A New Way of Assessing Ways of Knowing: The Attitudes Toward Thinking and Learning Survey (ATTLS)

In four studies, college students (both male andfemale, predominantly white) filled out a 50-item surveyconsisting of statements illustrating“separate” (critical, detached) and“connected” (empathic) ways of knowing (Belenky, Clinchy, G oldberger,& Tarule, 1986). The instrument showed acceptableinternal reliability. Scores on the two scales wereuncorrelated, supporting the view that the twoepistemological positions are independent. Females consistentlyrated connected knowing (CK) statements higher thanseparate knowing (SK) statements, while males showed aslight, but non-significant difference favoring SK statements. When participants were dividedinto groups using a joint median split of the two ratingscores, females were disproportionately likely to beplaced in the High CK-Low SK group. CK and SK scores were unrelated to performance on avariety of cognitive tasks, but were related to somemeasures of preference, suggesting that ways of knowingmay function more as approaches or styles rather than basic abilities.     

Empathy is interpretation (and who ever said it wasn't?)

Whenever the subject is explicitly addressed, all analysts agree that empathic perception is an attitude one takes toward making observations, not a privileged means of perception. Furthermore, analysts seem to agree that observations made with an empathic intention are interpretations like any other observations. Empathy is not a conduit to the patient's inner life. But despite these points of consensus, it often seems to be implied in the psychoanalytic literature, usually unintentionally, that empathy is a privileged means of knowing another person. This undercurrent is sometimes present even in the work of theorists who simultaneously state their opposition to this very point of view. In this paper, after presenting an example from the literature of this kind of contradiction, I, basing my argument in hermeneutics, offer the view that all observation, inside and outside psychoanalysis, is interpretation. Then, turning to the three papers of the symposium individually, I take the perspective that in one way or another they all portray empathic perception as a privileged means of observation. These portrayals are examples of the unconscious politics of theory.     

The Spiritual Self‐In‐Relation: Empathy and the Construction of Spirituality Among Modern Descendants of theSpanish Crypto‐Jews

The research that is presented here explores the role that empathic attachment plays in the development of the religious self. Based on an ethnographic study of modern descendants of the Spanish crypto‐Jews, the work applies self‐in‐relation theory to the study of spirituality and religious belief acquisition among a population of individuals who, in adulthood, have modified their religious world view as a result of their crypto‐Jewish heritage. The findings of the research expand the parameters of self‐in‐relation theory in three important ways: 1) through an examination of the role that empathic attachment plays in adult conversion patterns; 2) through the elaboration of a developmental model that considers the significance of empathic attachment for sons as w ll as daughters; and 3) through an investigation into the relationship between ethnicity and spiritual development.     

Empathy: An Integral Model in the Counseling Process

Expanding on a framework introduced by Carl Rogers, an integral model of empathy in counseling uses empathic understanding through 3 ways of knowing: Subjective empathy enables a counselor to momentarily experience what it is like to be a client, interpersonal empathy relates to understanding a client's phenomenological experiencing, and objective empathy uses reputable knowledge sources outside of a client's frame of reference. Across the counseling process, empathy is integral to treatment strategies and interventions.     

Intrinsic Natures: A Critique of Langton on Kant

This paper argues that there is an important respect in which Rae Langton's recent interpretation of Kant is correct: Kant's claim that we cannot know things in themselves should be understood as the claim that we cannot know the intrinsic nature of things. However, I dispute Langton's account of intrinsic properties, and therefore her version of what this claim amounts to. Langton's distinction between intrinsic, causally inert properties and causal powers is problematic, both as an interpretation of Kant, and as an independent metaphysical position. I propose a different reading of the claim that we cannot know things intrinsically. I distinguish between two ways of knowing things: in terms of their effects on other things, and as they are apart from these. 1 argue that knowing things' powers is knowing things in terms of effects on other things, and therefore is not knowing them as they are in themselves, and that there are textual grounds for attributing this position to Kant.     

Transcendental empathy in the therapeutic encounter

Abstract

The experience of many therapists suggest that most contemporary conceptions of empathy underestimate empathic potential. This paper describes deep or transcendental empathy as a more direct knowing of the client's world. The author examines the epistemic process or the activity of knowing of transcendental empathy by considering two broad forms: transcendental countertransference and psychological resonance. Difficulties and distortions are explored as well as characteristics of an individual that correspond with deep empathy.     

The role of empathy in the neural responses to observed human social touch

One of the ways in which individuals convey feelings and thoughts to one another is through touch. Although the neural responses to felt and observed tactile stimuli between an inanimate object and a part of the human body have been vastly explored, the neural responses to observed human interaction involving touch are not well understood. Considering that the observation of social touch involves vicarious sharing of emotions, we hypothesized that levels of empathic traits modulate the neural responses to observed touch and focused on the attenuation in the mu\alpha rhythm (8–13Hz), a neural marker that has been related to sensorimotor resonance. Fifty-four participants observed photos depicting social touch, nonsocial touch, or no touch while their electroencephalography (EEG) activity was recorded. Results showed that interindividual differences in levels of empathic traits modulated both behavioral and electrophysiological responses to human social touch, such that highly empathic participants evaluated human social touch as inducing more pleasant emotions and exhibited greater mu suppression upon observation of human social touch compared to less empathic participants. Specifically, both the behavioral and the electrophysiological responses to observed social touch were predicted by levels of personal distress, a measure of emotional contagion. These findings indicate that the behavioral and electrophysiological responses to observed social touch are modulated by levels of empathy.     

Metacognition of emotional face recognition

While humans are adept at recognizing emotional states conveyed by facial expressions, the current literature suggests that they lack accurate metacognitions about their performance in this domain. This finding comes from global trait-based questionnaires that assess the extent to which an individual perceives him or herself as empathic, as compared to other people. Those who rate themselves as empathically accurate are no better than others at recognizing emotions. Metacognition of emotion recognition can also be assessed using relative measures that evaluate how well a person thinks s/he has understood the emotion in a particular facial display as compared to other displays. While this is the most common method of metacognitive assessment of people's judgments of learning or their feelings of knowing, this kind of metacognition--"relative meta-accuracy"--has not been studied within the domain of emotion. As well as asking for global metacognitive judgments, we asked people to provide relative, trial-by-trial prospective and retrospective judgments concerning whether they would be right or wrong in recognizing the expressions conveyed in particular facial displays. Our question was: Do people know when they will be correct in knowing what expression is conveyed, and do they know when they do not know? Although we, like others, found that global meta-accuracy was unpredictive of performance, relative meta-accuracy, given by the correlation between participants' trial-by-trial metacognitive judgments and performance on each item, were highly accurate both on the Mind in the Eyes task (Experiment 1) and on the Ekman Emotional Expression Multimorph task (in Experiment 2).     

ANIMAL PASSIONS AND BEASTLY VIRTUES: COGNITIVE ETHOLOGY AS THE UNIFYING SCIENCE FOR UNDERSTANDING THE SUBJECTIVE,EMOTIONAL, EMPATHIC,AND MORAL LIVES OF ANIMALS

Abstract. In this essay, my response to four papers that were presented at the 2004 annual meeting of the American Academy of Religion in a session devoted to my research on animal behavior and cognitive ethology, I stress the importance of interdisciplinary research and collaboration for coming to terms with various aspects of animal behavior and animal cognition. I argue that we have much to learn from other animals concerning a set of “big” questions including who we are in the grand scheme of things, the role science (“science sense”) plays in our understanding of the world in which we live, what it means to “know” something, what some other ways of knowing are and how they compare to what we call “science,” and the use of anecdotes and anthropomorphism to inform studies of animal behavior. I ask, Are other minds really all that private and inaccessible? Can a nonhuman animal be called a person? What does the future hold if we continue to dismantle the only planet we live on and persecute the other animal beings with whom we are supposed to coexist? I argue that cognitive ethology is the unifying science for understanding the subjective, emotional, empathic, and moral lives of animals, because it is essential to know what animals do, think, and feel as they go about their daily routines in the company of their friends and when they are alone. It is also important to learn why both the similarities and differences between humans and other animals have evolved. The more we come to understand other animals, the more we will appreciate them as the amazing beings they are, and the more we will come to understand ourselves.     

The Automaton Self: Defensive organisation,psychodynamics and treatment approaches

Abstract

This paper is not primarily concerned with the content of theory and what we then, in the light of this and of our own experience, say to our clients. Rather, it is concerned with the nature of this knowledge that we are using and that the client in turn uses and experiences in the counselling.

How, or the way in which, we know, defines our knowledge as much as the actual content of that knowledge. The paper delineates two fundamental ways of knowing. One is our ordinary practical and rational way of understanding reality and is usually about achieving some goal – this is what I am calling the product side of counselling: the other is concerned with our more immediate first-hand experiential knowing of ourselves and our world.

The paper opens with a definition of these two kinds of knowledge, product and process, and presents some clinical material to show how these different ways of knowing can have a real effect on the counselling. It then moves on to the question of why counselling trainings are becoming increasingly concerned with product knowledge, and ends with a discussion of how Freud himself was constantly using both ways of knowing as if they were the same, without understanding the implications of this for therapeutic practice.     

Claiming Subjectivity: Re-Storying Clinical Psychology and Myself

This article explores becoming a clinical psychologist later in life. Drawing on the author’s experience as a developmental psychologist who becomes a clinical respecialization student, it traces shifts in narratives of identity, belongingness, perspectives on psychology, and ways of knowing that both influence and construct her perspective on age and midlife. The paradigm shifts of going from professor, to student and intern, and philosophical shifts, transitioning from a stance of objectivity, to one informed by deep subjectivity, are considered. The ways that age matters is pondered as an artifact of the larger social construction of aging. The article proposes that a rich later-in-life perspective often includes the capacity to utilize self-knowledge and affective interpretation that nurtures subjectivity. The capacity to summon subjectivity facilitates rich authentic empathic connection with patients in clinical practice. The author explores the process of learning and re-storying herself in a manner that draws on self-reflection, clinical subjectivities, the life-learned ability to be humble, and a theory-informed lens of clinical psychology that is truly different from developmental psychology. The promise for future contributions to both clinical work and the greater field by “new” clinicians at midlife is explored.     

Intuition and the socratic method: Two opposed ways of knowing?

Socratic method and intuition are two ways of knowing commonly thought as opposed. The author shows how both ways of knowing can be linked in an education that has philosophy as its armature.     

Eye of the beholder: the individual and dyadic contributions of empathic accuracy and perceived empathic effort to relationship satisfaction

This study examined links between two distinct facets of empathy-empathic accuracy and perceived empathic effort-and one's own and one's partner's relationship satisfaction. Using a video recall procedure, participants (n = 156 couples in committed relationships) reported on their own emotions and their perceptions of partners' emotions and partners' empathic intentions during moments of high affect in laboratory-based discussions of upsetting events. Partners' data were correlated as a measure of how accurately they were able to read what the other was feeling and to what degree they felt the other was trying to be empathic at those moments. The perception of empathic effort by one's partner was more strongly linked with both men's and women's relationship satisfaction than empathic accuracy. Men's relationship satisfaction was related to the ability to read their partners' positive emotions accurately, whereas women's relationship satisfaction was related to their partners' ability to read women's negative emotions accurately. Women's ability to read their husbands' negative emotions was positively linked to both men's and women's relationship satisfaction. Findings suggest that the perception of a partner's empathic effort-as distinct from empathic accuracy-is uniquely informative in understanding how partners may derive relationship satisfaction from empathic processes. When working with couples in treatment, heightening partners' perceptions of each other's empathic effort, and helping partners learn to demonstrate effort, may represent particularly powerful opportunities for improving satisfaction in relationships.     

The use of early recollections as a narrative aid in psychotherapy

A narrative framework is put forward for using early recollections as a narrative aid in psychotherapy. According to this framework, early recollections are beginning episodes in the current version of an autobiography or self-narrative which is continuously updated to make sense of current concerns. Inclusion of these episodes in psychotherapy can provide therapists who share an interest in narrative and their clients with a quick way to recognize central themes that are restricting clients’ lives and detect openings to revise them. Revisions regard the form and content of early recollections. Three case examples propose ways of incorporating early recollections in empathic dialogs, including the process of detecting restricting themes and encouraging persons to tell stories in more compassionate voices. Group therapy is proposed as one of the contexts where early recollections can be discussed, but readers are encouraged to extend these ideas to work with individuals and families.     

Empathic accuracy of intimate partners in violent versus nonviolent relationships

This study compared the empathic accuracy of men and women who had perpetrated physical intimate partner violence with that of partners in nonviolent but distressed and nonviolent and nondistressed relationships. Examined was the empathic accuracy (a) of partners for one another’s thoughts and feelings during a relationship problem discussion in the laboratory, (b) of partners’ empathic accuracy for each other with the empathic accuracy of objective observers who watched the couples’ interactions, and (c) the males’ empathic accuracy for their female partner to their empathic accuracy for female strangers. No significant group differences were found among women’s empathic accuracy, but the data suggest that violent men exhibit poor empathic accuracy when attempting to understand their female partner’s thoughts and feelings.     

Gender Roles and Empathic Accuracy: The Role of Communion in Reading Minds

Although empathic accuracy is considered a stable skill, few individual difference measures consistently predict performance on Ickes’ (e.g., 2001) empathic accuracy measure. Because past work has shown that women are more empathically accurate than men when female gender roles are made salient before an empathic accuracy task, we hypothesized that self-reported communion and related variables might predict empathic accuracy. Participants (194 undergraduates) from a northwestern U.S. university completed an empathic accuracy task and self-report measures of communion and empathy. Communion and empathic concern predicted greater empathic accuracy, but only after controlling for socially desirable responding. The role of communion in empathic inference is discussed, along with the need to include measures of social desirability when examining correlates of empathic accuracy.     

The relation between feelings of knowing and the number of neighboring concepts linked to the test cue

We investigated whether feeling-of-knowing judgments are influenced by the number of different neighboring concepts linked to the test cue in long-term memory as measured using association norms. The purpose was to evaluate contrasting predictions made by the partial-retrieval hypothesis and the competition hypothesis. The partial-retrieval hypothesis assumes the more neighboring concepts activated by the test cue, the higher the feeling of knowing. In contrast, the competition hypothesis assumes that feelings of knowing are sensitive to competition between neighboring concepts, and it predicts that the fewer neighboring concepts activated by the cue, the higher the feeling of knowing. The findings were compatible with the competition hypothesis showing that both feeling-of-knowing and prediction-of-knowing ratings always were higher, the fewer different concepts were linked to the test cue. We obtained an identical pattern of results using different kinds of cues including taxonomic category names, ending sounds, and meaningfully related associates. We consider different ways that these findings could be reconciled with the partial-retrieval hypothesis, and we also discuss implications for other explanations of feeling-of-knowing effects.