What can we learn about immediate memory from the development of children's free recall?

We ask the question: Which aspects of immediate memory performance improve with age? In two studies, we reexamine the widely held view that primary memory capacity estimates derived from children's immediate free recall are age invariant. This was done by assessing children's immediate free-recall accuracy while also measuring the order in which they elected to recall items (Experiment 1) and by encouraging children to begin free recall with items from towards the end of the presented list (Experiment 2). Across samples aged between 5 and 8 years we replicated the previously reported age-related changes in free-recall serial position functions when aggregated across all trials of the standard task, including an absence of age differences in the recency portion of this curve. However, we also show that this does not reflect the fact that primary memory capacity is constant across age. Instead, when we incorporate order of report information, clear age differences are evident in the recall of list-final items that are output at the start of a participant's response. In addition, the total amount that individuals recalled varied little across different types of free-recall tasks. These findings have clear implications for the use of immediate free recall as a means of providing potential indices of primary memory capacity and in the study of the development of immediate memory.     

Variation in working memory capacity and intrusions: Differences in generation or editing?

The current study explored the reason for the relation between individual differences in working memory capacity (WMC) and intrusions in free recall. High and low WMC individuals were tested in standard delayed free recall and externalised free recall in which participants recalled everything that came to mind. Additionally, in externalised free recall participants were instructed to press a key for each item that they knew was an intrusion. In delayed free recall, low WMC individuals recalled fewer correct items and more previous list and extralist intrusions than high WMC individuals. In externalised free recall, differences only arose in previous list intrusions. Furthermore, in externalised free recall it was found that low WMC were less likely to identify both types of intrusions than high WMC individuals. It is argued that the reason low WMC individuals recall more intrusions than high WMC in free recall is due to differences in both generation and editing abilities.     

Interactive context integration in children? Evidence from an action memory study

Action–object phrases (e.g., “lift the bottle”) are remembered better if they have been enacted rather than learned verbally. This enactment effect is largest in free recall for phrases with objects (e.g., “bottle”) present because these phrases can be interactively encoded with those context objects (interactive context integration) that serve as retrieval cues. The current study investigated whether 6- and 8-year-olds are already capable of interactive context integration. Experiment 1 demonstrated interactive context integration with 8-year-olds. This was hindered in a condition where attention was directed away from context objects. Experiment 2 demonstrated interactive context integration with 6-year-old kindergartners. Taken together, our findings show that even 6-year-olds are capable of incidental context integration through enactment and that this process is attention based.     

An improved algorithm for predicting free recalls

Laming [Laming, D. (2006). Predicting free recalls. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 32, 1146-1163] has shown that, in a free-recall experiment in which the participants rehearsed out loud, entire sequences of recalls could be predicted, to a useful degree of precision, from the prior sequences of stimuli and rehearsals. This article describes an improved predictive algorithm, which is then used to re-analyse two further sets of free-recall data. Prediction is compared, generically, with conventional modelling, represented here by three recent models of free recall that are concerned with recalls only, not with rehearsals. Some implications are drawn, from the use of rehearsal data by the predictive algorithm, for some of the constituent assumptions embodied in those three models.     

Long–Term Recall Memory: Behavioral and Neuro–Developmental Changes in the First 2 Years of Life

Until not long ago, psychologists conceptually and methodologically linked the capacity for recall of the past to developments in language. With the advent of a nonverbal measure of recall, this association has been challenged. It now is apparent that the capacity for long–term recall emerges well before the verbal ability to describe past experiences. Long–term recall is newly (or recently) emergent late in the 1st year of life; over the 2nd year, it consolidates and becomes reliable. The course of age–related changes in mnemonic behavior is consistent with current understanding of developments in the neural substrate implicated in recall memory.     

Mood and the DRM paradigm: An investigation of the effects of valence and arousal on false memory

Recent studies regarding the effect of mood on the DRM (Deese–Roediger–McDermott) illusion have not been able to clearly establish yet whether valence or arousal is most critical in determining susceptibility to false memories, nor what the underlying processes are. In three experiments, both the valence and the level of arousal of participants' mood were manipulated. Six conditions were used: positive mood with high/low arousal, negative mood with high/low arousal, neutral mood, and a control condition. Memory was tested by means of immediate and delayed recognition and immediate free recall. The mood induction procedure was effective. For recognition memory, there was an effect of arousal on the endorsement of critical lures. Low-arousal moods elicited more false recognition than high-arousal moods, regardless of valence. Based on signal detection analyses, the effect was attributed to more liberal response criteria with low arousal, in combination with a tendency towards improved item-specific memory with high arousal.     

Long-term spatial clustering in free recall

We explored the influence of space on the organisation of items in long-term memory. In two experiments, we asked our participants to explore a virtual environment and memorise discrete items presented at specific locations. Memory for those items was later on tested in immediate (T1) and 24 hours delayed (T2) free recall tests, in which subjects were asked to recall as many items as possible in any order. In experiment 2, we further examined the contribution of active and passive navigation in recollection dynamics. Results across experiments revealed a significant tendency for participants to consecutively recall items that were encountered in proximate locations during learning. Moreover, the degree of spatial organisation and the total number of items recalled were positively correlated in the immediate and the delayed tests. Results from experiment 2 indicated that the spatial clustering of items was independent of navigation types. Our results highlight the long-term stability of spatial clustering effects and their correlation with recall performance, complementing previous results collected in immediate or briefly delayed tests.     

Age-related differences in guessing on free and forced recall tests

This study examined possible age-related differences in recall, guessing, and metacognition on free recall tests and forced recall tests. Participants studied categorised and unrelated word lists and were asked to recall the items under one of the following test conditions: standard free recall, free recall with a penalty for guessing, free recall with no penalty for guessing, or forced recall. The results demonstrated interesting age differences regarding the impact of liberal test instructions (i.e., forced recall and no penalty) relative to more conservative test instructions (i.e., standard free recall and penalty) on memory performance. Specifically, once guessing was controlled, younger adults’ recall of categorised lists varied in accordance with test instructions while older adults’ recall of categorised lists did not differ between conservative and liberal test instructions, presumably because older adults approach standard free recall tests of categorised lists with a greater propensity towards guessing than young adults.     

An investigation of the interaction between cognitive style and context reinstatement on the memory performance of eyewitnesses

The power of context reinstatement to improve recall is well established, but the degree of effect obtained varies widely between studies. Exploring possible causes for this variation, this paper examines the relationship between cognitive style and the efficacy of context reinstatement in improving free and cued recall in an eyewitness paradigm. Experiment 1, using a live staged event and a 1 week delay, indicated a significant improvement in free recall with the reinstatement of context and, as expected, no such improvement in cued recall. However, analysis of the data according to field dependency, as measured by Witkin, Oltman, Raskin, and Karp's [A manual for the Embedded Figures Test (1971) Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press] Group Embedded Figures Test (GEFT) revealed that, in free recall, field dependent witnesses' scores improved significantly with context reinstatement, whilst the scores of field independent witnesses did not. In cued recall, however, the field independent witnesses scored significantly higher overall than field dependent witnesses. Experiment 2 sought replication of these findings again utilised the GEFT and the Riding [Cognitive Styles analysis (1991) Birmingham: Learning and Training Technology] Cognitive Styles Analysis (CSA). Analysis of the data according to the Wholist-Analytic (W-A) dimension of the CSA, indicated no interaction with either context reinstatement or memorial performance. However the GEFT analysis produced similar results to that obtained in Experiment 1. The meaning of the interaction between the GEFT and both free and cued recall, and the failure of the CSA to similarly interact are discussed, together with the implication of these findings for establishing the value of reinstating context for individual eyewitnesses.     

Training attentional control and working memory – Is younger,better?

Authors have argued that various forms of interventions may be more effective in younger children. Is cognitive training also more effective, the earlier the training is applied? We review evidence suggesting that functional neural networks, including those subserving attentional control, may be more unspecialised and undifferentiated earlier in development. We also discuss evidence suggesting that certain skills such as attentional control may be important as ‘hub’ cognitive domains, gating the subsequent acquisition of skills in other areas. Both of these factors suggest that attentional training administered to younger individuals ought to be relatively more effective in improving cognitive functioning across domains. We evaluate studies that have administered forms of cognitive training targeting various subcomponents of attention and the closely related domain of working memory, and we contrast their reported transfer to distal cognitive domains as a function of the age of the participants. Although negative findings continue to be common in this literature we find that cognitive training applied to younger individuals tends to lead to significantly more widespread transfer of training effects. We conclude that future work in this area should concentrate on understanding early intensive training, and discuss a number of practical steps that might help to achieve this aim.     

Reliability and Validity of the Complex Postformal Thought Questionnaire: Assessing Adults’ Cognitive Development

Three studies investigated the psychometric properties of the complex postformal thought (PFT) questionnaire (Sinnott, unpublished scale, 1998; Sinnott and Johnson 1997), which is a measure of adult cognitive development. The scale was found to be moderately reliable (α = .63). To assess construct validity, a comparison of participants’ performance on the PFT scale to their performance on the Need for Cognition scale was conducted, which indicated the PFT scale is valid measure of complex thought. Factor analysis reduced the scale to three factors, which correspond to important components of PFT: Multiple Elements, Subjective Choice, and Underlying Complexities. Implications for understanding the nature of adult cognitive development and the usefulness of this new measure for research in this area are discussed.     

Developmental continuity in the processes that underlie spatial recall

This study investigated whether children's spatial recall performance shows three separable characteristics: (1) biases away from symmetry axes (geometric effects); (2) systematic drift over delays; and (3) biases toward the exemplar distribution experienced in the task (experience-dependent effects). In Experiment 1, the location of one target within each geometric category was varied. Children's responses showed biases away from a midline axis that increased over delays. In Experiment 2, multiple targets were placed within each category at the same locations used in Experiment 1. After removing geometric effects, 6-year-olds'--but not 11-year-olds'--responses were biased toward the average remembered location over learning. In Experiment 3, children responded to one target more frequently than the others. Both 6- and 11-year-olds showed biases toward the most frequent target over learning. These results provide a bridge between the performance of younger children and adults, demonstrating continuity in the processes that underlie spatial memory abilities across development.     

Disentangling the course of epistemic development: parsing knowledge by epistemic content

Over the past three decades, research into the developmental course by means of which persons come to an increasingly mature conception of the knowing process has yielded an highly defracted picture. Despite some concert of opinion about the general bill of particulars, what remains deeply problematic is the increasingly radical disagreement that has arisen regarding the ages at which major milestones in the course of epistemic development are said to be reached. As a way of making some sense of these competing claims, it is argued that the emerging insight that knowledge is ineluctably shaped by those doing the knowing (i.e., that there is an unavoidable “world-to-mind direction of fit” (J.R. Searle, Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983) between things in the world and the manner of their understanding) does not arrive in a single piece. Instead, as the data presented here help to illustrate, an appreciation of the constructed character of knowledge more commonly arrives piecemeal and at different ontogenetic moments, the times of which are governed by the place that different objects of knowledge occupy along an envisioned continuum of diverse epistemic contents. On this account, not all “facts of the matter” are ordinarily seen to occupy the same epistemic footing. Rather, some so-called facts are commonly understood to be of an “institutional” sort, where “representational” diversity is early expected and widely tolerated. By contrast, other objects of knowledge are imagined to be more like “brute” facts that, on some less mature readings, fully escape the clutches of subjective opinion. Viewed against the backcloth of this proposed continuum, a developmental sequence hypothesized according to which growing persons first come to view “institutional” facts as humanly constructed before subsequently coming to a similar view about presumptively “brute” facts. To test this hypothesis, 242 young persons were administered a paper and pencil measure of epistemic reasoning (the EDQ). Results strongly support the hypothesis that respondents understood the interpretive nature of beliefs about “institutional” facts at an earlier age than so-called “brute” facts.