The ‘theory theory’ of mind and the aims of Sellars’ original myth of Jones

Recent proponents of the ??theory theory?? of mind often trace its roots back to Wilfrid Sellars?? famous ??myth of Jones?? in his 1956 article, ??Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind??. Sellars developed an account of the intersubjective basis of our knowledge of the inner mental states of both self and others, an account which included the claim that such knowledge is in some sense theoretical knowledge. This paper examines the nature of this claim in Sellars?? original account and its relationship to more recent debates concerning ??theory of mind??, in particular the theory theory. A close look reveals that Sellars?? original view embodied several distinctions that would enable more recent theory theorists to accommodate certain phenomenological objections that have been raised against that outlook. At the heart of the philosophical issue is an overlooked complexity involved in Sellars?? account of the ??theory/observation?? distinction, involving a conception of the distinction that is both independently plausible and a key to the issue in dispute.     

Can Beck's theory of depression and the response style theory be integrated?

There are obvious similarities between the cognitive constructs of A. T. Beck's (1976) cognitive theory and the response style theory (S. Nolen-Hoeksema & J. Morrow, 1991). Different propositions of J. A. Ciesla and J. E. Roberts (2007) and S. Lyubomirsky and S. Nolen-Hoeksema (1993, 1995) concerning associations of 2 response styles, brooding and reflection, with constructs of Beck's cognitive theory (schemata, cognitive errors, cognitive triad, automatic thoughts) were tested. Model comparisons were based on a 4-week study in which 397 participants completed self-report instruments at 2 time points. A model allowing schemata to influence brooding and reflection that influence the other cognitive variables of Beck's cognitive theory fits the data better than the other integrated models. However, although schemata were significant predictors of both response styles, neither response style did significantly predict other cognitive variables. A comparison of the integrated model with Beck's original cognitive theory revealed that Beck's original theory fits the data better than the integrated model, whereas both models explain about the same amount of variance. Thus, an integration of Beck's theory and the response style theory are not supported.     

Jameson and Hurvich’s theory of brightness contrast

Jameson and Hurvich’s theoretical model, formulated to account for perceived brightness under conditions of simultaneous brightness contrast, was shown to predict linear brightness functions with (I) slopes of.33, ?.33, or 0 on a log-log plot, where apparent brightness is plotted against illuminance, contrast ratio is the parameter, and spatial arrangements are constant; and (2) y-intercepts that shift monotonically as contrast ratio is increased. Predicting the value of a y-intercept and which of the three possible slopes of a function would occur was shown to depend on empirically evaluating a constant k. Because k was found unsolvable, the model as presently defined was rejected. The evidence for a general class of similar models was found to be fragmentary.     

Schilder and Pavlov’s theory of higher nervous activity

In the late 1920s, the Viennese psychoanalyst Paul Schilder, after performing a conditioning experiment with human subjects, criticized I. P. Pavlov’s concept of “experimental neurosis.” Schilder maintained that subjective reports by conditioned human subjects were more informative than the objectively observed behavior of conditioned dogs. In 1932, Pavlov published a rejoinder to Schilder’s critique in theJournal of the American Medical Association. Pavlov maintained that Schilder misunderstood the value and implications of the scientific, objective method in the study of experimental neurosis. In 1934, Schilder subjected Pavlov’s theory of higher nervous activity to an incisive critique in a 1935 article inImago. Schilder objected to Pavlov’s narrow, reductionist conceptualization of the conditional reflex. Schilder reiterated his view that the psychological, subjective explanation of the conditional reflex is preferable to the physiological, objective explanation, and that the inference of cortical phenomena from experimental findings might be improper. Neither Pavlov nor any of his disciples replied to Schilder. The author provides an apology for the Pavlovian position, suggesting that Schilder was unfamiliar with early and late writings of Pavlov.     

An experimental test of Jameson and Hurvich’s theory of brightness contrast

Two hundred and fifty-two brightness functions for seven simultaneously presented black, gray, and white squares on black, gray, and white backgrounds approximated power curves with positive exponents when illuminance was varied in seven steps over 1.9 log fL. Mean exponents were significantly larger for whiter vs blacker squares and for squares on the white vs the gray background. Mean exponents also increased more for squares on white than on black or gray backgrounds. Finally, a white replacing a black background elicited increasingly larger decremental responses as the squares varied from black to white. Jameson and Hurvich’s opponent-process theory, tested by the experiment, was not predictive.     

The role of practice and habituation in Socrates’ theory of ethical development

ABSTRACT

The goal of this paper is to challenge the standard view that Socrates of the early Platonic dialogues is an intellectualist with respect to virtue. Through a detailed analysis of the educational theory laid out in the early dialogues, it will be argued that Socrates believes that the best way to cultivate virtues in his interlocutors is not to convince them of ethical truths by way of reason and argument alone, but to encourage them to participate in the practice of virtue. Habit and practice are essential to the cultivation of virtue because they mould the desires and dispositions of the agent and promote a kind of knowledge that cannot be achieved discursively – craft-knowledge. Only when agents have achieved craft-knowledge can they be counted on to act virtuously on every occasion; and craft-knowledge can only be achieved by way of practice and habituation.     

Self‐esteem and anomie: An integration of Adler and Merton as a theory of deviance

The purpose of this paper is to show that while anomie theory on the social level offers a valid explanation of deviance, in order to understand the phenomenon in its entirety, we must consider the individual level as well. The psycho‐dynamic dimension of individual action is a crucial component of deviant behavior and one which must be integrated into a broader theory of overall deviance. With this in mind we will attempt to integrate the social and the psychological by incorporating the Adlerian and Mertonian models in order to create a more dynamic theory of deviance.     

Self-perception and characteristics of premanipulation attitudes: A test of Bem’s theory

In a study to provide evidence for the assumption of self-perception theory that premanipulation attitudes are not salient to postmanipulation phenomenology, Bem and McConnell (1970) performed two forced-compliance experiments. One experiment was a typical forced-compliance experiment in which Ss indicated their postmanipulation attitudes. In the other experiment, the Ss were asked to recall their premanipulation attitude after the essay writing task. It was found that the recall ratings were essentially the same as the postmanipulation attitude ratings. The present study was a partial replication of the Bern and McConnell experiment. The results of this study indicate that premanipulation attitudes are salient to the postmanipulation phenomenology of Ss for whom these attitudes are highly relevant.     

An experimental test of Jameson and Hurvich’s theory of brightness contrast1

Two hundred and fifty-two brightness functions for seven simultaneously presented black, gray, and white squares on black, gray, and white backgrounds approximated power curves with positive exponents when illuminance was varied in seven steps over 1.9 log fL. Mean exponents were significantly larger for whiter vs blacker squares and for squares on the white vs the gray background. Mean exponents also increased more for squares on white than on black or gray backgrounds. Finally, a white replacing a black background elicited increasingly larger décrémentai responses as the squares varied from black to white. Jameson and Hurvich’s opponent-process theory, tested by the experiment, was not predictive.     

Triangles in ROC space: History and theory of “nonparametric” measures of sensitivity and response bias

Can accuracy and response bias in two-stimulus, two-response recognition or detection experiments be measured nonparametrically? Pollack and Norman (1964) answered this question affirmatively for sensitivity, Hodos (1970) for bias: Both proposed measures based on triangular areas in receiver-operating characteristic space. Their papers, and especially a paper by Grier (1971) that provided computing formulas for the measures, continue to be heavily cited in a wide range of content areas. In our sample of articles, most authors described triangle-based measures as making fewer assumptions than measures associated with detection theory. However, we show that statistics based on products or ratios of right triangle areas, including a recently proposed bias index and a not-yetproposed but apparently plausible sensitivity index, are consistent with a decision process based on logistic distributions. Even the Pollack and Norman measure, which is based on non-right triangles, is approximately logistic for low values of sensitivity. Simple geometric models for sensitivity and bias are not nonparametric, even if their implications are not acknowledged in the defining publications.     

Shape constancy and theory of mind: is there a link?

In three experiments, children aged between 4 and 7 years viewed a circular disc oriented at a slant. The disc was made of luminous material and situated in a darkened chamber. Children of all ages exaggerated the circularity of the disc when they knew that the object was really a circle (the circle task), and the effect was greatest in the younger members of the sample. Crucially, however, a group of children in Experiment 3 who viewed an identical shape that they knew emanated from an actual ellipse did not exaggerate circularity. In the second experiment, children tackled three standard theory of mind tasks in addition to the circle task mentioned above. A significant correlation emerged (even with age partialed) between the extent of exaggeration made by those who knew that the shape was a circle and ability to pass the theory of mind tests. It seems knowledge of reality contaminates judgements of appearance in the circle task. This might be the same bias that features in realist errors in theory of mind tasks.     

Hume’s theory of justice and Vanderschraaf’s vulnerablity objection

Philosophical Studies -     

Depiction and plastic perception. A critique of Husserl’s theory of picture consciousness

In this paper, I will present an argument against Husserl’s analysis of picture consciousness. Husserl’s analysis of picture consciousness (as it can be found primarily in the recently translated volume Husserliana 23) moves from a theory of depiction in general to a theory of perceptual imagination. Though, I think that Husserl’s thesis that picture consciousness is different from depictive and linguistic consciousness is legitimate, and that Husserl’s phenomenology avoids the errors of linguistic theories, such as Goodman’s, I submit that his overall theory is unacceptable, especially when it is applied to works of art. Regarding art, the main problem of Husserl’s theory is the assumption that pictures are constituted primarily as a conflict between perception/physical picture thing and imagination/picture object. Against this mentalist claim, I maintain, from a hermeneutic point of view, that pictures are the result of perceptual formations [Bildungen]. I then claim that Husserl’s theory fails, since it does not take into account what I call “plastic perception” [Bildliches Sehen], which plays a prominent role not only within the German tradition of art education but also within German art itself. In this connection, “plastic thinking” [Bildliches Denken] was prominent especially in Klee, in Kandinsky, and in Beuys, as well as in the overall doctrine of the Bauhaus. Ultimately, I argue that Husserl’s notion of picture consciousness and general perceptive imaginary consciousness must be replaced with a more dynamic model of the perception of pictures and art work that takes into account (a) the constructive and plastic moment, (b) the social dimension and (c) the genetic dimension of what it means to see something in something (Wollheim).

Risk compensation theory and bicycle helmets – Results from an experiment of cycling speed and short-term effects of habituation

It has been suggested that the safety benefits of bicycle helmets are limited by risk compensation. The current study contributes to explaining whether the potential safety effects of bicycle helmets are reduced by cyclists’ tendency to cycle faster when wearing them (as a result of risk compensation), and if this potential reduction can be associated with a change in perceived risk. A previous study (Fyhri & Phillips, 2013) showed that non-routine helmet users did not increase their speed immediately after being given a helmet to wear, while routine helmet users cycled more slowly. The current study tests whether the previously found reduction in speed in response to helmet removal – as an indirect indicator of risk compensation – could be established in non-routine helmet users, after a period of habituation while cycling with a helmet.We did this by conducting a randomized crossover trial, in which we used GPS-derived speed calculations and self-reported risk perception. To test the effect of habituation, we used a design where each participant took part in two rounds with a break between and each round having two trips. We collected the data in June 2015. Non-routine helmet users (N = 31) were recruited in the field (along cycle routes in Oslo), and through a sample drawn from the Falck National register of bicycle owners. In the first phase of the study, all participants were asked to complete a test route (2.4 km downhill) with and without a helmet. In the second phase of the experiment, conducted after 1.5–2 h, the same participants again completed the test route with and without a helmet. In the time between the first and second phases of the experiment, all participants were given helmets, and told to use them on a predefined bicycle route.Habituation to the helmet between the first and second phases of the experiment did not produce any decrease (with helmet removal) in speed, on top of the habituation that occurred while cycling down the hill (the order effect). Mean speed difference for cycling with/without a helmet before the break was −0.76 km/h, after the break this difference was 0.32 km/h; 95% CIs [−0.5, 2.9] and [−0.9, 1.5]. We argue that risk compensation is an unlikely effect of using a bicycle helmet, and probably cannot explain any adverse effects related to helmet legislation.     

An extension of freud and jung’s theory of the relation of dream states to schizophrenia

The central model for both Sigmund Freud and Carl Gustav Jung for the generation of schizophrenia’s hallucinations and delusional system is described as the intrusion of nighttime dream states into the waking consciousness. In this theoretical exegesis, a rent or tear is made in the ego instated by strongly repressed aggressive impulses which then create a dream-world for the patient as they subsequently overwhelm ego defenses. A parallel between this mode of knowing and, for example, the regioning of Martin Heidegger in his Discourse on Thinking is brought forward. Since these modes of thought are analogical and metaphorical, analysis based on this similarity may provide for greater insight into the thought and perceptual disorders of schizophrenia. An understanding of this kind of thought process may then provide a bridge towards more effective therapeutic interventions. A distinction is made between thought processes, per se, and those causal factors of a biological nature.