The emotional dog and its rational tail: a social intuitionist approach to moral judgment.

Research on moral judgment has been dominated by rationalist models, in which moral judgment is thought to be caused by moral reasoning. The author gives 4 reasons for considering the hypothesis that moral reasoning does not cause moral judgment; rather, moral reasoning is usually a post hoc construction, generated after a judgment has been reached. The social intuitionist model is presented as an alternative to rationalist models. The model is a social model in that it deemphasizes the private reasoning done by individuals and emphasizes instead the importance of social and cultural influences. The model is an intuitionist model in that it states that moral judgment is generally the result of quick, automatic evaluations (intuitions). The model is more consistent that rationalist models with recent findings in social, cultural, evolutionary, and biological psychology, as well as in anthropology and primatology.     

Comments on the social learning interpretation of moral judgment development

Abstract.— The interpretations of social learning theory on development in moral judgment was contested. From an organismic point of view it was argued that changes demonstrated by learning experiments did not fulfill the requirements of an organismic concept of development. Experiments were quoted which indicated that the measures of maturity employed in social learning studies were on the same formal level as the assumed immature responses. It was argued that the organismic theoretican Piaget had falsely interpreted change as development on the same grounds as social learning theory. A criterion of conservation of subjective responsibility, or interest-crossing, was proposed as an organismic criterion of development in moral judgment.     

Effects of social influences and waiting on time judgment

Utilizing social judgment theory, the relationships of three social cues to time judgment under low physical temporal-cue conditions were explored. These social influences were as follows: being free to interact with another person, being told by the experimenter to expect to wait a specified period of time, and seeing another person's time judgment. 72 college students, randomly assigned to conditions of free social interaction (alone-interactive) and of waiting expectancy (expected-unexpected), made time estimates after 4 min., 7 sec. Each person under interactive conditions made another judgment after seeing a partner's judgment. Mean estimation was lower alone than under interactive conditions and lower under expected than unexpected waiting conditions. Under interactive conditions, correlations were positive between the individual's first and second judgments, between the partners' second judgments, and between the individual's second and the partner's first judgments. Social cues may influence time judgment.     

A commentary on the symposium: The use of history in the social sciences curriculum

The use of history in the social science curriculum leads to a deepened understanding of the respective disciplines of anthropology, education, sociology, political science, psychology, and history of science. The use of history in the social sciences also leads to extradisciplinary interests in history, philosophy, and literature. Some highlights from a symposium and from the recent literature are discussed.     

Person perception and the bounded rationality of social judgment

In this article, we develop a bounded rationality view of the relation between person perception and social behavior. Two theses of this approach are that behaviors vary in their significance to observers, and that observers pursue bounded rather than global utility in forming personality impressions. Observers are expected to be sensitive to targets' overall behavioral tendencies and to the variability of their behavior across situations, but both sensitivities are bounded, being greater for behaviors that directly affect observers' outcomes. In two investigations involving extensive hourly and 6-s observations, we examined the bounded utility of people's impressions of personality, demonstrating how impression accuracy is linked to the significance of behaviors. Observers were sensitive to the organization of aggressive behaviors, but less sensitive to the organization of withdrawn behaviors, even when the consistency of those behaviors was comparable. The results clarify the relation between people's inferential shortcomings in laboratory paradigms and the bounded utility of person perception in the natural environment.     

From the scene to the crime: the effect of alcohol and social context on moral judgment

Forty men and women were given Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview (MJI) while drinking in a natural setting and were asked a series of questions about whether they should and would drive impaired. In a second testing in an academic context, these subjects were given an alternate form of the MJI and were asked whether they drove on the previous occasion. Forty additional men and women completed the MJI in an academic context and responded to the impaired driving questions hypothetically. Results revealed that Ss scored lower on moral maturity in the the social drinking contexts than in the academic contexts, especially when highly intoxicated. Ss responding hypothetically attributed more moral integrity to themselves than to others, indicating they would not drive impaired. The self-righteousness of these attributions was apparent in the behavior of Ss who drove to the social drinking settings--all but 1 drove home, however impaired.     

Comparison selection: An approach to the study of consumer judgment and choice

We introduce an alternative perspective on the study of consumer judgment and decision making, which is based on the notion that judgment and choice problems consist of comparisons that decision makers might select. Our new perspective proposes that if we can predict the likelihood that particular comparisons will become focal in a judgment or choice task, we will be able to gain a better understanding of and anticipate the resulting effect. Building on related literatures, we propose that comparison selection is driven by the task's latitude of acceptance (LOA) and comparison fluency (i.e., the overall ease of making that comparison). The task's LOA curve represents the range and concentration of potentially acceptable comparisons, whereas comparison fluency refers to the salience and ease of making the comparison. We illustrate our approach using previously studied problems (e.g., choice, variety seeking, the “jacket and calculator” problem, and contingent valuation) as well as new empirical tests.     

Beware of samples! A cognitive-ecological sampling approach to judgment biases

A cognitive-ecological approach to judgment biases is presented and substantiated by recent empirical evidence. Latent properties of the environment are not amenable to direct assessment but have to be inferred from empirical samples that provide the interface between cognition and the environment. The sampling process may draw on the external world or on internal memories. For systematic reasons (proximity, salience, and focus of attention), the resulting samples tend to be biased (selective, skewed, or conditional on information search strategies). Because people lack the metacognitive ability to understand and control for sampling constraints (predictor sampling, criterion sampling, selective-outcome sampling, etc.), the sampling biases carry over to subsequent judgments. Within this framework, alternative accounts are offered for a number of judgment biases, such as base-rate neglect, confirmation bias, illusory correlation, pseudo-contingency, Simpson's paradox, outgroup devaluation, and pragmatic-confusion effects.     

Contribution of conversation skills to the production of judgmental errors

An impressive body of evidence has accumulated demonstrating that many of the judgmental ‘errors’ or ‘biases’ formerly thought due to purely cognitive shortcomings actually reflect the operation of communication goals and strategies that people rely upon to comprehend and generate meaningful conversation. This study examines the effects of individual differences in conversational skills on the production of biased responses using six judgmental heuristics tasks: base-rate error, conjunction error, dilution effect, underuse of consensus information, primacy effect, and confirmation bias. Clarke's (1975) ‘method of reconstruction’ was used to obtain two measures of conversational sophistication: relevance-seeking and (un)responsiveness. A path analysis predicting biased judgments from the skill variables demonstrates that a combination of these variables, which we term ‘Pragmatic Competence’, is predictive of two independent subsets of the heuristics tasks. Our model provides convergent evidence with other, parametric studies for the proposition that biased social judgments are, at least in part, artifacts of participants' reasonable (and unreasonable!) expectations concerning experimenter cooperativeness. ‘The process of forming an integrated mental model of premises is nothing more than the proper comprehension of discourse: it is required in order to grasp the full impact of what the speaker has to say’ Johnson-Laird (1983, p. 119). © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effect of global versus local processing styles on assimilation versus contrast in social judgment

The authors propose a global/local processing style model (GLOMO) for assimilation and contrast effects in social judgment. GLOMO is based on Schwarz and Bless' (1992, 2007) inclusion-exclusion model, which suggests that when information is included into a category, assimilation occurs, whereas when information is excluded from a category, contrast occurs. According to GLOMO, inclusion versus exclusion should be influenced by whether people process information globally or locally. In 5 experiments, using both disambiguation and social comparison, the authors induced local versus global processing through perceptual tasks and time perspective and showed that global processing produced assimilation, whereas local processing produced contrast. The experiments showed that processing styles elicited in one task can carry over to other tasks and influence social judgments. Furthermore, they found that hemisphere activation and accessibility of judgment-consistent knowledge partially mediated these effects. Implications for current and classic models of social judgment are discussed.