Two Types of Quidditism

According to structuralism, all natural properties are individuated by their roles in causal/nomological structures. According to quidditism, at least some natural properties are individuated in some other way. Because these theses deal with the identities of natural properties, this distinction cuts to the core of a serious metaphysical dispute: Are the intrinsic natures of all natural properties essentially causal/nomological in character? I'll argue that the answer is ‘no’, or at least that this answer is more plausible than many critics of quidditism have recognized. In section 1, I distinguish between two versions of quidditism. Bare quidditism holds that worlds with distinct properties and isomorphic structures must be qualitatively identical in the following sense: inhabiting one world would be indistinguishable from inhabiting the other. In contrast, qualitative quidditism allows such worlds to have qualitative differences. In section 2, I discuss an epistemological position that allows us to better understand the sense in which isomorphic structures can be qualitatively distinct. In sections 3 and 4, I argue that qualitative quidditism fares much better than bare quidditism with respect to a number of well-known arguments in the field—both for quidditism and against it.     

Knowledge to Wisdom: We Need a Revolution

Introduction The following document is a very brief summary of a thesis and argument that I have devoted the last 30 years of my life to trying to get across to my fellow human beings. It was first spelled out in What’s Wrong With Science? (Bran’s Head Books, 1976) and subsequently in From Knowledge to Wisdom (Blackwell, 1984), Is Science Neurotic? (Imperial College Press, 2004) and numerous articles, references to which can be found on . Three years ago an international group was formed, called Friends of Wisdom, which seeks to get across to academics and the public the compelling arguments and urgent need to transform academic inquiry so that its basic aim becomes to seek and promote wisdom. The document below is taken from the website of Friends of Wisdom, the URL of which is . It is the mission statement of Friends of Wisdom. You are invited to join.     

Relationships Between Need for Cognition,Knowledge, and Verbal Ability

The authors investigated the relationships between need for cognition. knowledge, and verbal ability. Participants completed scales that measured their need for cognition, verbal ability, and knowledge about people and events that occurred during the Vietnam War era. Correlational analyses showed that the participants' need for cognition scores were modestly but positively correlated with verbal ability and knowledge and that verbal ability and knowledge were also positively correlated. The correlation between need for cognition and knowledge was small but significant when verbal ability was controlled. The conclusion drawn from these results is that need for cognition contributes to the acquisition of knowledge beyond the contribution of verbal ability.     

The Effects of Need for Cognition and Need for Affect on Partisan Evaluations

The voting behavior literature has advanced two prominent theoretical models of partisanship: the social psychological and rational models. Implicit to both stylized models is the assumption that all partisans process information similarly. Yet, growing research in psychology suggests that individuals possess different motivations when evaluating information. We propose that the applicability of the stylized models of partisanship is conditioned on individuals' need for cognition (NFC) and need for affect (NFA), with the social psychological model being most applicable to individuals who have a high NFA and the rational model most applicable to those with a high NFC. To test this proposition, we fielded a survey in which respondents who identified with the two major political parties in the United States (Democrat or Republican) were randomly assigned factual information that depicted either their party or their opposing party in a negative light. Respondents were then asked to assess the actions of that party and subsequently evaluate both political parties. We find evidence that is generally consistent with the proposition that the stylized models of partisanship are conditionally dependent on the extent to which individuals possess a need to engage in effortful thinking or a need to seek out emotions.     

Is understanding reducible?

ABSTRACT

Despite playing an important role in epistemology, philosophy of science, and more recently in moral philosophy and aesthetics, the nature of understanding is still much contested. One attractive framework attempts to reduce understanding to other familiar epistemic states. This paper explores and develops a methodology for testing such reductionist theories before offering a counterexample to a recently defended variant on which understanding reduces to what an agent knows.     

Did Rorty’s Pragmatism Have Foundations?

Abstract

There is an overt tension between Rorty’s pragmatist critique of philosophy and his apparent epistemological and metaphysical commitments, which it is instructive to examine in order to assess not only Rorty’s overall position, but also renewed contemporary interest in pragmatism and its metaphilosophical implications. After showing why Rorty’s attempts to limit the scope of his critique failed to resolve this tension, I try reading him as a constructive metaphysician who was attempting to balance a causal account of the language / world relation with panrelationism. However, Rorty intended these commitments to be interpreted in light of his pragmatism about vocabularies, and relied upon a ‘social standpoint strategy’ to render his overall position consistent. I conclude that to the extent that this strategy succeeds, it removes almost all of the argumentative force from Rorty’s pragmatism.     

Need for Cognition and Choice Framing Effects

Two experiments tested the hypothesis that framing biases in decision making would affect more strongly individuals with relatively low levels of need for cognition (NC). Participants were classified as high or low NC based on responses to a standard scale and subsequently were exposed to one of two framings of a choice problem. Different choice problems were used in each experiment, modeled after those developed by Kahneman and Tversky. Experiment 1 employed a monetary task and Experiment 2 a medical decision-making task. Consistent with expectations, framing effects on choice were observed in both experiments, but only for low NC participants. High NC participants were unaffected by problem framing, showing that they were less susceptible to attempts to alter their frame of reference.     

The Need for Closure and the Spontaneous Use of Complex and Simple Cognitive Structures

Abstract

The authors performed 2 experiments that explored the causal role of need for closure in producing the use of simple structures. In particular, the authors gave the participants a cue that called for a complex or a simple solution on a cognitive complexity task. The authors created the participants' need for closure through the use of time pressure. The results of both experiments revealed that participants only generated complex solutions in the complex cue-no time pressure condition. The discussion is focused on the effects of need for closure in tasks calling for adaptive and spontaneous flexibility.     

消费者独特性需求量表的研究

本研究目的是修订消费者独特性需求量表（CNFU）的中文版。研究对两个样本共计918名被试进行了问卷测量。项目分析显示,31个题目均符合心理测量学要求。验证性因素分析表明,26个题目的中文版量表符合原量表的三因素（即标新立异、非大众化和避免雷同）模型。量表的重测信度、内部一致性和分半信度均在0．85以上。量表具有较好的汇聚和区分效度,非学生样本得分显著高于学生样本。本文对量表今后的研究和应用进行了探讨。     

刍议社会性弱势群体健康需要与供给

弱势群体包括生理性弱势群体和社会性弱势群体。社会结构转型使我国社会性弱势群体的问题日益凸显。特别是健康问题和它的弱势地位形成了“弱势——不健康——更弱势”的恶性循环中。从生理、心理、道德、社会四个层次探讨社会性弱势群体的健康需要以及健康服务的供给状况,以期找出社会性弱势群体健康需要与供给的矛盾,打破社会性弱势群体弱势的循环链,解决民生问题。     

归属需要的研究进展

归属需要的概念经历长时间的演化和发展,并有其进化的心理机制。自Baumeister在1995年提出归属需要作为人类的基本动机后,归属需要与认知,情感和行为的相关研究也得到发展,部分结论得到进一步的证实,但也出现不一致的研究结果。同时也开始了对归属需要与行为后果之间内部过程的探讨。对归属需要的测量主要采用量表法,但未出现一个统一的测量工具,易造成测量的差异,剥夺归属需要的研究常采用实验法,未来的研究可注重提高其生态效度。     

风险敏感理论:需要驱动风险决策

风险敏感理论由研究动物觅食行为发展而来,提出有机体在有需要的状况下会出现从风险规避到风险寻求的行为,是风险决策领域内的一种生物学理论。目前风险敏感理论所做出的预测在动物和人类身上都获得了大量实证研究的支持,表明该理论可以解释很多领域中的风险决策。因此有必要对这一理论做一个系统的论述,包括对其理论来源和数学模型的发展演变进行梳理;从参照点等不同的角度分析该理论与其他决策理论的区别;并且,风险敏感理论也为经济不平等和权力等外部因素下的风险转移提供了解释,对已有研究做出了独特的贡献。     

认知闭合需要研究梳理与未来走向

认知闭合需要反应了个体在不确定情景中的认知动机, 在信息爆炸不断加重认知负荷的今天具有重要研究意义。研究梳理了认知闭合需要的概念结构与测量工具, 总结了近30年来相关研究在人格特质、信息加工、决策偏好、态度信念和精神健康等领域的研究结果, 最终指出区分“能力”和“动机”是未来研究的正确走向。此外, 未来的研究还应深入探讨认知闭合需要的概念与结构, 正确使用和合理开发相关测量工具, 并且丰富对其前因变量的实证研究。     

The elimination of de re formulas

It is shown that de re formulas are eliminable in the modal logic S5 extended with the axiom scheme x x.     

The Meaning of ＂Existence＂ and the Contingency of Sense

In this paper I argue first for a revisionary ontology, that is, for an understanding of ＂existence＂ as the property of a field not to be empty. In this context, I distinguish between ＂metaphysics＂ （the theory of totality or of fundamental reality） and ＂ontology＂ （the systematic investigation into the meaning of ＂existence＂）. In the second part, I provide a sketch for a corresponding revisionary theory of the modalities in light of the new ontology proposed.     

认知需要和警告类型对合取谬误的影响

合取谬误是一种常见的判断偏差,它指的是在不确定条件下,个体评估合取事件及其简单事件发生的概率时,对合取规则系统性偏离的一种现象.实验1 就认知需要类型对合取谬误的影响进行探讨,结果发现高认知需要的被试较不易表现出双重合取谬误和单合取谬误.实验2 探讨了警告类型对合取谬误的影响,结果发现无警告时个体最易表现出单合取谬误,其次是间接警告,最后是直接警告;此外,认知需要与警告类型的交互作用显著,高认知需要的被试在直接警告和间接警告时更少表现出双重合取谬误,在直接警告时更少表现出单合取谬误.     

Psychologism Revisited in Logic, Metaphysics, and Epistemology

Psychologism is a philosophical ideology that seeks to explain the principles of logic, metaphysics, and epistemology as psychological phenomena. Psychologism has been the storm center of concerted criticisms since the nineteenth century, and is thought by many to have been refuted once and for all by Kant, Frege, Husserl, and others. The project of accounting for objective philosophical or mathematical truths in terms of subjective psychological states has been largely discredited in mainstream analytic thought. Ironically, psychologism has resurfaced in unexpected guises in the form of intuitionistic logic and mathematics, cognitivism, and naturalized epistemology. I examine some of the principal objections to psychologism – distinguishing roughly between good and bad or philosophically acceptable versus unacceptable psychologism – and consider the extent to which a new wave of psychologism may be gaining prominence in contemporary philosophy, and the light its successes and failures may shed on the original concept and underlying perspective of classical psychologism.