The cognitive structure of choice dilemma decisions

We tried to find out why Ss chose a specific risk level. We, therefore, constructed a questionnaire with 30 statements about aspects of the contents of the choice dilemmas. A factor analysis of the 30 statements over ten choice dilemmas and 61 field-officers led to a structure of four cognitive elements. With these four factors as predictors we could explain a main part of the variance of the individual risk level of each choice dilemma. This regression analysis was done with normal product-moment-correlations and with scalar-products. Both analyses show great similarity, although it seemed to be better to use scalar-products because one can use the information of the means. The four cognitive elements could be interpreted as: (1) Decision-making strategy; (2) Responsibility for others; (3) Reputation; (4) Socially valued riskiness.     

The relationship between confidence and self-concept — Towards a model of response confidence

According to Stankov [Stankov, L. (2000). Complexity, metacognition and fluid intelligence. Intelligence, 28, 121–143.] response confidence in cognitive tests reflects a trait on the boundary of personality and abilities. However, several studies failed in relating confidence scores to other known traits, including self-concept. A model of response confidence is proposed which predicts that confidence judgements do reflect self-concept, but only to the extent that they do not reflect a calibration process based on task-inherent cues. In the current study, 101 students completed various tests of cognitive abilities and skills as well as scales of the SDQ III measuring general academic and problem-solving self-concept. As expected, self-concept predicts a significant proportion of variance in the confidence factor that is over and above the influence of test scores.     

The relationship between executive functions,episodic feeling-of-knowing and confidence judgements

Metamemory processes and executive control may be related, given that both are frontally mediated. However, previous behavioural research has been limited in identifying common processes driving this somewhat weak relationship partly because they mostly relied upon global executive measures and composite scores of executive function (EF). The present study investigated the relationship between specific EFs (task shifting, interference resolution), working memory capacity and feeling-of-knowing (FOK) and confidence judgements (CONF) in an episodic memory task. We found that, of the EFs, only task-switching performance was correlated with FOK accuracy and proposed a shared mechanism that may be at play in both task-switching and FOK judgements. We also demonstrated that interference resolution and episodic memory measures were related, suggesting strategic influences on memory retrieval. Finally, we found a strong consistency in the strength and accuracy of FOK and CONF judgements, possibly due to retrieval-based mechanisms in both types of judgements.     

The relationship between feeding rate and patch choice.

Rats in a laboratory foraging simulation searched for sequential opportunities to feed in two patches that differed in the rate at which food pellets were delivered (controlled by fixed-interval schedules) and in the size of the pellets. The profitability of feeding in each patch was calculated in terms of time (grams per minute) and in terms of effort (grams per bar press). These values were the result of the imposed fixed interval, the size of the pellets, and the rate at which the rats pressed the bar in each condition. The rats ate more food and larger meals, but not more frequent meals, at the patch offering the higher rate of food consumption, calculated as grams per minute. The relative intake at any patch was a function of the relative rate of intake during meals at that patch compared to the other patch. Rats respond to explicit manipulations of feeding time in the same manner as they respond to manipulations of feeding effort.     

The disutility of the hard-easy effect in choice confidence

A common finding in confidence research is the hard-easy effect, in which judges exhibit greater overconfidence for more difficult sets of questions. Many explanations have been advanced for the hard-easy effect, including systematic cognitive mechanisms, experimenter bias, random error, and statistical artifact. In this article, I mathematically derive necessary and sufficient conditions for observing a hard-easy effect, and I relate these conditions to previous explanations for the effect. I conclude that all types of judges exhibit the hard-easy effect in almost all realistic situations. Thus, the effect’s presence cannot be used to distinguish between judges or to draw support for specific models of confidence elicitation.     

The relationship between the motive to avoid success and vocational choice

This study examined, for 221 black and white male and female college students, the relationship between the Motive to Avoid Success (M_−s) and: (a) sex and race; (b) congruency, consistency, and differentiation of occupational choice; and (c) occupational aspirations. M_−s was assessed by a recent scoring system for verbal TAT cues and occupational choice patterns were analyzed by the Self-Directed Search. The results showed a significant sex difference on M_−s. High M_−s, in white females predicted well defined, sex-role stereotyped, and low occupational aspirations, but for white males it predicted high aspirations. No significant results were found for black males, and M_−s in black females seemed to be related to economic well-being.     

The role of free choice in memory for past decisions

After choosing between different options, people tend to remember the features of the options in ways that favour the chosen alternative. The present experiment examined how limitations on freedom to choose between options affected this memory bias. Participants were given a series of two-option choices and were either allowed free choice between options or were assigned to an option. Participants assigned to an option were led to believe that either the selection was random or was made in their best interest based on their personality profile. Results indicated that the choice and best interest conditions demonstrated memory attributions that favoured their received options, whereas the assignment condition did not. These findings support the view that memory biases towards received options are not unique to free choice situations, but may stem from expectations and implicit theories about how and why the choice was made.     

The role of free choice in memory for past decisions

After choosing between different options, people tend to remember the features of the options in ways that favour the chosen alternative. The present experiment examined how limitations on freedom to choose between options affected this memory bias. Participants were given a series of two-option choices and were either allowed free choice between options or were assigned to an option. Participants assigned to an option were led to believe that either the selection was random or was made in their best interest based on their personality profile. Results indicated that the choice and best interest conditions demonstrated memory attributions that favoured their received options, whereas the assignment condition did not. These findings support the view that memory biases towards received options are not unique to free choice situations, but may stem from expectations and implicit theories about how and why the choice was made.     

Post-decisional confidence and conflict experienced in a choice process

The present study investigated the relationships between time pressure, type of decision process, in terms of its being compensatory and non-compensatory, and post-decisional confidence. It was hypothesized that time pressure would lead to more frequent use of non-compensatory strategies and that post-decisional confidence would be higher after non-compensatory decisions than after compensatory decisions. For each subject 36 choice situations were developed such that choice of one alternative would suggest a compensatory decision process whereas choice of the other alternative would suggest a non-compensatory process. Twenty student nurses made these choices and rated their post-decisional confidence for each choice. Both hypotheses were supported although time pressure was not found to influence level of confidence. An explanation based on the amount of conflict accompanying each type of decision process was suggested.     

When confidence in a choice is independent of which choice is made

For forced-choice two-alternative general-information questions, confidence in the correctness of the answer differed reliably for different questions, regardless of which answer was chosen. Results suggested that this choice-independent confidence is mediated by the domain familiarity of the question and by its tendency to bring to mind either few or many thoughts and considerations. Ratings of the questions on familiarity and accessibility yielded strong correlations with participants’ confidence in whichever of two answers they had chosen, and with estimates of the percentage of participants who were likely to have chosen either of the answers in a previous experiment. The results were interpreted in terms of confirmation bias: Because items differ in the extent to which they bring to mind few or many pertinent thoughts, selective focusing on supportive evidence should yield a positive correlation between mean confidence in one answer and mean confidence in the alternative answer, as if there is no competition between them.     

Market entry decisions: effects of absolute and relative confidence

In a market entry game, the number of entrants usually approaches game-theoretic equilibrium quickly, but in real-world markets business start-ups typically exceed market capacity, resulting in chronically high failure rates and suboptimal industry profits. Excessive entry has been attributed to overconfidence arising when expected payoffs depend partly on skill. In an experimental test of this hypothesis, 96 participants played 24 rounds of a market entry game, with expected payoffs dependent partly on skill on half the rounds, after their confidence was manipulated and measured. The results provide direct support for the hypothesis that high levels of confidence are largely responsible for excessive entry, and they suggest that absolute confidence, independent of interpersonal comparison, rather than confidence about one's abilities relative to others, drives excessive entry decisions when skill is involved.     

Variance misperception explains illusions of confidence in simple perceptual decisions

Confidence in a perceptual decision is a judgment about the quality of the sensory evidence. The quality of the evidence depends not only on its strength (‘signal’) but critically on its reliability (‘noise’), but the separate contribution of these quantities to the formation of confidence judgments has not been investigated before in the context of perceptual decisions. We studied subjective confidence reports in a multi-element perceptual task where evidence strength and reliability could be manipulated independently. Our results reveal a confidence paradox: confidence is higher for stimuli of lower reliability that are associated with a lower accuracy. We show that the subjects’ overconfidence in trials with unreliable evidence is caused by a reduced sensitivity to stimulus variability. Our results bridge between the investigation of miss-attributions of confidence in behavioral economics and the domain of simple perceptual decisions amenable to neuroscience research.     

Am stressed,must travel: The relationship between mode choice and commuting stress

The stress of commuting has serious public health and social implications. By comparing stress across different modes it is possible to determine which modes are more heavily contributing to this potential health and social issue. This study uses a large-scale university travel survey to compare commuter stress across three modes of transportation (walking, driving, and using public transit). It also investigates the specific factors that contribute to stress using these modes. Using ordered logistic regressions, the study develops a general model of stress and three mode-specific models. Results show that driving is the most stressful mode of transportation when compared to others. We also find that stressors for some modes are not stressors for others. Knowing which specific factors make certain modes stressful will help transportation and public health professionals make commuting a safer, more enjoyable, and less stressful activity; in turn this could mitigate the potentially serious health outcomes of a stressful commute.     

The Monty Hall dilemma in pigeons: Effect of investment in initial choice

In the Monty Hall dilemma, humans are initially given a choice among three alternatives, one of which has a hidden prize. After choosing, but before it is revealed whether they have won the prize, they are shown that one of the remaining alternatives does not have the prize. They are then asked whether they want to stay with their original choice or switch to the remaining alternative. Although switching results in obtaining the prize two thirds of the time, humans consistently fail to adopt the optimal strategy of switching even after considerable training. Interestingly, there is evidence that pigeons show more optimal switching performance with this task than humans. Because humans often view even random choices already made as being more valuable than choices not made, we reasoned that if pigeons made a greater investment, it might produce an endowment or ownership effect resulting in more human-like suboptimal performance. On the other hand, the greater investment in the initial choice by the pigeons might facilitate switching behavior by helping them to better discriminate their staying versus switching behavior. In Experiment 1, we examined the effect of requiring pigeons to make a greater investment in their initial choice (20 pecks rather than the usual 1 peck). We found that the increased response requirement facilitated acquisition of the switching response. In Experiment 2, we showed that facilitation of switching due to the increased response requirement did not result from extinction of responding to the initially chosen location.