient relationships. Playing with that parable, we consider its relevance to four often unacknowledged dynamics that shape physician/patient interaction: commitment to a false binary of life and death; the tyranny of normative aesthetics; shared negative affect; and the ethics of care and care-denial. To "speak with Frankenstein" is, we show, to make space for the otherwise unspeakable. The result is a more complete model of narrative medicine that accommodates to its ideal of open communication and full attention the persistence of what cannot be said, seen, or known--only imagined and approximated.

     

Psychology and Modern Science

Modern science, since Galileo, has been founded upon the conviction that a scientific theory must be both empirical and logical. Modern cognitive psychologists, however, tend to oscillate between empiricism and logiC., as is characteristic of dualistic approaches, rather than to emphasize both criteria at the same time. Unfortunately, some of these cognitivists have argued that modern physics is completely in agreement with cognitive psychology. This argument has produced confusion in modern psychology.

     

BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS AND ECOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY: PAST,PRESENT, AND FUTURE. A REVIEW OF HARRY HEFT'S ECOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY IN CONTEXT

Relations between behavior analysis and ecological psychology have been strained for years, notwithstanding the occasional comment on their affinities. Harry Heft's (2001) Ecological Psychology in Context provides an occasion for reviewing anew those relations and affinities. It describes the genesis of ecological psychology in James's radical empiricism; addresses Holt's neorealism and Gestalt psychology; and synthesizes Gibson's ecological psychology and Barker's ecobehavioral science as a means for understanding everyday human behavior. Although behavior analysis is excluded from this account, Heft's book warrants a review nonetheless: It describes ecological psychology in ways that are congruent and complementary with behavior analysis (e.g., nonmediational theorizing; the provinces of natural history and natural science). After introducing modern ecological psychology, I comment on (a) Heft's admirable, albeit selective, historiography; (b) his ecological psychology—past and present—as it relates to Skinner's science and system (e.g., affordances, molar behavior); (c) his misunderstandings of Skinner's behaviorism (e.g., reductionistic, mechanistic, molecular); and (d) the theoretical status of Heft's cognitive terms and talk (i.e., in ontology, epistemology, syntax). I conclude by considering the alliance and integration of ecological psychology and behavior analysis, and their implications for unifying and transforming psychology as a life science, albeit more for the future than at present.     

Mary Shelley's Frankenstein: what made the Monster monstrous?

This paper discusses the genesis of the famous story of Frankenstein which arose from a dream experienced by Mary Shelley whilst on a holiday shared with her husband Percy Shelley, Lord Byron, Dr Polidori and her step sister Claire Clairmont. The novel relates how the creature created by Victor Frankenstein horrifies him, is rejected by him and called a monster. The monster's ensuing despair and subsequent murderousness is eloquently described. The whole book is clearly connected to Mary Shelley's experience as an infant whose mother died after giving birth to her and her subsequent loss, as a mother, of her own new born infant. It is suggested that the novel imaginatively describes what it is to have been primarily rejected as an infant and to feel regarded as a monster.     

Polarity and Inseparability: The Foundation of the Apodictic Portion of Aristotle's Modal Logic

Modern logicians have sought to unlock the modal secrets of Aristotle's Syllogistic by assuming a version of essentialism and treating it as a primitive within the semantics. These attempts ultimately distort Aristotle's ontology. None of these approaches make full use of tests found throughout Aristotle's corpus and ancient Greek philosophy. I base a system on Aristotle's tests for things that can never combine (polarity) and things that can never separate (inseparability). The resulting system not only reproduces Aristotle's recorded results for the apodictic syllogistic in the Prior Analytics but it also generates rather than assumes Aristotle's distinctions among ‘necessary’, ‘essential’ and ‘accidental’. By developing a system around tests that are in Aristotle and basic to ancient Greek philosophy, the system is linked to a history of practices, providing a platform for future work on the origins of logic.     

The Ethical Interest of Frankenstein; Or,the Modern Prometheus: A Literature Review 200 Years After Its Publication

Science and Engineering Ethics - Two hundred years after it was first published, Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein; or, the modern Prometheus remains relevant. This novel has endured because of its...     

科学心理学的观念及其范畴含义解析

关于心理学作为科学的观念或理想普遍兴起于19世纪下半叶,正是对这个观念或理想的百余年历史的追求和实践,塑造了现代意义上的科学心理学及其历史作为整体的基本面貌,并决定了科学心理学观念的两种范畴含义及其差异,具体表现为在心理学作为科学的整体背景中它的现象学传统或道路与它的科学主义传统或道路之间的对峙关系。历史分析表明,对科学心理学观念的范畴含义的理解和实现,与关于科学观念的范畴含义的探索和理解是密切关联、相互制约的。以人类思维的理论形态的历史转换为背景,我们发现,关于心理学作为科学的观念,只有实现为现象学意义上的科学,才能真正实现它自身;但主流的科学主义传统则要把心理学实现为自然科学,由此实现的科学心理学,只能是对心理学作为科学的观念的异化。     

SEXUAL DIVERSITY AND DIVINE CREATION: A TIGHTROPE WALK BETWEEN CHRISTIANITY AND SCIENCE

Abstract Although modern societies have come to recognize diversity in human sexuality as simply part of nature, many Christian communities and thinkers still have considerable difficulties with related developments in politics, legislation, and science. In fact, homosexuality is a recurrent topic in the transdisciplinary encounter between Christianity and the sciences, an encounter that is otherwise rather “asexual.” I propose that the recent emergence of “Christianity and Science” as an academic field in its own right is an important part of the larger context of the difficulties related to attempts to reconcile Christianity and a recognition of diversity in human sexuality as a norm. Through a critical discussion of arguments which are upheld most disturbingly on a global scale by the Roman Catholic Church and supported with much sophistry by important stakeholders of an influential stream in analytic philosophy of religion, this paper aims to contextualize and defend the legitimacy of the question why God would create homosexuals as such if it is true that every homosexual act is prohibited by God. While recently advanced nonheterosexist scientific models of sexuality in nature inform the discussion, I reject the simplistic view that religions suppress and the sciences liberate in matters sexual.     

Scientific Research and Human Rights: A Response to Kitcher on the Limitations of Inquiry

In his recent work exploring the role of science in democratic societies Kitcher (Science in a democratic society. Prometheus Books, New York, 2011) claims that scientists ought to have a prominent role in setting the agenda for and limits to research. Against the backdrop of the claim that the proper limits of scientific inquiry is John Stuart Mill’s Harm Principle (Kitcher in Science, truth, and democracy. Oxford University Press, New York, 2001), he identifies the limits of inquiry as the point where the outcomes of research could cause harm to already vulnerable populations. Nonetheless, Kitcher argues against explicit limitations on unscrupulous research on the grounds that restrictions would exacerbate underlying social problems. I show that Kitcher’s argument in favor of dissuading inquiry through conventional standards is problematic and falls prey to the same critique he offers in opposition to official bans. I expand the conversation of limiting scientific research by recognizing that the actions that count as ‘science’ are located in the space between ‘thinking’ and ‘doing’. In this space, we often attempt to balance freedom of research, as scientific speech, against the disparate impact citizens might experience in light of such research. I end by exploring if such disparate impact justifies limiting research, within the context of the United States, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or under international human rights standards more generally.     

Hermeneutic Inquiry in Depth Psychology: A Practical and Philosophical Reflection

This article examines foundational issues with respect to hermeneutic inquiry in depth psychology. Originally presented in a symposium on the relationship between psychological science and practice, the article begins by questioning psychology's commitment to its original vocations in both science and practice. The article then examines foundational perspectives in hermeneutic inquiry including the significance and implications of the hermeneutic circle for research in depth psychology. Following Martin Heidegger's phenomenological hermeneutic approach to scientific and philosophical inquiry, the article distinguishes between methodological and ontological hermeneutics and offers practical suggestions and examples for hermeneutic inquiry in the field. The article goes on to expose the origins and meaning of the term depth psychology and then reconsiders the term through the ontological perspective of Daseinsanalysis, suggesting that depth psychology is a psychology of the secret, a psychology of concealment as such. Finally, the relevance of a hermeneutic perspective for research in depth psychology is discussed by briefly dialoging core concerns in the work of Sigmund Freud and Martin Heidegger.     

V. M. BEKHTEREV IN RUSSIAN CHILD SCIENCE, 1900S–1920S: “OBJECTIVE PSYCHOLOGY”/“REFLEXOLOGY” AS A SCIENTIFIC MOVEMENT

In the early 20^th century the child population became a major focus of scientific, professional and public interest. This led to the crystallization of a dynamic field of child science, encompassing developmental and educational psychology, child psychiatry and special education, school hygiene and mental testing, juvenile criminology and the anthropology of childhood. This article discusses the role played in child science by the eminent Russian neurologist and psychiatrist Vladimir Mikhailovich Bekhterev. The latter's name is associated with a distinctive program for transforming the human sciences in general and psychology in particular that he in the 1900s labelled “objective psychology” and from the 1910s renamed “reflexology.” The article examines the equivocal place that Bekhterev's “objective psychology” and “reflexology” occupied in Russian/Soviet child science in the first three decades of the 20^th century. While Bekhterev's prominence in this field is beyond doubt, analysis shows that “objective psychology” and “reflexology” had much less success in mobilizing support within it than certain other movements in this arena (for example, “experimental pedagogy” in the pre‐revolutionary era); it also found it difficult to compete with the variety of rival programs that arose within Soviet “pedology” during the 1920s. However, this article also demonstrates that the study of child development played a pivotal role in Bekhterev's program for the transformation of the human sciences: it was especially important to his efforts to ground in empirical phenomena and in concrete research practices a new ontology of the psychological, which, the article argues, underpinned “objective psychology”/“reflexology” as a transformative scientific movement.     

Getting dirty: psychology's history of power

This introduction to the special issue on the history of power forwards the anthropological concept of "purification" as a means of drawing together disparate histories of psychology that invoke notions of power. Drawing on the work of Mary Douglas, Bruno Latour, Michel Foucault, and Donna Haraway, I argue for a history of psychology that links the carving up of people up into their properly natural and enculturated parts with keeping people in their place, the purification of interpretation by scientific representation, the maintenance of the body politic of the discipline, and the role of psychology in making up power in modern nation states.     

The long past and the short history of social psychology

In 1908 Ebbinghaus distinguished between the long past and the short history of psychology. The short history dated from 1879 when Wundt established a psychological laboratory at Leipzig. The long past concerns the time when psychology was a branch of philosophy. Implicit in such a break with the past is a positivist philosophy of science. I show how this philosophy of science distorts the historical record. I then analyse the history of social psychology. Unwittingly Lindzey and Aronson (1985) distinguish between the long past of social psychology as part of the Western intellectual tradition and its short history as an experimental science that is mainly American. Murchison's Handbook of Social Psychology (1935), whilst marking the boundary between the long past and the short history, belongs to the long past. The break with tradition came in 1954, when Lindzey published the first Handbook in the modern series. There is a self-conscious need, in the post World War II era, to train a whole new generation of social psychologists. The Lindzey series of Handbooks meets that need. The ‘progress’ of modern social psychology is now measured in terms of its distance from the Murchison milestone of 1935.     

再论我国心理学的分化现象

我国心理学正处于分化过程之中,其中两个明显的例证就是:基础心理学与应用及人文心理学的分化,以及对心理学研究和服务成果的评价标准摆脱SCI的束缚.这背后深层的原因在于,若以科学哲学认识论的视角,人类的知识大致可分为可靠有用的知识和无用虚幻(伪科学)的知识,可靠知识又可进一步分为科学的知识和非科学的知识.心理学从诞生之日起...     

GreekLex: A lexical database of Modern Greek

To conduct experimental investigations into the orthographic processing of Modern Greek, information is needed about the lexical properties known to influence visual word recognition. In this article we introduce GreekLex, a lexical database for Modern Greek, which presents collectively for the first time a series of orthographic measures that can be used for psycholinguistic research. GreekLex consists of 35,304 Modern Greek words ranging in length from 1 to 22 letters, and for each word includes the following statistical information: word length, word-form frequency, lemma frequency, neighborhood density and frequency, transposition neighbors, and addition and deletion neighbors. Furthermore, type and token frequency measures of single letters and bigrams derived from the database are also available. The complete database can be accessed and downloaded freely from www.psychology.nottingham.ac.uk/GreekLex.     

REALISM WITHOUT TRUTH: A REVIEW OF GIERE'S SCIENCE WITHOUT LAWS AND SCIENTIFIC PERSPECTIVISM

An increasingly popular view among philosophers of science is that of science as action—as the collective activity of scientists working in socially‐coordinated communities. Scientists are seen not as dispassionate pursuers of Truth, but as active participants in a social enterprise, and science is viewed on a continuum with other human activities. When taken to an extreme, the science‐as‐social‐process view can be taken to imply that science is no different from any other human activity, and therefore can make no privileged claims about its knowledge of the world. Such extreme views are normally contrasted with equally extreme views of classical science, as uncovering Universal Truth. In Science Without Laws and Scientific Perspectivism, Giere outlines an approach to understanding science that finds a middle ground between these extremes. He acknowledges that science occurs in a social and historical context, and that scientific models are constructions designed and created to serve human ends. At the same time, however, scientific models correspond to parts of the world in ways that can legitimately be termed objective. Giere's position, perspectival realism, shares important common ground with Skinner's writings on science, some of which are explored in this review. Perhaps most fundamentally, Giere shares with Skinner the view that science itself is amenable to scientific inquiry: scientific principles can and should be brought to bear on the process of science. The two approaches offer different but complementary perspectives on the nature of science, both of which are needed in a comprehensive understanding of science.