People's hypercorrection of high-confidence errors: did they know it all along?

This study investigated the "knew it all along" explanation of the hypercorrection effect. The hypercorrection effect refers to the finding that when people are given corrective feedback, errors that are committed with high confidence are easier to correct than low-confidence errors. Experiment 1 showed that people were more likely to claim that they knew it all along when they were given the answers to high-confidence errors as compared with low-confidence errors. Experiments 2 and 3 investigated whether people really did know the correct answers before being told or whether the claim in Experiment 1 was mere hindsight bias. Experiment 2 showed that (a) participants were more likely to choose the correct answer in a 2nd guess multiple-choice test when they had expressed an error with high rather than low confidence and (b) that they were more likely to generate the correct answers to high-confidence as compared with low-confidence errors after being told they were wrong and to try again. Experiment 3 showed that (c) people were more likely to produce the correct answer when given a 2-letter cue to high- rather than low-confidence errors and that (d) when feedback was scaffolded by presenting the target letters 1 by 1, people needed fewer such letter prompts to reach the correct answers when they had committed high- rather than low-confidence errors. These results converge on the conclusion that when people said that they knew it all along, they were right. This knowledge, no doubt, contributes to why they are able to correct those high-confidence errors so easily.     

Scaffolding feedback to maximize long-term error correction

Scaffolded feedback was tested against three other feedback presentation methods (standard corrective feedback, minimal feedback, and answer-until-correct multiple-choice feedback) over both short- and long-term retention intervals in order to assess which method would produce the most robust gains in error correction. Scaffolded feedback was a method designed to take advantage of the benefits of retrieval practice by providing incremental hints until the correct answer could be self-generated. In Experiments 1 and 3, on an immediate test, final memory for the correct answer was lowest for questions given minimal feedback, moderate for the answer-until-correct condition, and equally high in the scaffolded feedback condition and the standard feedback condition. However, tests of the maintenance of the corrections over a 30-min delay (Experiment 2) and over a 1-day delay (Experiment 3) demonstrated that scaffolded feedback gave rise to the best memory for the correct answers at a delay.     

Making related errors facilitates learning,but learners do not know it

Producing an error, so long as it is followed by corrective feedback, has been shown to result in better retention of the correct answers than does simply studying the correct answers from the outset. The reasons for this surprising finding, however, have not been investigated. Our hypothesis was that the effect might occur only when the errors produced were related to the targeted correct response. In Experiment 1, participants studied either related or unrelated word pairs, manipulated between participants. Participants either were given the cue and target to study for 5 or 10 s or generated an error in response to the cue for the first 5 s before receiving the correct answer for the final 5 s. When the cues and targets were related, error-generation led to the highest correct retention. However, consistent with the hypothesis, no benefit was derived from generating an error when the cue and target were unrelated. Latent semantic analysis revealed that the errors generated in the related condition were related to the target, whereas they were not related to the target in the unrelated condition. Experiment 2 replicated these findings in a within-participants design. We found, additionally, that people did not know that generating an error enhanced memory, even after they had just completed the task that produced substantial benefits.     

Using verification feedback to correct errors made on a multiple-choice test

A key educational challenge is how to correct students’ errors and misconceptions so that they do not persist. Simply labelling an answer as correct or incorrect on a short-answer test (verification feedback) does not improve performance on later tests; error correction requires receiving answer feedback. We explored the generality of this conclusion and whether the effectiveness of verification feedback depends on the type of test with which it is paired. We argue that, unlike for short-answer tests, learning whether one's multiple-choice selection is correct or incorrect should help participants narrow down the possible answers and identify specific lures as false. To test this proposition we asked participants to answer a series of general knowledge multiple-choice questions. They received no feedback, answer feedback, or verification feedback, and then took a short-answer test immediately and two days later. Verification feedback was just as effective as answer feedback for maintaining correct answers. Importantly, verification feedback allowed learners to correct more of their errors than did no feedback, although it was not as effective as answer feedback. Overall, verification feedback conveyed information to the learner, which has both practical and theoretical implications.     

Using verification feedback to correct errors made on a multiple-choice test

A key educational challenge is how to correct students' errors and misconceptions so that they do not persist. Simply labelling an answer as correct or incorrect on a short-answer test (verification feedback) does not improve performance on later tests; error correction requires receiving answer feedback. We explored the generality of this conclusion and whether the effectiveness of verification feedback depends on the type of test with which it is paired. We argue that, unlike for short-answer tests, learning whether one's multiple-choice selection is correct or incorrect should help participants narrow down the possible answers and identify specific lures as false. To test this proposition we asked participants to answer a series of general knowledge multiple-choice questions. They received no feedback, answer feedback, or verification feedback, and then took a short-answer test immediately and two days later. Verification feedback was just as effective as answer feedback for maintaining correct answers. Importantly, verification feedback allowed learners to correct more of their errors than did no feedback, although it was not as effective as answer feedback. Overall, verification feedback conveyed information to the learner, which has both practical and theoretical implications.     

Choice latency as a cue for children’s subjective confidence in the correctness of their answers

Research with adults indicates that confidence in the correctness of an answer decreases as a function of the amount of time it takes to reach that answer, suggesting that people use response latency as a mnemonic cue for subjective confidence. Experiment 1 extended investigation to 2nd, 3rd and 5th graders. When children chose the answer to general knowledge questions, their confidence in the answer was inversely related to choice latency. However, the strength of the relationship increased with grade, suggesting increased reliance with age on the feedback from task performance. The validity of latency as a cue for the accuracy of the answer also increased with age, possibly contributing to the observed age increase in the extent to which confidence judgment discriminated between correct and wrong answers. Whereas these results illustrate the dependence of metacognitive monitoring on the feedback from control operations, Experiments 2 and 3 examined the idea that control‐based monitoring affects subsequent control operations. When children were free to choose which answers to volunteer under a payoff schedule that emphasized accuracy, they tended to volunteer high‐confidence answers more than low‐confidence answers (Experiment 2) and more short‐latency answers than long‐latency answers (Experiment 3). The latter tendency was again stronger for older than for younger children. The results are discussed in terms of the intricate relationships between monitoring and control processes.     

Proactive and retroactive effects of negative suggestion

The negative effects of false information presented either prior to (proactive interference; PI) or following (retroactive interference; RI) true information was examined with word definitions (Experiment 1) and trivia facts (Experiment 2). Participants were explicitly aware of which information was true and false when shown, and true-false discrimination was evaluated via multiple-choice tests. Negative suggestion, defined as poorer performance on interference items than noninterference (control) items, consistently occurred when the wrong information followed the correct information (RI) but not when it preceded the correct information (PI). These effects did not change as a function of retention interval (immediate, 1 week, or 3 weeks) or number of incorrect alternatives (1 or 3). Implications of this outcome for experiencing incorrect information in both academic and nonacademic situations are considered.     

Can People Identify “Deceptive” or “Misleading” Items that Tend to Produce Mostly Wrong Answers?

In many domains, two‐alternative forced‐choice questions produce more correct responses than wrong responses across participants. However, some items, dubbed “deceptive” or “misleading”, produce mostly wrong answers. These items yield poor calibration and poor resolution because the dominant, erroneous response tends to be endorsed with great confidence, even greater than that of the correct response. In addition, for deceptive items, group discussion amplifies rather than mitigates error while enhancing confidence in the erroneous response. Can participants identify deceptive items when they are warned about their existence? It is argued that people's ability to discriminate between deceptive and non‐deceptive items is poor when the erroneous responses are based on the same process assumed to underlie correct responses. Indeed, participants failed to discriminate between deceptive and non‐deceptive perceptual items when they were warned that some of the items (Experiment 1) or exactly half of the items (Experiment 2) were deceptive. A similar failure was observed for general‐knowledge questions (Experiment 3) except when participants were informed about the correct answer (Experiment 4). Possibly, for these tasks, people cannot escape the dangers lurking in deceptive items. In contrast, the results suggest that participants can identify deceptive problems for which the wrong answer stems from reliance on a fast, intuitive process that differs from the analytic mode that is likely to yield correct answers (Experiment 5). The practical and theoretical implications of the results were discussed. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effects of tests on learning and forgetting

In three experiments, we investigated whether memory tests enhance learning and reduce forgetting more than additional study opportunities do. Subjects learned obscure facts (Experiments 1 and 2) or Swahili-English word pairs (Experiment 3) by either completing a test with feedback (test/study) or receiving an additional study opportunity (study). Recall was tested after 5 min or 1, 2, 7, 14, or 42 days. We explored forgetting by means of an ANOVA and also by fitting a power function to the data. In all three experiments, testing enhanced overall recall more than restudying did. According to the power function, in two out of three experiments, testing also reduced forgetting more than restudying did, although this was not always the case according to the ANOVA. We discuss the implications of these results both for approaches to measuring forgetting and for the use of tests in promoting long-term retention. The stimuli used in these experiments may be found at www.psychonomic.org/archive.     

Fostering understanding of multimedia messages through pre-training: evidence for a two-stage theory of mental model construction

Students received a narrated animation explaining the workings of a car's braking system (Experiments 1 and 2) or a bicycle tire pump (Experiment 3) and then took retention and transfer tests. Some students received pre-training concerning each of the components in the system before receiving the narrated animation (pre-training group), whereas others received no pre-training (no pre-training group) or--only in Experiment 3--training after the narrated animation (post-training group). The pre-training described or depicted the possible states of each part. Students in the pre-training group performed better than did students in other groups on tests of transfer (in all 3 experiments) and retention (in Experiments 1 and 2). Results are consistent with a 2-stage theory of mental model construction.     

Responding to Feedback after Multiple-choice Answers: The Influence of Response Confidence

A model is proposed that describes how people choose multiple-choice answers and deal with subsequent feedback. Central to the model is the construct of likelihood, a signal that: (1) indexes the match between task demands and what is known, (2) gives a basis for decisions, and (3) is estimated by response confidence ratings. In two experiments, subjects answered an item, rated confidence, and studied feedback (for 100 items), and then answered the items again. All predictions of the model were confirmed. Specifically, for right/wrong feedback messages, feedback study intervals were longer after correct than incorrect choices (for correct choices, these intervals decreased as confidence increased). Also, there was no relation between the probability of correcting errors and level of confidence. For feedback messages that consisted of an item with correct alternative marked, there was a positive relation between probability of correcting errors and level of confidence.     

A retrieval-based approach to eliminating hindsight bias

Individuals exhibit hindsight bias when they are unable to recall their original responses to novel questions after correct answers are provided to them. Prior studies have eliminated hindsight bias by modifying the conditions under which original judgments or correct answers are encoded. Here, we explored whether hindsight bias can be eliminated by manipulating the conditions that hold at retrieval. Our retrieval-based approach predicts that if the conditions at retrieval enable sufficient discrimination of memory representations of original judgments from memory representations of correct answers, then hindsight bias will be reduced or eliminated. Experiment 1 used the standard memory design to replicate the hindsight bias effect in middle-school students. Experiments 2 and 3 modified the retrieval phase of this design, instructing participants beforehand that they would be recalling both their original judgments and the correct answers. As predicted, this enabled participants to form compound retrieval cues that discriminated original judgment traces from correct answer traces, and eliminated hindsight bias. Experiment 4 found that when participants were not instructed beforehand that they would be making both recalls, they did not form discriminating retrieval cues, and hindsight bias returned. These experiments delineate the retrieval conditions that produce—and fail to produce—hindsight bias.     

Retention of problem solutions: the re-solution effect

Four experiments compared the re-solution performance of prior solvers with that of prior nonsolvers given the correct solutions. Experiments 1 and 2 challenged Weisberg and Alba's (1981) contention that solving a problem and being shown the solution yield equivalent problem knowledge. In both experiments, students who initially solved problems showed near-perfect recall of the solutions after a 1-week delay, far superior to recall by students who had been shown the correct answers. In Experiment 3, solves showed poor solution retention when the connection between the problem and the solution was not meaningful. Experiment 4 showed that with meaningful problems, solvers and those merely provided with solutions have qualitatively different problem representations. The findings can be explained in terms of differential understanding of problems and their solutions.     

Perceptual anticipation in handwriting: the role of implicit motor competence

In two experiments, perceptual anticipation--that is, the observer's ability to predict the course of dynamic visual events--in the case of handwriting traces was investigated. Observers were shown the dynamic display of the middle letter l excerpted from two cursive trigrams (lll or lln) handwritten by one individual. The experimental factor was the distribution of the velocity along the trace, which was controlled by a single parameter, beta. Only for one value of this parameter (beta = 2/3) did the display comply with the two-thirds power law, which describes how tangential velocity depends on curvature in writing movements. The task was to indicate the trigram from which the trace was excerpted--that is, to guess the letter that followed the specific instance of the l that had been displayed. In Experiment 1, the no answer option was available. Experiment 2 adopted a forced-choice response rule. Responses were never reinforced. When beta = 2/3, the rate of correct guesses was high (Experiment 1, P?correct? = .69; Experiment 2, P?correct? = .78). The probability of a correct answer decreased significantly for both smaller and larger values of beta, with wrong answers becoming predominant at the extremes of the range of variation of this parameter. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that perceptual anticipation of human movements involves comparing the perceptual stimulus with an internal dynamic representation of the ongoing event.     

Children's sensitivity to error magnitude when evaluating informants

Three experiments examined children's (N = 80; 40; 48) sensitivity to error magnitude as a measure of informants’ past accuracy, and indication of future reliability. Experiments 1 and 2 assessed whether, in a forced-choice task, children would evaluate as better and show greater trust in an informant whose previous errors were consistently within close range of the correct answer than one whose errors were more extreme. Six-to-seven-year olds displayed such sensitivity in an animal-labeling context (Experiment 1), whereas 4–5-year olds did so only in a number context, where the magnitude of errors was more obviously quantifiable (Experiment 2). Given a free choice in Experiment 3, 6- and 7-year olds preferred to guess the answers themselves rather than accept the claims of either informant. Only the older children's guesses, however, were informed by the testimony of the previously closer informant, indicating an increased awareness that this informant's claims could guide them toward the correct answers.     

Automatic grading and hinting in open-ended text questions

Open-ended text questions provide better assessment of learner’s knowledge, but analysing answers for this kind of questions, checking their correctness, and generating of detailed formative feedback about errors for the learner are more difficult and complex tasks than for closed-ended questions like multiple-choice.The analysis of answers for open-ended questions can be performed on different levels. Analysis on character level allows to find errors in characters’ placement inside a word or a token; it is typically used to detect and correct typos, allowing to differ typos from actual errors in the learner’s answer. The word-level or token-level analysis allows finding misplaced, extraneous, or missing words in the sentence. The semantic-level analysis is used to capture formally the meaning of the learner’s answer and compare it with the meaning of the correct answer that can be provided in a natural or formal language. Some systems and approaches use analysis on several levels.The variability of the answers for open-ended questions significantly increases the complexity of the error search and formative feedback generation tasks. Different types of patterns including regular expressions and their use in questions with patterned answers are discussed. The types of formative feedback and modern approaches and their capabilities to generate feedback on different levels are discussed too.Statistical approaches or loosely defined template rules are inclined to false-positive grading. They are generally lowering the workload of creating questions, but provide low feedback. Approaches based on strictly-defined sets of correct answers perform better in providing hinting and answer-until-correct feedback. They are characterised by a higher workload of creating questions because of the need to account for every possible correct answer by the teacher and fewer types of detected errors.The optimal choice for creating automatised e-learning courses are template-based open-ended question systems like OntoPeFeGe, Preg, METEOR, and CorrectWriting which allows answer-until-correct feedback and are able to find and report various types of errors. This approach requires more time to create questions, but less time to manage the learning process in the courses once they are run.     

The effect of emotion on interpretation and logic in a conditional reasoning task

The effect of emotional content on logical reasoning is explored in three experiments. Theparticipants completed a conditional reasoning task (If p, then q) with emotional and neutral contents. In Experiment 1, existing emotional and neutral words were used. The emotional value of initially neutral words was experimentally manipulated in Experiments 1B and 2, using classical conditioning. In all experiments, participants were less likely to provide normatively correct answers when reasoning about emotional stimuli, compared with neutral stimuli. This was true for both negative (Experiments 1B and 2) and positive contents (Experiment 2). The participants' interpretations of the conditional statements were also measured (perceived sufficiency, necessity, causality, and plausibility). The results showed the expected relationship between interpretation and reasoning. However, emotion did not affect interpretation. Emotional and neutral conditional statements were interpreted similarly. The results are discussed in light of current models of emotion and reasoning.     

Effects of reiteration,hindsight bias,and memory on realism in eyewitness confidence

This study investigated the effects of repetition, memory, feedback, and hindsight bias on the realism in confidence in answers to questions on a filmed kidnapping. In Experiment 1 the participants showed overconfidence in all conditions. In the Repeat condition (‘how confident are you now that your previous answers are correct’) overconfidence was reduced as a consequence of the decrease in confidence in both correct and incorrect answers compared with the Repeat condition when the participants received feedback on their answers and were asked to remember their initial confidence, the confidence level was higher for correct and lower for incorrect answers. In Experiment 2, recalled confidence (the Memory condition) increased compared with the original confidence both for correct and incorrect answers; the effect of this was increased overconfidence. The Hindsight condition showed a decrease in confidence in incorrect answers. The results suggest that a unique hindsight effect may be more clearly present for incorrect than for correct answers. Our study gives further evidence for the malleability of the realism in eyewitness confidence and we discuss both the theoretical and forensic implications of our findings. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Recent study,but not retrieval,of knowledge protects against learning errors

Surprisingly, people incorporate errors into their knowledge bases even when they have the correct knowledge stored in memory (e.g., Fazio, Barber, Rajaram, Ornstein, & Marsh, 2013). We examined whether heightening the accessibility of correct knowledge would protect people from later reproducing misleading information that they encountered in fictional stories. In Experiment 1, participants studied a series of target general knowledge questions and their correct answers either a few minutes (high accessibility of knowledge) or 1 week (low accessibility of knowledge) before exposure to misleading story references. In Experiments 2a and 2b, participants instead retrieved the answers to the target general knowledge questions either a few minutes or 1 week before the rest of the experiment. Reading the relevant knowledge directly before the story-reading phase protected against reproduction of the misleading story answers on a later general knowledge test, but retrieving that same correct information did not. Retrieving stored knowledge from memory might actually enhance the encoding of relevant misinformation.     

Gender differences on the mental rotations test: a factor analysis

The purpose of the present study was to examine possible gender differences in strategy when completing the mental rotations test. Two experiments examined gender differences and the factor structure on outcomes that can be obtained on this test. Experiment 1 involved large groups testing and Experiment 2 used small groups. Factor analytic results in both experiments generally supported the notion that items with one wrong and one blank response or one correct and one blank reflect reluctance to guess, whereas one correct and one wrong or two wrong answers reflect propensity to guess. Even though the factor structure was the same in males and females, the data provided mitigated support for the hypothesis that males have a higher propensity to guess and females show a greater reluctance to guess. Findings are discussed in terms of their implications for the interpretation of gender differences on the MRT.