The Relationship Between Attention,Interpretation, and Memory Bias During Facial Perception in Social Anxiety

Although cognitive theories suggest the interactive nature of information processing biases in contributing to social anxiety, most studies to date have investigated these biases in isolation. This study aimed at (a) testing the association between social anxiety and each of the threat-related cognitive biases: attention, interpretation, and memory bias; and (b) examining the relationship between these cognitive biases in facial perception. We recruited an unselected sample of 188 adult participants and measured their level of social anxiety and cognitive biases using faces displaying angry, disgusted, happy, and ambiguous versions of these expressions. All bias tasks were assessed with the same set of facial stimuli. Regression analyses showed that social anxiety symptoms significantly predicted attention avoidance and poorer sensitivity in recognizing threatening faces. Social anxiety was, however, unrelated to interpretation bias in our sample. Results of path analysis suggested that attention bias influenced memory bias indirectly through interpretation bias for angry but not disgusted faces. Our findings suggest that, regardless of social anxiety level, when individuals selectively oriented to faces displaying anger, the faces were interpreted to be more negative. This, in turn, predicted better memory for the angry faces. The results provided further empirical support for the combined cognitive bias hypothesis.     

Gender and orientation stereotypes bias source-monitoring attributions

Four experiments were conducted to determine whether gender stereotypes influence source-monitoring decision processes. Statements that were consistent with a male were more often correctly attributed to a male source and less frequently correctly attributed to a female. The reverse was true for items traditionally associated with a female. Both of these biases were reversed if participants believed the speaker was either a gay male or a lesbian female. These effects persisted under divided attention during test, suggesting that they are caused by automatic influences. But these biases were partially attenuated when participants first considered the detrimental impact of stereotypes. Because these biases were absent for gender-neutral statements, the results from this study show that the content of a memory can influence judgements about the context in which something was learned. The authors argue that the data are most consistent with a heuristic, early selection process that can be influenced by a conscious, late correction process (e.g., Jacoby, Kelly, & McElree, 1999).     

Metamemory and reality monitoring

Metamemory judgements and reality monitoring judgements were compared for real and imagined stimuli. Line drawings of everyday items were either perceived or imagined in differing ratios, to (a) investigate people's ability to predict the class of item that would be better recalled (Judgements of Learning, JOL), and the class of item which would be better sourced (Judgements of Source, JOS) in a future recall test, and (b) test the hypothesis that participants would show a bias towards calling remembered items real when the source had been forgotten. Although participants' JOLs indicated that they believed real items would be more memorable than imagined, in both experiments a larger proportion of items from either class (real or imagined) was only recalled when presentation modality was less frequent for that class. By contrast, JOSs were no different for real or imagined items, even though source attribution was more accurate for real than imagined items. An attribution of memories to real rather than to imagined events that often occurs when participants are unsure about the source (labelled a ‘bias towards the real’) was due to phenomenological qualities of the memories. The results are discussed in terms of Johnson and Raye's ( 1981 ) reality‐monitoring model. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Justifying the evidential use of linguistic intuitions

Linguistic intuitive judgements are the de facto data source of choice within generative linguistics. But why we are justified in relying on intuitive judgements as evidence for grammars? In the philosophy of linguistics, this question has been hotly debated. I argue that the three most prominent views of that debate all have their problems. Devitt’s Modest Explanation accounts for the wrong kind of intuitive judgements. The Voice of Competence view and Rey’s account both lack independent evidence. I introduce and defend a novel proposal that accounts for the evidential role of linguistic intuitive judgements and avoids these shortcomings. On this account, linguistic intuitive judgements are reports of the speaker’s immediate experience of trying to comprehend the sentence. This experience is due to the speaker’s linguistic competence, at least in part, and so the justification for the evidential use of linguistic intuitions ultimately comes from the speaker’s competence. However, the account does not rely on any special input from the speaker’s competence being available as the basis for linguistic intuitive judgements.

     

Judgement under uncertainty and conjunction fallacy inhibition training

Intuitive predictions and judgements under uncertainty are often mediated by judgemental heuristics that sometimes lead to biases. Our micro-developmental study suggests that a presumption of rationality is justified for adult subjects, in so far as their systematic judgemental biases appear to be due to a specific executive-inhibition failure in working memory, and not necessarily to a lack of understanding of the fundamental principles of probability. This hypothesis was tested using an experimental procedure in which 60 adult subjects were trained to inhibit the classical conjunction bias on a frequency judgement task derived from Tversky and Kahneman's work. Pre- and post-test performance was assessed via a probability judgement task. The data indicated a training effect, suggesting that subjects traditionally labelled as “irrational” with respect to the classical rules of inductive reasoning are in fact “inefficient inhibitors”. These findings are discussed in terms of a polymorphous view of rationality.     

Memory monitoring and the control of stereotype distortion

We propose a framework for investigating the role of conscious experience in regulating stereotype-based memory distortions. Memory biases are mediated by multiple memory processes, including forms of discriminability and response biases. Different psychological interpretations of these processes depend on how they relate to subjective experiences (e.g., conscious recollection vs. implicit accessibility processes). The ability to control memory distortions, in turn, depends on the psychological meaning attached to these parameters. In Experiment 1 we found that confidence was positively related to discriminability but uncorrelated with stereotype-consistent bias. In Experiment 2 participants were allowed to selectively control when they responded. Because of the asymmetry in monitoring ability, participants were able to increase overall accuracy, but were not able to reduce the stereotype bias. Discussion focuses on the conditions in which subjective experience may provide a valid basis for controlling biases, and when subjective experience may prove deceptive, exacerbating biases.     

Metacognitive inferences in source memory judgements: The role of perceived differences in item recognition

This research investigated the hypothesis that metacognitive inferences in source memory judgements are based on the recognition or nonrecognition of an event together with perceived or expected differences in the recognizability of events from different sources. The hypothesis was tested with a multinomial source-monitoring model that allowed separation of source-guessing tendencies for recognized and unrecognized items. Experiments 1A and 1B manipulated the number of item presentations as relevant source information and revealed differential guessing tendencies for recognized and unrecognized items, with a bias to attribute unrecognized items to the source associated with poor item recognition. Experiments 2A and 2B replicated the findings with a manipulation of presentation time and extended the analysis to subjective differences in item recognition. Experiments 3A and 3B used more natural source information by varying type of acoustic signal and demonstrated that subjective theories about differences in item recognition are sufficient to elicit differential source-guessing biases for recognized and unrecognized items. Together the findings provide new insights into the cognitive processes underlying source memory decisions, which involve episodic memory and reconstructive tendencies based on metacognitive beliefs and general world knowledge.     

Metacognitive inferences in source memory judgements: the role of perceived differences in item recognition

This research investigated the hypothesis that metacognitive inferences in source memory judgements are based on the recognition or nonrecognition of an event together with perceived or expected differences in the recognizability of events from different sources. The hypothesis was tested with a multinomial source-monitoring model that allowed separation of source-guessing tendencies for recognized and unrecognized items. Experiments 1A and 1B manipulated the number of item presentations as relevant source information and revealed differential guessing tendencies for recognized and unrecognized items, with a bias to attribute unrecognized items to the source associated with poor item recognition. Experiments 2A and 2B replicated the findings with a manipulation of presentation time and extended the analysis to subjective differences in item recognition. Experiments 3A and 3B used more natural source information by varying type of acoustic signal and demonstrated that subjective theories about differences in item recognition are sufficient to elicit differential source-guessing biases for recognized and unrecognized items. Together the findings provide new insights into the cognitive processes underlying source memory decisions, which involve episodic memory and reconstructive tendencies based on metacognitive beliefs and general world knowledge.     

The temporal locus of the categorical bias in spatial memories

People often use the region of a target's location to make judgements about its exact position. Although there is general agreement that this category-based effect is due to a blending of the specific coding of a target's location and the categorical coding of its region, there is little agreement on when the blending occurs. The current paper examines whether the systematic bias is the result of combining separate undistorted mental representations at the time of retrieval or a result of using a category-distorted mental representation. Participants studied a dot within a circle and reproduced its location from memory after a short or long delay, and new categorical information was introduced during target retrieval. The results showed a larger increase over time in the biases caused by the new category introduced at retrieval than in the biases caused by the originally encoded category. The findings are consistent with retrieval models, providing evidence that category biasing processes operate at the time of memory retrieval.     

Advertising's misinformation effect

This research explores whether post-experience advertising alters information learned in a consumer's direct experience. An advertising misinformation effect was obtained for colour memory of a previously seen candy bar wrapper upon both visual and verbal misinformation. However, the misleading visual information produced more ‘remember’ judgements than misleading verbal information. This advertising misinformation effect did not dissipate when the source was discredited. We found that such memory changes can be directly linked to consumer subjective judgements and choices when the misleading information is particularly salient. Not only do these findings constitute a novel generalizability of the misinformation effect, they also have implications for social policy research on deceptive advertising. Copyright © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Weighting information from outside sources: a biased process

How do people utilize information from outside sources in their decisions? Participants observed a signal‐plus‐noise or noise‐alone event and then made a yes–no decision about whether a signal had occurred. Participants were provided with two information sources to aid decision making. Each source consisted of four components that provided estimates of signal likelihood. In Experiment 1, the two sources had equal overall accuracy but differed in the expertise and internal correlation of their components. A regression analysis indicated that participants overweighed the high‐expertise‐high‐correlation source. This bias occurred on trials when the aggregate opinions of the sources disagreed. In Experiment 2, both the overall accuracy of the source and its components were manipulated. Participants overweighed information from the higher accuracy source. These biases reflect people's sensitivity to across‐trial and within‐trial differences in the accuracy and internal consistency of information sources. Experiment 3 provided additional evidence supporting these conclusions. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Ageing faces in ageing minds: A review on the own-age bias in face recognition

Similar to the well-established own-race bias, participants are more accurate at remembering own- relative to other-age faces. An own-age bias (OAB) in face memory was demonstrated in participants older than approximately 5 years. Crucially, the OAB is modulated by contact—participants with substantial contact with other-age persons show either reduced or absent OAB effects. In line with a perceptual expertise account of the phenomenon, holistic processing of other-age faces is less efficient when tested with young adult versus child faces, and differential holistic processing may therefore reflect one mechanism contributing to the OAB. A possible additional contribution of sociocognitive factors to the OAB remains largely untested. Importantly, event-related brain potential studies suggest that the own-race and own-age biases are based on at least partly different mechanisms. Theoretical explanations for different group-based biases in face memory will need to consider these findings.     

Overestimation and contraction biases of depth information stored in working memory depend on spatial configuration

Depth perception is essential for effective interaction with the environment. Although the accuracy of depth perception has been studied extensively, it is unclear how accurate the depth information is stored in working memory. In this study, we investigated the accuracy and systematic biases of depth representation by a delayed estimation task. The memory array consisted of items presented at various stereoscopic depth positions, and the participants were instructed to estimate the depth position of one target item after a retention interval. We examined the effect of spatial configuration by comparing the memory performance in the whole-display condition where non-target memory items were present during retrieval with that in the single-display condition where non-target memory items were absent. In the single-display condition, we found an overestimation bias that the depth estimates were farther than the corresponding depth positions defined by disparity, and a contraction bias that the stored depth positions near the observer were overestimated and those far from the observer were underestimated. The magnitude of these biases increased with the number of to-be-stored items. However, in the whole-display condition, the overestimation bias was corrected and the contraction bias did not increase with the number of to-be-stored items. Our findings suggested that the number of to-be-stored items could affect the accuracy of depth working memory, and its effect depended crucially on whether the information of spatial configuration of memory display was available at the retrieval stage.     

Expectancy bias mediates the link between social anxiety and memory bias for social evaluation

Social anxiety (SA) involves a multitude of cognitive symptoms related to fear of evaluation, including expectancy and memory biases. We examined whether memory biases are influenced by expectancy biases for social feedback in SA. We hypothesised that, faced with a socially evaluative event, people with higher SA would show a negative expectancy bias for future feedback. Furthermore, we predicted that memory bias for feedback in SA would be mediated by expectancy bias. Ninety-four undergraduate students (55 women, mean age = 19.76 years) underwent a two-visit task that measured expectations about (Visit 1) and memory of (Visit 2) feedback from unknown peers. Results showed that higher levels of SA were associated with negative expectancy bias. An indirect relationship was found between SA and memory bias that was mediated by expectancy bias. The results suggest that expectancy biases are in the causal path from SA to negative memory biases for social evaluation.     

Enhanced memory for the wolf in sheep’s clothing:: Facial trustworthiness modulates face-trait associative memory

Our decision about whether to trust and cooperate with someone is influenced by the individual’s facial appearance despite its limited predictive power. Thus, remembering trustworthy-looking cheaters is more important than remembering untrustworthy-looking cheaters because we are more likely to trust and cooperate with the former, resulting in a higher risk of unreciprocated cooperation. The present study investigated whether our mind adaptively copes with this problem by enhancing memory for trustworthy-looking cheaters. Participants played a debt game, wherein they learned to discriminate among good, neutral, and bad lenders, who respectively charged no, moderate, and high interest on the debt. Each lender had either a trustworthy- or untrustworthy-looking face. A subsequent memory test revealed that participants remembered the bad traits of trustworthy-looking lenders more accurately than those of untrustworthy-looking lenders. The results demonstrate enhanced memory for trustworthy-looking cheaters, or wolves in sheep’s clothing, implying that humans are equipped with protective mechanisms against disguised, unfaithful signs of trustworthiness.     

Paradoxical cross-over due to attention to high or low spatial frequencies

The mechanisms underlying the right hemisphere's dominance for spatial and attentional functions lacks a comprehensively explanation. For example, perceptual biases, as observed in line bisection and related tasks, might be caused by an attentional asymmetry or by perceptual processes such as a specialization of the left and right hemisphere for high and low spatial frequencies (SFs), respectively. Here we used the gratingscales task to measure perceptual bias in SF judgements, and we cued participants' attention either to high or low SFs. Participants showed a leftward bias when comparing the high SF components of the stimulus, and a rightward bias when comparing the low SF components-opposite to what would be expected from a hemispheric lateralization for SFs. Two control experiments used different strategies to manipulate the width of the attentional window. However, we observed no influence on perceptual bias, thus ruling out the possibility that the results in Experiment 1 were due to differences in attentional window size. These data support the idea of an attentional asymmetry underlying perceptual bias. Our results provide novel support for the role of attentional asymmetry in perceptual biases.     

When sex isn't special: Priming onto a sex decision

Recognition of famous faces is speeded by prior exposure. This repetition priming has been shown for familiarity judgements (familiar/unfamiliar), semantic judgements (British/American), and naming. However, no benefit of priming has been found onto a sex judgement made to an image of a face. The absence of priming is normally explained by appealing to the fact that sex judgements can be made to a face without needing to access memory for that person, and that priming has its effects within the memory system. Here we ask subjects to make sex judgements to famous people's surnames (e.g., Tyson, Geldof), a task that requires them to access their memories for people. Under these conditions we observe the normal pattern of priming. We argue that structural, rather than episodic models of processing fit the data most naturally.     

Monitoring memory errors: the influence of the veracity of retrieved information on the accuracy of judgements of learning

The current study examined the degree to which predictions of memory performance made immediately or at a delay are sensitive to confidently held memory illusions. Participants studied unrelated pairs of words and made judgements of learning (JOLs) for each item, either immediately or after a delay. Half of the unrelated pairs (deceptive items; e.g., nurse-dollar) had a semantically related competitor (e.g., doctor) that was easily accessible when given a test cue (e.g., nurse-do_ _ _r) and half had no semantically related competitor (control items; e.g., subject-dollar). Following the study phase, participants were administered a cued recall test. Results from Experiment 1 showed that memory performance was less accurate for deceptive compared with control items. In addition, delaying judgement improved the relative accuracy of JOLs for control items but not for deceptive items. Subsequent experiments explored the degree to which the relative accuracy of delayed JOLs for deceptive items improved as a result of a warning to ensure that retrieved memories were accurate (Experiment 2) and corrective feedback regarding the veracity of information retrieved prior to making a JOL (Experiment 3). In all, these data suggest that delayed JOLs may be largely insensitive to memory errors unless participants are provided with feedback regarding memory accuracy.     

A judgement analysis of social perceptions of attitudes and ability

A judgement analysis of people's social inferences of attitudes and ability was conducted. University students were asked to infer the liberalness (N = 60; Study 1) or intelligence (N = 40; Study 2) of targets seen in pictures. Multiple regression analyses revealed that attractiveness was the most important cue for predicting inferences of liberalness, while an ethnic cue (i.e., being Asian) was the most important cue for judgements about intelligence. Results also showed that a single-cue model was less susceptible to overfitting, but significantly less accurate than a multiple-cue model in predicting participant's intelligence judgements. Although the multiple regression models suffered a degree of overfitting, cross validation showed that they continued to have significant predictive value when applied to new data. Furthermore, a “random partner” method (comparing each participant's own regression equation with that of another, randomly selected, participant) provided evidence of significant idiosyncratic variation in the way intelligence judgements were made.