Internalism about a person’s good: don’t believe it

Internalism about a person’s good is roughly the view that in order for something to intrinsically enhance a person’s well-being, that person must be capable of caring about that thing. I argue in this paper that internalism about a person’s good should not be believed. Though many philosophers accept the view, Connie Rosati provides the most comprehensive case in favor of it. Her defense of the view consists mainly in offering five independent arguments to think that at least some form of internalism about one’s good is true. But I argue that, on closer inspection, not one of these arguments succeeds. The problems don’t end there, however. While Rosati offers good reasons to think that what she calls ‘two-tier internalism’ would be the best way to formulate the intuition behind internalism about one’s good, I argue that two-tier internalism is actually false. In particular, the problem is that no substantive theory of well-being is consistent with two-tier internalism. Accordingly, there is reason to think that even the best version of internalism about one’s good is in fact false. Thus, I conclude, the prospects for internalism about a person’s good do not look promising.     

The attractiveness-positivity link: Let’s contextualize it

The statement “what is beautiful is good” reflects a persuasive heuristic that may be supported either by a general association of attractiveness with positivity or by a specific association with the perceived credibility of an attractive source. In one study (N = 58), we approach this question using an explicit and an implicit measure (Stroop Task) to assess whether attractiveness is more likely associated with valenced words when these are related (vs. unrelated) to credibility. Results show that this effect occurs but only for the implicit measure. When the word-face associations were made at an explicit level, we found a general association between positivity and attractiveness, unrestricted to the dimension of credibility. We discuss how these results inform about attractiveness as a shortcut to judgments of validity.     

Propositional unity: what’s the problem, who has it and who solves it?

At least since Russell’s influential discussion in The Principles of Mathematics, many philosophers have held there is a problem that they call the problem of the unity of the proposition. In a recent paper, I argued that there is no single problem that alone deserves the epithet the problem of the unity of the proposition. I there distinguished three problems or questions, each of which had some right to be called a problem regarding the unity of the proposition; and I showed how the account of propositions formulated in my book The Nature and Structure of Content [2007 Oxford University Press] solves each of these problems. In the present paper, I take up two of these problems/questions yet again. For I want to consider other accounts of propositions and compare their solutions to these problems, or lack thereof, to mine. I argue that my account provides the best solutions to the unity problems.     

I’m curious,I’m open to it,I test it,I trust it! A focus groups study to understand a-priori trust in automated buses

Trust is regarded as one of the main predictors for adopting automated buses (ABs). However, theories about trust (development) in technology generally vary and an in-depths study about trust in ABs specifically is still outstanding. The present study fills this gap by presenting results from focus group interviews to trust (development) in shared automated buses prior to exposure. The objectives of this study are to contrast participants’ naïve concepts of trust with theory and to identify underlying factors influencing a-priori trust in ABs. Results show that the N = 21 focus group participants use different strategies to familiarise themselves with the new technology of ABs, e.g., comparisons with familiar technologies, fundamental tendencies to approach or avoid, additional information seeking, or anthropomorphisation. These strategies largely support existing theories on trust (development) in technology. Differences between naïve interpretations of trust and its theoretical assumptions were found in focus group debates where more control over technology limited uncertainty and led to more trust. While theories suggest control and trust to be incompatible opposites, participants see control as a way to enhance trust. We provide starting points for further theory development and expansion and stress the importance of explanations in emerging technologies for trust and acceptance building.     

It’s not what you said,it’s how you said it: An analysis of therapist vocal features during psychotherapy

Psychotherapy is a conversation, whereby, at its foundation, many interventions are derived from the therapist talking. Research suggests that the voice can convey a variety of emotional and social information, and individuals may change their voice based on the context and content of the conversation (e.g. talking to a baby or delivering difficult news to patients with cancer). As such, therapists may adjust aspects of their voice throughout a therapy session depending on if they are beginning a therapy session and checking in with a client, conducting more therapeutic ‘work’ or ending the session. In this study, we modelled three vocal features—pitch, energy and rate—with linear and quadratic multilevel models to understand how therapists’ vocal features change throughout a therapy session. We hypothesised that all three vocal features would be best fit with a quadratic function—starting high and more congruent with a conversational voice, decreasing during the middle portions of therapy where more therapeutic interventions were being administered, and increasing again at the end of the session. Results indicated a quadratic model for all three vocal features was superior in fitting the data, as compared to a linear model, suggesting that therapists begin and end therapy using a different style of voice than in the middle of a session.     

Why it doesn’t matter whether the virtues are truth-conducive

A potential explanation of a fact is a hypothesis such that, if it were true, it would explain the fact in question. Let’s suppose that we become aware of a fact and some potential explanations thereof. Let’s also suppose that we would like to believe the truth. Given this aim, we can ask two questions. First, is it likely that one of these hypotheses is true? Second, given an affirmative answer to the first question, which one is it likely to be? Inference to the best explanation (IBE) offers answers to both questions. To the first, it says ‘Yes’—assuming that at least one of the hypotheses would, if true, provide a satisfactory explanation of the fact under consideration. To the second, it says that the hypothesis most likely to be true is the one that scores best on the explanatory virtues: conservatism, modesty, simplicity, generality, and predictive power. Many philosophers have argued against IBE’s answer to the first question. I am interested in an objection to its answer to the second. Many philosophers seem to think that it is unsustainable: they seem to think that even if we assume that one of the competing hypotheses is true, we should not think that IBE will help us to identify it. Or, more carefully, if these philosophers are doing what they appear to be doing—namely, offering critiques of IBE that don’t depend on assumptions about the field of competing hypotheses—then their claim is that IBE will not help us to identify the truth. I believe that this is mistaken: the argument for believing it assumes a model of IBE that we have no reason to accept.     

Why it doesn’t matter to metaphysics what Mary learns

The Knowledge Argument of Frank Jackson has not persuaded physicalists, but their replies have not dispelled the intuition that someone raised in a black and white environment gains genuinely new knowledge when she sees colors for the first time. In what follows, we propose an explanation of this particular kind of knowledge gain that displays it as genuinely new, but orthogonal to both physicalism and phenomenology. We argue that Mary’s case is an instance of a common phenomenon in which something new is learned as the result of exploiting representational resources that were not previously exploited, and that this results in gaining genuinely new information.     

The folk strike back; or,why you didn’t do it intentionally,though it was bad and you knew it

Recent and puzzling experimental results suggest that people’s judgments as to whether or not an action was performed intentionally are sensitive to moral considerations. In this paper, we outline these results and evaluate two accounts which purport to explain them. We then describe a recent experiment that allegedly vindicates one of these accounts and present our own findings to show that it fails to do so. Finally, we present additional data suggesting no such vindication could be in the offing and that, in fact, both accounts fail to explain the initial, puzzling results they were purported to explain.

It’s not what you do,it’s why you do it: Motives for disclosure and concealment decisions among employees with depression

This multi-method study examined disclosure decisions made by employees with depression as well as their motives for those decisions. In Study 1, we conducted in-depth interviews with employees who had been diagnosed with depression to better understand why they chose to disclose or conceal their depression at work. Based on the results of the interviews, both approach and avoid motives for disclosure and concealment emerged in the analysis. Further, these motives were influenced by multiple organizational factors including social support, stigma, and diversity climate. In Study 2, we developed and validated a scale to measure approach and avoid motives for disclosure and concealement. In Study 3, we tested approach and avoid motives as mediators of the relationships between organizational factors and employee outcomes (i.e., engagement and presenteeism). We tested our model among 223 working adults with depression. Our results provided support for the hypothesized relationships among those who disclosed but not those who concealed, suggesting that when employees disclosed for approach reasons they were more likely to be engaged, and when they disclosed for avoid reasons they were more likely to engage in presenteeism. These findings provide both theoretical and practical contributions to the study of concealable identity management and to employees with mental illness.     

Wanting more than you have and it’s Consequences for Well-being

Americans have a lot of stuff, but are not necessarily happier for it. One possibility is that even if we want what we have, we want more. Wanting more may increase have-want discrepancies and reduce well-being. In this paper, we introduce the construct wanting more, and show that it negatively predicts well-being. We then identify materialism as a mediator of this relationship. Wanting more negatively effects well-being at least in part because those who want more are more likely to be materialistic. Finally, we show that wanting more than one has and wanting what one has are distinct constructs, and that wanting what one has moderates the relationship between wanting more and well-being. Those who want more are less happy only if they also do not want what they have. Wanting what one has may reduce attention to have-want discrepancies that result from wanting more.     

All Justice is Social but it’s not all Social Justice

I take social injustice to be injustice perpetrated on members of society by laws and public social practices. I take social justice to be the struggle to right social injustice. After explaining these ideas, I then address the question: why are so many people opposed to the very idea of social justice? I offer a number of explanations, among them, that to acknowledge that there is social injustice in one’s society often requires considerable change on one’s part.     

Grounding: it’s (probably) all in the head

In this paper we provide a psychological explanation for ‘grounding observations’—observations that are thought to provide evidence that there exists a relation of ground. Our explanation does not appeal to the presence of any such relation. Instead, it appeals to certain evolved cognitive mechanisms, along with the traditional modal relations of supervenience, necessitation and entailment. We then consider what, if any, metaphysical conclusions we can draw from the obtaining of such an explanation, and, in particular, if it tells us anything about whether we ought to posit a relation of ground.     

Thank goodness it’s Friday: weekly pattern of workplace incivility

Background and objectives: Recent research has shown day-level differences in an individual’s experience of uncivil behavior; however, it is unknown if that experience follows a consistent weekly change pattern. This study extends incivility theory and research by applying latent growth curve (LGC) modeling to diary study data to understand day-to-day changes in incivility.

Design: The authors took a theory-driven approach, reviewing both mood and recovery theory that would support a decrease in incivility over the working week.

Methods: Diary survey methodology was used, with a morning and evening survey completed on five consecutive workdays by 171 (73% of the 235 who initially volunteered, 95% of those who completed any surveys) employees in the legal industry. LGC analysis was used to identify patterns of experienced incivility, mood (both measured after work), and recovery (assessed the following morning).

Results: Regardless of job demands and gender, a weekly pattern was identified with the likelihood of experiencing incivility (coded as 0?=?none, 1?=?some) decreasing from Monday to Friday by .78 each day (p?<?.001) in a relatively linear fashion with a slope factor of .34 (SE?=?0.23; p?>?.05), indicating invariance between individuals. This weekly pattern was not explained by changes in mood or recovery.

Conclusions: Results emphasize the impact of contextual factors such as time on workplace incivility and the need to consider weekly rhythms of other behaviors that are likely to affect employee well-being and productivity. Although limited to one week of data per person, the findings are likely to be relevant to studies of other forms of interpersonal mistreatment, such as social undermining and interpersonal conflict.     

Wittgenstein: “I can’t believe…or rather can’t believe it yet”

This paper presents a characterization of the ontological dependence relation between an existent and its sustaining cause, which allows to straightforwardly deduce that the being of any dependent existent is grounded on an independent one. Furthermore, an argument is given to the conclusion that there is a unique independent existent, which is therefore the ultimate ground of being.     

Bare’ing it all for the Camera: Women’s Experience of Having Erotic Photographs Taken

One area in which a change in women’s sexual behavior has been observed is in the growing number of women who are having erotic photographs taken of themselves by professional photographers. The current research is an attempt to learn more about this unstudied phenomenon. In-depth, semi-structured interviews were conducted with 16 women who have had erotic photographs taken by a professional photographer. The interviews were subjected to thematic analysis. The women described the erotic photography experience as having positive implications, such as increased body esteem and feelings of empowerment, as well as giving the women the ability to see themselves as sexual and an opportunity to celebrate their bodies. Having erotic photos taken also provided women with the opportunity to create a sexual image in a photograph on their own terms. The findings provide insight into the changing nature of attitudes about women’s sexuality.     

What is What it’s Like? Introducing Perceptual Modes of Presentation

The central claim of this paper is that what it is like to see green or any other perceptible property is just the perceptual mode of presentation of that property. Perceptual modes of presentation are important because they help resolve a tension in current work on consciousness. Philosophers are pulled by three mutually inconsistent theses: representational externalism, representationalism, and phenomenal internalism. I throw my hat in with defenders of the first two: the externalist representationalists. We are faced with the problem of explaining away intuitions that favor phenomenal internalism. Perceptual modes of presentation account for what it is like to see properties in a way that accommodates those intuitions without vindicating phenomenal internalism itself. Perceptual MoPs therefore provide a new way of being an externalist representationalist.     

This time it’s personal: the memory benefit of hearing oneself

The production effect is the memory advantage of saying words aloud over simply reading them silently. It has been hypothesised that this advantage stems from production featuring distinctive information that stands out at study relative to reading silently. MacLeod (2011) (I said, you said: The production effect gets personal. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 18, 1197–1202. doi:10.3758/s13423-011-0168-8) found superior memory for reading aloud oneself vs. hearing another person read aloud, which suggests that motor information (speaking), self-referential information (i.e., “I said it”), or both contribute to the production effect. In the present experiment, we dissociated the influence on memory of these two components by including a study condition in which participants heard themselves read words aloud (recorded earlier) – a first for production effect research – along with the more typical study conditions of reading aloud, hearing someone else speak, and reading silently. There was a gradient of memory across these four conditions, with hearing oneself lying between speaking and hearing someone else speak. These results imply that oral production is beneficial because it entails two distinctive components: a motor (speech) act and a unique, self-referential auditory input.     

Some Forms of Collectively Bringing About or ‘Seeing to it that’

Journal of Philosophical Logic - One of the best known approaches to the logic of agency are the ‘stit’ (‘seeing to it that’) logics. Often, it is not the actions of an...     

‘It’s not a diet,it’s a lifestyle’: a longitudinal,data-prompted interview study of weight loss maintenance

Objective: To advance understanding of the individual and environmental factors underpinning weight loss maintenance. Design: Semi-structured, data-prompted interviews were conducted with twelve overweight adult participants (three men, nine women) who had lost over 5% of their body weight in the year before baseline. Participants gathered daily data through wireless scales, activity monitors (Fitbit?), ecological momentary assessment and experience sampling (taking photographs, writing notes). They were interviewed at 3- and 6-months post baseline. Interview stimuli included personal data of weight and activity graphs, correlations of psychological factors, and self-generated notes and photographs. Interview data were analysed using the Framework Method, applying pre-specified maintenance-relevant theoretical themes. Results: The theoretical Framework provided a good fit for the narratives, with five main themes underpinning successful weight loss maintenance: sustained motivation, effective self-regulation, plentiful resources, habit formation and a supportive environment. Additionally, participants reported an identity shift from being a dieter to accepting a new healthy lifestyle. Goal prioritising and allowing for occasional controlled lapses enhanced weight loss maintenance. Conclusions: This study successfully used the novel method of data-prompted interviews to explore weight loss maintenance experiences with new explanations emerging from the data. Future research should further develop behaviour change maintenance theory and data-prompted interview method.     

Children’s resistance to misleading postevent information: When does it occur?

Whether or not misleading postevent information influences children’s memory has been hotly debated. The present experiment focused on the null effects of misinformation and was designed so as to partially replicate Zaragoza’s (1991) finding that preschoolers were unaffected by suggested information. Consistent with Zaragoza’s findings, no difference in recognition memory performance was observed between control and misled conditions. Item analyses were also indicative of the absence of a misinformation effect. Results are discussed in terms of event salience, interviewer credibility, and their psycholegal implications.