Heterarchy of cognition: the depths and the highs of a framework for memory research

To celebrate the levels-of-processing approach, I describe a multilevel evolutionary architecture for human behaviour and cognition. New experimental data on human eye movements are presented that demonstrate a possibility of splitting visual perceptual activity at least on two hierarchical but closely interrelated levels of processing. Furthermore, data from behavioural studies of human memory and neuroimaging testify that within the domain of cognition proper two higher levels can be differentiated. I call them "conceptual structures" and "metacognitive coordinations" and provide evidence that the latter may residue in the phylogenetically new structures of prefrontal and particularly right prefrontal cortices. From this point of few, the most natural framework for an analysis of the levels-of-processing effects on human memory is to consider them as interactions within the main gradients of evolution and development of the corresponding neurophysiological mechanisms. Finally, several new, still unanswered questions for the future research are formulated.     

Remembering and knowing: Two means of access to the personal past

The nature of recollective experience was examined in a recognition memory task. Subjects gave “remember” judgments to recognized items that were accompanied by conscious recollection and “know” judgments to items that were recognized on some other basis. Although a levels-of-processing effect (Experiment 1) and a picture-superiority effect (Experiment 2) were obtained for overall recognition, these effects occurred only for “remember” judgments, and were reversed for “know” judgments. In Experiment 3, targets and lures were either preceded by a masked repetition of their own presentation (thought to increase perceptual fluency) or of an unrelated word. The effect of perceptual fluency was obtained for overall recogrntion and “know” judgments but not for “remember” judgments. The data obtained for confidencejudgments using the same design (Experiment4) indicated that “remember”/”know” judgments are not made solely on the basis of confidence. These data support the two-factor theories of recognition memory by dissociating two forms of recognition, and shed light on the nature of conscious recollection.     

编码任务对来源记忆的影响:一项事件相关电位研究

本研究采用ERPs技术,探讨编码任务对来源记忆的影响及其神经机制。在学习阶段,被试进行两种编码操作：匹配判断任务和大小判断任务;在测验阶段,让被试进行来源判断任务。行为结果发现：在编码阶段,匹配判断任务比大小判断任务需要更长的时间;在测验阶段,匹配判断任务在“项目旧/背景旧”和“部分旧”条件的正确率显著高于大小判断任务,匹配判断任务在“项目旧/背景旧”条件的反应时显著短于大小判断任务。测验阶段ERPs结果发现：两种编码任务的新旧效应在200~700ms均有较广泛的头皮分布,而在700~1100ms呈前额皮层最大化分布;匹配判断任务的新旧效应比大小判断任务更大,表现在600~700ms的FPz电极以及700~800ms的Pz、P4电极。由此可见,在来源记忆中,编码任务影响来源记忆,主要表现在后部顶区位置;晚期前额皮层新旧效应不受任务难度因素的影响。     

Recognizing group cognition

In this paper, we approach the idea of group cognition from the perspective of the “extended mind” thesis, as a special case of the more general claim that systems larger than the individual human, but containing that human, are capable of cognition (Clark, 2008, Clark and Chalmers, 1998). Instead of deliberating about “the mark of the cognitive” (Adams & Aizawa, 2008), our discussion of group cognition is tied to particular cognitive capacities. We review recent studies of group problem solving and group memory which reveal that specific cognitive capacities that are commonly ascribed to individuals are also aptly ascribed at the level of groups. These case studies show how dense interactions among people within a group lead to both similarity-inducing and differentiating dynamics that affect the group’s ability to solve problems. This supports our claim that groups have organization-dependent cognitive capacities that go beyond the simple aggregation of the cognitive capacities of individuals. Group cognition is thus an emergent phenomenon in the sense of Wimsatt (1986). We further argue that anybody who rejects our strategy for showing that cognitive properties can be instantiated at multiple levels in the organizational hierarchy on a priori grounds is a “demergentist,” and thus incurs the burden of proof for explaining why cognitive properties are “stuck” at a certain level of organizational structure. Finally, we show that our analysis of group cognition escapes the “coupling-constitution” charge that has been leveled against the extended mind thesis (Adams & Aizawa, 2008).     

Memory for goals: an activation‐based model

Goal‐directed cognition is often discussed in terms of specialized memory structures like the “goal stack.” The goal‐activation model presented here analyzes goal‐directed cognition in terms of the general memory constructs of activation and associative priming. The model embodies three predictive constraints: (1) the interference level, which arises from residual memory for old goals; (1) the strengthening constraint, which makes predictions about time to encode a new goal; and (3) the priming constraint, which makes predictions about the role of cues in retrieving pending goals. These constraints are formulated algebraically and tested through simulation of latency and error data from the Tower of Hanoi, a means‐ends puzzle that depends heavily on suspension and resumption of goals. Implications of the model for understanding intention superiority, postcompletion error, and effects of task interruption are discussed.     

Aristotle's Cognitive Science: Belief,Affect and Rationality

I offer a novel interpretation of Aristotle's psychology and notion of rationality, which draws the line between animal and specifically human cognition. Aristotle distinguishes belief (doxa), a form of rational cognition, from imagining (phantasia), which is shared with non‐rational animals. We are, he says, “immediately affected” by beliefs, but respond to imagining “as if we were looking at a picture.” Aristotle's argument has been misunderstood; my interpretation explains and motivates it. Rationality includes a filter that interrupts the pathways between cognition and behavior. This prevents the subject from responding to certain representations. Stress and damage compromise the filter, making the subject respond indiscriminately, as non‐rational animals do. Beliefs are representations that have made it past the filter, which is why they can “affect [us] immediately.” Aristotle's claims express ceteris paribus generalizations, subject to exceptions. No list of provisos could turn them into non‐vacuous universal claims, but this does not rob them of their explanatory power. Aristotle's cognitive science resolves a tension we grapple with today: it accounts for the specialness of human action and thinking within a strictly naturalistic framework. The theory is striking in its insight and explanatory power, instructive in its methodological shortcomings.     

Short-term memory: A brief commentary

Over the years, a metatheoretical view of short-term memory has developed. This view, closely related to the “modal” model from the 1960s, is supported by an increasing base of neurophysiological data, and a wide variety of empirical findings. It treats short-term memory as (1) the temporary, above threshold, activation of neural structures (related in not-too-well-specified ways to various recency effects); (2) a work space for carrying out virtually all cognitive operations involved in human cognition; and (3) the source of capacity limitations, accounting for certain memory limitations and most attentional limitations. The main problem with this view is the fact that it encompasses virtually everything that we are concerned with in human cognition—asuccessful model would almost be a general model of cognition, something the field has not yet approached. This situation is not grounds for despair. Progress is being made on many fronts, notwithstanding the fact that the most successful models are focused on specific task domains. Recent advances include an increasing awareness of the necessity for detailed models of short-term retrieval, a theme reflected in a number of articles in the present collection.     

Updating working memory in aircraft noise and speech noise causes different fMRI activations

The present study used fMRI/BOLD neuroimaging to investigate how visual‐verbal working memory is updated when exposed to three different background‐noise conditions: speech noise, aircraft noise and silence. The number‐updating task that was used can distinguish between “substitution processes,” which involve adding new items to the working memory representation and suppressing old items, and “exclusion processes,” which involve rejecting new items and maintaining an intact memory set. The current findings supported the findings of a previous study by showing that substitution activated the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, the posterior medial frontal cortex and the parietal lobes, whereas exclusion activated the anterior medial frontal cortex. Moreover, the prefrontal cortex was activated more by substitution processes when exposed to background speech than when exposed to aircraft noise. These results indicate that (a) the prefrontal cortex plays a special role when task‐irrelevant materials should be denied access to working memory and (b) that, when compensating for different types of noise, either different cognitive mechanisms are involved or those cognitive mechanisms that are involved are involved to different degrees.     

Analytic Phenomenology (or “What It Is Like”) vs. Husserlian Phenomenology

I begin this paper by outlining two senses of “phenomenology.” First, the “what it is like” or “analytic tradition” sense: the verbalization of qualitative states of consciousness of which we are aware. Second, the “Continental” sense: the rigorous study of the structures of consciousness. I outline the ways in which these two senses diverge. First, Continental phenomenology involves a diversified account of consciousness, states of awareness, and the human person. The phenomenologist articulates this account not by introspection but via acts of phenomenological reflection concerning eidetic intuitions about essential structural features. Second, via the method of “sense explication,” the phenomenologist can articulate an account of passive and subconscious states which we are not strictly “aware” of. The conclusion shows these divergences of senses are sometimes overlooked, leading to equivocation. Zahavi and Gallagher must be employing the “what it is like” sense when they make certain “phenomenological” arguments concerning social cognition, yet Spaulding’s ensuing critique of phenomenology is directed at Continental phenomenology. Also, it is only phenomenology in the “what it is like” sense which cannot contribute to subpersonal psychology. Genetic Continental phenomenology describes the lawful relations amongst the precursors and preconditions which give rise to conscious experience, constituting a type of (non-causal) subpersonal explanation.     

How are religious concepts created? A form of cognition and its effects

Science that needs logical demonstration has failed to eliminate religious concepts. It is as if they have own validity that cannot be broken by scientific knowledge we trust the most at present. In this paper, I will attempt to establish a new cognitive theory to help explain the basis of belief in religious concepts. This form of cognition will be named simply unifying-induction or unifying-inductive cognition. As illustrations, I will consider some typical religious discourses involving concepts such as “all-in-one” or “one is everything.” It is these typically religious discourses that science has not been able to easily sweep away by its logical scientific proofs. In the end, although we perhaps cannot know if the religious beings such as gods really exist or not, we may understand these concepts are very the creation of human cognition. It also has important implications for other disciplines such as robotics, developmental psychology, cognitive archaeology, the history of science, the study of religion and so on.     

The relationship between autobiographical memory,cognition, and emotion in older adults: a review

Over the past 30 years, the concept of “autobiographical memory” has been highlighted in numerous behavioral and neuroanatomical studies. Importantly, episodic autobiographical memory, an aspect of autobiographical memory, has been shown to decrease with age but can be improved by training. Autobiographical memory is deeply associated with the default mode network (especially posterior cingulate cortex and medial prefrontal cortex), which is particularly interesting in the context of better understanding the relationship between autobiographical memory, cognition, and emotion in older adults. This article provides an overview of the behavioral and neuroanatomical characteristics of autobiographical memory, as well as its relationship with the default mode network, cognition, emotion, and aging. This article also provides an overall review of autobiographical memory training.     

Place and the self: An autobiographical memory synthesis

In this article, I argue that the relationship between place and self can be accounted for by recent theoretical work on autobiographical memory. The link between place and self is conceptualized as a transitory mental representation that emerges as a “place of mine” (personal autobiographical experience) from a “place” (declarative knowledge). The function of “place of mine” is to guide personal memory and self-knowing consciousness of periods of our lives. I combine inquiries of memory, self, and place in a triadic relationship, a synthesis, suggesting a conceptual model for the phenomenon of place-related self as a sub-system of the self. This is formed by a causal progression from a physical place across time via emotional and cognitive bonds, components of the autobiographical information grounding the self, apportioned across declarative memory. Finally, using the methods of factor analysis and structural equation modeling, I show that the proposed model accounts for previous and new data on place-related identity.     

Levels of processing: Past,present... and future?

In this article I first briefly survey some enduring legacies of the Craik and Lockhart (1972) article on levels of processing (LOP) and address some common criticisms. In the next section I discuss whether memory can be regarded as “pure processing”, the role of short-term memory in an LOP framework, measurement of “depth” in LOP, encoding-retrieval interactions, the concept of consolidation, and the reality of “levels” of processing. In the final section I offer some speculations on future directions, discussing the notion of levels of representation and a possible continuing role for LOP in memory research.     

Testing enhances both encoding and retrieval for both tested and untested items

In forward testing effects, taking a test enhances memory for subsequently studied material. These effects have been observed for previously studied and tested items, a potentially item-specific testing effect, and newly studied untested items, a purely generalized testing effect. We directly compared item-specific and generalized forward testing effects using procedures to separate testing benefits due to encoding versus retrieval. Participants studied two lists of Swahili–English word pairs, with the second study list containing “new” pairs intermixed with the previously studied “old” pairs. Participants completed a review phase in which they took a cued-recall test on only the “old” pairs or restudied them. In Experiments 1a, 1b, and 2, the review phase was given either before or after the second study list. Testing benefited memory to the same degree for both “new” and “old” pairs, suggesting that there were no pair-specific benefits of testing. The larger benefit from testing when review was given before rather than after the second study list suggests that the memory enhancement was due to both testing-enhanced encoding and testing-enhanced retrieval. To better equate generalized testing effects for “new” and “old” pairs, Experiment 3 intermixed them in the review phase. A statistically significant pair-specific testing effect for “old” items was now observed. Overall, these results show that forward testing effects are due to both testing-enhanced encoding and retrieval effects and that direct, pair-specific forward testing benefits are considerably smaller than indirect, generalized forward testing benefits.     

The Relations of Visuo-Motor Conflict to Personality Traits and Cardio-Vascular Activity

This paper presents a review and critical analysis of some research findings and conclusions which seem to demonstrate that picture recognition memory is superior to verbal recognition memory. It cautions against accepting these data as evidence for two (picture-verbal) memory systems. Several alternative explanations of the picture-verbal performance discrepancy are derived from interference theory and partial learning theory. “Picture” as a stimulus category is vague and overinclusive. Recognition memory capacity varies from poor to excellent depending on the “pictures,” a fact not in harmony with a memory model employing a unitary processing mechanism for pictorial stimuli. Perceptual constancy is invoked in support of a view that is antagonistic to the implication that the human recognition memory mechanism is error free.     

On Broca, brain, and binding: a new framework

In speaking and comprehending language, word information is retrieved from memory and combined into larger units (unification). Unification operations take place in parallel at the semantic, syntactic and phonological levels of processing. This article proposes a new framework that connects psycholinguistic models to a neurobiological account of language. According to this proposal the left inferior frontal gyrus (LIFG) plays an important role in unification. Research in other domains of cognition indicates that left prefrontal cortex has the necessary neurobiological characteristics for its involvement in the unification for language. I offer here a psycholinguistic perspective on the nature of language unification and the role of LIFG.     

A neuronal retuning hypothesis of sentence-specificity in Broca’s area

It is clear that the left inferior frontal gyrus (LIFG) contributes in some fashion to sentence processing. While neuroimaging and neuropsychological evidence support a domain-general working memory function, recent neuroimaging data show that particular subregions of the LIFG, particularly the pars triangularis (pTri), show selective activation for sentences relative to verbal working memory and cognitive control tasks. These data suggest a language-specific function rather than a domain-general one. To resolve this apparent conflict, I propose separating claims of domain-generality and specificity independently for computations and representations—a given brain region may respond to a specific representation while performing a general computation over that representation, one shared with other systems. I hypothesize that the pTri underlies a language-specific working memory system, comprised of general memory retrieval/attention operations specialized for syntactic representations. There is a parallelism of top-down retrieval function among the phonological and semantic levels, localized to the pars opercularis and pars orbitalis, respectively. I further explore the idea of how such a system emerges in the human brain through the framework of neuronal retuning: the “borrowing” of domain-general mechanisms for language, either in evolution or development. The empirical data appear to tentatively support a developmental account of language-specificity in the pTri, possibly through connections to the posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS), a region that is both anatomically distinct for humans and functionally essential for language. Evidence of representational response specificity obtained from neuroimaging studies is useful in understanding how cognition is implemented in the brain. However, understanding the shared computations across domains and neural systems is necessary for a fuller understanding of this problem, providing potential answers to questions of how specialized systems, such as language, are implemented in the brain.     

Compounds,confounds, and models in developmental information processing: A reply to Trabasso and Foellinger

A point by point examination of Trabasso and Foellinger's paper shows their criticisms of my 1970 work to be based on errors of fact (regarding the data I reported) and errors of method (regarding proper procedures for model evaluation). Factual errors are refuted by summarizing crucial data reported in 1970 but ignored by my critics. Errors of method are refuted by contrasting my $\text{CSVI}\text{BE}$ model and data with Trabasso and Foellinger's model and data in the light of the scientific epistemology of model evaluation. The issues of “general” versus “local” models, their “empirical scope,” “number of empirical parameters,” and “simplifying assumptions” are examined. Five ways of evaluating models are distinguished, and in all five my 1970 model is shown to be superior to that of Trabasso and Foellinger. The 1970 data (in light of the controls built into the CSVI task) and new unreported data exhibiting developmental step functions confirm the model of a developmental growth of M (mental energy, working memory), which occurs concurrently with and independently from the growth of executive/control structures. Executive growth alone cannot explain the obtained results.     

An empirical test of two opposing theoretical models of prefrontal function.

The purpose of this study was to compare the validity of two models which contrast with each other in the manner in which they integrate neuropsychological tests into distinct prefrontal constructs. The first prefrontal model consists of five distinct functional constructs drawn from human clinical neuropsychology. The second model, elaborated by Goldman-Rakic, is based primarily on monkey research and postulates a basic prefrontal function, "on-line representational memory," which guides behavior in the absence of, or despite discriminative environmental stimuli. In the latter model, distinct prefrontal functional constructs are primarily defined in terms of various types of representational memory involved in specific tasks. Eleven "prefrontal" measures were obtained from 259 normal adults, stratified for age, education, and sex. Confirmatory factor analyses revealed that the Goldman-Rakic model "fit" the data better than the model derived from human clinical neuropsychology, while several constructs commonly used in human neuropsychology were refuted. It was concluded that new research on brain-damaged humans with a view to understanding prefrontal function might benefit from using the Goldman-Rakic model as a starting point.