Absolut memory distortions: alcohol placebos influence the misinformation effect

Can the simple suggestion that you have consumed alcohol affect your memory for an event? Alcohol placebos affect social behaviors but not nonsocial ones, and have not previously been shown to affect memory. We investigated the effect of alcohol placebos using materials that revealed both the social and the nonsocial influences of memory Subjects drank plain tonic water, but half were told it was a vodka and tonic; then all subjects took part in an eyewitness memory experiment. Subjects who were told they drank alcohol were more swayed by misleading postevent information than were those who were told they drank tonic water, and were also more confident about the accuracy of their responses. Our results show that the mere suggestion of alcohol consumption may make subjects more susceptible to misleading information and inappropriately confident. These results also provide additional confirmation that eyewitness memory is influenced by both nonsocial and social factors.     

Investigating the effects of age and gender on cowitness suggestibility during blame attribution

Despite a large body of research investigating the effects of age and gender on eyewitness suggestibility, the majority of studies has focussed on the impressionability of participants when attempting to recall the presence of items from an event. Very little research has attempted to investigate the effects of age and gender on the suggestibility of eyewitnesses when attempting to attribute blame. Participants (N = 268) viewed and discussed a crime (video) with cowitnesses before giving individual statements. Confederates were used to expose the participants to misinformation during the discussion, suggesting that the wrong bystander was responsible for the offence. Findings indicated that participants who encountered the misinformation were more likely to make a false blame attribution and were more confident in their erroneous judgements. The results found no significant age‐ or gender‐related differences in blame conformity rates; however, male eyewitnesses showed greater levels of overconfidence in their false responses than female participants, after encountering cowitness misinformation.     

The response order effect: People believe the first person who remembers an event

When groups of people remember an event, the order in which they discuss their memories is important. In three experiments, a response order effect was shown in which participants believed the first speaker to be more accurate and more confident than a subsequent speaker. Further, participants were more likely to report as their own memory what the first speaker reported than what a subsequent speaker reported. The experiments showed that the response order effect was not due to intrinsic characteristics of what the first speaker said. Even when participants chose the response order themselves and the speakers’ dialogue was counterbalanced, participants still believed that the first speaker was more accurate and confident than a subsequent speaker. Because in most situations the person who introduces a particular topic into a discussion is more accurate, people may assume that this is true, even when the response order is random.     

Repetition and Reconfiguration: Demand‐Based Confabulation in Initial Eyewitness Memory

Repeated recall, as a result of repeated questioning, is typical of situations involving eyewitness evidence. The present study addressed questions of eyewitness performance with reference to repeated questioning in an initial interview, in a format based on actual police procedures. This experiment focused on eyewitness accuracy, eyewitness confidence, and the addition of false details to eyewitness accounts. Ninety‐two adult respondents were asked to recall all the information they could from a single viewing of a scene depicting an assailant aiming a handgun at a victim. This initial question was followed by three additional questions, in which respondents were asked to report any additional details they could recall. On average, respondents provided several times as many correct as false details to the initial question. However, performance deteriorated significantly to the three subsequent questions; on average, across the three subsequent questions, witnesses recalled nearly as much false as accurate information. Witness confidence was positively related to amount of accurate information recalled. However, confidence was also positively related to the number of instances of erroneous recall. These results indicate that reconfigurative dynamics begin to operate, producing confabulated responses in response to questioning demands, as early as the initial interview. This work may also help to clarify the critical relationship between accuracy and confidence in eyewitness reportage, at least within the framework reflected by the present research. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A cross-race effect in metamemory: Predictions of face recognition are more accurate for members of our own race

The Cross-Race Effect (CRE) is the well-replicated finding that people are better at recognizing faces from their own race, relative to other races. The CRE reveals systematic limitations on eyewitness identification accuracy, suggesting that some caution is warranted in evaluating cross-race identification. The CRE is problematic because jurors value eyewitness identification highly in verdict decisions. We explore how accurate people are in predicting their ability to recognize own-race and other-race faces. Caucasian and Asian participants viewed photographs of Caucasian and Asian faces, and made immediate judgments of learning during study. An old/new recognition test replicated the CRE: both groups displayed superior discriminability of own-race faces. Importantly, relative metamnemonic accuracy was also greater for own-race faces, indicating that the accuracy of predictions about face recognition is influenced by race. This result indicates another source of concern when eliciting or evaluating eyewitness identification: people are less accurate in judging whether they will or will not recognize a face when that face is of a different race than they are. This new result suggests that a witness's claim of being likely to recognize a suspect from a lineup should be interpreted with caution when the suspect is of a different race than the witness.     

Witness confidence and accuracy: is a positive relationship maintained for recall under interview conditions?

A large positive correlation between eyewitness recall confidence and accuracy (C-A) is found in research when item difficulty is varied to include easy questions. However, these results are based on questionnaire responses. In real interviews, the social nature of the interview may influence C-A relationships, and it is the interviewer's perception of the accuracy of a witness that counts. This study was conducted to investigate the influence of these factors for recall of a video. Three conditions were used; the same questions were used in each. Participants in condition 1 (self-rate questionnaire condition, n = 20) were given a questionnaire that required them to answer questions and rate confidence on a scale. Pairs of participants in condition 2 (self-rate interview condition, n = 40) were given the role of eyewitness or interviewer. Eyewitnesses were asked questions by an interviewer and responded orally with answers and confidence judgements on a Likert scale. Participants in condition three (interviewer-rate interview condition, n = 40) were tested in the same way as condition two but provided confidence judgements in their own words. Interviewers independently rated each confidence judgement on the Likert scale. The experiment showed high C-A relationships, particularly for ‘absolutely sure’ responses. The main effect of the social interview condition was to increase confidence in correct answers but not in incorrect answers. However, the advantage of this effect was tempered by the fact that, although observers can differentiate between confident and less confident answers, less extreme confidence judgements were ascribed. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How do we judge our confidence? Differential effects of meta-memory feedback on eyewitness accuracy and confidence

According to the cue–belief model, we assess confidence in our memories using self-credibility cues that reflect beliefs about our memory faculties. We tested the influence of meta-memory feedback on self-credibility cues in the context of eyewitness testimony, when feedback was provided prior to “testifying” via a memory questionnaire (Experiment 1) and after an initial memory questionnaire but before participants had to retake it (Experiment 2). Participants received feedback (good score, bad score, or none) on a fictitious scale purported to predict eyewitness memory ability. Those given good score feedback before testifying were more confident (but no more accurate) than those given bad score feedback. Feedback also affected confidence (good increased and bad decreased) and accuracy (good increased) after testifying but only on leading questions. These differential effects of meta-memory feedback on confidence for normal and leading questions are not explained by the cue–belief model. Implications for our confidence judgments are discussed.     

What US judges know and believe about eyewitness testimony

In a survey, 160 US judges indicated their knowledge and beliefs about eyewitness testimony. Although correct on some issues, judges were often wrong on important issues such as whether at trial eyewitness confidence is a good indicator of eyewitness accuracy, and if jurors can distinguish accurate from inaccurate witnesses. Increased knowledge was associated with: a willingness to permit legal safeguards, including expert testimony at trial; a belief that jurors have limited knowledge of eyewitness factors; a reluctance to convict defendants solely from eyewitness testimony; a more accurate estimate of the extent to which wrongful convictions result from eyewitness error; and a belief that judges need more eyewitness training. Additional training about factors and procedures that affect eyewitness accuracy may help judges reduce the number of wrongful convictions. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Interviewer feedback in repeated interviews involving forced confabulation

The effects of confirmatory interviewer feedback on eyewitness testimony following forcibly confabulated and accurate responses to repeated interview questions were investigated in two experiments. The first experiment showed that, relative to neutral feedback, confirmatory feedback provided after a forcibly confabulated response greatly increased the likelihood that participants would provide the same confabulated response when re‐interviewed 2 days later, led participants to report these repeated confabulations with greater speed and fewer expressions of doubt, and increased the prevalence of false memories. Confirmatory interviewer feedback provided following accurate responses appeared to have more modest consequences for consistency and confidence, but ceiling effects provided little opportunity for observing potential effects. A second experiment showed that these effects of confirmatory feedback are of considerable practical significance, in that, regardless of their accuracy, responses that had earlier been reinforced with confirmatory feedback were much more likely to be judged by others as credible. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Evaluating Identification Evidence from Multiple Eyewitnesses

When two or more eyewitnesses provide identification evidence in a given investigation, their testimony will be characterized either by unanimity or by contradictions. In the present research, nominal groups of several sizes were constructed from the distributions of individual responses in a variety of previous studies. It was found that both unanimity and contradictions could be expected to occur with considerable frequency. When unanimity occurred, the unanimous response was very likely to be accurate, particularly in large groups. When contradictions occurred, the most common, or modal, response was most probably accurate, particularly when four or more witnesses endorsed the modal position. These and several subsidiary findings resulted largely from the fact that individual errors were randomly distributed across many different incorrect response options. Consequently, even when eyewitnesses were generally inaccurate, the correct option was still chosen more frequently than any single incorrect option. Distinctions between the implications of individual vs. multiple eyewitness testimony were discussed.     

Postidentification feedback affects real eyewitnesses

Many studies of simulated eyewitness situations have shown that under certain laboratory conditions, people's confidence about their identifications predicts their accuracy, but that their reported confidence can be affected by telling them that they chose the suspect. In this study, eyewitnesses (n= 134) to real crimes took part in lineups at an identification suite in the United Kingdom and were asked questions about their memory both before and after they were told whether they had identified the suspect or a filler. Before the eyewitnesses were told whether they had identified the suspect or a filler, their responses to several questions reliably differentiated between those who identified the suspect and those who identified a filler. In addition, responses to the memory questions were affected by telling the eyewitnesses whether or not they had identified the suspect. These results show that postidentification feedback affects real eyewitnesses and highlight the importance of recording meta-memory variables before an eyewitness discovers whether he or she has identified the suspect.     

Do emotional stimuli enhance or impede recall relative to neutral stimuli? An investigation of two “false memory” tasks

Many eyewitness memory situations involve negative and distressing events; however, many studies investigating “false memory” phenomena use neutral stimuli only. The aim of the present study was to determine how both the Deese–Roediger–McDermott (DRM) procedure and the Misinformation Effect Paradigm tasks were related to each other using distressing and neutral stimuli. Participants completed the DRM (with negative and neutral word lists) and viewed a distressing or neutral film. Misinformation for the film was introduced and memory was assessed. Film accuracy and misinformation susceptibility were found to be greater for those who viewed the distressing film relative to the neutral film. Accuracy responses on both tasks were related, however, susceptibility to the DRM illusion and Misinformation Effect were not. The misinformation findings support the Paradoxical Negative Emotion (PNE) hypothesis that negative stimuli will lead to remembering more accurate details but also greater likelihood of memory distortion. However, the PNE hypothesis was not supported for the DRM results. The findings also suggest that the DRM and Misinformation tasks are not equivalent and may have differences in underlying mechanisms. Future research should focus on more ecologically valid methods of assessing false memory.     

Emotion and memory: Children's long-term remembering, forgetting, and suggestibility

Children's memories for an experienced and a never-experienced medical procedure were examined. Three- to 13-year-olds were questioned about a voiding cystourethrogram fluoroscopy (VCUG) they endured between 2 and 6 years of age. Children 4 years or older at VCUG were more accurate than children younger than 4 at VCUG. Longer delays were associated with providing fewer units of correct information but not with more inaccuracies. Parental avoidant attachment style was related to increased errors in children's VCUG memory. Children were more likely to assent to the false medical procedure when it was alluded to briefly than when described in detail, and false assents were related to fewer "do-not-know" responses about the VCUG. Results have implications for childhood amnesia, stress and memory, individual differences, and eyewitness testimony.     

Gender Differences in Moral Influences on Adolescents’ Eyewitness Identification

Abstract

In this study, 232 (89 11- to 12-year-olds, 71 13- to 14-year-olds; 72 15- to 16-year-olds) students recruited from grades 6th–11th in an urban public high school participated in a study of eyewitness identification. The focus of this study was on the effects of age, gender and moral orientation on decisional bias and, as a secondary outcome, on accuracy (using signal detection analysis).The primary purpose of this and previous studies in this series is to uncover implicit moral decision-making in decisional bias. In this study the perpetrator, the bystanders and the foil were all females. Prior to completing the eyewitness identification task, participants were given instructions that emphasized either (a) fairness and crime prevention, or (b) neither. These instructions had no discernible effect on accuracy but, as in past studies, younger participants (below the age of 13) had lower decisional criteria, resulting in a higher rate of false alarms/positives. Further, those who judged the transgression as worse had a lower decisional criterion, indicating more false alarms. Females were more accurate than the males in identifying the female perpetrator and scored significantly higher on how bad they would feel if they were the victim than did the males.     

Age differences in source forgetting: effects on reality monitoring and on eyewitness testimony

Age differences in memory for the source of memories were investigated using two different experimental paradigms. Experiment 1 used a reality monitoring paradigm. A series of actions were either performed, imagined, or watched, and subjects were later tested for their ability to recognize the actions and identify their origins. Elderly subjects made more false positive responses than did young subjects, and they made more source confusion errors, attributing actions to the wrong sources. Both new and imagined actions were most often misclassified as watched. Experiment 2 used an eyewitness testimony paradigm. After watching a film, subjects read a written version of the story. A recognition test showed that elderly subjects were more often misled by false information in the story than were the younger subjects, and were more confident that their erroneous responses were correct. The findings suggest that a decline in memory for sources may diminish the accuracy of elderly witnesses.     

Cortisol response and psychological distress predict susceptibility to false memories for a trauma film

For eyewitness testimony to be considered reliable, it is important to ensure memory remains accurate following the event. As many testimonies involve traumatic, as opposed to neutral, events, it is important to consider the role of distress in susceptibility to false memories. The aim of this study was to investigate whether cortisol response following a stressor would be associated with susceptibility to false memories. Psychological distress responses were also investigated, specifically, dissociation, intrusions, and avoidance. Participants were allocated to one of three conditions: those who viewed a neutral film (N?=?35), those who viewed a real trauma film (N?=?35), and a trauma “reappraisal” group where participants were told the film was not real (N?=?35). All received misinformation about the film in the form of a narrative. Participants provided saliva samples (to assess cortisol) and completed distress and memory questionnaires. Cortisol response was a significant predictor of the misinformation effect. Dissociation and avoidance were related to confabulations. In conclusion, following a stressor an individual may differ with regard to their psychological response to the event, and also whether they experience a cortisol increase. This may affect whether they are more distressed later on, and also whether they remember the event accurately.     

Remembering with a friend or a stranger: comparing acquainted and unacquainted pairs in collaborative eyewitness interviews

ABSTRACT

Previous findings show that collaborative interviews with pairs of eyewitnesses can result in more accurate testimony than individual interviews, and that partners remember more together if they acknowledge, repeat, rephrase and elaborate upon each other's contributions. In the present study, we investigated whether these findings differ for pairs of acquainted and unacquainted partners, respectively. Participants viewed a violent movie in the cinema and took part in three eyewitness interviews approximately five days later. The first and the last interview were always individual. The second interview was individual in the nominal condition (N?=?22 pairs), collaborative with a known partner in the acquainted condition (N?=?21 pairs), and collaborative with a stranger in the unacquainted condition (N?=?20 pairs). We replicated benefits of collaborative eyewitness interviews, in terms of error pruning as well as delayed cross-cuing. However, we found no significant differences between acquainted and unacquainted pairs, neither in recall performance nor in retrieval strategies during the collaborative interview. Regardless of acquaintance, pairs who elaborated upon each other's contributions during the collaborative interview, remembered more together. The findings are evaluated within the theoretical framework of transactive memory. Practical implications for investigative interviewers are discussed.     

Age‐related Differences in the Free‐recall Accounts of Child,Adolescent, and Adult Witnesses

Many researchers have examined the factors that affect children's ability to provide eyewitness evidence, leading to significant reform in policy and practice. In stark contrast, there has been virtually no eyewitness research conducted with adolescents, even though adolescents are still undergoing developmental changes that are likely to affect eyewitness performance. We compared the eyewitness performance of children, adolescents, and adults by showing them a brief film clip depicting a simulated crime and using cognitive interview instructions to elicit free‐recall accounts. Adolescents provided more information than children, but less information than adults. Accuracy did not differ with age. These data suggest that, like children, adolescents could benefit from specialised interview techniques that help them provide more complete accounts. Across all three age groups, individual differences in cognitive functioning contributed to variation in eyewitness performance, and eliciting a second free‐recall account increased the amount of information reported. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Expert testimony and jury decision making: An empirical analysis

This experiment examines the influence of expert psychological testimony on juror decision making in eyewitness identification cases. Experienced jurors and undergraduate mock jurors viewed versions of a videotaped trial, rated the credibility of the eyewitness and the strength of the prosecution's and defense's cases, and rendered verdicts. In the absence of expert testimony jurors were insensitive to eyewitness evidence. Expert testimony improved juror sensitivity to eyewitness evidence without making them more skeptical about the accuracy of the eyewitness identification. Few differences emerged between the experienced jurors and undergraduate mock jurors.