Event plausibility does not determine children's false memories

In this paper we ask how the plausibility of an event affects the likelihood that children will develop a false memory for it. Over three interviews 6-year-olds and 10-year-olds were shown two true photos and two false photos-a plausible and less plausible event-and reported what they could remember about those events. Children also rated their confidence that the events happened, and how much they could remember about the events. By the final interview, within each age group, there were no differences in children's confidence ratings for the two false events. In addition, within each age group, the rate of false memories was the same for each event; across age groups, younger children developed more false memories than older children.     

A photo,a suggestion,a false memory

We examined the effect of photographs on children's memories for events that did and did not happen. Over three interviews, 10‐year olds saw three true photos and one false photo. Half the children saw a doctored photo of themselves and other family members in a hot air balloon, while the remaining half saw only the hot air balloon. At each interview, children reported what they could remember about each event, rated their confidence that the events really happened and rated how much they could remember. Children who saw the photo showing themselves in the balloon developed more false memories than those who saw only the balloon, but when children in either condition developed false memories, they were equally confident that the event was real. These data highlight a potential problem with the use of photographs as tools in therapy. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Abducted by a UFO: prevalence information affects young children's false memories for an implausible event

This study examined whether prevalence information promotes children's false memories for an implausible event. Forty‐four 7–8 and forty‐seven 11–12 year old children heard a true narrative about their first school day and a false narrative about either an implausible event (abducted by a UFO) or a plausible event (almost choking on a candy). Moreover, half of the children in each condition received prevalence information in the form of a false newspaper article while listening to the narratives. Across two interviews, children were asked to report everything they remembered about the events. In both age groups, plausible and implausible events were equally likely to give rise to false memories. Prevalence information increased the number of false memories in 7–8 year olds, but not in 11–12 year olds at Interview 1. Our findings demonstrate that young children can easily develop false memories of a highly implausible event. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Do Cognitive Interview Instructions Contribute to False Beliefs and Memories?

To examine whether exposing people to false events using instructions taken from the cognitive interview creates false beliefs and false memories, we conducted an experiment where participants took part in two sessions. First, they rated how confident they were that they had experienced certain childhood events and their memories of those events; they also rated how plausible they thought the events were. Second, 2 weeks later, participants were exposed to two of three false target events: one high, one moderate, and one low plausibility. For the first event, participants were instructed to either report everything or mentally reinstate the event context. For the second event, participants received both instructions. The third event was the control event about which participants received no instructions. Finally, participants rated their confidence and memories the second time. The results showed that the cognitive interview instructions had little to no effect on the development of false beliefs and false memories. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Creating false memories for events that occurred before versus after the offset of childhood amnesia

We examined whether false images and memories for childhood events are more likely when the event supposedly took place during the period of childhood amnesia. Over three interviews, participants recalled six events: five true and one false. Some participants were told that the false event happened when they were 2 years old (Age 2 group), while others were told that it happened when they were 10 years old (Age 10 group). We compared participants’ reports of the false event to their reports of a true event from the same age. Consistent with prior research on childhood amnesia, participants in the Age 10 group were more likely than participants in the Age 2 group to remember their true event and they reported more information about it. Participants in the Age 2 group, on the other hand, were more likely to develop false images and memories than participants in the Age 10 group. Furthermore, once a false image or memory developed, there were no age-related differences in the amount of information participants reported about the false event. We conclude that childhood amnesia increases our susceptibility to false suggestion, thus our results have implications for court cases where early memories are at issue.     

Creating false memories for events that occurred before versus after the offset of childhood amnesia

We examined whether false images and memories for childhood events are more likely when the event supposedly took place during the period of childhood amnesia. Over three interviews, participants recalled six events: five true and one false. Some participants were told that the false event happened when they were 2 years old (Age 2 group), while others were told that it happened when they were 10 years old (Age 10 group). We compared participants' reports of the false event to their reports of a true event from the same age. Consistent with prior research on childhood amnesia, participants in the Age 10 group were more likely than participants in the Age 2 group to remember their true event and they reported more information about it. Participants in the Age 2 group, on the other hand, were more likely to develop false images and memories than participants in the Age 10 group. Furthermore, once a false image or memory developed, there were no age-related differences in the amount of information participants reported about the false event. We conclude that childhood amnesia increases our susceptibility to false suggestion, thus our results have implications for court cases where early memories are at issue.     

The quality of suggested memories

Alarge number of studies have demonstrated that participants could be led to report suggested events that were never witnessed (Loftus & Palmer, 1974 ). The present study attempts to explore the quality of such suggested memories. Thirty‐six participants were exposed to a live event of brief duration (20 s). They were then misled about certain aspects of the event. Memory was assessed using a forced‐choice recognition test. The participants were also required to give remember/know/guess responses, together with confidence ratings, and also to indicate how they came to remember the item. Thirty‐six per cent of the suggested memories were “know” responses, while 43% were “remember” responses. Moreover, whenever the participants had a remember experience they always recalled a wealth of visual information. With regards to the confidence level of the suggested memories, it was observed that the suggested memories were as confidently held as accurate memories. The results indicate that suggestions may become integrated with other kinds of information and that these falsely remembered memories are often accompanied with varied kinds of information; predominant among them seems to be visual imagery and past associations. For accurate memories, too, visual imagery was recalled the most, followed by other kinds of information (e.g., past associations, emotional, auditory, and inferential). The study points to the difficulties of differentiating between true recollections of actual events and false recollections of events that did not occur.     

Do people remember the temporal proximity of unrelated events?

In the present study, we tested the ability to remember the temporal proximity of two unrelated events that had happened within 7 days of one another. In three experiments, 1,909 participants judged whether pairs of news events, ranging in age from 1 month to about 6 years, had occurred within a week of each other and, if not, how far apart they had occurred. Some event pairs were related, and others were unrelated. For unrelated event pairs, same-week and separation judgments were very poor. Accuracy was much greater for both kinds of judgments when the events were related. Participants often guessed the separation of unrelated event pairs, whereas they frequently deduced the separation or remembered the proximity of related event pairs. For both types of pairs, the participants reported using the strength of the memories or the general period in which the events had occurred.     

Imagination can create false autobiographical memories

Previous studies have shown that imagining an event can alter autobiographical beliefs. The current study examined whether it can also create false memories. One group of participants imagined a relatively frequent event and received information about an event that never occurs. A second group imagined the nonoccurring event and received information about the frequent event. One week before and again 1 week immediately after the manipulation, participants rated the likelihood that they had experienced each of the two critical events and a series of noncritical events, using the Life Events Inventory. During the last phase, participants were also asked to describe any memories they had for the events. For both events, imagination increased the number of memories reported, as well as beliefs about experiencing the event. These results indicate that imagination can induce false autobiographical memories.     

False memories of fabricated political events

In the largest false memory study to date, 5,269 participants were asked about their memories for three true and one of five fabricated political events. Each fabricated event was accompanied by a photographic image purportedly depicting that event. Approximately half the participants falsely remembered that the false event happened, with 27% remembering that they saw the events happen on the news. Political orientation appeared to influence the formation of false memories, with conservatives more likely to falsely remember seeing Barack Obama shaking hands with the president of Iran, and liberals more likely to remember George W. Bush vacationing with a baseball celebrity during the Hurricane Katrina disaster. A follow-up study supported the explanation that events are more easily implanted in memory when they are congruent with a person's preexisting attitudes and evaluations, in part because attitude-congruent false events promote feelings of recognition and familiarity, which in turn interfere with source attributions.     

Photographs cause false memories for the news

What is the effect on memory when seemingly innocuous photos accompany false reports of the news? We asked people to read news headlines of world events, some of which were false. Half the headlines appeared with photographs that were tangentially related to the event; others were presented without photographs. People saw each headline only once, and indicated whether they remembered the event, knew about it, or neither. Photos led people to immediately and confidently remember false news events. Drawing on the Source Monitoring Framework (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993), we suggest that people often relied on familiarity and other heuristic processes when making their judgments and thus experienced effects of the photos as evidence of memory for the headlines.     

False memories in children and adults: age,distinctiveness, and subjective experience

This study investigated developmental trends associated with the Deese/Roediger-McDermott false-memory effect, the role of distinctive information in false-memory formation, and participants' subjective experience of true and false memories. Children (5- and 7-year-olds) and adults studied lists of semantically associated words. Half of the participants studied words alone, and half studied words accompanied by pictures. There were significant age differences in recall (5-year-olds evinced more false memories than did adults) but not in recognition of critical lures. Distinctive information reduced false memory for all age groups. Younger children provided with distinctive information, and older children and adults regardless of whether they viewed distinctive information, expressed higher levels of confidence in true than in false memories. Source attributions did not significantly differ between true and false memories. Implications for theories of false memory and memory development are discussed.     

The effects of photographs and event plausibility in creating false beliefs

Recent studies have shown that using photographs as memory retrieval aids can significantly increase the likelihood of false memories. The current study further investigated this effect by examining the interactive effects of photographs and event plausibility in developing false beliefs. At Time 1 and two weeks later at Time 2, participants rated 20 events on the Life Events Inventory (LEI) as to whether each occurred to them in childhood. One week after Time 1, participants were told that two target events were plausible and two were implausible. They then used event-related photographs to visualize one plausible and one implausible event. Occurrence ratings significantly increased from Time 1 to Time 2 for plausible events in the photo condition. These results suggest that the use of photographs as a memory enhancing technique is unlikely to cause false memories for events that are not perceived personally plausible.     

People believe it is plausible to have forgotten memories of childhood sexual abuse

Pezdek, Blandon-Gitlin, and Gabbay (2006) found that perceptions of the plausibility of events increase the likelihood that imagination may induce false memories of those events. Using a survey conducted by Gallup, we asked a large sample of the general population how plausible it would be for a person with longstanding emotional problems and a need for psychotherapy to be a victim of childhood sexual abuse, even though the person could not remember the abuse. Only 18% indicated that it was implausible or very implausible, whereas 67% indicated that such an occurrence was either plausible or very plausible. Combined with Pezdek et al.’s findings, and counter to their conclusions, our findings imply that there is a substantial danger of inducing false memories of childhood sexual abuse through imagination in psychotherapy.     

Actually,a picture is worth less than 45 words: Narratives produce more false memories than photographs do

Most memory “implantation” studies have elicited false memories by using fake narratives. Recently, Wade, Garry, Read, and Lindsay (2002) showed that doctored photographs can be used to create false childhood memories in adults. Fifty percent of Wade et al.’s sample reported details of taking a childhood hot air balloon ride, although they had never been in a balloon. In this experiment, we investigated whether photos or narratives influence memory more than the other. We exposed subjects to either a fake photograph or a fake narrative of a childhood hot air balloon ride. Subjects tried to remember the false event and three real events over 1 week. Narratives were more likely to produce false memory reports than were photos. We offer a fluency-based account of our results and suggest that narratives promote more familiarity in subjects than do photographs.     

Childhood amnesia in children and adolescents: their earliest memories

Investigations of childhood amnesia have almost exclusively focused on the earliest memories of adults. Here we investigate the earliest memories of children of 6--19 years old. Parents confirmed the memory events and dated the memories. There were surprisingly few developmental differences between the earliest memories of children. Although 6--9-year-olds recalled earlier events than did older children, there were no differences between older age groups. Memories from all age groups were similar in structure, social orientation, and the nature of the recalled event. However, memories of older children were more likely to involve negative affect. There were also few gender differences, although girls were more likely to recall traumatic or transitional events while boys were more likely to recall play events. Overall, results deepen the paradox of early memory: 6--9-year-olds have verbally accessible memories from very early childhood that then seem to disappear as they get older.     

Childhood amnesia in children and adolescents: Their earliest memories

Investigations of childhood amnesia have almost exclusively focused on the earliest memories of adults. Here we investigate the earliest memories of children of 6–19 years old. Parents confirmed the memory events and dated the memories. There were surprisingly few developmental differences between the earliest memories of children. Although 6–9-year-olds recalled earlier events than did older children, there were no differences between older age groups. Memories from all age groups were similar in structure, social orientation, and the nature of the recalled event. However, memories of older children were more likely to involve negative affect. There were also few gender differences, although girls were more likely to recall traumatic or transitional events while boys were more likely to recall play events. Overall, results deepen the paradox of early memory: 6–9-year-olds have verbally accessible memories from very early childhood that then seem to disappear as they get older.