Factors affecting balance,agreement and positivity biases in POQ and POX triads

This review considers experiments which have tested triadic balance in POX and POQ structures. It is pointed out that balance is only one bias which affects subjects' responses to these structures. Of the others the most important are agreement and P/O positivity; these three biases act independently of each other and therefore should be considered as separate influences on subjects' responses. In addition, because they act independently, Newcomb's (1968) theory of interpersonal balance cannot be an adequate explanation of their operation. In an attempt to discover the different influences on balance, agreement, and positivity biases, experiments concerned with balance theory are reviewed in three sections: (1) a classification based on experimental task, (2) a classification based on characteristics of the triad, and (3) personality variables. It is concluded that there are different influences on the different biases, and that any attempt to assess their relative strength must consider the influences upon them. Finally, it is suggested that the view of biases as methods of encoding information about social structures should consider that such methods can be varied by subjects' knowledge or assumptions about that social structure.     

Processing bias: Individual differences in the cognition of situations

An approach to investigating individual differences in the cognition of situations is presented. Situations are characterized in terms of Gibson's notion of affordances, and it is suggested that individuals differ in the extent to which they differentially process information specifying certain types of affordances rather than others. This differential cognitive processing of a situational affordance is termed a "processing bias." It is proposed that processing biases are manifest in an individual's anticipation, perception, and memory of situations. To illustrate the approach, a processing bias for social vs. nonsocial affordances is investigated within and among these three cognitive domains. The relationship of this processing bias to two facets of the personality trait dimension of sociability--overall level and self-schemata--is also examined. Such research on processing biases may help to clarify the role of cognition in person-situation interactions. The greatest strength of the approach is that its characterization of individual differences in cognition and behavior is complementary to a general approach to describing human environments.     

Distortions in location memory

Memory for the location of a briefly presented target is often distorted in systematic ways. When people remember dot locations within a circular space, they typically show memory biases that appear to reflect a categorical strategy. However, memory for a target location can also be biased toward visible markers or landmarks. In the present study, we investigated the interaction of categorical and landmark effects by providing sectioning lines in a circular space. In the absence of lines, response biases showed categorical effects, whereas in the presence of lines, response biases suggested that participants used a landmark-based scheme. Possible relations between the strategies are discussed.     

Are the states underlying implicit biases unconscious? – A Neo-Freudian answer

Many philosophers as well as psychologists hold that implicit biases are due to unconscious attitudes. The justification for this unconscious-claim seems to be an inference to the best explanation of the mismatch between explicit and implicit attitudes, which is characteristic of implicit biases. The unconscious-claim has recently come under attack based on its inconsistency with empirical data. Instead, Gawronski, Hoffman, and Wilbur (2006) analyze implicit biases based on the so-called Associative-Propositional Evaluation (APE) model, according to which implicit attitudes are phenomenally conscious and accessible. The mismatch between the explicit and the implicit attitude is explained by the Cognitive Inconsistency Approach (CIA) (as I will call it): implicit attitudes are conscious but rejected as basis for explicit judgments because the latter lead to cognitive inconsistency with respect to other beliefs held by the subject. In this paper, I will argue that the CIA is problematic since it cannot account for the fact that implicit attitudes underlying implicit biases typically are unconscious. I will argue that a better explanation of the attitude-mismatch can be given in terms of a Neo-Freudian account of repression. I will develop such an account, and I will show how it can accommodate the merits of the APE model while avoiding the problems of the CIA.     

教师教学认知偏差的调查研究

通过对846名教师进行“教师教学认知偏差问卷”调查发现,所调查的教师在教学对象等10个教学因子方面均存在不同程度的认知偏差,这些认知偏差之间均存在着非常显著性相关。同时发现教师在教学诸因子方面的认知偏差存在性别、类型、任教的学校层次及教龄等方面的显著性差异,其中在整个教学因子上,女教师的教学认知偏差要好于男教师,教龄在1～5年的教师的教学认知偏差要好于教龄在16—20年及20年以上的教师;在绝大多数因子方面,教学优秀教师的认知偏差要好于一般普通教师;在部分教学因子上,小学和高校教师的认知偏差分别要好于初中和高中教师,教龄在6～10年段和11～15年段的教师的认知偏差均好于教龄在16～20年及20以上的教师。     

Toward a synthesis of cognitive biases: how noisy information processing can bias human decision making

A single coherent framework is proposed to synthesize long-standing research on 8 seemingly unrelated cognitive decision-making biases. During the past 6 decades, hundreds of empirical studies have resulted in a variety of rules of thumb that specify how humans systematically deviate from what is normatively expected from their decisions. Several complementary generative mechanisms have been proposed to explain those cognitive biases. Here it is suggested that (at least) 8 of these empirically detected decision-making biases can be produced by simply assuming noisy deviations in the memory-based information processes that convert objective evidence (observations) into subjective estimates (decisions). An integrative framework is presented to show how similar noise-based mechanisms can lead to conservatism, the Bayesian likelihood bias, illusory correlations, biased self-other placement, subadditivity, exaggerated expectation, the confidence bias, and the hard-easy effect. Analytical tools from information theory are used to explore the nature and limitations that characterize such information processes for binary and multiary decision-making exercises. The ensuing synthesis offers formal mathematical definitions of the biases and their underlying generative mechanism, which permits a consolidated analysis of how they are related. This synthesis contributes to the larger goal of creating a coherent picture that explains the relations among the myriad of seemingly unrelated biases and their potential psychological generative mechanisms. Limitations and research questions are discussed.     

CROSS-CULTURAL DIFFERENCES: INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL VS. CULTURE-LEVEL ANALYSIS

Two approaches to the interpretation of and theorizing about cross-cultural differences are identified. In the individual-level approach, cultural differences are assumed to be consistent with individual differences within each of the cultures included in the cross-cultural comparison. The use of antecedent variables to eliminate alternative explanations based on biases is reviewed and some problems noted. It is suggested that explicit theories be used to guide the selection of antecedent variables to minimize the impact of cultural biases. In the second approach, the culture-level approach, culture is the unit of analysis and there is no assumption regarding the correspondence between culture- and individual-level relationships. Two examples are given to illustrate the potential usefulness of this approach to developing concepts and theories that are very different from those derived from the individual-level approach. The problems of bias in this level of analysis are also discussed. Finally, it is argued that in cross-cultural psychology the individual-level approach dominates, but we should pay more attention to culture-level research. This approach may lead to the development of concepts and theories that are not likely to be produced by mono-cultural works.     

Attribution of success and failure revisited, or: The motivational bias is alive and well in attribution theory

Do causal attributions serve the need to protect and / or enhance self-esteem? In a recent review, Miller and Ross (1975) proposed that there is evidence for self-serving effect in the attribution of success but not in the attribution of failure; and that this effect reflects biases in information-processing rather than self-esteem maintenance. The present review indicated that self-serving effects for both success and failure are obtained in most but not all experimental paradigms. Processes which may suppress or even reverse the self-serving effect were discussed. Most important, the examination of research in which self-serving effects are obtained suggested that these attributions are better understood in motivational than in information-processing terms.     

Psychological conceptions of randomness

This article presents a critique of the concept of randomness as it occurs in the psychological literature. The first section of our article outlines the significance of a concept of randomness to the process of induction; we need to distinguish random and non-random events in order to perceive lawful regularities and formulate theories concerning events in the world. Next we evaluate the psychological research that has suggested that human concepts of randomness are not normative. We argue that, because the tasks set to experimental subjects are logically problematic, observed biases may be an artifact of the experimental situation and that even if such biases do generalise they may not have pejorative implications for induction in the real world. Thirdly we investigate the statistical methodology utilised in tests for randomness and find it riddled with paradox. In a fourth section we find various branches of scientific endeavour that are stymied by the problems posed by randomness. Finally we briefly mention the social significance of randomness and conclude by arguing that such a fundamental concept merits and requires more serious considerations.     

On the Relation between Kanizsa's Bias Towards Convexity and the Gestaltists Prägnanz from the Perspective of Current in Shape Recognition

What is the relation between Kanizsa's bias towards convexity and the Gestaltists' demonstrations that perceptual organization obeys a principle of pragnänz, or simplicity? Why should either kind of bias exist? Textbook accounts assign no functional role for these biases. Geon theory (Biederman 1987) proposes that we can understand these biases in terms of fundamental processes by which complex objects are decomposed into convex (or singly concave) regions at points of matched cusps according to the transversality regularity (Hoffman and Richards 1985). Such decomposition yields simple, convex parts segmented between the concavities. A shape that contains concavities is generally regarded as complex insofar as it can be decomposed into the regions, or parts, between the concavities. It is these simple parts that are the stable elements of shape, not the whole object. In fact, geon theory leads to the expectation that shape recognition proceeds most efficiently when the parts are good (in the pragnänz sense) but the object is bad!     

Presentation order effects in duration discrimination

Three separate experiments indicate that the second of a pair of durations tends to be overestimated relative to the first. These negative time-order errors are discussed as reliable perceptual phenomena, not explainable in terms of simple response biases, criterion biases, assimilation, or fading traces.     

Discussant's Comments Symposium: Applications of Androgyny to the Theory and Practice of Psychotherapy

As the preceding papers indicate, social change is creating pressure upon women and men to become increasingly androgynous. Thus, it is necessary to clarify the parameters of psychologically healthy androgynous functioning. Androgyny is currently defined in terms of the relative balance between masculine and feminine characteristics; it is suggested that both the relative degree of masculinity and feminity, and the particular configuration of characteristics need to be taken into account in specifying the convergence between androgyny and psychological health. Finally, the assumption that masculinity and femininity are orthogonal dimensions is questioned for some characteristics.     

Mood congruent memory in dysphoria: the roles of state affect and cognitive style

Biases in incidental memory for self-referent adjectives and intentional memory were compared across nondysphoric (ND; n=48), experimentally induced dysphoric (EXP; n=49), and naturally dysphoric (NAT; n=48) individuals. Negative biases, "evenhandedness", and positive biases were demonstrated among NAT, EXP and ND participants, respectively, in terms of incidental memory. Correlation analyses suggested that the effects of cognitive style (self-esteem, dysfunctional attitudes, and attributional style) are limited to negative stimuli. Memory for incidental positive stimuli was only predicted by state affect. Groups did not differ in performance on an intentional memory task. Implications for network and schema models of depression are explored.     

Labeling: The relationship between certain personal characteristics and some attribution processes

Ideas proposed by labeling theorists in criminology have been the focus of considerable controversy. However, these ideas have often not been systematically formulated and tested. In order to go beyond “sensitizing concepts,” it is necessary to restate the basic propositions in testable terms. In this paper, labeling and attribution perspectives were combined and labeling hypotheses were derived from attribution theory. These hypotheses were tested on a population of institutionalized juveniles in Washington State correctional facilities. We were interested in whether the age, sex, or race of a child activates stereotypes and biases staff attributions about the child. The results suggest that these characteristics do not affect certain staff perceptions of the child.     

When does random responding distort self-report personality assessment? An example with the NEO PI-R

Recent meta-analyses suggest that, notwithstanding almost 100 years of study, concerns about the impact of response biases on the validity of self-report personality scales remain to be justified. This study addresses the topic by demonstrating that random responding is indeed an issue for self-report personality scales, and that limitations associated with base rates exist that affect the ability of moderated multiple regression to evaluate fully the effects of a response bias. Overall, it is suggested that dismissing response biases as a concern for self-report personality assessment is premature when based only on a lack of significant regression moderator effects.     

Heuristics and biases in diagnostic reasoning: II. Congruence,information, and certainty

Six experiments were carried out to examine possible heuristics and biases in the evaluation of yes-or-no questions for the purpose of hypothesis testing. In some experiments, the prior probability of the hypotheses and the conditional probabilities of the answers given each hypothesis were elicited from the subjects; in other experiments, they were provided. We found the following biases (systematic departures from a normative model), and interviews and justifications suggested that each was the result of a corresponding heuristic: Congruence bias. Subjects overvalued questions that have a high probability of a positive result given the most likely hypothesis. This bias was apparently reduced when alternative hypotheses or probabilities of negative results are explicitly stated. Information bias. Subjects evaluated questions as worth asking even when there is no answer that can change the hypothesis that will be accepted as a basis for action. Certainty bias. Subjects overvalued questions that have the potential to establish, or rule out, one or more hypotheses with 100% probability. These heuristics are explained in terms of the idea that people fail to consider certain arguments against the use of questions that seem initially worth asking, specifically, that a question may not distinguish likely hypotheses or that no answer can change the hypothesis accepted as a basis for action.     

Children construct novel word meaning ad-hoc based on known words: Computational model of shape and material biases

Taking the stance that two well-known word learning biases (shape and material bias) are formed through learning (learned bias account, LBA), we illustrated a concrete computational mechanism with “ad-hoc meaning substitution (AMS)” hypothesis, and verified it by two computer simulations. AMS represents that when given a novel word and a corresponding instance, children create novel word meaning by using the known word meaning and the instance as an ad-hoc template. The AMS function enables fast mapping and vocabulary spurt. To describe the AMS process computationally, we introduced “word distributional prototype (WDP),” which is the explicit representation of word meaning with an inductive learning function. Simulation 1 revealed that when a network with WDP and AMS was given a biased vocabulary reflecting young children, it demonstrated shape, material, and overgeneralized shape biases. This result suggested that a triad of word meaning induction, ad-hoc meaning substitution, and early biased vocabulary is essential for the emergence of biases. Simulation 2 introduced the notion of maturity that denoted a degree of learning convergence for each word meaning, and then the network showed neither shape nor material bias during an early small vocabulary. This result indicated that the period at which each bias emerges is decided by maturity. Though AMS consists of simpler and valider mechanisms than those proposed in previous studies, it could reproduce behavior of shape and material biases and explain their emergence process clearly. These results suggest that phenomena concerning shape and material biases are explicable with a simple ad-hoc learning instead of meta-learning among LBA or innate language-specific ones.     

Born to be biased? Unrealistic optimism and error management theory

When individuals display cognitive biases, they are prone to developing systematically false beliefs. Evolutionary psychologists have argued that rather than being a flaw in human cognition, biases may actually be design features. In my paper, I assess the claim that unrealistic optimism is such a design feature because it is a form of error management. Proponents of this theory say that when individuals make decisions under uncertainty, it can be advantageous to err on the side of overconfidence if the potential gains through success are high and the costs of failure are low. I argue that there are a number of conceptual problems in matching the theory with the existing data. I also show that there is empirical evidence against the error management hypothesis.     

Manual laterality in nonhuman primates: a distinction between handedness and manual specialization

This article examines individual and group manual lateralization in nonhuman primates as a function of task's demands. It is suggested to distinguish low- from high-level manual activities with respect to the novelty variable and to the spatiotemporal scale of the movements. This review shows that low-level tasks lead to (a) symmetrical distributions of hand biases for the group and (b) manual preferences that are not indicative of the specialization of the contralateral hemisphere. In contrast, behaviors expressed in high-level tasks (a) show asymmetrical distribution of hand biases for the group and (b) seem to be related to a specialization of the contralateral hemisphere. Two types of lateralization, handedness and manual specialization, correspond to the 2 levels of tasks that are distinguished.     

Cognitive-processing bias in chronic pain: a review and integration

Do patients with chronic pain selectively process pain- and illness-related stimuli? The evidence with regard to attention, interpretation, and recall biases is critically reviewed. A model is proposed to account for the findings in which it is suggested that biases in information processing in chronic pain are the result of overlap between 3 schemas: pain, illness, and self. With frequent repeated or continued experience of pain, the pain schema becomes enmeshed with illness and self-schemas. The extent of the enmeshment and the salient content of the schema determine the bias. A fundamental assumption is that all patients with pain selectively process sensory-intensity information. A clinical implication of the results is that processing biases that extend beyond this healthy and adaptive process to enmesh the self-schema with pain and illness schemas could maintain and exacerbate distress and illness behavior in patients with chronic pain.