WHY NO GUIDELINES FOR BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION?

This paper reviews the guidelines for behavioral programs published by the National Association of Retarded Children. The review discusses a number of reasons why guidelines should not be enunciated for behavior modification, e.g., the procedures of behavior modification appear to be no more or less subject to abuse and no more or less in need of ethical regulation than intervention procedures derived from any other set of principles and called by other terms. The review recommends alternative methods for protecting the rights of clients who participate in behavioral programs. Specifically, behavioral clinicians, like other therapists, should be governed by the ethics codes of their professions; also, the ethics of all intervention programs should be evaluated in terms of a number of critical issues.     

IS THERE A FUTURE FOR THE DIALOGUE?

The title question was raised by Philip Hefner in an editorial in the March 2007 issue of Zygon, and answered in various ways in sixteen guest editorials in the June, September, and December 2007 issues. In this article, after defining some pertinent concepts, I comment on these essays. I review critical statements made by the guest editorialists and survey their proposals for further dialogue topics. I conclude with my own views on the future of the dialogue and the role of Zygon therein.     

CAN GROUPS HAVE CONCEPTS? SEMANTICS FOR COLLECTIVE INTENTIONS

A substantial literature supports the attribution of intentional states such as beliefs and desires to groups. But within this literature, there is no substantial account of group concepts. Since on many views, one cannot have an intentional state without having concepts, such a gap undermines the cogency of accounts of group intentionality. In this paper I aim to provide an account of group concepts. First I argue that to fix the semantics of the sentences groups use to make their decisions or express their beliefs, we need to appeal to a conventional semantics like that of Lewis. I then argue that the same reasons we have for taking group intentional states to be irreducible to the intentional states of their members apply also to the terms fixed by a conventional semantics. It follows that the meanings of terms in the sentences expressing a group's intentional states are also fixed by facts about the group, not its members. And recognizing this, I argue, amounts to attributing concepts to groups. Finally, I discuss a real‐life example of a group concept—the meaning of ‘meter’ as fixed by the International Bureau of Weights and Measurements—and I discuss the upshot of these considerations for the question of social externalism about concepts.     

WHOM TO BLAME FOR THE CHARGE OF SECULARIZATION?

Abstract. In the last century science and technology have been viewed as guilty of contributing to the modern secularization process and also to a crisis in religion. The extent of this influence is less clear today: while technology is stronger, and an easy target for any kind of social and cultural criticism, science seems weaker than it used to. The aim of this commentary is to examine in a critical way the arguments for and against scientific and technological involvement in the crisis religion faces today. In the end, a revision of the future of religion is called into question, especially in the light of a more “technological theology.”     

TOWARD A NEW FOCUS FOR CHURCHES' DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS?

“The Church must recognize that she is growing powerless to orient or produce development. The less efficient she is as a power, the more effective she can be as a celebrant of the mystery… The Church will have to renounce progressively the ‘power to do good’ she now has, and see this power pass into the hands of a new type of institution.”     

THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE OF RELIGION: IMPLICATIONS FOR THEISM?

Abstract. Although the Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR), a current approach to the scientific study of religion, has exerted an influence in the study of religion for almost twenty years, the question of its compatibility or incompatibility with theism has not been the subject of serious discussion until recently. Some critics of religion have taken a lively interest in the CSR because they see it as useful in explaining why religious believers consistently make costly commitments to false beliefs. Conversely, some theists have argued for the compatibility of religious belief with basic CSR results. In this article, we contribute to the incipient discussion about the worldview relevance of the CSR by arguing that while a theistic reading of the field only represents one interpretative option at most, antitheistic claims about the incompatibility of the CSR with theism look like they may be harder to maintain than first appearances might suggest.     

THE ANALYSIS OF BEHAVIOR WHAT'S IN IT FOR US?

When we publish behavioral research, we are not allowed to communicate the thrill, the poetry, or the exhilaration that are outcomes of the discovery process. Yet, these are among our most potent reinforcers. Explicit recognition of the emotional accompaniments to research could help attract students into the experimental analysis of behavior.     

HOW CAN SCIENCE HELP RELIGION TOWARD OPTIMAL BENEFIT FOR SOCIETY?

Abstract. The dispute between theism and atheism has centered on whether there exists any entity that may be referred to as God and on how to explain life and the universe. As a consequence of this dispute and of the power of scientific explanations, religion may end up having less impact on society. The situation makes the following questions relevant: What are the advantages and disadvantages for society of downgrading religion? If the net effect of religion is considered to be positive, is it possible to counteract this trend? Moreover, examining the benefits of religion raises a further question: Is it possible to influence theology toward a stance with optimal utility for society? As a scientist writing from an atheist perspective, I argue that religion has a potential for serving society and that this advantage need not necessarily be sacrificed on the altar of science.     

WHAT IS CLIMATE CHANGE DOING TO US AND FOR US?

What are we doing to our climate? Emissions from fossil fuel burning have raised carbon dioxide concentrations 35 percent higher than in the past millions of years. This increase is warming our planet via the greenhouse effect. What is climate change doing to and for us ? Dry regions are drier and wet ones wetter. Wildfires have increased threefold, hurricanes more violent, floods setting record heights, glaciers melting, and seas rising. Parts of Earth are increasingly uninhabitable. Climate change requires us to act as a global community. Climate justice enjoins emitters to pay the social‐environmental costs of fossil fuel burning. This would expedite green solar, wind, and next‐generation nuclear energy sources. Individuals should conserve resources, waste less food, and eat a plant‐rich diet.     

THE PLACEBO EFFECT: WHAT'S INTERESTING FOR SCHOLARS OF RELIGION?

Abstract. The placebo effect these days is no longer merely the insubstantial, subjective response that some patients have to a sham treatment, like a sugar pill. It has been reconceived as a powerful mind‐body phenomenon. Because of this, it has also emerged as a complex reference point in a number of high‐stakes conversations about the metaphysical significance of experiences of religious healing, the possible health benefits of being religious, and the feasibility of using double‐blind placebo‐controlled trials to investigate the efficacy of prayer. In each of these conversations, the placebo effect is always pointing toward some larger issue, serving some larger agenda. The agendas, though, tend to pull in different directions, leading to a situation that feels at once fractured and stalemated. This essay reviews the main areas of interest, and proposes some specific issues where humanistic scholars of religion in particular might be able to introduce constructive and creative new perspectives.     

WHAT ARE DESIRES GOOD FOR? TOWARDS A COHERENT ENDORSEMENT THEORY

Desire‐based theories of well‐being are often said to accept (G), x is good for a person just in case he wants it, and (B), x is better for a person than y just in case he prefers x to y. I shall argue that (G) and (B) are inconsistent, and this inconsistency resists any plausible refinement of these principles. The inconsistency is brought out by cases in which our wants and preferences for certain life‐options are contingent on which life‐option we realize. My argument can be generalized to endorsement theories that define a person’s good as the right combination of some kind of objective desirability and subjective endorsement, and allow preferences to be tie‐breakers when the compared objects are equally desirable (or incommensurable). My conclusions will not just be negative. I shall argue that if the choice is between (G) and (B), the most attractive option is to keep (G), slightly refined, and drop (B). 1     

TELEOLOGY IN BIOLOGY: WHO COULD ASK FOR ANYTHING MORE?

Abstract. Teleological thinking permeates biology and is useful in pondering unanswered biological questions. Such thinking differs from the usual sense of teleology in that “purpose” in biology carries no imputation of causation. A few examples are given. The teleological system of biology is every bit as elegant a construct of the human mind as any other teleological system and in no way precludes spirituality. I argue that it provides a firmer foundation for moral guidance than supernatural systems.     

A ROLE FOR NEGATIVE REINFORCEMENT OF RESPONSE OMISSION IN PUNISHMENT?

This experiment attempted to disentangle response-rate reductions controlled by the direct suppressive effects of a punisher from those due to negative reinforcement of response omission. Key-peck responding of pigeons was maintained by a conjoint variable-interval 3-min schedule of food presentation variable-interval 30-s schedule of response-dependent electric shock presentation. Omission of responses for 5, 10, or 30 s resulted in the possibility of canceling a scheduled shock. Response rates were a function of required pause duration, with lower rates occurring when longer periods of response omission were required for shock cancellation. These results show that, with several parameters of punishment held constant, response rates were controlled by the negative reinforcement contingency. Such a finding argues for renewed consideration of the role of negative reinforcement in punishment contingencies.     

DOES THE THREAT OF AIDS CREATE DIFFICULTIES FOR LORD DEVLIN'S CRITICS?

Although over twenty years have passed since the Hart-Devlin exchange, the controversy over society's right to punish homosexuals remains alive, as is shown by recent concern over the spread of AIDS and the recent announcement of the Supreme Court that "majority sentiments about the morality of homosexuality" constitute an adequate justification for sodomy statutes under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.¹ Lord Devlin's moral justification for punishing homosexual conduct seems to follow a similar line of reasoning. The one argument to which his critics have paid the most attention begins with the assertion that society consists of a seamless web of ideas and values, the content of which is determined by whether the ordinary, reasonable person is disgusted by a particular type of conduct.² Among the types of conduct that disgust the ordinary person, he continues, is homosexual conduct.³ Therefore, Devlin concludes, society may punish homosexual conduct, even if it is consensual.     

MNEMONIC TEXT‐PROCESSING STRATEGIES: A TEACHING SCIENCE FOR SCIENCE TEACHING

This article reports on the development and evaluation of a two‐component mnemonic strategy for teaching botany concepts. One component, a pictorial “mnemonomy”, was targeted at learning a hierarchically organized plant‐classification system; and the second component, based on the mnemonic “keyword” method, was targeted at learning the specific defining characteristics of the various plant groups. It was hypothesized that this dual mnemonic approach would be more useful than the usual figural‐taxonomy approach in allowing college students to acquire both higher‐order structural and lower‐order detail information‐‐the “forest” andthe “trees”, as it were. The research results strongly support the hypothesis. Especially important to this conclusion was the finding that relative to traditional instruction, mnemonic instruction facilitated: (1) the acquisition of both classification and characteristic information; and (2) inferential thinking on a transfer (problem‐solving) task that required novel manipulations of the learned concepts. Performance gains associated with the mnemonic condition were long‐term, still being manifested on delayed‐test measures. A number of theoretical and educational implications of the research are considered     

SCIENCE AND SERIOUS THEOLOGY: TWO PATHS FOR SCIENCE AND RELIGION'S FUTURE?

Although they take different approaches, both Taede A. Smedes and Kevin Sharpe have challenged the theology-and-science enterprise and raised important questions about theological and scientific assumptions behind this work. Smedes argues that theology should be taken more seriously, and Sharpe believes that theology should be more scientific. A proposed middle way involves engaging in the dialogue itself and exploring the questions and methodological implications that arise in the context of problem-focused interactions.     

IS ALTRUISM GOOD? EVOLUTION,ETHICS, AND THE HUNGER FOR THEOLOGY

This essay pushes the discussion of biology and altruism in radical directions by highlighting the moral ambiguity of biology itself. The extent to which we draw positive moral implications from animal behavior, and even the extent to which we see positive traits in animals, is shaped by the preconceptions and the purposes one brings to the study. These preconceptions, when examined, involve worldview issues that are all related in one way or another to either a theological position or some nontheistic substitute for an account of ultimate reality. It is arguable that Darwin's own perceptions of nature were colored by the theological and social‐ethical context in which he worked. William Paley's natural theology, together with Thomas Malthus's Essay on the Principle of Population, led many theologians of Darwin's day to conclude that struggle, inequality, suffering, and death are basic features of the natural world and are the result of divine providence. No wonder, then, that Darwin was able to see competition as the major key to natural selection. The moral ambiguity of biology can be pressed further by contrasting contemporary attempts to find altruism in animal behavior with the conclusions reached by Friedrich Nietzsche, partly in response to his reading of Darwin. Nietzsche concluded that the standard, more or less Christian, morality of his day is best labeled “slave morality.” It is created by the weak in order to coerce the strong to provide for them. In this essay I contend that competing views of morality can be adjudicated only by turning to an account of ultimate reality. Whether Nietzsche is right in arguing against the morality of altruism depends on whether God is indeed dead.