Power,Freedom, and Individuality: Foucault and Sexual Difference

This paper offers a detailed account of Foucaults ethical and political notion of individuality as presented in his late work, and discusses its relationship to the feminist project of the theory of sexual difference. I argue that Foucaults elaboration of the classical ethos of care for the self opens the way for regarding the I-woman as an ethical, political and aesthetic self-creation. However, it has significant limitations that cannot be ignored. I elaborate on two aspects of Foucaults avoidance of sexual difference as a relevant category for an account of political and ethical individuality, which thus implicitly associates individual agency with men. I argue that Foucault implicitly assumes the existence of an ontological desire to become engaged in political self-creation. However, the ethical position of self-knowledge and desire should be understood as a contingent option that depends on material and historical conditions for its realization. Hence, I argue that a feminist reworking of Foucaults notion of political individuality should add a substantial ethical condition to the imperative of self-knowledge and self-creation – making possible the desiring woman subject.     

Power,Subjectivity, and Agency: Between Arendt and Foucault

The author argues for bringing the work of Michel Foucault and Hannah Arendt into dialogue with respect to the links between power, subjectivity, and agency.Although one might assume that Foucault and Arendt come from such radically different philosophical starting points that such a dialogue would be impossible, the author argues that there is actually a good deal of common ground to be found between these two thinkers. Moreover, the author suggests that Foucault's and Arendt's divergent views about the role that power plays in the constitution of subjectivity and agency should be seen as complementary rather than opposed.     

福柯对医学“祛主体性”的形上之思

福柯运用考古学的研究方法,绘制了医学“祛主体性”谱系,从古典医学的构型中人是不存在的,再到现代临床医学知识型将主体客体化,证实人的有限性,深度剖析主体是由各种关系所建构,揭示了近代西方哲学中将人作为知识源头的先验主体,价值承载的自由主体是不存在的。当想象福柯是否会像拉康那样将主体性理论釜底抽薪的时候,他却吊诡地杀了个回马枪,重新回到古希腊罗马伦理学,开启了拯救主体的行动,完成了从主体解构再到主体重构的华丽转身。同时也为“祛主体性”的医学如何为人类提供“终极关怀”开辟了新的思考路径。

     

Critique,Ethics, and the Apparatus of Experience: A Foucauldian Framework

The paper explores examples of contemporary experience in order to demonstrate the moralisation of new areas of behaviour (especially in relation to environmental issues).It sketches a Foucauldian framework for understanding the historical transformation of experience,in terms of the "apparatus of experience." On that basis,it presents a novel account of critique,in which critique is seen as the potentially transformational,experiential practice of re-experiencing the contemporary apparatuses of experience.In other words,critique is "experience squared." It is this re-experiencing of our everyday experience that permits us,to a certain extent,to "get over ourselves" and thus to reflect critically on the processes of moralisation and de-moralisation in which we participate.     

Subject in first person--subject in third person: subject, subjectivity, and intersubjectivity

In this article, the author traces the history of the concepts of subject, subjectivity, and intersubjectivity in different psychoanalytic theories in the last decades. She argues that the uniqueness of these concepts and their different implications were not emphasized enough. The author discusses the various implications and contexts of the concept of subject in psychoanalytic theory proper and to relate as to: (1). The need to distinguish between the concepts of subject and subjectivity; (2). The mutual interdependence of the subject and his subjectivity and the intersubjective domain (both in the development of the individual and in theoretical thought pertaining to it). Her point of departure is from the position of the subject as a free creature, the centrality of the experiencing individual, from his/her perspective—the subject in the first person. She tries to explain the paradox implicit in the experiential dimension, the place of the other as participant, as both negating and recognizing—the subject in the third person. She suggests the interdependency of the first-person experience of subjectivity on the intersubjective dimension.     

Reflectivity, Reflection, and Counter-Education

This article sets forward a new concept of reflection, to be contrasted with more usual reading of the concept for which we use the term `reflectivity'. The contrast is related to a distinction between normalizing education and counter-education. We claim that within the framework of normalizing education there is no room for reflection, but only for reflectivity. In contrast to reflectivity, reflection manifests a struggle of the subject against the effects of power which govern the constitution of her conceptual apparatus, her knowledge, her consciousness and her limitations and possibilities for successful functioning. Reflectivity re-presents the hegemonic realm of self-evidence and the productive violence of social and cultural order. Reflection, by contrast, aims to challenge the supposedly self-evident and the present order of things. Reflection aims at transcendence and represents a moral commitment in respect of the otherness of the Other, which power relations in every realm of self-evidence oblige us to neglect, to destroy or consume. Transcendence is a concrete utopia, and so is the subject in her nonrepressive communication with the Other: they are part and parcel of our present possibilities, sometimes in microscopic arenas, struggled for, and from time to time even realized.     

Foucault, Ethical Self-concern and the Other

In his later writings on ethics Foucault argues that rapport à soi – the relationship to oneself – is what gives meaning to our commitment to ‘moral behaviour’. In the absence of rapport à soi, Foucault believes, ethical adherence collapses into obedience to rules (‘an authoritarian structure’). I make a case, in broadly Levinasian terms, for saying that the call of ‘the other’ is fundamental to ethics. This prompts the question whether rapport à soi fashions an ethical subject who is unduly self-concerned. Here we confront two apparently irreconcilable pictures of the source of moral demands. I describe one way of trying to reconcile them from a Foucaultian perspective, and I note the limitations in the attempt. I also try to clear away what I think to be a misunderstanding on Foucault’s part about what is at stake in the choice between these pictures. To clarify my critique of Foucault, I also relate it to a similar recent critique of virtue ethics by Thomas Hurka.

Voices of Silence: Foucault,Disability, and the Question of Self-determination

Studies in Philosophy and Education - In this paper I examine two controversialissues that occurred in two different centuriesbut that are inextricably linked with eachother – the 1835 murder...     

Self-Ownership, Freedom, and Autonomy

The libertarian view of freedom has attracted considerable attention in the past three decades. It has also been subjected to numerous criticisms regarding its nature and effects on society. G. A. Cohen's recent book, Self-Ownership, Freedom and Equality, continues this attack by linking libertarian views on freedom to their view of self-ownership. This paper formulates and evaluates Cohen's major arguments against libertarian freedom and self-ownership. It contends that his arguments against the libertarian rights definition of freedom are inadequate and need modification. Similarly, Cohen's defense of restrictions on self-ownership on behalf of autonomy are also found wanting. Finally, I argue that the thesis of self-ownership (whether in its full or partial version) ought to be rejected.     

Foucault and the Glamazon: The Autonomy of Ronda Rousey

In this paper, we examine the case of Ronda Rousey, a high profile female Mixed Martial Arts (MMA) fighter in the Ultimate Fighting Championship (UFC). We argue that Rousey represents a female athlete who can be considered a gender transgressor yet simultaneously a Glamazon. The case of Rousey will be applied to gender transgressor theories to demonstrate that Rousey counters traditional discourse which holds that exhibiting stereotypically masculine traits implies not being an authentic woman. Female fighters face criticisms for being “unfeminine” or “manly” because they participate in such an aggressive sport. Despite her gender divergent behaviour, as much as she transgresses, Rousey is also pinned by sporting and societal sexist culture that reinforces sex binaries and exposes pressures to adhere to hyperfemininity and heterosexual ideals. Finally, using the notions of self and power found in Michel Foucault’s later work as a springboard, we examine whether Rousey’s embrace of the Glamazon identity is an act of autonomy or evidence of false consciousness.     

Ethnography and Subjectivity in Comparative Religious Ethics

The ethnographic turn in religious studies has responded to important developments, such as the rejection of value neutrality and the need to better address the lived experience of individuals and communities. In this essay, I affirm the value of ethnography as a method in comparative religious ethics, but distinguish between two ways of framing ethnography in relation to ethics. The first way insists on the hard limits of translating values across cultures, and tends to marginalize or dismiss normative inquiry. The second way allows for the interpretation of practices of ethical justification in diverse cultural contexts. I argue that this second category of ethnography is more congenial to the work of comparative religious ethicists, since an integral part of ethical inquiry involves reflecting on, and making arguments about, social norms and practices.     

A Critical Theory of the Self: Wittgenstein,Nietzsche, Foucault

Critical thinking, considered as a version of informallogic, must consider emotions and personal attitudesin assessing assertions and conclusions in anyanalysis of discourse. It must therefore presupposesome notion of the self. Critical theory may be seenas providing a substantive and non-neutral positionfor the exercise of critical thinking. It thereforemust presuppose some notion of the self. This paperargues for a Foucauldean position on the self toextend critical theory and provide a particularposition on the self for critical thinking. Thisposition on the self is developed from moretraditional accounts of the self from Descartes toSchopenhauer, Nietzsche and Wittgenstein.     

Freedom,Love, and Justice

This article starts from love as being a fundamental value, guiding modes of behaviour that establish a reliable framework and basis for the recognition of the rights and dignity of everyone in the community. The affirmation of justice and freedom based on love leads to corrective and transformative action in cases where life is threatened and rights are being violated. Drawing on the experience and witness of Martin Luther King Jr, the article underlines that love empowers the oppressed to stand up and becomes a moral imperative for change, against the background of the many forces promoting conflict and violence, division, and polarization. The power of love is a message to the world, to the powerful, and to the powerless – to all who long for a different reality from what we see in today’s world. This needs to be expressed in the quest for the unity of the church and the unity of humankind, serving the sustainability and unity of God’s creation.     

医学化的权力与经济批判——从伊里奇到福柯

权力与经济是分析当代医学化现象的两个重要维度。医学不只是一种知识和技术,同时也是一种权力规范和经济活动,伊里奇和福柯都对此展开了分析,但是两者的方式与对策有所不同。伊里奇将医学化视为一种文化异化现象,并提出了一种文化主义的消除策略,福柯则将医学化视为权力体系和经济体系的一部分,从而提出了一种基于生命政治批判的反抗策略。两者的解决方案都具有局限性,但两者所开启的权力与经济批判以及对个体自主性的强调,有助于理解当代社会医学化的复杂性,也有助于将医学化批判置于整个社会危机的哲学反思之中。

     

福柯与《临床医学的诞生》

《临床医学的诞生》是20世纪法国著名学者福柯的一部医学史研究专著,主要从空间、语言和死亡三个方面探讨了现代医学也就是临床医学诞生的可能性条件,兼具历史与批判的性质。它揭示了隐藏在医学话语背后的权力关系,反映了福柯瓦解传统、颠覆理性的新型历史观。     

赋权、共情与主体性：作为微型民族志的叙事医学

基于对生物医学的批判,疾病叙事转向抓住第一人称的痛苦体验,是为病人赋权的主体性回归过程,成为一种批判性与补充性研究方法。叙事医学促使医务人员达成共情,深入理解病人的生理与社会苦痛,创造医患对话空间。然而,这些叙事局限于医患之间普适性单向互动表达。微型民族志作为叙事医学新范式,是资料收集、赋权、共情、治疗为一体的研究范式,将阿尔茨海默病老人的主体性互动研究作为微型民族志的典型案例,为完善中国叙事医学理论与方法带来更多启示。

     

Two Kinds of Awareness: Foucault,the Will,and Freedom in Somatic Practice

This essay identifies two kinds of awareness of one’s body that occur in a variety of literatures: awareness as psychologically or spiritually enabling or therapeutic, and awareness as undesirable self-consciousness of the body. Drawing on Foucault’s account of normalizing judgment, it argues that these two forms of awareness are impossible to separate, if that separation is into authentic versus extrinsic somatic experience. Nonetheless, awareness is an important component of embodied freedom, but a freedom understood with Spinoza and Nietzsche as grounded in necessity rather than only in the will, and with Arendt and Foucault as a practice rather than an achievement of a sovereign subject. Somatic practices grounded in awareness and acceptance of the body’s necessities, along with attention to the I-can (rather than the I-will) cultivate a form of embodied freedom that bridges care of the self and the political.     

Ethics, Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure

Universities can and have existed without academic freedom and academic tenure. But academic freedom is necessary for a university dedicated to the pursuit of knowledge in a democratic society. Both academic freedom and academic tenure are not only rights but also carry with them moral obligations. Furthermore academic tenure is the best defense of academic freedom that American universities have found. Academic tenure can be successfully defended from the many contemporary attacks to which it is being subjected only insofar as it is necessary to defend academic freedom, and only if all involved in the system of tenure observe the ethical requirements that the system demands.     

Subjectivity and unconsciousness

Concepts of the unconscious were crucial to both Jung's and Freud's thinking. Psychoanalytic and analytical psychological views of the unconscious are compared and contrasted, and both are critically reviewed. It is suggested that we need to revise our conceptualization so as to take better account of the role of the analyst's expectations and inferences, and therefore of his or her subjectivity, whenever he or she makes a clinical judgement that unconscious mental processes are in operation. Some technical implications of a revised definition of unconsciousness are considered, especially indications for self-disclosure by an analyst of his or her own experience of events within the treatment.