Children's emotional false memories

Eight- and 12-year-old children were presented with neutral and negative emotional Deese-Roediger-McDermott lists equated on familiarity and associative strength. Both recall and recognition (A') measures were obtained. Recall measures exhibited the usual age increments in true and false recollection. True neutral items were better recalled and recognized than true negative emotional items. Although the children showed more false recall for neutral than for negative emotional lists, false recognition was higher for negative emotional than for neutral items. A' analyses also showed that whereas true neutral information and false neutral information were easily discriminated by children regardless of age, the same was not the case for true and false negative emotional information. Together, these results suggest that although children may be able to censor negative emotional information at recall, such information promotes relational processing in children's memory, making true and false emotional information less discriminable overall.     

Correcting socially introduced false memories: The effect of re-study

This study examined whether participants could utilize re-study and perceptual elaboration to correct erroneous suggestions from their partner in the social contagion of memory paradigm. Participants studied household scenes and then collaboratively recalled the scenes with a confederate who interjected erroneous items. Before completing subsequent individual recall and recognition tests, participants were allowed to re-study the original items and/or to generate perceptual details of the items. Across two experiments, participants who re-studied the original material were less likely to incorporate the confederate's misleading suggestions. Re-study reduced false recall and recognition and increased veridical recall and recognition (Experiment 1) and the effect was especially pronounced with longer re-study episodes (Experiment 2). Items generated on the perceptual elaboration test offered no corrective benefit above and beyond the effects of re-study. These data demonstrate that participants can rely on self-initiated correction processes engaged during re-study to reduce socially suggested false memories.     

Tell Me Everything You Discussed: Children's Memory for Dyadic Conversations after a 1-Week or a 3-Week Delay

In child abuse investigations, children are often asked to recount previous conversations related to the allegations (i.e., “conversational testimony”). To explore children's ability to provide conversational testimony, we staged a semi-structured novel dyadic conversation between an adult researcher and 8-year-old children (n = 90). Children's gist recall and recognition memory for their own statements, their conversational partner's statements, and question–answer pairs were tested after either a 1-week or a 3-week delay. The results revealed that children recounted a minority of the conversation, although children recalled more after a short delay (7%) than after a long delay (4%). A majority of children's free recall statements were accurate (68%); however, approximately one-third of their free recall statements were incorrect. Children almost exclusively recounted their own statements, and rarely recalled any of the adult's statements or the question–answer pairs during free recall. Reports of the adult's statements and question–answer pairs increased with cued recall questioning, but remained minimal. During recognition testing, children were able to distinguish between true and false recognition items for their own statements and the adult's statements, but performed at chance level on recognition items concerning question–answer pairs. Forensic implications of the results are discussed. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Own-age biases in verbal person memory

Two experiments examined own-age biases in younger adults', older adults', and children's verbal person memory. In line with findings from face recognition studies, Experiment 1 showed that younger adults had a better recall of own-age than of other-age targets, while older adults were unaffected by target age. Participants' self-reported interest in targets did not predict target memory. Experiment 2, which examined children's and younger adults' memory of own- and other-age targets, showed an own-age advantage in children's but not in younger adults' verbal person memory. Differences in expertise of own-/other-age targets, in combination with a development of expertise throughout the Hfespan, may account for the findings, although alternative explanations should be considered. Implications for theory and practice are discussed.     

The role of associative strength in children's false memory illusions

The effects of associative strength on rates of 7- and 11-year-old children's true and false memories were examined when category and Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) lists were used to cue the same critical lure. Backward associative strength (BAS) was varied such that the category and DRM lists had the same strength (DRM=category), DRM lists had more BAS (DRM>category), or category lists had more BAS (DRM<category). If BAS drives children's false memories then BAS, not the type of relation across items in a list, should determine false memory production. The results confirmed this prediction using both recall and recognition measures: (1) both true and false memories increased with age, (2) true memory was better for category than DRM lists but there were no differences for false memory, and (3) at all ages, false memories varied predictably with changes in BAS but were unaffected by list-type manipulations. These findings are discussed in the context of models of false memory development.     

Affective valence influences participant's susceptibility to false memories and illusory recollection

This study examined the influence of emotional valence on the production of DRM false memories (Roediger & McDermott, 1995). Participants were presented with neutral, positive, or negative DRM lists for a later recognition (Experiment 1) or recall (Experiment 2) test. In both experiments, confidence and recollective experience (i.e., "Remember-Know" judgments; Tulving, 1985) were also assessed. Results consistently showed that, compared with neutral lists, affective lists induced more false recognition and recall of nonpresented critical lures. Moreover, although confidence ratings did not differ between the false remembering from the different kinds of lists, "Remember" responses were more often associated with negative than positive and neutral false remembering of the critical lures. In contrast, positive false remembering of the critical lures was more often associated with "Know" responses. These results are discussed in light of the Paradoxical Negative Emotion (PNE) hypothesis (Porter, Taylor, & ten Bricke, 2008).     

Detecting children's true and false denials of wrongdoing: Effects of question type and base rate knowledge

One common and unfortunately overlooked obstacle to the detection of sexual abuse is non-disclosure by children. Non-disclosure in forensic interviews may be expressed via concealment in response to recall questions or via active denials in response to recognition (e.g., yes/no) questions. In two studies, we evaluated whether adults' ability to discern true and false denials of wrongdoing by children varied as a function of the types of interview question the children were asked. Results suggest that adults are not good at detecting deceptive denials of wrongdoing by children, even when the adults view children narrate their experiences in response to recall questions rather than provide one word answers to recognition questions. In Study 1, adults exhibited a consistent “truth bias,” leading them toward believing children, regardless of whether the children's denials were true or false. In Study 2, adults were given base-rate information about the occurrence of true and false denials (50% of each). The information eliminated the adults' truth bias but did not improve their overall detection accuracy, which still hovered near chance. Adults did, however, perceive children's denials as slightly more credible when they emerged in response to recall rather than recognition questions, especially when children were honestly denying wrongdoing. Results suggest the need for caution when evaluating adults' judgments of children's veracity when the children fail to disclose abuse.     

Emotional true and false memories in children with callous-unemotional traits

Several studies have found that children with callous-unemotional (CU) traits have a deficit in processing emotionally negative material. The present study examined whether this deficit also affects emotional memory. Twenty-two children with low CU traits and 24 children with high CU traits between 8 and 12 years of age were selected from a community sample and presented with neutral and negative emotional words, using the Deese–Roediger–McDermott paradigm. On true recall, there was no difference between the groups. Both groups had higher true recall rates for the neutral word lists than for the negative lists. However, on false recall, although there were no group differences for neutral word lists, the high CU group recalled significantly fewer critical lures on the negative word lists than the low CU group. Furthermore, the high CU group had significantly less false recall on the negative word lists compared to the neutral word lists, while the low CU group showed no difference in false recall between the word lists. These results indicate that children with high CU traits have no deficiencies in true memory performance, yet are less susceptible to developing false memories concerning emotionally negative material.     

Time-limited effects of emotional arousal on item and source memory

Two experiments investigated the time-limited effects of emotional arousal on consolidation of item and source memory. In Experiment 1, participants memorized words (items) and the corresponding speakers (sources) and then took an immediate free recall test. Then they watched a neutral, positive, or negative video 5, 35, or 50?min after learning, and 24 hours later they took surprise memory tests. Experiment 2 was similar to Experiment 1 except that (a) a reality monitoring task was used; (b) elicitation delays of 5, 30, and 45?min were used; and (c) delayed memory tests were given 60?min after learning. Both experiments showed that, regardless of elicitation delay, emotional arousal did not enhance item recall memory. Second, both experiments showed that negative arousal enhanced delayed item recognition memory only at the medium elicitation delay, but not in the shorter or longer delays. Positive arousal enhanced performance only in Experiment 1. Third, regardless of elicitation delay, emotional arousal had little effect on source memory. These findings have implications for theories of emotion and memory, suggesting that emotion effects are contingent upon the nature of the memory task and elicitation delay.     

Presentation modality affects false memory

Roediger and McDermott (1995) rejuvenated interest in Deese’s (1959) paradigm for producing reliable intrusions and false alarms. Using this paradigm in three experiments, we demonstrated that visual study presentation dramatically reduces the rate of false memories. Only auditory study presentation resulted in equal production of studied and critical items. Correct recall and recognition were unaffected. The suggestion that visual presentation provides a means for discriminating between false and true memories was supported by Experiment 3: Pleasantness rating of study items significantly reduced the creation of false memories regardless of modality.     

Assessing the effectiveness of warnings and the phenomenological characteristics of false memories

The phenomenology of false memories was investigated in three experiments in which participants heard two experimenters read lists of items that were related to critical nonpresented items. In Experiments 1, following a recognition memory test, participants rated the phenomenological characteristics of their memories immediately and after a 48-hour delay. False recognition was prevalent and on several dimensions participants rated their true memories as more vivid than their false memories. In Experiments 2 and 3, following the study phase, participants were warned about the phenomenological differences between true and false memories and were instructed to use this information to avoid reporting nonpresented items. This type of warning was ineffective at reducing false recall (Experiment 2) and false recognition (Experiment 3) relative to unwarned participants. Importantly, the inability of explicit warnings to impact illusory recollections demonstrates that the false memories cannot be attributed simply to a criterion shift.     

Assessing the effectiveness of warnings and the phenomenological characteristics of false memories

The phenomenology of false memories was investigated in three experiments in which participants heard two experimenters read lists of items that were related to critical nonpresented items. In Experiments 1, following a recognition memory test, participants rated the phenomenological characteristics of their memories immediately and after a 48-hour delay. False recognition was prevalent and on several dimensions participants rated their true memories as more vivid than their false memories. In Experiments 2 and 3, following the study phase, participants were warned about the phenomenological differences between true and false memories and were instructed to use this information to avoid reporting nonpresented items. This type of warning was ineffective at reducing false recall (Experiment 2) and false recognition (Experiment 3) relative to unwarned participants. Importantly, the inability of explicit warnings to impact illusory recollections demonstrates that the false memories cannot be attributed simply to a criterion shift.     

The effect of mood on false memory for emotional DRM word lists

In the present study, we investigated the effect of participants’ mood on true and false memories of emotional word lists in the Deese–Roediger–McDermott (DRM) paradigm. In Experiment 1, we constructed DRM word lists in which all the studied words and corresponding critical lures reflected a specified emotional valence. In Experiment 2, we used these lists to assess mood-congruent true and false memory. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three induced-mood conditions (positive, negative, or neutral) and were presented with word lists comprised of positive, negative, or neutral words. For both true and false memory, there was a mood-congruent effect in the negative mood condition; this effect was due to a decrease in true and false recognition of the positive and neutral words. These findings are consistent with both spreading-activation and fuzzy-trace theories of DRM performance and have practical implications for our understanding of the effect of mood on memory.     

Mood-congruent true and false memory: Effects of depression

The Deese/Roediger-McDermott paradigm was used to investigate the effect of depression on true and false recognition. In this experiment true and false recognition was examined across positive, neutral, negative, and depression-relevant lists for individuals with and without a diagnosis of major depressive disorder. Results showed that participants with major depressive disorder falsely recognised significantly more depression-relevant words than non-depressed controls. These findings also parallel recent research using recall instead of recognition and show that there are clear mood congruence effects for depression on false memory performance.     

What can we learn about immediate memory from the development of children's free recall?

We ask the question: Which aspects of immediate memory performance improve with age? In two studies, we reexamine the widely held view that primary memory capacity estimates derived from children's immediate free recall are age invariant. This was done by assessing children's immediate free-recall accuracy while also measuring the order in which they elected to recall items (Experiment 1) and by encouraging children to begin free recall with items from towards the end of the presented list (Experiment 2). Across samples aged between 5 and 8 years we replicated the previously reported age-related changes in free-recall serial position functions when aggregated across all trials of the standard task, including an absence of age differences in the recency portion of this curve. However, we also show that this does not reflect the fact that primary memory capacity is constant across age. Instead, when we incorporate order of report information, clear age differences are evident in the recall of list-final items that are output at the start of a participant's response. In addition, the total amount that individuals recalled varied little across different types of free-recall tasks. These findings have clear implications for the use of immediate free recall as a means of providing potential indices of primary memory capacity and in the study of the development of immediate memory.     

ASSOCIATIVE PROCESSES IN FALSE RECALL AND FALSE RECOGNITION

Abstract— Studying a list of words associated to a critical nonpresented word results in high rates of false recall and false recognition for that nonpresented item (Roediger & McDermott, 1995) Two experiments examined the effect of manipulating the number of associates presented on false recall and later false recognition of a nonpresented item. In Experiment 1, associate lists of varying lengths were studied, in Experiment 2, list length was held constant and the number of associates within the list was manipulated. In both experiments, the rate of critical intrusions in recall increased steadily with increasing number of associates studied Most notably, the filler words used in Experiment 2 to equate the list lengths did not affect the rate of critical intrusions, although they did depress recall of studied words. False recall and false recognition appear to be tied to the total, not the mean, associative strength of items in the list.     

Age differences in collaborative memory: the role of retrieval manipulations

In two experiments, we examined age differences in collaborative inhibition (reduced recall in pairs of people, relative to pooled individuals) across repeated retrieval attempts. Younger and older adults studied categorized word lists and were then given two consecutive recall tests and a recognition test. On the first recall test, the subjects were given free-report cued recall or forced-report cued recall instructions (Experiment 1) or free recall instructions (Experiment 2) and recalled the lists either alone or in collaboration with another subject of the same age group. Free-report cued recall and free recall instructions warned the subjects not to guess, whereas forcedreport cued recall instructions required them to guess. Collaborative inhibition was obtained for both younger and older adults on initial tests of free-report cued recall, forced-report cued recall, and free recall, showing that the effect generalizes across several tests for both younger and older adults. Collaborative inhibition did not persist on subsequent individual recall or recognition tests for list items. Older adults consistently falsely recalled and recognized items more than did younger adults, as had been found in previous studies. In addition, prior collaboration may exaggerate older adults’ tendency toward higher false alarms on a subsequent recognition test, but only after a free recall test. The results provide generality to the phenomenon of collaborative inhibition and can be explained by invoking concepts of strategy disruption and source monitoring.     

Discounting input from older adults: the role of age salience on partner age effects in the social contagion of memory

Three experiments examined the impact of partner age on the magnitude of socially suggested false memories. Young participants recalled household scenes in collaboration with an implied young or older adult partner who intentionally recalled false items. In Experiment 1, participants were presented with only the age of their partner (low age-salience context); in Experiment 2, participants were presented with the age of their partner along with a photograph and biographical information about their partner (high age-salience context); in Experiment 3, age salience was varied within the same experiment. Across experiments, participants in both the low age-salience and high age-salience contexts incorporated their partners’ misleading suggestions into their own subsequent recall and recognition reports, thus demonstrating social contagion with implied partners. Importantly, the effect of partner age differed across conditions. Participants in the high age-salience context were less likely to incorporate misleading suggestions from older adult partners than from young adult partners, but participants in the low age-salience context were equally likely to incorporate suggestions from young and older adult partners. Participants discount the memory of older adult partners only when age is highly salient.     

Remembering Words Never Presented: False Memory Effects in Dementia of the Alzheimer Type

Thirty-five young adults, 35 older adults and 29 individuals with dementia of the Alzheimer’s type studied lists of semantically related words (e.g., thread, pin, sewing) that converged on a non-presented lure (needle). Compared to the young adults, older adults remembered (recall and recognition tests) fewer studied items but falsely remembered more non-presented lures. Memory for studied items was lower in the DAT group compared to normal elders. The DAT group did recall some non-presented lures, although unlike the older adults, recall of non-presented lures was not elevated compared to veridical memory. Similar to the normal elders, the DAT group showed increased susceptibility to false recognition of non-presented lures. Susceptibility to false recognition did not vary as a function of disease severity.     

Need for Cognition and false recall

Two experiments investigated whether Need for Cognition (NFC) affected false recall in the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm. In the first experiment, participants were presented with DRM lists and given one attempt to recall the items. In the second experiment, participants were presented with DRM lists under full or divided attention and were given three consecutive recall tests. In Experiment 2, high-NFC individuals exhibited increased false recall across successive recall attempts in both the full and divided attention conditions whereas low-NFC individuals did not. Furthermore, high-NFC individuals in the full attention condition exhibited increased levels of true recall across successive tests. These results show that the individual differences in the ways in which individuals process information can affect true and false recall in the DRM task.