The threat of moral transgression: The impact of group membership and moral opportunity

When other ingroup members behave immorally, people's motivation to maintain a moral group image may cause them to experience increased threat and act defensively in response. In the current research, we investigated people's reactions to others' misconduct and examined the effect of group membership and the possible threat‐reducing function of moral opportunity—the prospect of being able to re‐establish the group's moral image. In Study 1, students who were confronted with fellow students' plagiarism and who received an opportunity to improve their group's morality reported feeling less threatened than students who did not receive such opportunity. In Study 2, students reacted to a recent academic fraud case, which either implicated an ingroup (scholar in their own discipline) or an outgroup member (scholar in another discipline). Results indicated that participants experienced more threat when an ingroup (versus an outgroup) member had committed the moral transgression. However, as hypothesized, this was not the case when moral opportunity was provided. Hence, the threat‐reducing effect of moral opportunity was replicated. Additionally, participants generally were more defensive in response to ingroup (versus outgroup) moral failure and less defensive when moral opportunity was present (versus absent). Together, these findings suggest that the reduction of threat due to moral opportunity may generally help individuals take constructive action when the behavior of fellow group members discredits the group's moral image.     

Lay Persons' and Police Officers' Beliefs Regarding Deceptive Behaviour

Research on the detection of deception, via non-verbal cues, has shown that people's ability to successfully discriminate between truth and deception is only slightly better than chance level. One of the reasons for these disappointing findings possibly lies in people's inappropriate beliefs regarding ‘lying behaviour’. A 64-item questionnaire originally used in Germany, which targets participants' beliefs regarding truthful and deceptive behaviour, was used. The present study differed from previous research in three ways: (i) instead of a student population, police officers and lay people were sampled, (ii) both people's beliefs regarding others' deceptive behaviour and their beliefs regarding their own deceptive behaviour were examined, and (iii) both non-verbal cues to, and content characteristics of, deceptive statements were examined. Results were consistent with previous studies, which found significant differences between people's beliefs regarding deceptive behaviour and experimental observations of actual deceptive behaviour. Further, police officers held as many false beliefs as did lay people and finally, participants were more accurate in their beliefs regarding their own deceptive behaviour than they were in their beliefs regarding others' behaviour.     

Judgement of confidence in childhood memories

Memory judgement processes, based on the characteristics and associations of retrieved memories such as sensory details and supporting memories, are considered as important as retrieval in several autobiographical memory models. Judgement processes have received less research attention than memory characteristics themselves. The present studies examined memory judgement using qualitative analysis of the reasons participants gave for confidence in retrieved childhood memories. For memories they were confident of, participants cited memory phenomenology, especially sensory and affective details, much more frequently than consistency with other autobiographical knowledge. For memories they were not confident of, participants reported lack of consistency with autobiographical knowledge or with others' memories more often than memory phenomenology as reasons for their uncertainty. Participants' comments also revealed several metacognitive beliefs about the relationship between memory characteristics and accuracy. These data are consistent with two‐process models of memory judgement associated with true versus false memories. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Receiver's Dilemma: Impressions Formed in Response to Impression Management

Two studies examined the extent to which individuals' racial attitudes are influenced more by interdependent others' attitudes than people with whom they do not mutually depend. Study 1 demonstrated that participants significantly changed their racial attitudes when they received disagreement feedback from an ingroup friend, whereas there was no change in attitudes when participants received disagreement feedback from an ingroup stranger, agreement feedback, or no feedback. Furthermore, feelings of interdependence mediated the relationship between feedback from a friend versus stranger and changes in racial attitudes. In Study 2, we manipulated interdependence and found that interdependent partners altered their racial attitudes after receiving disagreement information, whereas independent partners did not. The importance of interdependent others' attitudes in reducing prejudice is discussed.     

The relation of young children's vicarious emotional responding to social competence,regulation, and emotionality

Abstract

The relation of preschool and kindergarten children's vicarious emotional responding to their social competence, regulation (attentional and coping styles), and emotionality (negative emotional intensity and dispositional negative affect) was examined. Vicarious responding was assessed by means of facial reactions to a film about a peer in a social conflict and children's reported negative affect to viewing peers' real-life negative emotion. Mothers and teachers reported on children's regulation and emotionality, social competence was assessed with sociometric nominations, teachers' reports, and observations of children's real-life anger reactions. Facial concerned attention during the film was associated with various measures of social competence, regulation, and low or moderate negative emotionality. Although negative vicarious emotional responding in real contexts was infrequently related to measures of interest, girls who reported intense negative vicarious emotional responses were relatively unregulated and low in social competence. Finally, with age, regulation of vicarious emotional responding was increasingly related to children's sociometric status and to girls' coping at school. Thus, as they get older, children's abilities to regulate emotions may take on increasing importance in others' evaluations of their social competencies.     

Exploiting the Wisdom of Others to Make Better Decisions: Suspending Judgment Reduces Egocentrism and Increases Accuracy

Although decision makers often consult other people's opinions to improve their decisions, they fail to do so optimally. One main obstacle to incorporating others' opinions efficiently is one's own opinion. We theorize that decision makers could improve their performance by suspending their own judgment. In three studies, participants used others' opinions to estimate uncertain quantities (the caloric value of foods). In the full‐view condition, participants could form independent estimates prior to receiving others' opinions, whereas participants in the blindfold condition could not form prior opinions. We obtained an intriguing blindfold effect. In all studies, the blindfolded participants provided more accurate estimates than did the full‐view participants. Several policy‐capturing measures indicated that the advantage of the blindfolded participants was due to their unbiased weighting of others' opinions. The full‐view participants, in contrast, adhered to their prior opinion and thus failed to exploit the information contained in others' opinions. Moreover, in all three studies, the blindfolded participants were not cognizant of their advantage and expressed less confidence in their estimates than did the full‐view participants. The results are discussed in relation to theories of opinion revision and group decision making. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Pluralistic ignorance in revenge attitudes and behavior in interpersonal relationships

We investigated whether people's perceptions of social norms concerning interpersonal revenge reflect a tendency for individuals to believe that others' revenge attitudes and behavior differ from their own (i.e., pluralistic ignorance). As part of a survey on revenge experiences in relationships with romantic partners, family members, and associates (e.g., friends), participants (N = 534) judged the acceptability and frequency of revenge in significant personal relationships. As expected, participants believed that others (a) saw revenge as more acceptable and (b) engaged in revenge more frequently than they did themselves. They did not, however, perceive others' revenge attitudes and behaviors to be any more variable than their own attitudes and behaviors actually were. Explanations for and implications of these findings are discussed.     

Do we look happy? Perceptions of romantic relationship quality on Facebook

Does the information that people share about their romantic relationships on Facebook influence how other people perceive their relationship quality? Across 2 studies, people's accuracy at inferring others' relationship quality based on their Facebook profiles and how Facebook profiles influenced others' judgments of people's relationship quality and likability were investigated. Perceived relationship quality corresponded to self‐reported relationship quality (Study 1), and people with more visible relationships were perceived as having greater relationship satisfaction and commitment (Studies 1 and 2) and being more likable (Study 2). High disclosure about the relationship predicted greater perceived relationship quality but lower likability (Study 2). These findings illuminate how sharing information about one's relationship influences other people's impressions of the individual and the relationship.     

Decision-makers use social information to update their preferences but choose for others as they do for themselves

People's risky decisions are susceptible to the social context in which they take place. Across three experiments using different paradigms, we investigated the influence of three social factors upon participants' decisions: the recipient of the decision-making outcome (self, other, or joint), the nature of the relationship with the other agent (friend, stranger, or teammate), and the type of information that participants received about others' preferences: none at all, general information about how previous participants had decided, or information about a specific partner's preference. We found that participants' decisions about risk did not differ according to whether the outcome at stake was their own, another agent's, or a joint outcome, nor according to the type of information available. Participants did, however, adjust their preferences for risky options in light of social information.     

The Sound of Social Cognition: Toddlers’ Understanding of How Sound Influences Others

Understanding others' perceptions is a fundamental aspect of social cognition. Children's construal of visual perception is well investigated, but there is little work on children's understanding of others' auditory perception. The current study assesses toddlers' recognition that producing different sounds can affect others differentially—auditory perspective taking. Two- and 3-year-olds were familiarized with two objects, one loud and one quiet. The adult then introduced a doll, and children were randomly assigned to one of two goals: either to wake the doll or to let her sleep. Children's object choice and the sound intensity they produced significantly varied in the predicted direction as a function of the goal task. These findings reveal young children's understanding of the effects of sound on other people's behavior and psychological states.     

Recovered Memories of Child Abuse:

In this paper we exemplify the ongoing and inconclusive nature of empirical research examining the validity of adults' recovered memories of childhood abuse. In view of increasing evidence that the processes underlying traumatic memories differ in fundamental ways from those underlying memories for nontraumatic events, experimental studies of everyday memory processes are likely to have little relevance for our understanding of the memory processes underlying traumatic child abuse. Further, given ethical concerns, it is unlikely that research will ever establish a definitive 'scientific' conclusion regarding the accuracy of recovered memories. Nevertheless, both laypersons and professionals are taking a stand on the recovered memory issue. In this regard, we discuss social psychological research that suggests that people's beliefs about recovered memories and other aspects of child abuse are tied to their personal needs and sociopolitical interests rather than to science or social values. These personal needs and interests include people's inability to acknowledge the injustice of child abuse and their opposition to women's equality, both of which vary as a function of people's authoritarian inclinations. The implications of these findings for social action, as opposed to social research, are discussed.     

The Selective Laziness of Reasoning

Reasoning research suggests that people use more stringent criteria when they evaluate others' arguments than when they produce arguments themselves. To demonstrate this “selective laziness,” we used a choice blindness manipulation. In two experiments, participants had to produce a series of arguments in response to reasoning problems, and they were then asked to evaluate other people's arguments about the same problems. Unknown to the participants, in one of the trials, they were presented with their own argument as if it was someone else's. Among those participants who accepted the manipulation and thus thought they were evaluating someone else's argument, more than half (56% and 58%) rejected the arguments that were in fact their own. Moreover, participants were more likely to reject their own arguments for invalid than for valid answers. This demonstrates that people are more critical of other people's arguments than of their own, without being overly critical: They are better able to tell valid from invalid arguments when the arguments are someone else's rather than their own.     

Projecting Lower Competence to Maintain Moral Warmth in the Avoidance of Prosocial Requests

When faced with prosocial requests, consumers face a difficult decision between taking on the request's burden or appearing unwarm (unkind, uncaring). We propose that the desire to refuse such requests while protecting a morally warm image leads consumers to under‐represent their competence. Although consumers care strongly about being viewed as competent, five studies showed that they downplayed their competence to sidestep a prosocial request. This effect occurred across both self‐reported and behavioral displays of competence. Further, the downplaying competence effect only occurred when facing an undesirable prosocial request, not a similarly undesirable proself request. The final studies showed that people specifically downplayed competence and not warmth. We further distinguished between social warmth (e.g., humor) and moral warmth (e.g., kindness), showing that when competence, social warmth, and moral warmth were all requisite skills for a prosocial task, people downplayed competence and social warmth more than moral warmth. These findings underscore that although people care strongly about being viewed as competent, they willingly trade off competence evaluations if evaluations of warmth—particularly moral warmth—are at risk.     

From regulation to projection: Reliance on regulatory mode in predictions about others

Past research showed that people project their goals onto unknown others. The present research investigates whether they also rely on their motivational orientation in terms of regulatory mode (locomotion vs. assessment). In line with work on self-judgments, a stronger chronic personal focus on locomotion over assessment decreased predictions of others' experiences of nostalgia (Study 1) and increased predictions of others' preference for, motivation by, and evaluation of a transformational over a transactional leader (Study 2). Furthermore, an experimentally induced locomotion mode compared to an assessment mode increased peoples' predictions of others' motivation to reconcile after interpersonal conflict (Study 3). We examined process evidence via the Testing-Process-by-Interaction-Strategy: As predicted, effects only emerged under time pressure (vs. ample deliberation; Study 2) and for ingroup (vs. outgroup) members (Study 3). These findings suggest that people's regulatory mode is a basis for predicting others' reactions and preferences. We discuss implications and future research directions.     

The Effects of Social Influence on Perceptual and Affective Reactions to Scenes of Sexual Violence1

In 2 experiments, we examined the effect of social influence (discussion and modeling) on men's and women's perceptual and affective reactions to a sexually violent film scene depicting gang rape. In Experiment 1, women who discussed the film rated the perpetrators as more responsible compared to participants in all other conditions. Men who did not discuss the film reported higher levels of positive affect compared to participants in all other conditions. In Experiment 2, men and women were affected by the social influence manipulation similarly. As predicted, participants differed in their attributions of responsibility depending on a confederate's response to the film scene. Participants who heard a confederate say that the men in the film were responsible for the rape rated these men as relatively more responsible than did participants in a neutral confederate condition or in a condition in which the confederate said that the woman in the film was responsible for the rape.     

The effects of co-witness discussion on confidence and precision in eyewitness memory reports

We examined the influence of co-witness discussion on the metacognitive regulation of memory reports. Participants (N?=?92) watched a crime video. Later, a confederate confidently agreed with (gave confirming feedback), disagreed with (gave disconfirming feedback), or gave no feedback (control) regarding participants’ answers to questions about the video. Participants who received disconfirming feedback reported fewer fine-grain details than participants in the confirming and control conditions on a subsequent, individual recall test for a different question set. Unexpectedly, this decrease in fine-grain reporting was not accompanied by a decrease in participants’ confidence in the accuracy of their fine-grain responses. These results indicate that receiving social comparative feedback about one’s memory performance can affect rememberers’ metamemorial control decisions, and potentially decrease the level of detail they volunteer in later memory reports. Further research is needed to assess whether these results replicate under different experimental conditions, and to explore the effects of social influences on metamemory.     

Co‐witness feedback in line‐ups

The aim of the current study was to establish whether feedback from a co‐witness concerning their choice of suspect could influence an individual witness' certainty and other testimony‐relevant judgements. Eighty‐two university students and members of the general public viewed a film of a staged mugging in pairs and then made an identification of who they thought was the suspect from a culprit‐absent line‐up (i.e. identification parade). The participants were then required to tell their partner whom they had identified and to fill out a questionnaire with testimony‐relevant questions (e.g. How good a view did you get of the person in the line‐up?). When the pairs of participants agreed on their choice of suspect, their scores on the testimony‐relevant questions tended to be higher than when the pairs did not agree. This shows that co‐witnesses can influence each others' memory reports when giving each other feedback after the identification process. The implications of these findings are discussed. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Artifacts as Conventional Objects

What underlies children's understanding of artifacts? Studies suggest that beginning around age 7, people reason about artifacts in terms of the inventor's purpose—termed the design stance. Our two studies emphasize another component of artifact understanding—the cultural nature of artifacts—by demonstrating people's sensitivity to an artifact's conventional use. In past studies participants were shown a novel artifact and told that someone invented it for a certain purpose and that later another person used it for a different purpose. Here we demonstrate that if participants are told that many people, as opposed to just one person, use an artifact differently, 5-year-olds, 7-year-olds, and adults do not strictly judge the artifact in terms of its invented purpose. We conclude that people's conceptions of artifacts are more complex and dynamic than has been suggested.