Epistemology shmepistemology: moral error theory and epistemic expressivism

Some philosophers object to moral error theory by arguing that there a parity between moral and epistemic normativity. They maintain that moral and epistemic error theory stand or fall together, that epistemic error theory falls, and that moral error theory thus falls too. This paper offers a response to this objection on behalf of moral error theorists. I defend the view that moral and epistemic error theory do not stand or fall together by arguing that moral error theory can be sustained alongside epistemic expressivism. This unusual combination of theories can be underpinned by differences in the foundational norms that guide moral and epistemic inquiry. I conclude that the problem of epistemic normativity fails to show that it is compulsory for us to reject moral error theory.     

Self‐deception and pragmatic encroachment: A dilemma for epistemic rationality

Self‐deception is typically considered epistemically irrational, for it involves holding certain doxastic attitudes against strong counter‐evidence. Pragmatic encroachment about epistemic rationality says that whether it is epistemically rational to believe, withhold belief or disbelieve something can depend on perceived practical factors of one's situation. In this paper I argue that some cases of self‐deception satisfy what pragmatic encroachment considers sufficient conditions for epistemic rationality. As a result, we face the following dilemma: either we revise the received view about self‐deception or we deny pragmatic encroachment on epistemic rationality. I suggest that the dilemma can be solved if we pay close attention to the distinction between ideal and bounded rationality. I argue that the problematic cases fail to meet standards of ideal rationality but exemplify bounded rationality. The solution preserves pragmatic encroachment on bounded rationality, but denies it on ideal rationality.     

World‐Pictures and Wittgensteinian Certainty

Although certainty is a fundamental notion in epistemology, it is less studied in contemporary analytic epistemology than other important notions such as knowledge or justification. This paper focuses on Wittgensteinian certainty, according to which the very basic dimension of our epistemic practices, the elements of our world‐pictures, are objectively certain, in that we cannot legitimately doubt them. The aim of the paper is to offer the best philosophical way to clarify Wittgensteinian certainty, in a way that is consonant with Wittgenstein's fundamental insights. The paper critiques two alternative proposals for clarifying Wittgensteinian certainty that are philosophically unsatisfying: the rule view and the proposition view. Finally, it instead shows how viewing world‐pictures as pictures, in the sense of unclear conceptions, is a more philosophically fruitful approach to understanding world‐pictures.     

An epistemic and dynamic approach to abductive reasoning: Abductive problem and abductive solution

We propose a study of abductive reasoning addressing it as an epistemic process that involves both an agent?s information and the actions that modify this information. More precisely, we present and discuss definitions of an abductive problem and an abductive solution in terms of an agent?s information, that is, in terms of knowledge and beliefs. The discussion is then formalised by ‘implementing’ our definitions in a dynamic epistemic logic framework, where the properties of these definitions are studied, an epistemic action that represents the application of an abductive step is introduced, and an illustrative example is provided. A number of the most interesting properties of abductive reasoning (those highlighted by Peirce) are shown to be better modelled within this approach.     

Dual pathways to engage in ‘Silent Marches’ against violence: moral outrage,moral cleansing and modes of identification

A survey (N = 120) examined variables that contribute to the willingness of people to engage in silent marches against violence in the Netherlands. As argued in Sacred Value Protection Model (SVPM) of Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, and Lerner ( 2000 ) and moral mandate theory of Skitka, Bauman, and Sargis ( 2005 ), moral threats that are triggered by violent incidents, may indeed drive people to protest against such incidents. Our findings indicated dual pathways to such protests, that are all associated with reactive, angry empathic concerns. These concerns involve people's outrageous, punitive reactions towards offenders on behalf of the victims. These concerns are directly or indirectly related to people's participation intentions. That is, they directly influence the participation intention variable, or indirectly, through (re‐)establishing the belief in a just‐world, or through more fearful, self‐directed moral cleansing reactions. These latter reactions aim at reinforcing community‐shared moral standards. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Educating moral emotions: a praxiological analysis

This paper presents a praxiological analysis of three everyday educational practices or strategies that can be considered as being directed at the moral formation of the emotions. The first consists in requests to imagine other's emotional reactions. The second comprises requests to imitate normative emotional reactions and the third to re-appraise the features of a situation that are relevant to an emotional response. The interest of these categories is not just that they help to organize and recognize the significance of what might otherwise appear to be a disparate set of ordinary moral-educational interactions between children and educators. We suggest, further, that this analysis provides some new insight into what distinguishes the broad and recurrent conceptions of moral education from one another. Rather than being straightforwardly reducible to intractable differences over core normative or meta-ethical questions they can also be seen as correlating with different suppositions about the central role of the emotions in moral life and, correspondingly, different but to a large degree compatible interpretations of what the "education of the moral emotions" primarily means.

Learning for oneself: A Confucian‐inspired case for moral formation in ethics pedagogy

This article explores the disconnection between ethical theory and ethical practice in ethics courses at secular U.S. colleges and universities. In such contexts academic ethics focuses almost exclusively on “ethical reasoning” and leaves the business of practical moral formation of students in the realm of “student life.” I argue this disconnection is inevitable given the dominant understanding that moral formation must be guided by a consistent ethical theory, and must eventuate in certain prosocial behaviors, while norms of pluralism and free inquiry mandate that academic courses not attempt to dictate certain views or behaviors as normative. Drawing on the Confucian model of moral cultivation expressed by the early Chinese figure Mengzi, I argue for a different understanding of moral formation that focuses on open‐endedness, self‐direction, and the acquisition of skills in directing attention and will. This approach avoids the most serious challenges to practical moral formation in secular contexts, and I suggest some broadly applicable principles for implementing these ideas in ethics courses.     

The effects of physical contact and decision type on moral decision making: A study of harm to save moral behavior

This study examined the relationship between physical contact and decision type in predicting “harm to save” behavior. Participants were assigned to making either a judgment or a choice involving moral dilemmas. All participants were presented with dilemmas that either required or did not require having physical contact with potential victims. Participants were asked to decide whether to sacrifice fewer people to save more (utilitarian responses) or not to do so and thus more people would die (deontological responses). The study sample included 345 participants who completed a set of self‐report measures. Results indicated an interaction between physical contact and decision type. In the choice condition only, participants reported significantly less utilitarian responses to the dilemmas that required having physical contact with the person to be harmed than to dilemmas that did not require physical contact. This difference was not found in the judgment condition. These results contribute to a greater understanding of the nature and potential malleability of human morality.     

心理虐待与忽视对志愿投入的影响:链式中介效应分析

本研究根据道德认同模型与亲社会行为理论,以808名大学生志愿者为被试,通过问卷调查探索心理虐待与忽视对志愿投入的影响机制。结果发现:心理虐待与忽视对志愿投入的影响主要由公正世界信念与道德认同的中介作用来实现。本研究揭示了心理虐待与忽视与志愿投入的关系及内在机制,丰富了公正世界信念和道德认同的相关研究。     

The role of epistemic and social characteristics in children’s selective trust: Three meta‐analyses

Over the last 15 years, researchers have been increasingly interested in understanding the nature and development of children’s selective trust. Three meta‐analyses were conducted on a total of 51 unique studies (88 experiments) to provide a quantitative overview of 3‐ to 6‐year‐old children’s selective trust in an informant based on the informant’s epistemic or social characteristics, and to examine the relation between age and children’s selective trust decisions. The first and second meta‐analyses found that children displayed medium‐to‐large pooled effects in favor of trusting the informant who was knowledgeable or the informant with positive social characteristics. Moderator analyses revealed that 4‐year‐olds were more likely to endorse knowledgeable informants than 3‐year‐olds. The third meta‐analysis examined cases where two informants simultaneously differed in their epistemic and social characteristics. The results revealed that 3‐year‐old children did not selectively endorse informants who were more knowledgeable but had negative social characteristics over informants who were less knowledgeable but had positive social characteristics. However, 4‐ to 6‐year‐olds consistently prioritized epistemic cues over social characteristics when deciding who to trust. Together, these meta‐analyses suggest that epistemic and social characteristics are both valuable to children when they evaluate the reliability of informants. Moreover, with age, children place greater value on epistemic characteristics when deciding whether to endorse an informant’s testimony. Implications for the development of epistemic trust and the design of studies of children’s selective trust are discussed.     

帛书《易传》四篇天人道德观析论

本文通过对帛书易传<二三子问>、<易之义>、<要>、<缪和、昭力>四篇的分析,认为帛传四篇为孔子<易>论,其中包涵着<论语>、<孔子集语>、传世本<易传>等反映孔子思想的传世文献所隐微罕见的天人道德观念;帛传四篇表现了孔子在涵括三代以至春秋新旧天人观念的基础上对于天人内涵的初步的哲学改造,反映了孔子将传统的主宰之天转化为道德之天、并将传统的主体对于形上存在的外在超越关系转化为内在超越关系的致思取向,从而凸显了孔子作为当时敏锐而深邃的思想家的形象;帛传四篇所涵具的孔子天人道德思想补足了三代天命德政观与思孟天道性命思想之间的逻辑缺环,是经由曾子(<天圆>)而达致<中庸>、郭店儒家简、<孟子>乃至传世本<易传>所体现的天道性命思想高峰的理论根据.     

Elevation: A review of scholarship on a moral and other-praising emotion

The term elevation (also referred to as moral elevation), described by Thomas Jefferson and later coined by Jonathan Haidt, refers to the suite of feelings people may experience when witnessing an instance of moral beauty. The construct of elevation signifies the emotion felt when a person is a witness to, but not a recipient of, the moral behavior of others. Scholarship examining elevation has burgeoned since Haidt first introduced the construct. Researchers have explored the antecedents of, and outcomes associated with, witnessing instances of moral beauty. The current review will outline the existing scholarship on elevation, highlight conflicting findings, point out critical gaps in the current state of elevation research, and delineate fertile future directions for basic and applied research. Continued investigation of the affective, motivational, and behavioral responses associated with witnessing virtuous actions of others is warranted.     

善良人格与道德需要满足的关系：交叉滞后研究

道德需要被认为是独立于自主、胜任和关系需要（ACR）的基本心理需要,通过对两个时间段的纵向数据分析（N = 1,187）,使用交叉滞后模型,研究探讨了善良人格与道德需要满足之间的关系。结果发现,善良人格与道德需要满足存在一定程度的跨时间稳定性;在控制了ACR和人口学信息后,善良人格与道德需要满足存在双向预测关系。研究在中国文化下为道德需要的存在提供了证据,扩展了基本心理需要相关理论,并为道德教育和人格培养提供理论依据。     

公正世界信念——重建公正的双刃剑

公正世界信念即相信所处的世界是公正的,人们得其所应得,所得即应得.然而在现实生活中这一信念常常受到各种不公正事件的威胁,公正世界信念可以帮助人们应对威胁、重建公正.这种重建可能是行动上的也可能是认知上的,认知公正重建往往导致对不公正现状的合理化以及对受害者的贬损责怪.同时对于各种不公正的受害者或见证者,公正世界信念充当着重要的个人资源或是心理缓冲,帮助个体应对不公正事件,维护心理健康,并遵循公正原则追求其长远目标.公正世界信念的多维结构是解释其双重功能的基础.     

The unity of moral attitudes: recipe semantics and credal exaptation*

Abstract

This paper offers a noncognitivist characterization of moral attitudes, according to which moral attitudes count as such because of their inclusion of moral concepts. Moral concepts are distinguished by their contribution to the functional roles of some of the attitudes in which they can occur. They have no particular functional role in other attitudes, and should instead be viewed as evolutionary spandrels. In order to make the counter-intuitive implications of the view more palatable, the paper ends with an account of the evolution of normative judgments as exaptations of the cognitive structures that underlie beliefs.     

The Dialectic Relationship Between the Shared Values of Humanity and a Human Community with a Shared Future

General Secretary Xi Jinping deeply grasps the overall strategic situation of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and great changes in the world unseen in a hundred years, and forms the important thought of carrying forward the shared values of humanity of peace, development, fairness, justice, democracy, and freedom and promoting the building of a human community with a shared future. The shared values of humanity provide value basis for the community, confirm the morality of the community, and lay the foundation of value recognition for building the community. A human community with a shared future is the practice area for the shared values of humanity, providing it with a real subject and delimiting the boundaries of the times. The shared values of humanity and a human community with a shared future complement each other, and are dialectically unified in the planning and grasp of the “two overall situations,” i.e., the overall strategic situation of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and great changes in the world unseen in a century．     

Children's moral judgments of commission and omission based on their understanding of second‐order mental states1

Abstract: Children's moral judgments about acts of commission and omission with negative outcomes were studied based on their understanding of mental states. Children (N = 142) in the first, third, and fifth grades made judgments about four tasks composed of two levels of mental states (first‐order or second‐order) and two types of acts (commission or omission). The results showed that the 7‐year‐olds responded considering only first‐order mental states, but the 9‐ and 11‐year‐olds also used second‐order mental states in their judgments. Whether the acts were commission or omission did not make a difference. These results indicate that children can make moral judgments regarding acts of commission and omission based on an understanding of second‐order mental states by approximately the age of 9 years.     

道德概念具身隐喻及其影响因素：来自元分析的证据

采用元分析技术探讨道德概念具身隐喻及其影响因素。通过文献检索和筛选, 共有65篇文献153个独立样本符合元分析标准( N = 8659)。元分析结果显示, 道德概念具身隐喻的始源域与目标域存在中等程度正相关(r = 0.34); 调节效应检验表明, 道德概念具身隐喻受文化背景和隐喻维度的影响, 但不受隐喻映射方向、研究范式和感觉通道的影响。以上研究结果表明, 道德概念具身隐喻具有心理现实性, 并且受文化背景和隐喻维度的调节, 具体而言, 东方文化背景下个体的道德概念具身隐喻更强, 道德概念与空间维度和大小维度的隐喻联结程度更高。