Children's understanding of the transmission of genetic disorders and contagious illnesses

The authors conducted 4 studies suggesting that children attribute different modes of transmission to genetic disorders and contagious illnesses. Study 1 presented preschoolers through 5th graders and adults with "switched-at-birth" scenarios for various disorders. Study 2 presented preschoolers with the same disorders but used contagion links in a contagion context. Studies 3 and 4 presented preschoolers and adults with novel (fictitious) illnesses to determine which cues participants would use to differentiate the modes of transmission. In the presence of kinship cues, children distinguished genetic disorders from contagious illnesses, but in the presence of contagion cues, preschoolers selectively applied contagious links primarily to contagious illnesses. With novel illnesses, preschoolers and adults inferred that permanent illnesses were more likely to be transmitted by birth parents than by contagion. These results suggest that by the preschool years, children recognize that not all disorders are transmitted exclusively through germ contagion.     

Children's developmental understanding of ethnicity and race

Research on children's development of ethnic cognition from preschool through adolescence was reviewed. This review was based on research conducted on (a) children's ethnic cognition, (b) children's social-cognitive development, (c) children's understanding of a variety of social status, and (d) Quintana's model of children's understanding of ethnicity. Four developmental levels were described: Integration of affective and perceptual understanding of ethnicity (level 0), literal understanding of ethnicity (level 1), social and nonliteral perspective of ethnicity (level 2), and ethnic-group consciousness and ethnic identity (level 3). For each developmental level, applied implications were discussed.     

儿童病因认知发展的研究

对儿童病因认知发展的研究具有重要的理论和实践意义。近20年来,西方发展心理学家在该领域的研究逐渐从皮亚杰理论框架下的研究转变为“朴素理论”框架下的研究。在理论上,研究越来越强调领域特殊性;在研究思路上,研究逐渐从“自上而下”的研究转变为“自下而上”的研究;在研究方法上,研究不断降低任务难度,提高了任务的区分度和敏感性。该领域进一步的研究将更为深入和细致的探查儿童的病因认知。     

Children's understanding of ownership transfers

An understanding of ownership entails the recognition that ownership can be transferred permanently and the ability to differentiate legitimate from illegitimate transfers. Two experiments explored the development of this understanding in 2-, 3-, 4- and 5-year olds, using stories about gift-giving and stealing. The possibility that children use simple biases to identify owners, such as a first possessor, current possessor or a loan bias, was also investigated. Five-year olds appropriately acknowledged a permanent transfer of ownership in the case of giving but not stealing. Four-year olds allowed permanent transfers but struggled to differentiate legitimate from illegitimate transfers. Many 4-year olds allowed adults, but not children, to keep property that had been stolen. Two- and 3-year olds exhibited a first possessor bias for both stories. We conclude that, by 5 years of age, children possess a mature understanding of ownership transfer whereas younger children are prone to biases.     

Children's understanding of mental states as causes of emotions

Theory of mind studies of emotion usually focus on children's ability to predict other people's feelings. This study examined children's spontaneous references to mental states in explaining others' emotions. Children (4‐, 6‐ and 10‐year‐olds, n = 122) were told stories and asked to explain both typical and atypical emotional reactions of characters. Because atypical emotional reactions are unexpected, we hypothesized that children would be more likely to refer to mental states, such as desires and beliefs, in explaining them than when explaining typical emotions. From the development of lay theories of emotion, derived the prediction that older children would refer more often to mental states than younger children. The developmental shift from a desire‐psychology to a belief‐psychology led to the expectation that references to desires would increase at an earlier age than references to beliefs. Our findings confirmed these expectations only partly, because the nature of the emotion (happiness, anger, sadness or fear) interacted with these factors. Whereas anger, happiness and sadness mainly evoked desire references, fear evoked more belief references, even in 4‐year‐olds. The fact that other factors besides age can also play an influential role in children's mental state reasoning is discussed. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Personal narratives about states of suffering and wellbeing: Children's conceptualization in terms of physical and psychological domain

The aim was to investigate how children conceptualize personal events of positive and negative valences pertaining to the physical and psychological domains. Five‐ to 9‐year‐olds narrated events referring to suffering states (Study 1, n = 112) and to suffering and wellbeing states (Study 2, n = 118). Analysis of the narratives revealed differences between the two states, with higher focus on events pertaining to a physical domain for suffering and to psychological domain for wellbeing; however, older children were more oriented toward psychological than physical events for both valences. Children showed higher tendency to produce causes compared to consequences, with younger children finding it difficult to introduce physical causes. Psychological suffering narratives revealed a richer psychological lexicon and more instances of domain coexistence. Asymmetry in the representation of different state valences and domains indicates multifaceted and developing conceptualization. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Children's profiles of addition and subtraction understanding

The current research explored children's ability to recognize and explain different concepts both with and without reference to physical objects so as to provide insight into the development of children's addition and subtraction understanding. In Study 1, 72 7- to 9-year-olds judged and explained a puppet's activities involving three conceptual relations: (a) a+b=c, b+a=c; (b) a-b=c, a-c=b; and (c) a+b=c, c-b=a. In Study 2, the self-reports and problem-solving accuracy of 60 5- to 7-year-olds were recorded for three-term inverse problems (i.e., a+b-b=?), pairs of complementary addition and subtraction problems (i.e., a+b=c, c-b=?), and unrelated addition and subtraction problems (e.g., 3-2). Both studies highlighted individual differences in the concepts that children understand and the role of concrete referents in their understanding. These differences were related to using efficient procedures to solve unrelated addition and subtraction problems in Study 2. The results suggest that a key advance in children's conceptual understanding is incorporating subtractive relations into their mental representations of how parts are added to form a whole.     

学前儿童对疾病的认知

通过三个研究分别探查了教育条件不同的两组学前儿童能否以疾病这一生命现象为指标做出生物和非生物的本体区分;他们是否理解疾病的产生和康复不受心理意图控制;以及他们对疾病原因的认识。结果显示,3、4、5岁学前儿童在分类作业中的认知成绩随年龄逐渐提高,他们能够认识疾病不受意图控制。其对疾病原因的解释既不用意图也不用道德准则,而主要是从行为水平,表现出“朴素生物学”的认知,但其认知与成人的认知和科学的生物学概念有明显差距。教育条件影响儿童的疾病认知成绩     

Children's and adults' understanding of the impact of nutrition on biological and psychological processes

Four studies examined children's and adults' beliefs about the impact of nutrition on growth and mood states. In Studies 1 and 2, 271 participants (preschoolers through adults) judged the impact of healthy and unhealthy nutrition on height and weight. In Studies 3 and 4, 267 participants judged the impact of healthy and unhealthy nutrition on positive and negative mood states. The results suggest that young children demonstrate a co‐existence of an ontologically distinct theory of biology as well as a theory of cross‐domain interaction when reasoning about the impact of food on biological and psychological processes.     

Children's conceptions of physical events: Explicit and tacit understanding of horizontal motion

The conceptual understanding that children display when predicting physical events has been shown to be inferior to the understanding they display when recognizing whether events proceed naturally. This has often been attributed to differences between the explicit engagement with conceptual knowledge required for prediction and the tacit engagement that suffices for recognition, and contrasting theories have been formulated to characterize the differences. Focusing on a theory that emphasizes omission at the explicit level of conceptual elements that are tacitly understood, the paper reports two studies that attempt clarification. The studies are concerned with 6‐ to 10‐year‐old children's understanding of, respectively, the direction (141 children) and speed (132 children) of motion in a horizontal direction. Using computer‐presented billiards scenarios, the children predicted how balls would move (prediction task) and judged whether or not simulated motion was correct (recognition task). Results indicate that the conceptions underpinning prediction are sometimes interpretable as partial versions of the conceptions underpinning recognition, as the omission hypothesis would imply. However, there are also qualitative differences, which suggest partial dissociation between explicit and tacit understanding. It is suggested that a theoretical perspective that acknowledges this dissociation would provide the optimal framework for future research.     

Children's understanding of equity in the context of inequality

In the context of a pre‐existing resource inequality, the concerns for strict equality (allocating the same number of resources to all recipients) conflict with the concerns for equity (allocating resources to rectify the inequality). This study demonstrated age‐related changes in children's (3–8 years old, N = 133) ability to simultaneously weigh the concerns for equality and equity through the analysis of children's judgements, allocations, and reasoning in the context of a pre‐existing inequality. Three‐ to 4‐year‐olds took equity into account in their judgements of allocations, but allocated resources equally in a behavioural task. In contrast, 5‐ to 6‐year‐olds rectified the inequality in their allocations, but judged both equitable and equal allocations to be fair. It was not until 7–8 years old that children focused on rectifying the inequality in their allocations and judgements, as well as judged equal allocations less positively than equitable allocations, thereby demonstrating a more complete understanding of the necessity of rectifying inequalities. The novel findings revealed age‐related changes from 3 to 8 years old regarding how the concerns for equity and equality develop, and how children's judgements, allocations, and reasoning are coordinated when making allocation decisions.     

Children's recognition of time in the causes and cures of physical and emotional reactions to illnesses and injuries

The present set of studies examined children's and college students' recognition of the role of time in the manifestation of causes and cures for illnesses and injuries. In Study 1, participants ranging from 4‐year‐olds through college students were presented with biological, moral, psychological, and irrelevant causes for illness symptoms and were asked how much time elapsed between the cause and the symptom. They were also asked if medicine would make the person feel better and if so how much time elapsed between taking the medicine and feeling better. Study 2 replicated Study 1 with 4‐ and 5‐year‐olds. Study 3 examined whether 4‐ and 5‐year‐olds and college students could differentiate between physical and emotional reactions to illnesses and injuries, with regard to time course. Overall, young children underestimate how long it takes for illness symptoms to emerge (expecting them to result right away following exposure to contamination). Nonetheless, children generated longer timelines for biological cures than biological causes. Moreover, 4‐ and 5‐year‐olds expect physical and emotional reactions to follow different time courses. These results suggest that young children have a nascent expectation that biological events are distinct from non‐biological events, in how they unfold over time.     

Illness representations,coping and psychological adjustment to Parkinson's disease

The present study reports an application of the common sense model (CSM) of illness representations to the prediction of psychological distress in people with Parkinson's disease (PD). The study sought to (i) examine cross-sectional and prospective associations between illness representations, coping and psychological distress, and (ii) test the hypothesis that coping would mediate any relationships between illness representations and psychological distress. Patients with PD (n = 58) completed the Illness Perception Questionnaire-Revised, the Medical Coping Modes Questionnaire and the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale. Patients (n = 57) were followed-up at 6 months. Illness representations explained large amounts of variance in time 1 anxiety (R ² = 0.42) and depression (R ² = 0.44) as well as additional variance in time 2 anxiety (ΔR ² = 0.12) and depression (ΔR ² = 0.09) after controlling for baseline scores. In addition, avoidance mediated the effect of emotional representations on time 1 anxiety, and acceptance-resignation mediated the effects of both consequences and emotional representations on time 1 depression. The present study therefore provides partial support for the mediational model outlined in the CSM, as significant mediation effects were found only in the cross-sectional analyses.     

Children's understanding of their own and others' mental states. Part A. Self‐understanding precedes understanding of others in pretence

We examined 3‐ to 6‐year‐old children's attributions of pretence when their own or another's behaviours were characterized as similar (usually unintentionally) to that of a real or nonexistent animal. In some pretence tasks, we asked children if they were trying to look like or looked like the animal they were characterized as looking like; in others, if and how they could (or why they could not) pretend to be a real or nonexistent animal. Children at 4–6 years of age understood their own pretences better than another's pretences, but even by 6 years of age children continued to fail to understand pretence by another. Across ages children tended to be consistent in their claims about whether or not they looked liked (or were trying to look like) the animal, and whether or not they were pretending to be it. Children appear to take someone's merely looking like an animal as evidence that the person (whether self or other) is pretending to be that animal. Their success on self‐pretence tasks probably results from their unwillingness to believe that their own actions look like those of the animal because they had not intended to look like it.     

Choosing between hearts and minds: Children's understanding of moral advisors

Moral development research has often focused on the development of moral reasoning without considering children's understanding of moral advisors. We investigated how children construe sources of moral advice by examining the characteristics that children deem necessary for reasoning about moral or scientific problems. In two experiments, children in grades K, 2, and 4 were presented with dilemmas of a moral nature or scientific nature and chose between two advisors. Second and fourth graders chose advisors differentially based on their expertise, while kindergartners did not discriminate between advisors. In a third experiment, older children indicated that only certain characteristics are needed to solve moral or scientific problems, and they endorsed these characteristics differentially based on the problem to be solved. Thus, by middle childhood, children construe moral knowledge as distinct from scientific knowledge and select advisors in each area accordingly.     

Children's theories of motivation

To investigate children’s theories of motivation, we asked 166 children (8-12 years of age) to rate the effect of various motivational strategies on task interest, over the short and long terms, in activities described as appealing or unappealing. Children viewed the rewards strategy as resulting in greatest interest except when implemented over the long term for appealing activities. Individual difference analyses revealed that some children held operant theories of motivation, in which rewards were central, and others held hybrid theories, in which rewards were key, but some allowance was made for interest to be self-sustaining in the absence of inducements. Children’s theories predicted their academic self-regulation. Their theories are discussed relative to an expert theory of motivation.     

Attachment and preschool children's understanding of maternal versus non‐maternal psychological states

There is growing evidence that insecurely attached children are less advanced in their social understanding than their secure counterparts. However, attachment may also predict how individual children use their social understanding across different relationships. For instance, the insecure child's social‐cognitive difficulties may be more pronounced when the psychological states of an attachment figure are being considered. In the current study, forty‐eight 4‐ to 5‐year‐old children were asked about their mothers' emotions and false beliefs, as well as those of non‐attachment figures. The Separation Anxiety Test (SAT) was administered to assess children's attachment representations. Children's SAT scores predicted their overall performance on the false belief and causes of emotion tasks, even after controlling for age and verbal ability. More interestingly, however, children with high scores on the Avoidance dimension of the SAT experienced greater difficulty understanding maternal false beliefs relative to those of an unfamiliar adult female. Thus, although attachment insecurity may hinder social‐cognitive development in general, the findings suggest that there are more specific effects as well. Attachment representations that are characterized by high levels of avoidance appear to interfere with children's ability to fully engage their social‐cognitive skills when reasoning about maternal mental states.     

On the development of depressive states from a psychodynamic viewpoint

The author analyzes the temporal dimension of depression by making reference to one of the clinical cases he treated and re-examining a clinical case analyzed by Edith Jacobson. According to the result of his observations, the developmental psychodynamics of a depressive state normally appears to take place in two distinct phases: a first narcissistic loss, which gives rise to an integrative conflict and to the formation of a certain identificatory structure, is later followed by a second narcissistic loss, which leads to the real depressive state. The two phases present a specific, intrinsic connection constituted by the implication of the same identificatory element of the self, recognition of which can favour a clinical work that more closely adheres to the deep dynamics of depression.     

Children's understanding of advertising: an investigation using verbal and pictorially cued methods

Conflicting results on children's understanding of advertising may stem from differences in research methods. Most studies are conducted using interviewing techniques, employing only verbal questioning. In the present study, 136 children of two age groups (7 and 10 years) were first asked what advertising was for and, after responding, shown depictions of possible reasons. The results indicate that although older children are more likely than younger ones to understand that advertising seeks to promote selling, pictorial cues allow a much larger proportion of all children to indicate their understanding than verbal questioning does on its own, with younger children especially showing improvement. Thus, seven‐year‐olds seem to have an implicit understanding of the persuasive intent of advertising that they are unable to articulate in response to investigators' questions. Multiple methods appear to offer a means of evaluating the level of sophistication in children' understanding of advertising. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Children's understanding of habitual behaviour

Research into the development of Theory of Mind (ToM) has shown how children from a very early age infer other people's goals. However, human behaviour is sometimes driven not by plans to achieve goals, but by habits, which are formed over long periods of reinforcement. Habitual and goal‐directed behaviours are often aligned with one another but can diverge when the optimal behavioural policy changes without being directly reinforced (thus specifically hobbling the habitual learning strategy). Unlike the flexibility of goal‐directed behaviour, rigid habits can cause agents to persist in behaviour that is no longer adaptive. In the current study, all children predict agents will tend to behave consistently with their goals, but between the ages of 5 and 10, children showed an increasing understanding of how habits can cause agents to persistently take suboptimal actions. These findings stand out from the typical way the development of social reasoning is examined, which instead focuses on children's increasing appreciation of how others' beliefs or expectations affect how they will act in service of their goals. The current findings show that children also learn that under certain circumstances, people's actions are suboptimal despite potentially ‘knowing better.’