Mood-related changes in construing self and others

Two repertory grids were administered to 31 Canadian undergraduates (20 women and 11 men) in which they rated themselves and 10 personal acquaintances on 11 supplied constructs. For the initial (baseline) grid they followed neutral instructions. For the second grid, they rated the same figures while listening to happy music and attempting to recall pleasant memories. The results from both grids closely approximated a set of theoretical predictions derived from a model of interpersonal judgment by Lefebvre, Lefebvre, and Adams-Webber (1986) within the framework of personal construct theory.     

Modeling self on others: An import theory of subjectivity and selfhood

This paper outlines an Import Theory of subjectivity and selfhood. Import theory claims that subjectivity is initially perceived as a key feature of other minds before it then becomes imported from other minds to own minds whereby it lays the ground for mental selfhood. Import theory builds on perception-production matching, which in turn draws on both representational mechanisms and social practices. Representational mechanisms rely on common coding of perception and production. Social practices rely on action mirroring in dyadic interactions. The interplay between mechanisms and practices gives rise to model self on others. Individuals become intentional agents in virtue of perceiving others mirroring themselves. The outline of the theory is preceded by an introductory section that locates import theory in the broader context of competing approaches, and it is followed by a concluding section that assesses import theory in terms of empirical evidence and explanatory power.     

Including others in the self

We propose that to some extent, people treat the resources, perspectives, and identities of close others as their own. This proposal is supported by allocation, attribution, response time, and memory experiments. Recently, we have applied this idea to deepening understanding of feeling “too close” (including too much of the other in the self leading to feeling controlled or a loss of identity), the effects of relationship loss (it is distressing to the extent that the former partner was included in the self, liberating to the extent that the former partner was preventing self-expansion), ingroup identification (including ingroup in the self), and the effect of outgroup friendships on outgroup attitudes (including outgroup member in the self entails including outgroup member's identity in the self).     

Individual risk taking for self and others

In this experimental study, individual risk taking for self and others was observed for three experimental situations (the choice dilemma situations of Kogan and Wallach, 1964, the Pruitt and Teger gambling situation, 1969, and a simple one-trial gamble game). The results of the present study suggest that one takes as much risk for oneself as for somebody else. An attempt was made to determine to what degree the results could be explained by properties of the experimental situations.     

Defining traits differently for self and others

Identical trait labels may be understood differently in thinking about self and in thinking about others. Specifically, when making self-judgments, individuals define traits primarily in terms of unobservable manifestations, e.g., how one feels. However, in making other-judgments, particularly in making judgments about relatively unfamiliar others, individuals define traits primarily in terms of observable manifestations, e.g., how one looks. This prediction was tested in three experiments (Exp. 1: N = 96, Polish undergraduates including 19 men, 77 women; Exp. 2: N = 96, U.S. undergraduates including 18 men, 78 women; Exp. 3: N = 74, Polish undergraduates including 18 men, 56 women). Participants were asked to perform a generic trait judgment task followed by a specific trait judgment task in which the same traits were preceded by a qualifier "feels" or "looks". As expected, in the case of self-judgments, generic judgments predicted feels judgments better than looks judgments. This pattern did not occur for judgments of others and was reversed for judgments about others who were relatively unfamiliar.     

Perceived ingroup entitativity and intergroup bias: an interconnection of self and others

Campbell's (1958) concept of ingroup entitativity is reformulated as a perceived interconnection of self and others. A 2 (intergroup relations: competitive, neutral)×3 (intragroup interaction: low, medium, high) between-subjects design was used to examine (1) the effects of intergroup and intragroup relations on perceived ingroup entitativity and (2) the relation between ingroup entitativity and intergroup bias. Regardless of the relations between groups, members who experienced intragroup interaction had stronger perceptions of ingroup entitativity and stronger representations of the aggregate of ingroup and outgroup members as two separate groups than members who lacked intragroup interaction. Furthermore, perceptions of ingroup entitativity mediated the effect of the salience of the intergroup boundary on behavioral intergroup bias. These results call into question the ‘intergroup’ nature of group based phenomena. An ingroup entitativity framework is presented that locates the source of group-based phenomena (e.g. intergroup bias) in intragroup processes. Copyright © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Confusions of self with close others

This article explores the cognitive underpinnings of interpersonal closeness in the theoretical context of "including other in the self" and, specifically, the notion of overlap between cognitive representations of self and close others. In each of three studies, participants first rated different traits for self, close others (e.g., romantic partner, best friend), and less close others (e.g., media personalities), followed by a surprise source recognition task (who was each trait rated for?). As predicted, in each study, there were more source confusions between traits rated for self and close others (e.g., a trait rated for self recalled as having been rated for the close other) than between self (or close others) and non-close others. Furthermore, several results suggest that the greater confusions between self and close others are due specifically to interpersonal closeness and not to greater familiarity or similarity with close others     

Attributions about self and others in commons dilemmas

An experiment was conducted to investigate the effects of self-harvest and resource management outcome on self–other attributions in a simulated commons dilemma. In groups of five or six, participants (n=171) managed a limited, shared, self-regenerating resource. Self-attributions to ignorance, concern for others, fear, and greed were compared to the same attributions made for cooperative and noncooperative others. The attributions were made in two contexts: efficient management and rapid resource depletion. As predicted, self-attributions resembled those made for similar others; heavy harvesters made similar attributions for themselves and noncooperative others, and light harvesters made similar attributions for themselves and the cooperative others. A self-serving bias was evident, especially among heavy harvesters. Attributions were also influenced by the context in which they were made; stronger attributions to ignorance, fear, and greed, and weaker attributions to concern for others were made when the resource pool was rapidly depleted than when it was managed efficiently.     

Intuitions about situational correction in self and others

People's attributional phenomenology is likely to be characterized by effortful situational correction. Drawing on this phenomenology and on people's desire to view themselves more favorably than others, the authors hypothesized that people expect others to engage in less situational correction than themselves and to make more extreme dispositional attributions for constrained actors' behavior. In 2 studies, people expected their peers to make more extreme dispositional inferences than they did themselves for a situationally constrained actor's behavior. People's expectation that they engage in more situational correction than their peers was diminished among Japanese participants, who have less desire to view themselves as superior to their peers (Study 3), and among participants who were led to view dispositional attributions more favorably than situational attributions (Study 4).     

Through the looking glass: self and others

In the present article we discuss the relevance of the mirror mechanism for our sense of self and our sense of others. We argue that, by providing us with an understanding from the inside of actions, the mirror mechanism radically challenges the traditional view of the self and of the others. Indeed, this mechanism not only reveals the common ground on the basis of which we become aware of ourselves as selves distinct from other selves, but also sheds new light on the content of our self and other experience, showing that we primarily experience ourselves and the others in terms of our own and of their motor possibilities respectively.     

Conceptions of the self and others across time

People are full of plans, goals, hopes, and fears-future-oriented thoughts that constitute a significant part of the self-concept. But are representations of others similarly future oriented? Studies 1a and 1b demonstrate that the future is seen as a larger component of the self than of another person. Study 2 found that because self-identity is tied to an unrealized future, the self is thought to be less knowable than others in the present. Study 3 indicates that people believe that others need to know who they are striving to be in order to be understood-more so than they believe they need to know others' strivings to understand them. Studies 4a and 4b tested an important implication of these findings, that because so much of who they are is tied to the future, people believe they are further from their ideal selves than others are. Implications for judgment and decision making are discussed.     

The impact of perceived experience on likelihood judgments for self and others: an experimental approach

This study examines the effect of an experimental manipulation of perceived experience on self and others' likelihood ratings for a set of relatively commonplace misfortunes. Participants were randomly assigned to a condition in which they were asked whether they had ever experienced the events (designed to induce higher perceived experience) or whether they had done so frequently, typically, etc. (designed to induce lower perceived experience). The manipulation led to increases in ratings of both perceived self‐likelihood and others' likelihood, in ease of imagining the outcome and recall of a past occurrence, and to decreases in perceived control over the events in the higher perceived experience condition. The increases in ease of imagining mediated the impact of manipulated experience on comparative likelihood whereas the decreases in perceived control did not. There was little evidence that event controllability moderated the impact of experience on comparative likelihood for these events. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Social competency and social perceptivity in self and others

Males who self-reported heterosocial problems and whose role-play interactions were judged to be low on social competence were compared to a group of high socially competent males on their ability to judge their own and others' social competency. Results indicated that in comparison to the high-competent group, low-competent males showed less agreement with judges in rating their own and others' levels of competency. Using profile components of elevation, scatter, and pattern, more detailed analyses showed that the two groups differed primarily on scatter. The low-competent individuals had less scatter, suggesting that they have a discrimination deficiency. Implications of the results are discussed for the etiology and treatment of social incompetence and for future research.     

The self and others in the experience of pride

Pride is seen as both a self-conscious emotion as well as a social emotion. These categories are not mutually exclusive, but have brought forth different ideas about pride as either revolving around the self or as revolving around one’s relationship with others. Current measures of pride do not include intrapersonal elements of pride experiences. Social comparisons, which often cause experiences of pride, contain three elements: the self, the relationship between the self and another person, and the other person. From the literature on pride, we distilled three related elements; perceptions and feelings of self-inflation, other-distancing, and other-devaluation. In four studies, we explored whether these elements were present in pride experiences. We did so at an implicit (Experiment 1; N?=?218) and explicit level (Experiment 2; N?=?125), in an academic setting with in vivo (Experiment 3; N?=?203) and imagined pride experiences (Experiment 4; N?=?126). The data consistently revealed that the experience of pride is characterised by self-inflation, not by other-distancing nor other-devaluation.     

Dispositional forgiveness of self, others, and situations

Six studies regarding forgiveness are presented. The Heartland Forgiveness Scale (HFS), a self-report measure of dispositional forgiveness (with subscales to assess forgiveness of self, others, and situations) was developed and demonstrated good psychometric properties. Forgiveness correlated positively with cognitive flexibility, positive affect, and distraction; it correlated negatively with rumination, vengeance, and hostility. Forgiveness predicted four components of psychological well-being (anger, anxiety, depression, and satisfaction with life); forgiveness of situations accounted for unique variance in these components of psychological well-being. Forgiveness and hostility demonstrated equivalent, inverse associations with relationship duration, and forgiveness accounted for unique variance in relationship satisfaction, even when controlling for trust. Forgiveness level correlated positively with decreased negativity in statements written about transgressions in the present versus the past tense.