The ecological imagination

This paper offers a psychoanalytic exploration of meaning within the concept of ecology. From a starting point in the experience of primal anxiety, originating in the work of Freud, Jung and Klein, links are made to cultural themes through a developing comparison of case studies in literature, mythology, the public sphere and clinical practice. It is argued that the application of psychoanalytic ideas to environmental concern has validity. The idea emerges that individual and public attitudes to our environment might be open to positive change through an appreciation of the concept of early anxiety, currently available to us in work of the imagination.     

Aboutness in imagination

I present a formal theory of the logic and aboutness of imagination. Aboutness is understood as the relation between meaningful items and what they concern, as per Yablo and Fine’s works on the notion. Imagination is understood as per Chalmers’ positive conceivability: the intentional state of a subject who conceives that p by imagining a situation—a configuration of objects and properties—verifying p. So far aboutness theory has been developed mainly for linguistic representation, but it is natural to extend it to intentional states. The proposed framework combines a modal semantics with a mereology of contents: imagination operators are understood as variably strict quantifiers over worlds with a content-preservation constraint.     

Supervision and imagination

Abstract :  This paper explores the role of imagination for the supervisor and examines the differences between the supervisor's use of creative and defensive imagination. It is suggested that reverie and imagining play a central role in supervision but that these need to be harnessed in the service of the reality principle. It is argued that the Jungian emphasis on the ego-self relationship provides a context for this process. A clinical example of work with a supervisee is described in which hidden aspects of a strong erotic transference/countertransference were revealed in the supervisor's imagining and became available for reflection.     

Empathy as dialectic imagination

Abstract

The importance of relationship processes for humanistic and psychodynamic therapists makes empathy a critical concept in psychotherapy. Experimental work suggests that learning occurs only when the subject is actively and cooperatively engaged in the learning process. Similarly, psychotherapy is only effective when the client is willingly active in the therapeutic process. A crucial aspect of the therapist's activity is empathic imagination, defined here as the use of “dialectic” thinking capacities‐the recognition of conceptual alternatives in a given situation. These processes are at the heart of a humanistic view of agency. The therapist's use of this capacity allows imaginative projection into aspects of the client's experience, helping the client to feel understood in the relationship and emboldened to consider new possibilities in life.     

Responsibility and evil imagination

In this Niebuhrian perspective on hostile and violent discourse the author utilizes H. R. Niebuhr's fourfold notion of responsibility and his concept of evil imagination to examine relations marred by protracted hostility toward hated other or others. The author argues that violent and hostile discourse manifests a particular form of responsibility whereby persons expressing hostility toward hated others construct, by way of negative representations, maligned histories and identities for the other and at the same time construct an idealized or glorified history and identity for themselves. These positive and negative representations and histories, then, are utilized to answer questions regarding interpretation, accountability, and solidarity. Niebuhr's concept of evil imagination is employed to hypothesize about the intransigence of this form of responsibility and to suggest reasons why elevated and maligned representations, identities, and histories are, more often than not, inextricably and tragically linked.     

The hippocampus as a "stupid," domain-specific module: Implications for theories of recent and remote memory, and of imagination.

The hippocampus and surrounding regions of the medial temporal lobe play a central role in all neuropsychological theories of memory. It is still a matter of debate, however, how best to characterise the functions of these regions, the hippocampus in particular. In this article, I examine the proposal that the hippocampus is a "stupid" module whose specific domain is consciously apprehended information. A number of interesting consequences for the organisation of memory and the brain follow from this proposal and the assumptions it entails. These, in turn, have important implications for neuropsychological theories of recent and remote episodic, semantic, and spatial memory and for the functions that episodic memory may serve in perception, comprehension, planning, imagination, and problem solving. I consider these implications by selectively reviewing the literature and primarily drawing on research my collaborators and I have conducted.     

Individual differences in imagination inflation

Garry, Manning, Loftus, and Sherman (1996) found that when adult subjects imagined childhood events, these events were subsequentlyjudged as more likely to have occurred than were not-imagined events. The authors termed this effect imagination inflation. We replicated the effect, using a novel set of Life Events Inventory events. Further, we tested whether the effect is related to four subject characteristics possibly associated with false memory creation. The extent to which subjects inflated judged likelihood following imagined events was associated with indices of hypnotic suggestibility and dissociativity, but not with vividness of imagery or interrogative suggestibility. Results suggest that imagination plays a role in subsequent likelihood judgments regarding childhood events, and that some individuals are more likely than others to experience imagination inflation.     

How literature expands your imagination

Many great authors claim that reading literature can expand your phenomenal imagination and allow you to imagine experiences you have never had. How is this possible? Your phenomenal imagination is constrained by your phenomenal concepts, which are in turn constrained by the phenomenology of your own actual past experiences. Literature could expand your phenomenal imagination, then, by giving you new phenomenal concepts. This paper explains how this can happen. Literature can direct your attention to previously unnoticed phenomenal properties of your own past experiences, as brought to mind by involuntary memory. This process gives you the opportunity to notice those phenomenal properties for the first time, and so also to form phenomenal concepts of those properties. Forming a new phenomenal concept strictly expands the range of your phenomenal imagination. It gives you the capacity to imagine more than you could have before, including certain specific kinds of experience that you yourself have never enjoyed firsthand. Literature’s capacity to expand your phenomenal imagination in this way is central to its social, moral, and epistemic value.