Is psychodiagnostic assessment humanistic?

The views of psychologists associated with the humanistic orientation in regard to psychodiagnostic assessment was examined. For the most part these theorists describe assessment as nonhumanistic. Their concerns about assessment were divided into five categories: that assessment is reductionistic; it is artificial; it does not pay attention to the examiner-patient relatinship; it judges people; it is overly intellectual. These concerns were elaborated and then responded to from a pro-assessment stance. Although these criticisms could be valid, their validity was said to reflect poor diagnostic practice rather than an inherent weakness in the assessment enterprise. As long as the examiner attempts actively to engage the patient in the assessment process and is aware of the interpersonal context of the test responses and behavior, then psychodiagnostic assessment is consistent with a humanistic orientation.     

Is ‘human action’ A category?

It seems to have been taken for granted that we all know what a human action is. However in attempting to draw from what philosophers have said about actions the necessary clues as to their distinguishing features, one finds little to discourage the idea that there is no way of distinguishing one category of occurrences, human actions, from the complex of different sorts of things which happen. From this I am tempted to conclude that there is no category of human action. But before drawing such a conclusion an ancient but terrible question must be faced: What sorts of things happen in the world ? This ancient question is faced but not answered. It is brought up because the failure to find a satisfactory answer to the question, Is human action a category? is a failure even to find a satisfactory assumption about what kind of reference the term ‘human action’ is supposed to have.     

Is the human mind a Turing machine?

In this paper I discuss the topics of mechanism and algorithmicity. I emphasise that a characterisation of algorithmicity such as the Turing machine is iterative; and I argue that if the human mind can solve problems that no Turing machine can, the mind must depend on some non-iterative principle — in fact, Cantor's second principle of generation, a principle of the actual infinite rather than the potential infinite of Turing machines. But as there has been theorisation that all physical systems can be represented by Turing machines, I investigate claims that seem to contradict this: specifically, claims that there are noncomputable phenomena. One conclusion I reach is that if it is believed that the human mind is more than a Turing machine, a belief in a kind of Cartesian dualist gulf between the mental and the physical is concomitant.     

Is Psychoanalytic Education Effective? Comment on Damsa et al. (2010)

While a growing body of empirical data attests increasingly to the efficacy of psychoanalytic treatment, what data do we have that attests to the effectiveness of psychoanalytic education? In this comment on Damsa et al. (2010), I briefly address that question and suggest that—if we are to truly generate passionate interest in psychoanalysis among psychiatric residents and other mental health professionals in training—perhaps we need to begin by researching the largely unresearched process of psychoanalytic education and supervision.     

Is Capitalism Inevitable? Is Revolution Possible? Deleuze and Guattari between Capitalism and Calculus

In Anti-Oedipus, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari maintain that nature is a process in which there is neither nature nor human being, except as a single reality produced in the processes of production, distribution and consumption, where distributions are immediately consumed and the consumptions immediately reproduced. In its historical realization, this is the process of capitalism, which must be an effect of such processes, processes of nature and human nature. This gives rise to this question: given the rules governing nature, including human nature, how much contingency is there and how much determinism? And ultimately, is capitalism inevitable?     

Is there something quantum-like about the human mental lexicon?

Following an early claim by Nelson and McEvoy suggesting that word associations can display ‘spooky action at a distance behaviour’, a serious investigation of the potentially quantum nature of such associations is currently underway. In this paper quantum theory is proposed as a framework suitable for modelling the human mental lexicon, specifically the results obtained from both intralist and extralist word association experiments. Some initial models exploring this hypothesis are discussed, and experiments capable of testing these models proposed.     

Psychoanalytic Depth: A Contemporary Concept?

Although it sounds antiquated to refer to psychoanalysis as “depth psychology,” we continue to use the metaphor in relation to our clinical work. What does depth mean as we think about and engage in our work today? This is an introduction to three different arguments for a contemporary understanding of psychoanalytic depth followed by a discussion.     

Is Color-dispositionalism Nasty and Unecological?

This article is a brief presentation and defense of response-dispositionalist intentionalism against a family of objections. The view claims that for a surface to have an objective stable color is to have a disposition to cause in normal observers a response, namely, intentional phenomenal-color experience. The objections, raised recently by M. Johnston, B. Stroud, and by Byrne and Hilbert, claim that any dispositionalist view is unfair to the naive perceiver-thinker, saddles her with massive error and represents her as maladaptated to her environment. The paper reconstructs the main line of thought in favor of response-intentionalism and argues that it is in fact rather charitable and fair to na?ve cognizers, and also avoids a cluster of related objections.     

Is there a sensitive period in human incest avoidance?

Many studies support the proposition that early cosocialization with opposite-sex children has the effect of inhibiting later mutual sexual attraction, but the existence of a period in the life cycle in which individuals are sensitive to the effect of early cosocialization has been a matter of controversy. Drawing on earlier traditional psychological research, and on more recent work guided by parental investment theory, we hypothesized that only for maternal perinatal association (MPA)-absent males a less-than- around-three-years age difference with the sister can predict stronger aversion to sibling incest. The results corroborated the hypothesis. The results can be interpreted as support for the existence of a sensitive period as well as for the potent role of MPA. Cross-cultural comparative studies were called on to further test the hypothesis.     

Why Don't People Change? A Psychoanalytic Perspective

From a psychoanalytic perspective, a central reason that people do not easily change is their fear of the dangers that they believe, at some level, change entails. These dangers include relinquishment of infantile wishes and fantasies, anxiety that would be experienced were defenses weakened, guilt, fantasies that change would harm a parental figure or threaten a vital relationship. Other factors that prevent change and maintain the sameness of behavior include defenses, unconscious pathogenic beliefs, devotion and loyalty to early figures, stable internal working models of self, other, and prototypic interactions, and emitting cues that elicit responses from others that confirm these working models. Finally, 1 discuss some selective psychoanalytic research on therapeutic change.     

What Is and Is Not Ethnocentrism? A Conceptual Analysis and Political Implications

Conceptual analysis has not been systematically implemented in psychology, and many concepts have often been defined in different and contradictory ways. This article focuses on a conceptual clarification of ethnocentrism. It points out the conceptual confusion surrounding the term, reviews numerous definitions and operationalizations, and attempts to clarify it. Ethnocentrism is reconceptualized as a strong sense of ethnic group self‐centeredness, which involves intergroup expressions of ethnic group preference, superiority, purity, and exploitativeness, and intragroup expressions of ethnic group cohesion and devotion. It is conceptually and empirically distinguished from other concepts, such as outgroup negativity and mere ingroup positivity. The article presents a theoretical framework and related empirical analyses supporting the usefulness of reconceptualized ethnocentrism. It also details important and unique implications of reconceptualized ethnocentrism for political phenomena. It is expected that reliance on the clarified reconceptualization should enable researchers to systematically study ethnocentrism, its origins, and consequences.     

Psychoanalytic Treatment: Thick Soup or Thin Gruel?

One way to evaluate a psychoanalytic theory is to picture a therapist with that theory in his mind and imagine what happens when we fold him into the basic soup of psychoanalytic procedure. Because the background forces of analytic treatment are so influential, the practical outcome cannot be predicted from the details or the validity of the theory alone. Thus, we should not assume that newly discovered items of neurophysiology and infant observation are ever what is actually being dealt with in psychoanalysis. To illustrate this principle, I select two recent theories derived from observational studies, and explore the likely effects that a therapist's belief in them would have on seven dimensions of the psychoanalytic situation. Theories set the therapist's attitude, the attitude affects the background forces, and the total effect of all of that constitutes the significance of the theories for psychoanalytic treatment.     

On “That Is Not Psychoanalysis”: Ethics as the Main Tool for Psychoanalytic Knowledge and Discussion

“That is not (or that is) psychoanalysis” is a statement that, more often than not, can only remind us that psychoanalysis is divided into many schools and that discussion among them is difficult if not impossible. This will always be the case as long as analysts hold to their respective ontological definitions as if these were impervious to the laws and, most important, to the Ethics of translation. In psychoanalysis our Ethics and our Epistemology are two sides of the same coin, inseparable from our know-how. Our ethical stance is what allows (or impedes) central psychoanalytic facts to be brought into daylight. This principle applies both in the analytic room and in the room where analysts from different schools try to hold a productive discussion. In both instances “translation” is necessarily incomplete; it is therefore recommended to start by looking for the missing part.