Waves,streams, states,and self: An outline of an integral psychology 1

Abstract

Although far from unanimous, there seems to be a general consensus that neither mind nor brain can be reduced without remainder to the other. This essay argues that indeed both mind and brain need to be included in a nonreductionistic way in any genuinely integral theory of consciousness. In order to facilitate such integration, this essay presents the results of an extensive cross‐cultural literature search on the “mind” side of the equation, suggesting that the mental phenomena that need to be considered in any integral theory include developmental levels or waves of consciousness, developmental lines or streams of consciousness, states of consciousness, and the self (or self‐system). A “master template” of these various phenomena, culled from over one‐hundred psychological systems East and West, is presented. It is suggested that this master template represents a general summary of the “mind” side of the brain‐mind integration. The essay concludes with reflections on the “hard problem,” or how the mind‐side can be integrated with the brain‐side to generate a more integral theory of consciousness.     

On the Integration of Need‐related Autobiographical Memories among Late Adolescents and Late Adults: The Role of Depressive Symptoms and Self‐congruence

Within self‐determination theory, integration denotes the process through which people accept past and present experiences and harmonize these experiences within their sense of self. We investigated associations between indicators of successful and poor integration of need‐related memories and memory‐related affect. We also examined the role of depressive symptoms and self‐congruence as antecedents of these indicators. Moreover, we investigated whether late adults, compared with late adolescents, were better capable of integrating need‐frustrating memories through higher levels of self‐congruence. Participants were 132 late adolescents (Mage = 17.83) and 147 late adults (Mage = 76.13), who reported on their level of depressive symptoms and self‐congruence. Next, participants generated a need‐satisfying and need‐frustrating memory and reported on the memories' integration (in terms of acceptance, connection and rumination) and associated affect. Whereas depressive symptoms related mainly to the poor integration of need‐frustrating memories, self‐congruence related positively to the integration of both need‐satisfying and need‐frustrating memories. In turn, integration was related to more positive and less negative affect. Late adults scored higher than late adolescents on the integration of need‐frustrating memories, an effect that was partly accounted for by late adults' elevated self‐congruence. Results suggest that self‐congruence, depressive symptoms and age play a role in the integration of need‐based autobiographical memories. Copyright © 2016 European Association of Personality Psychology     

Neuroscience and the Embodiment of Psychoanalysis—With an Appreciation of Damasio’s Contribution

ABSTRACT

This article contends that psychoanalysis benefits from a neurobiological perspective. It is suggested that Antonio Damasio’s view on the neurobiology of mind and self is particularly useful in this regard. The article presents a review and discussion of Damasio’s basic assumptions on body, emotion, feeling, unconscious and conscious mind, and embodied self. It explains how Freud’s hypotheses that ego is first and foremost a bodily ego is underpinned by contemporary neurobiological research and theory. A clinical illustration highlights that changes in sense of self encompasses changes throughout the whole body, as felt from the inside and as observed from the outside.     

Attachments,gender, and delinquency

The purpose of this study is to contribute to a gender‐integrated theory of delinquent behavior by testing the assumptions of gender specialized delinquent behavior and of sex typed bonds as inhibitors of deviance. Data from self‐administered questionnaires completed by a sample of teenagers in the 10th grade and one year later were used in the study. We found no clear evidence of gender specialization in the deviant behavior reported by the youth. Furthermore, the analysis did not lend support to traditional theories that link male and female delinquency to the weakening of different bonds. The testing of an inclusive model of bond theories produced very similar results for both genders.     

Ego transcendence in postmodern perspective

Based on the author's previous specification of the conventional ego mind as the primary barrier to “realization of the ground of consciousness,” postmodern perspectives on the ego mind barrier are compared with premodern and modern approaches. Postmodernists view the ego as a socio‐linguistic construct. Modern assumptions of consistent subjectivity and a unitary self or identity are rejected, and reduction of the ego mind barrier to transcendence is seen to follow from exploration of alternative self‐concepts. This perspective is manifest in theories of “possible selves” and in the contrast between formulations such as the “saturated self vs. the “empty self.” Though forms of ego transcendence likely in postmodern cultures will differ from those in premodern cultures, many of the same functions will be served, as may be observed in such phenomena as “ecomysticism.”     

A Review of: “Pamela J. Burry's Living with “The Gloria Films”: A daughter's memory.”

Abstract

This article examines alternatives for using language and discourse in clinical practice. The goal is to deconstruct deficit language and move toward a competency based psychological service. Deficit and pathology, the native tongue of psychotherapy, tend to initiate permanent stigmatizing patterns of social interaction which further marginalizes clients. This article deconstructs the taken‐for‐granted assumptions and discourses that underpin deficit‐based practice. Through the process of rediscoursing and re‐inventing therapeutic languages, therapists can reverse the self‐sustaining feedback loop initiated by deficit focus. These changes transport possibilities and personal agency into postmodern practice.     

The dynamic self in psychoanalytic psychology a formulation

Following Hartmann's theoretical formulations, the self has been explored primarily as a body of self‐representations coordinate to object representations; the dynamic organizations of the mind (the id‐egosuperego systems) have been seen as impersonal (nonself) functions.

This paper attempts a conception of the id‐ego‐superego structures as self‐functions in intimate relation to self‐representations. Building on an integration of Piagetian and psychoanalytic object relations frameworks (event theory), it proposes that the earliest self‐experience occurs in dynamic schemes of personally motivated interaction between self and nonself. These I‐schemes lay the groundwork for both the dynamic and the representational aspects of the self: Their structure results in experience characteristic of the dynamic id and in their character as undifferentiated interactions provides the base for the development of self‐ and object representations. Development occurs by integration and differentiation in processes of conflict resolution. The paper traces these developments in outline as they lead to the transition in the dynamic self from id to ego organizations, and in the self‐representations from part‐selves and part‐objects to a whole and individuated self in relation to whole objects.     

Self‐Awareness Revisited: Reconsidering a Core Value of the Counseling Profession

The construct of self‐awareness is highly valued by the counseling profession. However, the foundational assumptions that support this construct have not been systemically examined and critiqued. The author provides an overview of self‐awareness in light of humanistic, psychoanalytic, and postmodernist ideologies. The author concludes that the construct of self‐awareness should be replaced by self‐storying. Implications of self‐storying for counseling practice are discussed.     

Platonic Knowledge and the Standard Analysis

Abstract

In this paper I explore Plato’s reasons for his rejection of the so‐called standard analysis of knowledge as justified true belief. I argue that Plato held that knowledge is an infallible mental state in which (a) the knowable is present in the knower and (b) the knower is aware of this presence. Accordingly, knowledge (epistēmē) is non‐propositional. Since there are no infallible belief states, the standard analysis, which assumes that knowledge is a type of belief, cannot be correct. In addition, I argue that Plato held that belief (doxa) is only possible for the sort of being capable of knowledge. This is because self‐reflexivity is necessary for infallible knowledge and self‐reflexivity is only possible if the intellect is immaterial. This capacity for self‐reflexivity is also essential for belief, since beliefs are, paradigmatically, not dispositions but self‐reflexive mental states.     

Movement experience (ME): A context of inquiry for professional development

Abstract

This article advocates the incorporation of a model for learning witnessing and moving to explore authenticity¹ as it unfolds through and within the nonverbal language of the body, into the initial education and ongoing professional development of psychotherapists and psychoanalysts, regardless of the school of thought they follow. It argues for the expansion of the verbal/intellectual focus in professional educational experience, to include a focus on Movement Experience (ME) ‐ a context of inquiry, a process which can teach us of presence and clarity, and may lead to an unfolding of the Self and of self‐knowledge, that rest in the wisdom and the mystique of the human existence as body and movement becomes conscious. It presents a working model as a tool for raising self‐awareness, and for reflection in‐action and on‐action (movement supervision). In Movement Experience (ME)² and Authentic Movement (AM)³ participants consciously engage in a heuristic act, in the search, and re‐search, for a deeper understanding of the meaning of experience. A personal journey toward professional growth and development.     

The growth hypothesis and self‐actualization: An existential alternative

Abstract

Examining the process of becoming from an existential perspective, we describe the existence of the self in non‐biological terms as a product of its own intentionality. In this context, there is no need to postulate a growth hypothesis in order to (1) to describe a person as a process of becoming, and (2) to explain self‐actualization. While the process of becoming is a static process, self‐actualization is a dynamic process. In the first case, the self deterministically and naively merely becomes. In the second, case, the process results from becoming the object of personal choices, whereby we become authentic. While the self is “a being in the process of mere becoming,” self‐actualization is “a being in the process of authentic becoming.” In this view, humanistic psychotherapy aims at making the self's mere becoming an authentic process. Existential crisis, in particular confrontation with death, is often the transformational medium.     

The development of bodily self‐consciousness: changing responses to the Full Body Illusion in childhood

The present work investigates the development of bodily self‐consciousness and its relation to multisensory bodily information, by measuring for the first time the development of responses to the full body illusion in childhood. We tested three age groups of children: 6‐ to 7‐year‐olds (n = 28); 8‐ to 9‐year‐olds (n = 21); 10‐ to 11‐year‐olds (n = 19), and a group of adults (n = 31). Each participant wore a head‐mounted display (HMD) which displayed a view from a video camera positioned 2 metres behind their own back. Thus, they could view a virtual body from behind. We manipulated visuo‐tactile synchrony by showing the participants a view of their virtual back being stroked with a stick at the same time and same place as their real back (synchronous condition), or at different times and places (asynchronous condition). After each period of stroking, we measured three aspects of bodily self‐consciousness: drift in perceived self‐location, self‐identification with the virtual body, and touch referral to the virtual body. Results show that self‐identification with the virtual body was significantly stronger in the synchronous condition than in the asynchronous condition even in the youngest group tested; however, the size of this effect increased with age. Touch referral to the virtual body was greater in the synchronous condition than in the asynchronous condition only for 10‐ to 11‐year‐olds and adults. Drift in perceived self‐location was greater in the synchronous condition than in the asynchronous condition only for adults. Thus, the youngest age tested can self‐identify with a virtual body, but the links between multisensory signals and bodily self‐consciousness develop significantly across childhood. This suggests a long period of development of the bodily self and exciting potential for the use of virtual reality technologies with children.     

The growth hypothesis and self‐actualization: An existential alternative

Abstract

Examining the process of becoming from an existential perspective, we describe the existence of the self in non‐biological terms as a product of its own intentionality. In this context, there is no need to postulate a growth hypothesis in order to (1) to describe a person as a process of becoming, and (2) to explain self‐actualization. While the process of becoming is a static process, self‐actualization is a dynamic process. In the first case, the self deterministically and naively merely becomes. In the second, case, the process results from becoming the object of personal choices, whereby we become authentic. While the self is “a being in the process of mere becoming,” self‐actualization is “a being in the process of authentic becoming.” In this view, humanistic psychotherapy aims at making the self's mere becoming an authentic process. Existential crisis, in particular confrontation with death, is often the transformational medium.     

The importance of body satisfaction to physical self‐concept and body mass index in Spanish adolescents

This research examines the association between measured body mass index (BMI) and the perception of BMI by young students. Moreover, this research tests the importance of BMI and self‐concept, in order to predict body dissatisfaction in high school students. The sample consisted of 2087 individuals from different high schools in Extremadura, Spain, both males (n = 1046) and females (n = 1041), ranging in age from 15 to 17 years old (M = 15.42; SD = 0.86). Initially, participants' BMIs were assessed through anthropometry. Later, all individuals were asked about their weight and height, and their self‐reported BMI was calculated. Participants also answered a questionnaire about their perception of self‐concept, as well as completed a test about body image perception using Stunkard images. Outcomes revealed that factors concerning self‐concept and perceived BMI explained body dissatisfaction. Finally, results are discussed with the aim of improving knowledge in body dissatisfaction context.     

Individual Differences in Self‐Enhancement and Self‐Protection Strategies: An Integrative Analysis

ABSTRACT Research has identified a large number of strategies that people use to self‐enhance or self‐protect. We aimed for an empirical integration of these strategies. Two studies used self‐report items to assess all commonly recognized self‐enhancement or self‐protection strategies. In Study 1 (N=345), exploratory factor analysis identified 4 reliable factors. In Study 2 (N=416), this model was validated using confirmatory factor analysis. The factors related differentially to the key personality variables of regulatory focus, self‐esteem, and narcissism. Expanding this integrative approach in the future can reveal a great deal about the structure and dynamics of self‐enhancement and self‐protection motivation.     

Self‐Control as a Normative Capacity

Recently, two apparent truisms about self‐control have been questioned in both the philosophical and the psychological literature: the idea that exercising self‐control involves an agent doing something, and the idea that self‐control is a good thing. Both assumptions have come under threat because self‐control is increasingly understood as a mental mechanism, and mechanisms cannot possibly be good or active in the required sense. However, I will argue that it is not evident that self‐control should be understood as a mechanism, suggesting that we might also argue the other way around: if we have independent reason to hold onto the idea that self‐control is inherently good and active, the conclusion might be that self‐control cannot be a mechanism. I will show that Aristotle's original analysis of self‐control actually offers grounds for both assumptions: he took there to be conceptual connections between self‐control and goodness/activity. By examining these connections, I argue that an Aristotelian approach could offer promising leads for a contemporary non‐mechanistic understanding of self‐control as a normative capacity.     

Body‐Weight Self‐Schema: Determinant of Mood and Behavior in Women With an Eating Disorder1

The schema approach to self‐concept was used to investigate the association between body‐weight self‐conception and self‐esteem, negative affect states, and disordered eating behavior in women with anorexia nervosa (n= 26) or bulimia nervosa (N= 53) using experience sampling methodology. We predicted that self‐esteem would be lower and unpleasant affect and disordered eating behaviors would be higher when the body‐weight self‐schema was activated in working memory compared to when non‐weight‐related self‐schemas were activated. Participants recorded the currently activated self‐schema, self‐esteem, affect, and behavior in response to an alarm‐watch signal 5 times daily for 5 days. Activation of the body‐weight self‐schema was associated with lower self‐esteem and higher negative affect, but not higher levels of disordered eating behavior. Low self‐esteem and negative affect, however, were associated with disordered eating behavior. Findings have important implications for treatment of eating disorders.     

Who is a homosexual? A critique of the heterosexual‐homosexual dimension

Abstract

The heterosexual‐homosexual distinction as a construction inhibits appreciation of the diversity of sexual experience by encouraging use of static labels to classify people's continually evolving sexual histories. Distinguishing sexual preference may expedite comprehension of sexual acts, but is counterproductive when considering whole persons. We question the need for biological explanations of homosexuality and propose that “coming out” as homosexual is a personal choice to be celebrated, not a biological abnormality. We perceive sexuality as merely one aspect of per‐sonhood. When people instead see self‐proclaimed homosexuals as “homosexuals and only homosexuals” sexual behavior overshadows other salient individual characteristics, and sexual desire becomes inseparable from personality style.     

Implicit motives and basic psychological needs

The present article starts with discussing similarities and differences between conceptualizations of human needs in self‐determination theory (SDT; Deci & Ryan [1985], Intrinsic motivation and self‐determination in human behavior; Deci & Ryan [2000], Nebraska symposium on motivation: Perspectives on motivation) and motive disposition theory (MDT; McClelland, Human motivation, 1985). The second section focuses on the two‐process model of psychological needs (Sheldon [2011], Psychological Review, 118: 552), which aims to integrate the two approaches, whereas the third section highlights some aspects of both theories that are still decoupled or even contradictory, but nevertheless still have a high potential to be linked. These three aspects are (a) the noncorresponding concepts of implicit power motive (MDT) and basic need for autonomy (SDT); (b) the differentiation of needs into hope and fear components, which is theoretically embedded in MDT, but not in SDT; and (c) MDT researchers’ differentiation into an implicit and explicit motivational system, which is not included in SDT. Particularly, the last section highlights the potential for areas in which further integration is possible, which provides a foundation for comprehensive and exciting research on human motivation.