Mental time travel: Effects of trial duration on episodic and semantic content

Studies exploring mental time travel commonly use cue-word paradigms to elicit past and future autobiographical events. However, the effect of trial duration (how long participants are allowed to describe events) on the relationship between episodic and nonepisodic detail and episodic specificity (i.e., whether longer durations increase event specificity) has not been examined. To resolve these issues, a cue-word study was devised whereby participants described past and future events under three randomly administered time constraints: short (1-min), standard (3-min), and long (5-min) durations. Findings indicated that an individual's capacity for episodic and nonepisodic thought for the past and future were unrelated. This lends supports to the idea that independent mechanisms are responsible for episodic and semantic information. This study also offers clarity concerning the effect of different trial durations on episodic specificity, which may aid the design of future studies of mental time travel.     

Understanding deliberate practice in preschool-aged children

Deliberate practice is essential for skill acquisition and expertise and may be a direct consequence of episodic foresight. However, little is known about how deliberate practice develops in children. We present two experiments testing children's ability to selectively practise a behaviour that was going to be useful in future and to reason about the role of practice in skill formation. Five-year-olds demonstrated an explicit understanding of deliberate practice both in selectively choosing to practise a future-relevant skill and in predicting skill change in others based on their practice. Four-year-olds showed some capacities, but failed to demonstrate consistent understanding of the relationship between practice and skill improvement. Children's understanding of this relationship was significantly related to their understanding of how information leads to knowledge, suggesting that both may draw on similar cognitive developmental changes.     

A LORETA study of mental time travel: Similar and distinct electrophysiological correlates of re-experiencing past events and pre-experiencing future events

Previous studies exploring mental time travel paradigms with functional neuroimaging techniques have uncovered both common and distinct neural correlates of re-experiencing past events or pre-experiencing future events. A gap in the mental time travel literature exists, as paradigms have not explored the affective component of re-experiencing past episodic events; this study explored this sparsely researched area. The present study employed standardized low resolution electromagnetic tomography (sLORETA) to identify electrophysiological correlates of re-experience affect-laden and non-affective past events, as well as pre-experiencing a future anticipated event. Our results confirm previous research and are also novel in that we illustrate common and distinct electrophysiological correlates of re-experiencing affective episodic events. Furthermore, research from this experiment yields results outlining a pattern of activation in the frontal and temporal regions is correlated with the time frame of past or future events subjects imagined.     

Personality and mental time travel: a differential approach to autonoetic consciousness

Recent research on autonoetic consciousness indicates that the ability to remember the past and the ability to project oneself into the future are closely related. The purpose of the present study was to confirm this proposition by examining whether the relationship observed between personality and episodic memory could be extended to episodic future thinking and, more generally, to investigate the influence of personality traits on self-information processing in the past and in the future. Results show that Neuroticism and Harm Avoidance predict more negative past memories and future projections. Other personality dimensions exhibit a more limited influence on mental time travel (MTT). Therefore, our study provide an additional evidence to the idea that MTT into the past and into the future rely on a common set of processes by which past experiences are used to envision the future.     

Episodic memory and episodic foresight in 3- and 5-year-old children

In the present study, we examined the development of episodic memory and episodic foresight. Three- and 5-year-olds were interviewed individually using a personalised timeline that included photographs of them at different points in their life. After constructing the timeline with the experimenter, each child was asked to discuss a number of different events: an event that happened yesterday, an event that happened earlier today, an event that would happen later today, and an event that would happen tomorrow. As judged by their parents, children's accounts were highly accurate. After controlling for age and language scores, there was a strong relation between amount of information reported about past and future events. Overall, 5-year-olds reported more total information than 3-year-olds; however, reports by 3-year-olds included a similar proportion of first-person reference as did reports by 5-year-olds. No age difference appeared in proportion of future-oriented talk. We conclude that the present task provides a promising method of exploring the emergence of mental time travel during early childhood.     

Experiencing past and future personal events: functional neuroimaging evidence on the neural bases of mental time travel

Functional MRI was used in healthy subjects to investigate the existence of common neural structures supporting re-experiencing the past and pre-experiencing the future. Past and future events evocation appears to involve highly similar patterns of brain activation including, in particular, the medial prefrontal cortex, posterior regions and the medial temporal lobes. This result seems to support the view of a common neurocognitive system, which would allow humans to mentally travel through time. Past events recollection was associated with greater amplitude of hippocampal and anterior medial prefrontal hemodynamic responses. This result is discussed in terms of the involvement of the self in the conscious experience of past and future events representations. More generally, our data provide new evidence in favour of the idea that re- and pre-experiencing past and future events may rely on similar cognitive capacities.     

"When did I learn and when shall I act?": The developmental relationship between episodic future thinking and memory

This study investigated the development of the ability to reflect on one’s personal past and future. A total of 64 4- to 6-year-olds received tasks of delayed self-recognition, source memory, delay of gratification, and a newly developed task of future-oriented action timing. Although children’s performance on delayed self-recognition, source memory, and action timing improved with age, their performance on delay of gratification did not. Children’s errors in source memory and action timing were solely and strongly associated with each other in older children (5–6 years) even after controlling for age and verbal ability. Results are discussed in terms of mental time travel underlying episodic memory and future thinking that includes both the projection of oneself into the past and future and the appreciation of events’ temporal relations.     

Prospective and retrospective time perception are related to mental time travel: Evidence from Alzheimer’s disease

Unlike prospective time perception paradigms, in which participants are aware that they have to estimate forthcoming time, little is known about retrospective time perception in normal aging and Alzheimer’s disease (AD). Our paper addresses this shortcoming by comparing prospective and retrospective time estimation in younger adults, older adults, and AD patients. In four prospective tasks (lasting 30 s, 60 s, 90 s, or 120 s) participants were asked to read a series of numbers and to provide a verbal estimation of the reading time. In four other retrospective tasks, they were not informed about time judgment until they were asked to provide a verbal estimation of four elapsed time intervals (lasting 30 s, 60 s, 90 s, or 120 s). AD participants gave shorter verbal time estimations than older adults and younger participants did, suggesting that time is perceived to pass quickly in these patients. For all participants, the duration of the retrospective tasks was underestimated as compared to the prospective tasks and both estimations were shorter than the real time interval. Prospective time estimation was further correlated with mental time travel, as measured with the Remember/Know paradigm. Mental time travel was even higher correlated with retrospective time estimation. Our findings shed light on the relationship between time perception and the ability to mentally project oneself into time, two skills contributing to human memory functioning. Finally, time perception deficits, as observed in AD patients, can be interpreted in terms of dramatic changes occurring in frontal lobes and hippocampus.     

Children's temporal judgments for autobiographical past and future events

We compared the performance of twenty 5-7-year-olds on two spatial-temporal judgment tasks. In a semantic task, children located temporal distances from today that were described using conventional, temporal terms on a spatial timeline. In an autobiographical task, children judged temporal distances on the same spatial timeline for events that they had experienced, or were going to experience, presented without explicit temporal references. Six-year-olds were equally accurate in judging temporal distances in the semantic and autobiographical tasks, but 7-year-olds were more accurate in the semantic task. Older children were more accurate than younger children in the semantic task, but no significant age differences were found for autobiographical events. Surprisingly, children were equally accurate in locating past and future events in time. Children at both ages were more accurate judging temporal distances up to one week away (both past and future) as compared to distances of two to four weeks across both tasks. Results suggest that knowledge of recurring time patterns and conventional time measurement systems is necessary, but not sufficient, for locating autobiographical events in time, and temporal distance plays an important role in children's temporal judgments.     

Do future thoughts reflect personal goals? Current concerns and mental time travel into the past and future

Our overriding hypothesis was that future thinking would be linked with goals to a greater extent than memories; conceptualizing goals as current concerns (i.e., uncompleted personal goals). We also hypothesized that current-concern-related events would differ from non-current-concern-related events on a set of phenomenological characteristics. We report novel data from a study examining involuntary and voluntary mental time travel using an adapted laboratory paradigm. Specifically, after autobiographical memories or future thoughts were elicited (between participants) in an involuntary and voluntary retrieval mode (within participants), participants self-generated five current concerns and decided whether each event was relevant or not to their current concerns. Consistent with our hypothesis, compared with memories, a larger percentage of involuntary and voluntary future thoughts reflected current concerns. Furthermore, events related to current concerns differed from non-concern-related events on a range of cognitive, representational, and affective phenomenological measures. These effects were consistent across temporal direction. In general, our results agree with the proposition that involuntary and voluntary future thinking is important for goal-directed cognition and behaviour.     

Individual differences in time perspective predict autonoetic experience

Tulving (1985) posited that the capacity to remember is one facet of a more general capacity—autonoetic (self-knowing) consciousness. Autonoetic consciousness was proposed to underlie the ability for “mental time travel” both into the past (remembering) and into the future to envision potential future episodes (episodic future thinking). The current study examines whether individual differences can predict autonoetic experience. Specifically, the Zimbardo Time Perspective Inventory (ZTPI, Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999) was administered to 133 undergraduate students, who also rated phenomenological experiences accompanying autobiographical remembering and episodic future thinking. Scores on two of the five subscales of the ZTPI (Future and Present-Hedonistic) predicted the degree to which people reported feelings of mentally traveling backward (or forward) in time and the degree to which they reported re- or pre-experiencing the event, but not ten other rated properties less related to autonoetic consciousness.     

A model of episodic memory: Mental time travel along encoded trajectories using grid cells

The definition of episodic memory includes the concept of mental time travel: the ability to re-experience a previously experienced trajectory through continuous dimensions of space and time, and to recall specific events or stimuli along this trajectory. Lesions of the hippocampus and entorhinal cortex impair human episodic memory function and impair rat performance in tasks that could be solved by retrieval of trajectories. Recent physiological data suggests a novel model for encoding and retrieval of trajectories, and for associating specific stimuli with specific positions along the trajectory. During encoding in the model, external input drives the activity of head direction cells. Entorhinal grid cells integrate the head direction input to update an internal representation of location, and drive hippocampal place cells. Trajectories are encoded by Hebbian modification of excitatory synaptic connections between hippocampal place cells and head direction cells driven by external action. Associations are also formed between hippocampal cells and sensory stimuli. During retrieval, a sensory input cue activates hippocampal cells that drive head direction activity via previously modified synapses. Persistent spiking of head direction cells maintains the direction and speed of the action, updating the activity of entorhinal grid cells that thereby further update place cell activity. Additional cells, termed arc length cells, provide coding of trajectory segments based on the one-dimensional arc length from the context of prior actions or states, overcoming ambiguity where the overlap of trajectory segments causes multiple head directions to be associated with one place. These mechanisms allow retrieval of complex, self-crossing trajectories as continuous curves through space and time.     

On being stuck in time

It is sometimes claimed that non-human animals (and perhaps also young children) live their lives entirely in the present and are cognitively ‘stuck in time’. Adult humans, by contrast, are said to be able to engage in ‘mental time travel’. One possible way of making sense of this distinction is in terms of the idea that animals and young children cannot engage in tensed thought, which might seem a preposterous idea in the light of certain findings in comparative and developmental psychology. I try to make this idea less preposterous by looking into some of the cognitive requirements for tensed thought. In particular, I suggest that tensed thought requires a specific form of causal understanding, which animals and young children may not possess.

How great is great ape foresight?

Osvath and Osvath (Anim Cogn 11: 661–674, 2008) report innovative studies with two chimpanzees and one orangutan that suggest some capacity to select and keep a tool for use about an hour later. This is a welcome contribution to a small, but rapidly growing, field. Here we point out some of the weaknesses in the current data and caution the interpretation the authors advance. It is not clear to what extent the apes really engaged in any foresight in these studies. This is an invited response to Osvath and Osvath (2008).     

Odour-induced mental time travel into the past and future: Do odour cues retain a unique link to our distant past?

Proustian memories, or memories spontaneously evoked by taste and odours, have been argued to be uniquely linked to our remote past. This view suggests an asymmetry between odour-cued memories and odour-cued representations of future events regarding their temporal distance to the present. We investigated the temporal distribution and other phenomenological qualities of autobiographical memories and future events employing a 2 (temporal direction: past vs future)×3 (cue type: verbal, visual, and odour) mixed design. We found that while odour-evoked memories were predominantly from the first decade of life, the future condition showed a marked preponderance of odour-cued events in the upcoming year. Odour-evoked memories were also less specific than the verbal and visual conditions. The odour condition was responsible for interactions concerning coherency of the events and the events’ significance to the life story. The results support the view that odours possess a unique ability to evoke remote autobiographical memories.