Which processes are involved in cognitive procedural learning?

Procedural memory is characterised by a relative resistance to pathology, making its assessment of the utmost importance. However, few studies have looked at the cognitive processes involved in cognitive procedural learning. In an initial experiment, we studied the role of different cognitive functions in massed cognitive procedural learning. Our results confirmed the existence of three separate learning phases and, for the first time, demonstrated the involvement of episodic memory and executive functions in the first learning phase. In a second experiment, we studied the effect of distributed learning conditions on the dynamics of procedural learning. This second study confirmed our results but showed that these conditions slow down the process of cognitive procedural learning. Our overall findings call into question the status of functionally autonomous memory system that is currently allotted to procedural memory, and suggest that the role of nonprocedural cognitive components should be taken into account in patient rehabilitation.     

What cognitive abilities are involved in trail-making performance?

The cognitive abilities involved in the Connections (Salthouse, et al., 2000) version of the trail making test were investigated by administering the test, along with a battery of cognitive tests and tests of complex span and updating conceptualizations of working memory, to a sample of over 3600 adults. The results indicate that this variant of the trail making test largely reflects individual differences in speed and fluid cognitive abilities, with the relative contributions of the two abilities varying according to particular measure of performance considered (e.g., difference, ratio, or residual). Relations of age on trail making performance were also examined. Although strong age differences were evident in the Connections and working memory measures, with both sets of variables there was nearly complete overlap of the age differences with individual differences in speed and fluid cognitive abilities.     

Pointing following in dogs: are simple or complex cognitive mechanisms involved?

Animal Cognition - Domestic dogs have proved to be extremely successful in finding hidden food following a series of human social cues such as pointing (an extended hand and index finger indicating...     

Which children benefit from letter names in learning letter sounds?

Typical U.S. children use their knowledge of letters' names to help learn the letters' sounds. They perform better on letter sound tests with letters that have their sounds at the beginnings of their names, such as v, than with letters that have their sounds at the ends of their names, such as m, and letters that do not have their sounds in their names, such as h. We found this same pattern among children with speech sound disorders, children with language impairments as well as speech sound disorders, and children who later developed serious reading problems. Even children who scored at chance on rhyming and sound matching tasks performed better on the letter sound task with letters such as v than with letters such as m and h. Our results suggest that a wide range of children use the names of letters to help learn the sounds and that phonological awareness, as conventionally measured, is not required in order to do so.     

Children's understanding of ambiguous figures: Which cognitive developments are necessary to experience reversal?

In two experiments involving one hundred and thirty-eight 3- to 5-year-olds we examined the claim that a complex understanding of ambiguity is required to experience reversal of ambiguous stimuli [Gopnik, A., & Rosati, A. (2001). Duck or rabbit? Reversing ambiguous figures and understanding ambiguous representations. Developmental Science, 4, 175–183]. In Experiment 1 a novel Production task measured the ability to acknowledge both interpretations of ambiguous figures. This was as easy as and significantly correlated with a False Belief task, and easier than a Droodle task. We replicated this finding in Experiment 2, and also found that perceiving reversal of ambiguous figures was harder than either the False Belief or Production tasks. In contrast to previous findings, the Reversal and Droodle tasks were not specifically related. We conclude that children only attempt reversal once they can understand the representational relationship between the figure and its two interpretations. The process resulting in reversal however is hard, probably requiring additional developments in executive functioning and imagery abilities.     

Procedural interference in perceptual classification: Implicit learning or cognitive complexity?

Researchers have argued that an implicit procedural-learning system underlies performance for information integration category structures, whereas a separate explicit system underlies performance for rule-based categories. One source of evidence is a dissociation in which procedural interference harms performance in information integration structures, but not in rule-based ones. The present research provides evidence that some form of overall difficulty or category complexity lies at the root of the dissociation. The authors report studies in which procedural interference is observed for even simple rule-based structures under more sensitive testing conditions. Furthermore, the magnitude of the interference is large when the nature of the rule is made more complex. By contrast, the magnitude of interference is greatly reduced for an information integration structure that is cognitively simple. These results challenge the view that a procedural-learning system mediates performance on information integration categories, but not on rule-based ones.     

Which components of processing speed are affected in ADHD subtypes?

The term “processing speed” (PS) encompasses many components including perceptual, cognitive and output speed. Despite evidence for reduced PS in Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), little is known about which component(s) is most impacted in ADHD, or how it may vary by subtypes. Participants included 151 children, ages 8–12 years, with ADHD Predominantly Inattentive Type, ADHD Combined Type and typically developing controls using DSM-IV criteria. All children completed four measures of processing speed: Symbol Search, Coding, Decision Speed, and simple reaction time. We found children with ADHD-PI and ADHD-C had slower perceptual and psychomotor/incidental learning speed than controls and that ADHD-PI had slower decision speed than controls. The subtypes did not differ on any of these measures. Mean reaction time was intact in ADHD. Hence, at a very basic output level, children with ADHD do not have impaired speed overall, but as task demands increase their processing speed becomes less efficient than controls’. Further, perceptual and psychomotor speed were related to inattention, and psychomotor speed/incidental learning was related to hyperactivity/impulsivity. Thus, inattention may contribute to less efficient performance and worse attention to detail on tasks with a higher perceptual and/or psychomotor load; whereas hyperactivity/impulsivity may affect psychomotor speed/incidental learning, possibly via greater inaccuracy and/or reduced learning efficiency. Decision speed was not related to either dimension. Results suggest that PS deficits are primarily linked to the inattention dimension of ADHD but not exclusively. Findings also suggest PS is not a singular process but rather a multifaceted system that is differentially impacted in ADHD.     

Septohippocampal acetylcholine: involved in but not necessary for learning and memory?

The neurotransmitter acetylcholine (ACh) has been accorded an important role in supporting learning and memory processes in the hippocampus. Cholinergic activity in the hippocampus is correlated with memory, and restoration of ACh in the hippocampus after disruption of the septohippocampal pathway is sufficient to rescue memory. However, selective ablation of cholinergic septohippocampal projections is largely without effect on hippocampal-dependent learning and memory processes. We consider the evidence underlying each of these statements, and the contradictions they pose for understanding the functional role of hippocampal ACh in memory. We suggest that although hippocampal ACh is involved in memory in the intact brain, it is not necessary for many aspects of hippocampal memory function.     

Can cognitive processes be inferred from neuroimaging data?

There is much interest currently in using functional neuroimaging techniques to understand better the nature of cognition. One particular practice that has become common is 'reverse inference', by which the engagement of a particular cognitive process is inferred from the activation of a particular brain region. Such inferences are not deductively valid, but can still provide some information. Using a Bayesian analysis of the BrainMap neuroimaging database, I characterize the amount of additional evidence in favor of the engagement of a cognitive process that can be offered by a reverse inference. Its usefulness is particularly limited by the selectivity of activation in the region of interest. I argue that cognitive neuroscientists should be circumspect in the use of reverse inference, particularly when selectivity of the region in question cannot be established or is known to be weak.     

Nomic Universals and Particular Causal Relations: Which are Basic and Which are Derived?

Armstrong holds that a law of nature is a certain sort of structural universal which, in turn, fixes causal relations between particular states of affairs. His claim that these nomic structural universals explain causal relations commits him to saying that such universals are irreducible, not supervenient upon the particular causal relations they fix. However, Armstrong also wants to avoid Plato’s view that a universal can exist without being instantiated, a view which he regards as incompatible with naturalism. This construal of naturalism forces Armstrong to say that universals are abstractions from a certain class of particulars; they are abstractions from first-order states of affairs, to be more precise. It is here argued that these two tendencies in Armstrong cannot be reconciled: To say that universals are abstractions from first-order states of affairs is not compatible with saying that universals fix causal relations between particulars. Causal relations are themselves states of affairs of a sort, and Armstrong’s claim that a law is a kind of structural universal is best understood as the view that any given law logically supervenes on its corresponding causal relations. The result is an inconsistency, Armstrong having to say that laws do not supervene on particular causal relations while also being committed to the view that they do so supervene. The inconsistency is perhaps best resolved by denying that universals are abstractions from states of affairs.

How are cognitive and physical difficulty compared?

Tasks that require less physical effort are generally preferred over more physically demanding alternatives. Similarly, tasks that require less mental effort are generally preferred over more mentally demanding alternatives. But what happens when one must choose between tasks that entail different kinds of effort, one mainly physical (e.g., carrying buckets) and the other mainly mental (e.g., counting)? We asked participants to choose between a bucket-carrying task and a counting task. Our participants were less likely to choose the bucket task when it required a long reach rather than a short reach, and our participants were also less likely to choose the bucket task the smaller the final count value. We tested the hypothesis that subjective task durations provided a common currency for comparing the difficulties of the two kinds of tasks. We found that this hypothesis provided a better account of the task choice data than did an account that relied on objective task durations. Our study opens the door to a new problem in the study of attention, perception, and psychophysics—judging the difficulty of different kinds of tasks. The approach we took to this problem, which relies on two-alternative forced choice along with modeling the basis for the choice, may prove useful in future investigations.     

Dual processes in reasoning?

Previous results have shown that the introduction of negatives into the sentences used in a deductive problem affected behavior in a systematic way which was independent of the logical structure of the problem. In the present investigation, the subjects were asked to justify their responses when reasoning about such sentences. In accordance with previous results, the responses were dominated by the terms in the sentences regardless of whether they were negated. However, the justifications did vary when negatives were introduced in accordance with the logical consequences of the responses. The interpretation of these justifications as causes of behavior seemed implausible. It was suggested that they were rationalizations, or that there was at least some form of dual processing between behavior and conscious thought.     

Decision-making competence and cognitive abilities: Which abilities matter?

Decision-making competence is a skill that is associated with numerous positive life outcomes. Even though multiple cognitive abilities have been shown to predict decision-making competence, few studies have incorporated a large test battery tapping into several cognitive abilities concurrently in the same models. The current paper presents a study that sought to investigate which cognitive abilities predicted overall decision-making competence in adults using hierarchical regression analysis. A cognitive test battery, comprising abilities such as general intelligence, executive functions, numeracy, visuospatial ability, and time perception, was administered to 182 participants. Results indicate that both general intelligence, which was consistently the strongest predictor, and numeracy contributed independently to overall decision-making competence. Executive functions did predict overall decision-making competence, while all predictors were included in the models. A novel finding concerns the relationship between time perception and decision-making competence. The complementary roles of these cognitive abilities are discussed.     

What is involved in forgiving?

Conclusion I have argued that forgiveness paradigmatically involves overcoming moral anger, of which resentment is the central case. I have argued, as well, that forgiveness may involve overcoming any form of anger so long as the belief that you have been wrongfully harmed is partially constitutive of it, and that overcoming other negative emotions caused by a wrongdoer's misdeed may, given appropriate qualifications, count as forgiveness. Those qualifications indicate, however, significant differences between moral anger and other negative emotions; differences which must be taken into account when determining whether overcoming negative emotions other than moral anger count as forgiveness. I have proposed, too, that forgiveness requires neither overcoming all negative feelings (other than moral anger) nor the judgment that the offender is a wrongdoer.I must acknowledge that my analysis is incomplete, focusing as it does on the forgiver rather than on the person forgiven. After all, there are two sides to forgiveness. Not all forgiving involves a struggle to overcome negative feelings; sometimes it is a social transaction of a more casual sort that is effected by the simple speech act I forgive you. My analysis is incomplete insofar as it treats exclusively of forgiveness as a process and fails to offer an analysis of forgiveness as an act. Finally, a complete theory of forgiveness requires an account of the conditions under which forgiveness qualifies as a moral virtue, and such an account is beyond the scope of this essay. Though I have not offered a complete theory of forgiveness, my effort to clarify a dimension of what is involved in a common type of forgiveness may clear the way for answering related questions about it, and thereby lead to a fuller account of forgiveness as a moral phenomenon.     

Is one item an adequate measure of cognitive learning?

While the "leaning loss" scale is a valid means of estimating cognitive learning, the test is valid only when used as designed-with two items.     

Word learning in dogs?

In a recent paper, Kaminski, Call and Fischer report pioneering research on word-learning in a dog. In this commentary we suggest ways of distinguishing referential word use from mere association. We question whether the dog is reasoning by exclusion and, if so, compare three explanations - learned heuristics, default assumptions, and pragmatic reasoning - as they apply to children and might apply to dogs. Kaminski et al.'s work clearly raises important questions about the origins and basis of word learning and social cognition.     

Does opposition logic provide evidence for conscious and unconscious processes in artificial grammar learning?

The question of whether studies of human learning provide evidence for distinct conscious and unconscious influences remains as controversial today as ever. Much of this controversy arises from the use of the logic of dissociation. The controversy has prompted the use of an alternative approach that places conscious and unconscious influences on memory retrieval in opposition. Here we ask whether evidence acquired via the logic of opposition requires a dual-process account or whether it can be accommodated within a single similarity-based account. We report simulations using a simple neural network model of two artificial grammar learning experiments reported by that dissociated conscious and unconscious influences on classification. The simulations demonstrate that opposition logic is insufficient to distinguish between single- and multiple-system models.