Ego transcendence in postmodern perspective

Based on the author's previous specification of the conventional ego mind as the primary barrier to “realization of the ground of consciousness,” postmodern perspectives on the ego mind barrier are compared with premodern and modern approaches. Postmodernists view the ego as a socio‐linguistic construct. Modern assumptions of consistent subjectivity and a unitary self or identity are rejected, and reduction of the ego mind barrier to transcendence is seen to follow from exploration of alternative self‐concepts. This perspective is manifest in theories of “possible selves” and in the contrast between formulations such as the “saturated self vs. the “empty self.” Though forms of ego transcendence likely in postmodern cultures will differ from those in premodern cultures, many of the same functions will be served, as may be observed in such phenomena as “ecomysticism.”     

Alexithymia and the reflexive self: Implications of congruence theory for treatment of the emotionally impaired

Abstract

This paper attempts to articulate a so far neglected dimension of congruence theory, the reflexive self to self transaction. My claim is that self reflexivity is a tacit but fundamental assumption behind Carl Rogers’ formulations of the relationship—what he refers to as “congruence” or “incongruence"—between experience and its symbolization in awareness. Gendlin's elaboration of the congruence theory in terms of “experiencing” and “inward sensing” has made clear and explicit the important role self reflexivity plays in the relationship between symbols and “unformed emotional experience.” A case vignette of Focusing is used to demonstrate the relevance of self reflexivity to our understanding of verbal expression of emotions, and by extension, to our understanding and treatment of alexithymia and related conditions of emotional impairments.     

Settling on what we are: The central place of the sense‐of‐self in education,and the implication of the concepts of the teleon and telentropy for the development of the sense‐of‐self

The purpose of this article is to illustrate the centrality of the development of a person's sense‐of‐self in his or her personal growth, and so to justify why educators should deliberately focus the attention of learners on the development of their own senses‐of‐self.

We describe the sense‐of‐self as a person's working hypothesis of what he or she is, as a functioning being. (This is in contrast to the notion of self‐concept, which is composed of the beliefs and evaluations that one has about oneself as a person in a social context.)

To illustrate the centrality of the sense‐of‐self we introduce two associated concepts—the teleon and telentropy. Teleons are “purposeful action patterns,” which may be regarded as the defining characteristic of any living system, including human beings.

Telentropy is similar to entropy (encountered in physics and chemistry), but instead of dealing with the level of disorder in externally described systems, it represents the level of informational confusion existing within an organism regarding its own true nature.

We discuss the implications of the concepts “teleon” and “telentropy” for a person's educability, using examples from daily life and educational institutions.

We provide a number of suggestions for the revising of educational practice to foster the development of the sense‐of‐self in learners. This we demonstrate to have potentially beneficial effects of the general stress levels of society.     

Worries about crime: Rank‐ordering survival concerns among urban transient females

This exploratory study examined the role that worries about crime occupies in the lives of New York City's homeless women. Building upon Coston's (1988) research finding of self‐perceptions of high vulnerability but low levels of fear of crime among homeless females, the present study suggests that homeless women deprioritize worries about crime in lieu of worries about their family's well‐being, poor physical health, lack of proper nutrition, and lack of money. Maslow's (1954) needs hierarchy is applied as an explanation of these findings.     

Buddha,being and the black forest 1

Abstract

While Martin Heidegger is commonly acknowledged as having a significant influence on contemporary philosophy and psychology, there have been comments made about his being a ‘closet Buddhist,’ and many of his later ideas are perceived as mystical. It is argued in this paper that this is because Heidegger is usually understood through a Western framework, whereas many of his later ideas move closer to Eastern thinking.

This paper revisits Heidegger via Buddhism. It examines important parallels and differences between Heideggerian and Buddhist ideas, such as “openness” and “non‐self,” “letting be” and “letting go,” “fourfold” and “inter‐relatedness. This comparison is undertaken against the backdrop of Medard Boss's psychotherapy, daseinsanalysis (Existential Analysis), which Heidegger engaged with extensively. Overall, the analysis illuminates the pragmatics and psychological underpinnings of Heideggerian and Buddhist philosophy, and elucidates the contributions that this understanding can make to contemporary psychology.     

Personal Construct Theory and Cognitive Science

Abstract

Warren (1990) claims to have formulated an argument “that personal construct psychology is not a cognitive psychology” (p. 379). Nonetheless, he presents very little in the way of logical demonstration or empirical evidence to support this conclusion. Moreover, the theoretical significance of the question posed in the title of his essay (“Is Personal Construct Psychology a Cognitive Psychology?”) is far from obvious. He asserts that “what is at dispute here is the proper characterization of a position” however, his listing several textbooks that refer to Kelly's theory as a “cognitive” approach to the study of personality does nothing at all to either clarify the specific implications of this question or explain its importance. Interestingly, in a recent introductory personality text by one of Kelly's former students (Phares, 1988), this theory is designated as a “phenomenological approach,” which is consistent with Warren's own notion that “he [Kelly] was more phenomenological than he himself believed” Kelly vigorously resisted all such attempts to classify his model in terms of the usual textbook categories (cf. Adams-Webber & Mancuso, 1983).     

Posttraumatic growth following pregnancy termination for fetal abnormality: the predictive role of coping strategies and perinatal grief

Background: Research about termination for fetal abnormality (TFA) suggests that it is a traumatic event with potential negative psychological consequences. However, evidence also indicates that following traumatic events individuals may experience growth. Although TFA’s negative psychological outcomes are well documented, little is known of the potential for growth following this event. Therefore, the study’s objectives were to measure posttraumatic growth (PTG) post-TFA, examine the relationship between PTG, perinatal grief and coping, and determine the predictors of PTG.

Design: An online, retrospective survey was conducted with 161 women.

Methods: Eligible participants were women over 18 who had undergone TFA. Participants were recruited from a support organisation. They completed the Brief COPE, Short Perinatal Grief Scale and Posttraumatic Growth Inventory. Data were analysed using regression analyses.

Results: Moderate levels of PTG were observed for “relating to others,” “personal strengths” and “appreciation of life.” “Positive reframing” was a significant predictor of PTG. Despite using mainly “adaptive” coping strategies, women’s grief levels were high.

Conclusions: “Adaptive” coping strategies such as, “positive reframing” are relevant to TFA. They may act as protective factors against distress and as foundations for growth, implicating that interventions such as Cognitive Behavioural Therapy, which aim to reframe women’s experience, may be beneficial.     

Self and space

Abstract

Seemingly incomparable, self and space are seen as related, both psychologically and ontologically. The experience of self as expansive space has distinct psychological benefits, which are explored through a clinical vignette. Next, the issue of the “reality” of self is taken up. It is argued that the ontological status of self is indeterminate, which means that it is open to being that which it is considered to be. The powerful effect of such considerations on the being of self and its Ufe experience are explored both through various philosophical conceptions of self (e.g., as extensionless point, intentional consciousness, or limitless space) and through the self‐fulfilling prophecies which conceptions of self generate in people's lives. Lastly, it is proposed that the consideration of self as space can open the door to a rich, expanded, connected, harmonious living.     

Ferenczi's “Confusion of Tongues” Theory and the Analysis of the Incest Trauma

Abstract

The tender-mother transference of Ferenczi's humanistic analytic orientation was as important an advance in pioneering times as was Kohut's selfobject transference in contemporary psychoanalysis. Ferenczi's clinical theory and method began a focus on pre-oedipal experiences, which eventually became an alternate to the oedipal theory. Freud was critical of Ferenczi's formulation, leading a successful attempt to suppress his work and remove it from mainstream psychoanalysis because he believed it was “regressive.” In actuality, Ferenczi's “Confusion of Tongues” theory and “Relaxation Therapy” were prophetic and pioneering attempts to understand and treat the incest trauma (ironically the clinical data upon which Freud founded psychoanalysis 100 years ago). In the case of Miss T., Ferenczi's ideas are applied to the contemporary analysis of the incest trauma.     

Temporal dimensions of the self-concept: Entrapped and possible selves in chronic pain

Abstract

The purpose of this qualitative study was to explore temporal aspects of chronic pain patients' conceptions of their selves; what they were in the past, how they were functioning at the present and what they thought about their potential and future. In-depth interviews with 21 chronic pain patients were performed and analysed. The main results of the analysis included four higher-order conceptual patterns: “the body and I”, “maintaining the consistency of past self”, the “entrapped self”, and “projected selves, defined by others”. These results are presented in a systems-oriented model illustrating the temporal dynamic between the perceived functioning self, the body and others, such as health care personnel and significant others. The mechanisms of the process of how selves are developing in the chronisation or healing process of pain are finally discussed. A clinical implication of these findings might be that with an enlarged insight of the temporal dynamic and the importance of interactive and social factors in shaping positive possible selves, health care personnel can contribute more effectively in stew-arding the chronic pain patient toward health-promotive ends and a concomitantly higher quality of life.     

Kane,Luck, and the significance of free will

Abstract

This paper raises a pair of objections to the novel libertarian position advanced in Robert Kane's recent book, The Significance of Free Will.The first objection's target is a central element in Kane's intriguing response to what he calls the “Intelligibility” and “Existence” questions about free will. It is argued that this response is undermined by considerations of luck.The second objection is directed at a portion of Kane's answer to what he calls “The Significance Question” about free will: “Why do we, or should we, want to possess a free will that is incompatible with determinism? Is it a kind of freedom ‘worth wanting’... and, if so, why?” A desire for “objective worth” has a featured role in his answer. However, a compatibilist can have that desire.     

Phenomenology,behaviorism and psychotherapy

Abstract

t “Everything begins with subjective states,” is the basic position of Phenomenology, and only through subjectivity imate reality be reached. Behaviorism, on the contrary, sees “mind” as part of the material world—the and behavior as determining man's essence (man is what he does). “Change,” which is the goal of every therapy, is attend by altering behavior which leads to changes in attitudes. The best way to alter beliefs is by controlling the behavioral cognition itself.     

Constructive Metatheory: II. Implications for Psychotherapy

Abstract

The implications of constructive metatheory for the conceptualization and practice of psychotherapy are briefly outlined. It is argued that the constructivist therapist construes the client as an active and developing process, and that psychological problems are approached not as piecemeal flaws or deficiencies, but as expressions of current discrepancies between an individual's adaptive capacities and the challenges she or he faces. Likewise, the process of psychotherapy is portrayed as one of trial-and-error experimentation with different (novel) ways of “being in the world.” Ideally, the client and therapist create an intimate and emotionally charged alliance in and from which the client can explore and experiment with self and world relationships. These practical features dovetail with many assertions of the major me-tatheories of psychotherapy, and it is argued that constructive metatheory may be uniauely suited to facilitating attempts at conceptual integration     

Organic imagination as intuitive intellect: Self‐knowledge and self‐constitution in Hegel's early critique of Kant

This paper concerns Hegel's early treatment of the productive imagination in his 1803–1804 Faith and Knowledge. I show how he articulates that activity in terms of a pair of speculative unities, which solve lingering problems of self‐knowledge and self‐constitution from Kant's B‐deduction. On the one hand, I argue that the familiar unity of spontaneity and receptivity makes possible knowledge of the moment of self‐positing. On the other hand, I contend that Hegel's talk of imagination as both an “organic idea” and an “intuitive intellect” refers to a self‐constituting capacity that intellects like ours possess. I show that self‐constitution is possible, for Hegel, only in so far as intellects like ours possess a capacity to unify possibility and actuality in thought, or to think themselves into being.     

Unity with(in) Plurality: Rawls’s Idea of Public Justification Reinterpreted

Abstract

This paper explores and interprets Rawls’s idea of public justification by analysing the types of reasons that citizens use when engaged in public justification of a political conception of justice. In particular, I focus on the distinction between “consensual” and “distributive” modes of justification. Some critics have argued that Rawls is unclear whether he is relying on “consensual” or “distributive” forms of reasoning; others argue that Rawls shifts inconsistently between them. I attempt to clarify this puzzle. I show that consensual and distributive modes of public reasoning are not mutually exclusive to each other. On the contrary, they are introduced as necessary components of public justification in Rawls’s theory. Thus, his model is consensual-cum-distributive. I also suggest some reasons why this model can better account for the liberal idea of pluralism, and how it offers a more realistic moral and political psychology, giving the account greater epistemic virtue than its alternatives.     

A Response to the Contributors

Abstract

In my “response to the contributors” I emphasize that I was moved to write my book in response to the question “Why are so many well-trained colleagues, young and old, having so much difficulty developing satisfying analytic practices?” To answer that question I proposed to explore my experience successfully developing and maintaining an analytic practice.

In attempting to answer the question I inadvertently stumbled upon a revolutionary (with a “small r”) answer to the problem. I discovered, in my attitudes and in my way of working in a consultation and the early phase of an analytic collaboration, a new “concrete puzzle solution” to the problem of how to help a prospective, often reluctant collaborator give analysis a “try.”

My book emphasizes my view that courses on “analyzability” and differential diagnosis are based on psychiatric rather than psychoanalytic diagnostic schema and may interfere with candidates' ability to learn how to create analytic patients.

Since I was a candidate, courses on analyzability have always seemed to me to resemble an exclusive club, deciding whom to exclude and whom to admit, rather than a procedure based on sound clinical experience. Analytic experience has demonstrated that it is not possible in a consultation to predict accurately the outcome of an analysis. To make matters worse, it is probable that an analyst whose mind is focused on the task of evaluating a prospective analysand contributes to creating an environment in which certain patients are experienced as sicker than they might otherwise be.

In spite of the fact that it is not possible in a consultation to predict accurately the outcome of an analysis, many experienced “senior” analysts believe an analyst can and should be evaluative and selective. In their discussions of the subject, they focus primarily on characteristics of the patient rather than the match.

In my book I emphasize that in a consultation there are advantages in focusing on the patient's responses to the idea of engaging in a trial of analysis. The issue of the match and the particular time in their lives are significant from my perspective. The analyst's gender, age, personality, and related state of mind may be as important in effecting the outcome of a trial as any feature of the patient's mind.

My book shifts the emphasis of the focus of inquiry in a consultation from the patient to the analytic couple. It offers a different way of teaching candidates to work with prospective collaborators.     

Who is a homosexual? A critique of the heterosexual‐homosexual dimension

Abstract

The heterosexual‐homosexual distinction as a construction inhibits appreciation of the diversity of sexual experience by encouraging use of static labels to classify people's continually evolving sexual histories. Distinguishing sexual preference may expedite comprehension of sexual acts, but is counterproductive when considering whole persons. We question the need for biological explanations of homosexuality and propose that “coming out” as homosexual is a personal choice to be celebrated, not a biological abnormality. We perceive sexuality as merely one aspect of per‐sonhood. When people instead see self‐proclaimed homosexuals as “homosexuals and only homosexuals” sexual behavior overshadows other salient individual characteristics, and sexual desire becomes inseparable from personality style.     

A meditation on the nature of self‐healing and personality change in psychotherapy based on Gendlin's theory of experiencing

Abstract

From a humanistic point of view psychotherapy is a creative transformational process in which therapists assist clients’ intrinsic self‐healing tendencies. However the nature of the self‐healing process is poorly understood. I briefly consider two theories of self‐healing, Rogers’ self‐actualization theory and dialectical theory, but focus on Gendlin's theory of experiencing as providing a more complete explanation. I consider the fundamentally implicational nature of change and portray personal change as “paradigm evolution” rather than paradigm revolution. I conclude with an examination of the self‐healing process in therapies that provide minimal prosthetic assistance to the client: client‐centered therapy, eye movement desensitization and reprocessing, and focusing‐oriented therapy. I conclude that the self‐healing/self‐change process occurs when intellectual, “top‐down” cognitive and self‐critical activity is interrupted, and when clients adopt a receptive, listening attitude towards inner experience.