Understanding causal conditionals: A study of individual differences

Previous studies have suggested that a minority of university students, of lower cognitive ability, are inclined to interpret abstract conditional statements, if p then q, as if they were conjunctions: p and q. In the present study we administered the conditional truth table task to a large sample of students (n = 160), but using realistic, everyday causal conditionals. We also measured their general intelligence. While individual differences were found, these were not consistent with some participants adopting a conjunctive interpretation of such statements. Rather, it appears that students of lower cognitive ability are rather likely to assume that a conditional implies its converse, so that it means also if q then p. The results are discussed with reference to the suppositional theory of conditionals and our more general account of hypothetical thinking.     

The Causal Structure of Utility Conditionals

The psychology of reasoning is increasingly considering agents' values and preferences, achieving greater integration with judgment and decision making, social cognition, and moral reasoning. Some of this research investigates utility conditionals, ‘‘if p then q’’ statements where the realization of p or q or both is valued by some agents. Various approaches to utility conditionals share the assumption that reasoners make inferences from utility conditionals based on the comparison between the utility of p and the expected utility of q. This article introduces a new parameter in this analysis, the underlying causal structure of the conditional. Four experiments showed that causal structure moderated utility‐informed conditional reasoning. These inferences were strongly invited when the underlying structure of the conditional was causal, and significantly less so when the underlying structure of the conditional was diagnostic. This asymmetry was only observed for conditionals in which the utility of q was clear, and disappeared when the utility of q was unclear. Thus, an adequate account of utility‐informed inferences conditional reasoning requires three components: utility, probability, and causal structure.     

Beyond personal responsibility: Effects of causal attributions for overweight and obesity on weight-related beliefs,stigma, and policy support

Objective: The objective of this research was to compare the effects of different causal attributions for overweight and obesity, among individuals with overweight and obesity, on weight-related beliefs, stigmatising attitudes and policy support.

Design: In Study 1, an online sample of 95 US adults rated the extent to which they believed various factors caused their own weight status. In Study 2, 125 US adults read one of three randomly assigned online passages attributing obesity to personal responsibility, biology, or the ‘food environment.’ All participants in both studies were overweight or obese.

Main outcome measures: All participants reported beliefs about weight loss, weight-stigmatising attitudes, and support for obesity-related policies.

Results: In Study 1, biological attributions were associated with low weight-malleability beliefs and blame, high policy support, but high internalised weight bias. ‘Food environment’ attributions were not associated with any outcomes, while ‘personal responsibility’ attributions were associated with high prejudice and blame. In Study 2, participants who received information about the food environment reported greater support for food-related policies and greater self-efficacy to lose weight.

Conclusion: Emphasising the role of the food environment in causing obesity may promote food policy support and health behaviours without imposing the negative consequences associated with other attributions.     

Double trouble: restrained eaters do not eat less and feel worse

Objective: While high levels of dietary restraint do not appear to reflect actual caloric restraint, it has been found to be a risk factor for a wide array of maladaptive eating patterns. These findings raise the question what, if not caloric restriction, dietary restraint entails. We propose that the very finding that restrained eaters do not eat less than they intend to do can provide an answer. Based on this disparity between the intention to restrain oneself and actual behaviour, we therefore hypothesised that high levels of restraint are associated with eating-related guilt.

Method: Three studies (N?=?148) using unobtrusive measures of food intake; different restraint scales; and different measures of guilt tested whether restraint is related to eating-related guilt.

Results: Results indicated that restraint was not associated with food intake, but instead was associated with increased levels of guilt after eating. Guilt was explicitly related to food intake. Moreover, the observed guilt could not be attributed to a general increase in negative affect.

Conclusion: The results of these studies suggest that restraint is not an indicator of actual restricted food intake, but rather a reflection concerns about food and eating manifested in eating-related guilt.     

Thinking about conditionals: A study of individual differences

Recent studies have shown the existence of two qualitatively distinct groups of people based on how they judge the probability of a conditional statement. The present study was designed to test whether these differences are rooted in distinctive means of processing conditional statements and whether they are linked to differences in general intelligence. In the study, each of 120 participants completed three separate cognitive tasks involving the processing of abstract conditional statements--the probability-of-conditionals task, the conditional truth table task, and the conditional inference task--in addition to completing a test of general intelligence (AH4). The results showed a number of predicted effects: People responding with conditional (rather than conjunctive) probabilities on the first task were higher in cognitive ability, showed reasoning patterns more consistent with a suppositional treatment of the conditional, and showed a strongly "defective" truth table pattern. The results include several novel findings and post challenges to contemporary psychological theories of conditionals.     

Theory of mind ability in high socially anxious individuals

Background/Objectives: Research has demonstrated an association between social anxiety and impaired Theory of Mind (ToM). We assess whether ToM deficits occur even at a subclinical level of social anxiety and whether group differences in ToM performance are consistent with interpretation bias. We also explore potential reasons as to why socially anxious individuals may perform differently on ToM tasks.

Methods/Design: Undergraduate participants high (HSA; n?=?78) and low (LSA; n?=?35) in social anxiety completed a task of ToM decoding, the Reading the Mind in the Eyes (MIE), a task of ToM reasoning, the Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition (MASC), and a post-task questionnaire about their experience completing the MASC.

Results: HSAs performed marginally worse than LSAs on the MIE on neutrally valenced trials, and their pattern of errors may be consistent with a negative interpretation bias. HSAs and LSAs did not differ overall in performance on the MASC, though HSAs reported experiencing more confusion and distress than LSAs during the task, and this distress was associated with more MASC errors for HSA participants only. These results provide insight into the nature of ToM ability in socially anxious individuals and highlight important avenues for future research.     

A Conflict in Norms; Metric Versus English Units of Linear Measurement

Summary

This study examined the relationship between incoming information and a person's attitude. The hypothesis tested was that information operates on the cognitive component of attitude which, if sufficiently reorganized, occasions change in the affective component, and that this, if sufficiently large, finally actuates the behavioral component. This hierarchical tricomponent hypothesis was tested by

(a) establishing through factor analysis that cognition, affect, and behavior (each represented by 10 Likert-type statements) were unique attitude components, and thus that dynamic consistency among them is attributable to linkages and not duplication;

(b) establishing through χ² analysis that observed triadic change patterns were significantly more consistent with the hypothesized hierarchy than chance alone would allow;

(c) establishing through a comparison of conditional component changes that the direction of the critical dyadic change patterns were consistent with the hypothesized hierarchy: namely, that cognitive change preceded affective change, and that it, in turn, preceded behavioral change;

(d) establishing through a comparison of group means that the amount of cognitive and affective change was significantly greater for those Ss experiencing affective and behavioral change, respectively, than for those Ss not experiencing such change;

(e) establishing through the use of 25 different change criteria that the foregoing results are relatively stable, and not an artifact of any specific criterion of “attitude change.”     

Causal and noncausal conditionals: An integrated model of interpretation and reasoning

We present an integrated model for the understanding of and the reasoning from conditional statements. Central assumptions from several approaches are integrated into a causal path model. According to the model, the cognitive availability of exceptions to a conditional reduces the subjective conditional probability of the consequent, given the antecedent. This conditional probability determines people's degree of belief in the conditional, which in turn affects their willingness to accept logically valid inferences. In addition to this indirect pathway, the model contains a direct pathway: Availability of exceptional situations directly reduces the endorsement of valid inferences. We tested the integrated model with three experiments using conditional statements embedded in pseudonaturalistic cover stories. An explicitly mentioned causal link between antecedent and consequent was either present (causal conditionals) or absent (arbitrary conditionals). The model was supported for the causal but not for the arbitrary conditional statements.     

Effects of order of presentation on conditional reasoning

ABSTRACT

The main goal of this research is to study whether or not the order of presentation of the premises in a logical argument form, such as a conditional reasoning task, could affect the processing time of premises and conclusion and the conclusions that participants accept as valid in an evaluation task. One experiment is reported in which participants are asked to evaluate computer-presented conditionals. Half of the problems were presented in traditional order (“if p then q, p, therefore q”) and half in inverse order (“p, if p then q, therefore q”). The experiment showed that there was an order effect in processing the premises and conclusion: participants took longer to read the premises in traditional order than in inverse order, but they took longer to read the conclusion in inverse order than in traditional order. The finding is discussed with respect to the main theories of conditional reasoning.     

Conditional Direction Dependence Analysis: Evaluating the Causal Direction of Effects in Linear Models with Interaction Terms

Abstract

Direction dependence analysis (DDA) makes use of higher than second moment information of variables (x and y) to detect potential confounding and to probe the causal direction of linear variable relations (i.e., whether x?→?y or y?→?x better approximates the underlying causal mechanism). The “true” predictor is assumed to be a continuous nonnormal exogenous variable. Existing methods compatible with DDA, however, are of limited use when the relation of a focal predictor and an outcome is affected by a moderator. This study presents a conditional direction dependence analysis (CDDA) framework which enables researchers to evaluate the causal direction of conditional regression effects. Monte–Carlo simulations were used to evaluate two different moderation scenarios: Study 1 evaluates the performance of CDDA tests when a moderator affects the strength of the causal effect x?→?y. Study 2 evaluates cases in which the causal direction itself (x?→?y vs y?→?x) depends on moderator values. Study 3 evaluates the robustness of DDA tests in the presence of functional model misspecifications. Results suggest that significance tests compatible with CDDA are suitable in both moderation scenarios, i.e., CDDA allows one to discern regions of a moderator in which the causal direction is uniquely identifiable. An empirical example is provided to illustrate the approach.     

The interplay between feelings and beliefs about condoms as predictors of their use

Objective: Negative feelings about condoms are a key barrier to their use. Using the behavioural affective associations model, we examined the joint effects of affective associations and cognitive beliefs about condoms on condom use.

Design: In Study 1 (N = 97), students completed measures of their affective associations and cognitive beliefs about sex and condoms, sexual activity and condom use. In Study 2 (N = 171), a measure of behavioural intentions and condom selection task were added.

Main outcome measures: Condom use measured in Study 1 as (1) current condom use, and (2) willingness to use condoms; in Study 2 as: (1) behavioural intentions, (2) number of condoms selected.

Results: Affective associations with sex and condoms were behaviour-specific, were directly associated with the respective behaviour, and mediated the relations of cognitive beliefs to behaviour, ps < .05. In Study 2, affective associations were associated with behavioural intentions and the number of condoms selected, ps < .05; cognitive beliefs were indirectly associated with these outcomes through affective associations, indirect effects: ps < .05.

Conclusions: Affective associations are a behaviour-specific and proximal predictor of condom use, mediating the effect of cognitive beliefs, suggesting they may be a particularly viable intervention target.     

Decomposing the within-person and between-person sources of variation in physical activity-cognition associations for low-active older adults

Abstract

Objectives: To examine within-person and between-person sources of variation in the relationship between physical activity and cognition in older adults participating in a walking program. To explore whether demographic, health and fitness variables, and their interactions with activity, are significant predictors of cognition.

Design: Brief longitudinal burst design.

Participants: 118 participants (91 females, mean age?=?72.81?+ 5.24 years).

Main Outcome Measures: Cognition, self-reported moderate-to-vigorous walking and self-reported moderate-to-vigorous physical activity were assessed at baseline and 6, 9, 12 and 16 weeks follow-up. Attendance at weekly walks was also recorded.

Results: Within-persons, changes in physical activity were related to select measures of executive functioning, with increased activity predictive of better cognition (three of four cognitive functions, p<.05). Between-persons, activity was also associated with cognition (two of four cognitive functions, p<.05). Younger age and higher education were related to better cognition. Interactions of demographic, health, and fitness variables with changes in within-person activity were generally non-significant.

Conclusion: The results highlight the importance of distinguishing within- from between-person effects in longitudinal analyses of the association between physical activity and cognition. This stringent within-person test of association underscores the potential value of simple physical activity interventions for improving cognitive function.     

"If …": Satisficing algorithms for mapping conditional statements onto social domains

People regularly use conditional statements to communicate promises and threats, advices and warnings, permissions and obligations to other people. Given that all conditionals are formally equivalent--"if P, then Q"--the question is: When confronted with a conditional statement, how do people know whether they are facing a promise, a threat, or something else? In other words, what is the cognitive algorithm for mapping a particular conditional statement onto its corresponding social domain? This paper introduces the pragmatic cues algorithm and the syntactic cue algorithm as partial answers to this question. Two experiments were carried out to test how well these simple satisficing algorithms approximate the performance of the actual cognitive algorithm people use to classify conditional statements into social domains. Conditional statements for promises, threats, advices, warnings, permissions, and obligations were collected from people, and given to both other people and the algorithms for their classification. Their corresponding performances were then compared. Results revealed that even though these algorithms utilised a minimum number of cues and drew only a restricted range of inferences from these cues, they performed well above chance in the task of classifying conditional statements as promises, threats, advices, warnings, permissions, and obligations. Moreover, these simple satisficing algorithms performed comparable to actual people given the same task.     

Physical cognition and tool-use: performance of Darwin’s finches in the two-trap tube task

The trap tube is a classic test of causal reasoning abilities in animals in the physical domain. Recently, a modified version of this task improved its diagnostic capacity and allowed testing of non-tool-using animals. We used this modified two-trap tube task to compare the cognition of two Darwin’s finch species: the woodpecker finch, Cactospiza pallida, a tool-using species, and the small tree finch, Camarhynchus parvulus, a closely related non-tool-using species. Not all woodpecker finches use tools in nature, and we therefore also tested non-tool-using individuals to assess the effect of experience on trap tube performance. No small tree finches and only two non-tool-using woodpecker finches solved the initial task which was operated using a pre-inserted piston. One tool-using woodpecker finch solved the task when allowed to use its own tool instead of the pre-inserted piston. The fact that none of these subjects transferred their knowledge when the features of the task changed, suggests that in this species, neither experience using tools nor the genetic composition of a tool-user are associated with the general physical cognitive skills required to solve the trap tube task.     

Feeling bad about progress does not lead people want to change their health behaviour

Objective: When do people decide to do something about problematic health behaviours? Theoretical models and pragmatic considerations suggest that people should take action when they feel bad about their progress – in other words, when they experience negative progress-related affect. However, the impact of progress-related affect on goal striving has rarely been investigated.

Design and Methods: Study 1 (N = 744) adopted a cross-sectional design and examined the extent to which measures of progress-related affect were correlated with intentions to take action. Study 2 (N = 409) investigated the impact of manipulating progress-related affect on intentions and behaviour in an experimental design.

Results: Study 1 found that, while engaging in health behaviours had the expected affective consequences (e.g. people felt bad when they were not eating healthily, exercising regularly or limiting their alcohol consumption), it was feeling good rather than bad about progress that was associated with stronger intentions. Study 2 replicated these findings. Participants induced to feel good about their eating behaviour had marginally stronger intentions to eat healthily than participants led to feel bad about their eating behaviour.

Conclusion: The findings have implications for interventions designed to promote changes in health behaviour, as well as theoretical frameworks for understanding self-regulation.     

What causal conditional reasoning tells us about people's understanding of causality

Causal conditional reasoning means reasoning from a conditional statement that refers to causal content. We argue that data from causal conditional reasoning tasks tell us something not only about how people interpret conditionals, but also about how they interpret causal relations. In particular, three basic principles of people's causal understanding emerge from previous studies: the modal principle, the exhaustive principle, and the equivalence principle. Restricted to the four classic conditional inferences—Modus Ponens, Modus Tollens, Denial of the Antecedent, and Affirmation of the Consequent—causal conditional reasoning data are only partially able to support these principles. We present three experiments that use concrete and abstract causal scenarios and combine inference tasks with a new type of task in which people reformulate a given causal situation. The results provide evidence for the proposed representational principles. Implications for theories of the naïve understanding of causality are discussed.     

An Investigation of Differential Relationships of Implicit and Explicit Aggression: Validation of an Arabic Version of the Conditional Reasoning Test for Aggression

Abstract

Most personality research in the workplace relies on self-reports. Although self-report measures are believed to assess the explicit aspect of personality, a more recent approach for assessing implicit personality is based on conditional reasoning. The Conditional Reasoning Test for Aggression (CRT–A) was developed to assess implicit cognitions that justify aggressive behavior. The integrative model of personality proposes that both the explicit and implicit personality interact together to predict different behavioral outcomes. The results of this investigation are reported in two studies. The purpose of Study 1 was to adapt the CRT–A to the Arabic language and to examine its validity evidence using a large sample of Egyptian employees (n?=?1,046). Study 2 aimed at examining the differential relationships of implicit and explicit components of aggressive personality in explaining different forms of aggressive behavior variance (n?=?271). The results of Study 1 revealed that the psychometric properties of the adapted Arabic version of CRT–A were similar to those obtained for the United States. In addition, factor analysis results were consistent with the psychological theory used to build the conditional reasoning problems. The results of Study 2 provide substantial empirical support for the integrative model of assessment of aggression.     

Rapid-response versus free-time selection tasks using different logical connectives

When reasoning with conditional statements (i.e., if [not] p then [not] q), people tend to display matching bias: Options that match the entities named in the rule are selected even when logically inappropriate. Three different Wason selection tasks were administered under free-time and rapid-response formats. For the latter, individual cards were presented for one second, and required a response within a further one second. Previous research using these formats (Roberts & Newton, 2001) has shown that this increases matching bias, in line with the action of preconscious heuristic processes which direct attention towards relevant aspects of a problem, but whose action can be overturned if there is sufficient time to apply analytic reasoning processes. The selection tasks administered included a standard abstract conditional task, a disjunctive version (i.e., either [not] p or [not] q), and a conditional task in which the cards showed explicitly negated values. Both conditional tasks demonstrated matching bias, but under rapid-response presentation, matching bias only increased for the standard conditional and disjunctive tasks. Overall, the data support Evans’ (e.g., 2006) heuristic-analytic framework albeit with some caveats, and it is suggested that the broad question, of whether individual selection task formats show or do not show matching bias, requires more detailed investigation.     

Developmental trends in everyday conditional reasoning: the retrieval and inhibition interplay

Two experiments examined developmental patterns in children’s conditional reasoning with everyday causal conditionals. In Experiment 1, a group of pre-, early, young, and late adolescents generated counterexamples for a set of conditionals to validate developmental claims about the counterexample retrieval capacity. In Experiment 2, participants in the same age range were presented with a conditional reasoning task with similar conditionals. Experiment 1 established that counterexample retrieval increased from preadolescence to late adolescence. Experiment 2 showed that acceptance rates of the invalid affirmation of the consequent inference gradually decreased in the same age range. Acceptance rates of the valid modus ponens inference showed a U-shaped pattern. After an initial drop from preadolescence to early adolescence, modus ponens acceptance ratings increased again after the onset of adolescence. Findings support the claim that the development of everyday conditional reasoning can be characterized as an interplay between the development of a counterexample retrieval and inhibition process.     

A psychometric comparison of anxiety-relevant attention measures

Background and Objectives: Preferential attention to threat, emotional response inhibition, and attentional control each purportedly play a key role in anxiety disorders. Divergent psychometric properties among attention measures may produce differential detection of anxiety-related associations and treatment-related changes. However, no studies have directly compared the psychometric properties of these attention measures in the same sample.

Design: Eighty-five young adults (M?=?19.41 years, SD?=?1.47, 48 Females) completed a cognitive task battery and a subset of 60 participants (M?=?19.42 years, SD?=?1.48, 33 Females) completed the task battery again approximately two weeks later.

Method: To assess preferential attention to threat, emotional response inhibition, and attentional control, the cognitive task battery included a dot-probe task, emotion and gender Stroop tasks, and a flanker task. Tasks varied in how attention was directed and if emotional stimuli were included. Internal consistency and test-retest reliability were compared across measures.

Results: Within the same sample, internal consistency and reliability differed across attention measures. Explicit attention measures (emotional Stroop and flanker) exhibited stronger internal consistency and greater test-retest reliability compared to implicit measures (dot-probe and gender Stroop).

Conclusions: These results inform clinical research using attention measures to assess anxiety-related differences and treatment response.