共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
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Claire Horisk 《Philosophical Studies》2008,137(2):269-300
It is often argued that the combination of deflationism about truth and the truth-conditional theory of meaning is impossible
for reasons of circularity. I distinguish, and reject, two strains of circularity argument. Arguments of the first strain
hold that the combination has a circular account of the order in which one comes to know the meaning of a sentence and comes
to know its truth condition. I show that these arguments fail to identify any circularity. Arguments of the second strain
hold that the combination has a circular explanation of the ideas or concepts of meaning and truth. I show that these arguments
identify a genuine, but acceptable, circularity. 相似文献
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Philosophia - This article argues that bullshit is not an offense against truth but against reason. It maintains that bullshit occurs when speakers intentionally assert vague premises to make... 相似文献
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Michael G. Dzialo 《Argumentation》1998,12(2):217-232
Anti-foundationalism is a central topic in recent legal scholarship. The critical legal studies movement (CLS) has mounted a strong challenge to the traditional belief that legal materials (constitutions, statutes, and precedents) determine legal outcomes and constrain judicial decision making. This scholarship has overlooked, however, the degree to which the debate between traditional legal determinacy and anti-foundational indeterminacy is yet another manifestation of a continuous debate in Western thought – one that has its roots in pre-Socratic rhetoric and philosophy.This paper traces the indeterminacy thesis back to the contest of ideas between Protagoras and Plato. I examine two well-known and elated Protagorean notions: first, that two arguments (logoi) are always set in opposition to one another with regard to every matter and, second, that the rhetorician can always make the weaker argument the stronger. I contend that taking these Protagorean notions seriously – perhaps even more seriously than self-avowed anti-foundationalists customarily do – leads paradoxically to a modified endorsement of foundationalism that is nevertheless wholly consistent with the Protagorean project. Calling upon texts by Aristotle, Seneca and René Girard, I focus upon how fictionality in representations of Platonically conceived Truth reveals a binarization in thought that is simultaneously untenable and unavoidable. 相似文献
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Truth,belief, and vagueness 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Kenton F. Machina 《Journal of Philosophical Logic》1976,5(1):47-78
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Paul Teller 《Metaphilosophy》2012,43(3):257-274
Knowledge requires truth, and truth, we suppose, involves unflawed representation. Science does not provide knowledge in this sense but rather provides models, representations that are limited in their accuracy, precision, or, most often, both. Truth as we usually think of it is an idealization, one that serves wonderfully in most ordinary applications, but one that can terribly mislead for certain issues in philosophy. This article sketches how this happens for five important issues, thereby showing how philosophical method must take into account the idealized nature of our familiar conception of truth. 相似文献
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Philosophical Studies - 相似文献
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Mark Bevir 《Metaphilosophy》2000,31(4):412-426
This essay approaches Derrida through a consideration of his writings on Saussure and Husserl. Derrida is right to insist, following Saussure, on a relational theory of meaning: words do not have a one-to-one correspondence with their referents. But he is wrong to insist on a purely differential theory of meaning: words can refer to reality within the context of a body of knowledge. Similarly, Derrida is right to reject Husserl's idea of presence: no truths are simply given to consciousness. But he is wrong to reject the very idea of objective knowledge: we can defend a notion of objective knowledge couched in terms of a comparison of rival bodies of theories. The essay concludes by considering the implications of the preceding arguments for the enterprise of phenomenology. 相似文献
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Dan Dahlstrom 《British Journal for the History of Philosophy》2013,21(5):1027-1036
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David Ingram 《Pacific Philosophical Quarterly》2018,99(3):442-463
Presentists, who believe that only present objects exist, should accept a thisness ontology, since it can do considerable work in defence of presentism. In this article, I propose a version of presentism that involves thisnesses of past and present entities and I argue that this view solves important problems facing standard versions of presentism. 相似文献
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