Remembrance of remembrance past

Arnold and Lindsay (2002) found that individuals more often failed to remember they had previously recalled an item if that item had been cued in a qualitatively different way on two recall occasions: the "forgot-it-all-along" (FIA) effect. Experiment 1 was designed to determine if the FIA effect arises because participants incorrectly believe they have not been previously tested for an item, or because they incorrectly believe they have failed to recall the item when previously tested. Experiment 2 measured participants' confidence in their incorrect prior-recall judgements, and Experiment 3 tested participants' ability to "recover" their previous recollection when the prior-recall context was restored. Results indicated that participants usually believed they had not previously been cued for the items they failed to remember previously recalling; they were often confident in their incorrect judgements of prior non-remembering; and re-introducing the context of prior remembering sometimes enabled them to recapture their memories of previous recall.     

Remembrance of futures past

Much behavioural and physiological evidence suggests that the hippocampus encodes space. Puzzlingly, however, hippocampal damage also disrupts episodic memory. A recent study shows how these two faculties might be related, finding that the spatial firing of hippocampal 'place cells' is sometimes modulated by what the animal has recently done or what it will do next. Thus, the cells encode something resembling a context, or episode, collectively forming a potential substrate for episodic memory.     

Remembrance of sounds past: memory and psychophysical scaling

What is the role of long-term memories of previous stimulus-response mappings, and of previous sensory and perceptual experiences generally, in psychophysical scaling judgments? I conducted four experiments in an attempt to provide some preliminary answers to this question. In each experiment, subjects made judgments of the loudness of sounds on 3 successive days. Stimulus intensities were drawn randomly from the same set on Days 1 and 3 but from a different set, either all 12 dB higher or all 12 dB lower, on Day 2. Four different types of psychophysical scaling judgments were studied: category judgment without an experimenter-induced identification function, ratio magnitude estimation with a variable standard, absolute magnitude estimation, and cross-modality matching. The first two methods required completely relative judgment, the last two completely absolute judgment. Data from all methods reveal profound effects of stimulus-response mappings experienced on previous days (long-term memory) and immediately previous stimuli and responses (short-term memory) on responses to current stimuli. Responses were typically a compromise between absolute and relative judgment. Individual differences were dramatic.     

The functional independence of trait self-knowledge: Commentary on Sakaki (2007)

In a recent paper, Sakaki (2007) proposed that Klein and Loftus's conclusion that semantic and episodic trait self-knowledge are functionally independent (e.g., Klein, Babey, & Sherman, 1997; Klein & Loftus, 1993a; Klein, Loftus, Trafton, & Fuhrman, 1992b) was based on questionable assumptions and not supported by the available evidence. In this paper we show that Sakaki (2007) has misinterpreted our position on the independence of self-knowledge, omitted mention of large portions of the relevant research at odds with her contention, and conducted her studies with procedures we explicitly warned against due to interpretive ambiguities associated with their use.     

Serial memory for sound-specified locations: Effects of spatial uncertainty and motor suppression

The current study examined four factors that were expected to influence recognition accuracy of previously retrieved events: remoteness of the event, rated emotionality of the event, the type of changes that were made to the original memory report, and the plausibility of these changes. This was done in a study with 33 participants who were tested for recognition accuracy of original and altered reports a year after they had initially reported these autobiographical memories. Participants evaluated original and altered reports as being authentic or not. High recognition accuracy occurred for report evaluations of events that were recent, that contained central changes, and that had higher emotional intensity ratings. Recognition errors were more likely to occur when the original events were remote and when altered reports contained peripheral and plausible changes. These findings demonstrate the vulnerability of recognition accuracy in older adults under difficult retrieval conditions.     

How you lie affects what you remember

We investigated how telling different types of lies may impact memory. Participants studied pictures of objects, and later lied and told the truth about these and new objects once or multiple times by describing them or by denying they had seen them. Forty-eight hours later, participants were tested on their source memory. Results revealed that participants had good memory for having falsely described a never-seen object, but relatively poor memory for having falsely denied seeing a studied object. These results suggest that telling certain types of lies may make a person more likely to forget having lied. In addition, repeated truthful denials of having seen a picture paradoxically increased false memories for having seen it. Thus, telling the truth does not always prevent the possibility of memory distortion.     

Correcting socially introduced false memories: The effect of re-study

This study examined whether participants could utilize re-study and perceptual elaboration to correct erroneous suggestions from their partner in the social contagion of memory paradigm. Participants studied household scenes and then collaboratively recalled the scenes with a confederate who interjected erroneous items. Before completing subsequent individual recall and recognition tests, participants were allowed to re-study the original items and/or to generate perceptual details of the items. Across two experiments, participants who re-studied the original material were less likely to incorporate the confederate's misleading suggestions. Re-study reduced false recall and recognition and increased veridical recall and recognition (Experiment 1) and the effect was especially pronounced with longer re-study episodes (Experiment 2). Items generated on the perceptual elaboration test offered no corrective benefit above and beyond the effects of re-study. These data demonstrate that participants can rely on self-initiated correction processes engaged during re-study to reduce socially suggested false memories.     

Putting false memories into context: the effects of odour contexts on correct and false recall*

ABSTRACT

False memories created by the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm are often accompanied by contextual information. Yet, research investigating the effects of context on false memories is surprisingly scarce. We used the context-dependent memory (CDM) model to construct same versus different context conditions using odours as contexts and DRM lists as to-be-remembered stimuli. Experiment 1 showed that levels of correct recall were higher in the same-context condition than in the changed-context condition, but no effects of context were observed in false recall. Experiment 2 used different odours and a longer retention interval and showed that context-dependent memory effects were found for both true and false memory. For true memory, context reinstatement improved memory, whilst simultaneously reducing false memory. Theoretical and forensic implications of these findings are discussed.     

The effects of study order and backward associative strength on illusory recollection: A source-strength effect does not always occur

We investigated illusory recollection by dividing lists of associated words into three subsets (high, medium and low) based on their backward associative strength (BAS) to an unstudied theme. Participants studied these subsets at different visual locations on a computer screen and afterwards were given a source memory test. In Experiment 1, we varied the order in which high- and medium-BAS subsets were studied. In Experiment 2, we again manipulated study order as well as the associative strength of the medium-BAS subsets (strong or weak). Across both experiments, illusory recollection was constrained by both study order and BAS. Source attributions to the high-BAS location were more likely (a source-strength effect) when high-BAS items were studied first or studied following items of relatively low associative strength. However, attributions to the strong medium-BAS studied location were more likely when these items were studied before high-BAS items. These findings are interpreted as resulting from misbinding of source details at encoding which can be explained by the activation-monitoring theory of illusory recollection.     

Testing improves true recall and protects against the build-up of proactive interference without increasing false recall

Retrieval practice has been shown to protect against the negative effects of previously learned information on the learning of subsequent information, while increasing retention of new information. We report three experiments investigating the impact of retrieval practice on false recall in a multiple list paradigm. In three different experimental designs participants studied blocks of interrelated words that converged on non-presented associates. Participants were tested either after every study block or only after the fifth study block, and both groups received a cumulative test on all five study blocks. Overall the results from all three different experimental designs point to a benefit of testing in increasing long-term veridical recall on the cumulative test. More importantly, this improvement in veridical recall did not come at a cost: False recall on the cumulative test did not increase from retrieval practice.     

Memory and the Moses illusion: Failures to detect contradictions with stored knowledge yield negative memorial consequences

Although contradictions with stored knowledge are common in daily life, people often fail to notice them. For example, in the Moses illusion, participants fail to notice errors in questions such as “How many animals of each kind did Moses take on the Ark?” despite later showing knowledge that the Biblical reference is to Noah, not Moses. We examined whether error prevalence affected participants' ability to detect distortions in questions, and whether this in turn had memorial consequences. Many of the errors were overlooked, but participants were better able to catch them when they were more common. More generally, the failure to detect errors had negative memorial consequences, increasing the likelihood that the errors were used to answer later general knowledge questions. Methodological implications of this finding are discussed, as it suggests that typical analyses likely underestimate the size of the Moses illusion. Overall, answering distorted questions can yield errors in the knowledge base; most importantly, prior knowledge does not protect against these negative memorial consequences.