Analytic and Continental Philosophy: Explaining the Differences

A number of writers have tackled the task of characterizing the differences between analytic and Continental philosophy. I suggest that these attempts have indeed captured the most important divergences between the two styles but have left the explanation of the differences mysterious. I argue that analytic philosophy is usefully seen as philosophy conducted within a paradigm, in Kuhn's sense of the word, whereas Continental philosophy assumes much less in the way of shared presuppositions, problems, methods and approaches. This important opposition accounts for all those features that have rightly been held to constitute the difference between the two traditions. I finish with some reflections on the relative superiority of each tradition and by highlighting the characteristic deficiencies of each.     

从个体主义到文化主义--心理学研究范式的转向与整合

西方心理学存在两种不同的研究范式,即个体主义和文化主义。文章拟以库恩的“范式”为标准,阐述西方心理学个体主义范式到文化主义范式的演变,剖析二者的基本观点及其优势和局限。在此基础上提出两者整合的构思。     

On Classification of Scientific Revolutions

The question whether Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions could be applied to mathematics caused many interesting problems to arise. The aim of this paper is to discuss whether there are different kinds of scientific revolution, and if so, how many. The basic idea of the paper is to discriminate between the formal and the social aspects of the development of science and to compare them. The paper has four parts. In the first introductory part we discuss some of the questions which arose during the debate of the historians of mathematics. In the second part, we introduce the concept of the epistemic framework of a theory. We propose to discriminate three parts of this framework, from which the one called formal frame will be of considerable importance for our approach, as its development is conservative and gradual. In the third part of the paper we define the concept of epistemic rupture as a discontinuity in the formal frame. The conservative and gradual nature of the changes of the formal frame open the possibility to compare different epistemic ruptures. We try to show that there are four different kinds of epistemic rupture, which we call idealisation, re-presentation, objectivisation and re-formulation. In the last part of the paper we derive from the classification of the epistemic ruptures a classification of scientific revolutions. As only the first three kinds of rupture are revolutionary (the re-formulations are rather cumulative), we obtain three kinds of scientific revolution: idealisation, re-presentation, and objectivisation. We discuss the relation of our classification of scientific revolutions to the views of Kuhn, Lakatos, Crowe, and Dauben. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Paradigm shift in religious education: a reply to Jackson,or why religious education goes to war

This article provides a defence of my theoretical analysis of paradigm shift in contemporary religious education, particularly in light of Robert Jackson’s (2015) article published in this journal: ‘Misrepresenting religious education’s past and present in looking forward: Gearon using Kuhn’s concepts of paradigm, paradigm shift and incommensurability’. The core of Jackson’s concerns is my adaptation of Kuhn’s concepts of paradigm, paradigm shift and incommensurability to religious education. Defending in turn my use of these concepts – of paradigm, paradigm shift and incommensurability – I conclude that Jackson’s critique is in and of itself an apt demonstration of the position he seeks to attack. Drawing wider parallels with the methodological ‘paradigm wars’ in the social sciences I argue that the paradigms are why religious education too goes to ‘war’.     

Humanism and Theoretical Pluralism

Christian Smith's What Is a Person? calls for a normative turn in sociology—the grounding of sociology in a theory of human nature. While offering a systematic account of a thick view of personhood—what it should look like, how it can be applied, and why it is needed—the book proposes a critical realist personalism as the best metatheoretical direction for sociology. The author of this essay agrees with the main questions and direction of Smith's project. However, by historicizing the origins and sociological implications of personalist moral theory, the author problematizes the personalism that is one of the foundations of Smith's project. She contrasts personalism with humanism, suggesting that the latter might possess both the normative robustness and comparative potential needed for contemporary sociological theory and practice. She ends her response to Smith's book by raising questions about the relationship between critical realist personalism and theoretical pluralism.     

Of the Same in the Different. What is Wrong with Kuhn's Use of ``Seeing' and ``Seeing as'

Kuhn uses the distinction between `(simple) seeing', and `seeing as' in order to claim that among competing paradigms there cannot be found any middle (experiential) ground; nothing `same' can be located behind such radically different paradigm-worlds. He claims that scientists do not see a common something as this thing at one time and as that thing at another. Each time scientists simply see what they see. To claim the contrary is to claim that scientists arrive at their paradigmatic experiences of the world due to an interpretation of something `same' beyond the paradigms,and Kuhn rejects this. The question of whether a common ground can be found behind two or more different paradigmatic world-views relates to many issues in philosophy of science and in general epistemology (e.g., realism-idealism, relativism-objectivism, etc.). As a first approach to these, in this paper I examine the presuppositions of Kuhn's claim, its consistency in the exposition, and its overall viability. I conclude that the actual way in which Kuhn refers to the historical examples he examines undermines his explicit thesis. But also the paradox he himself recognizes in his thought that `though the world does not change with a change of paradigm, the scientists afterward works in a different world' can be solved only if we start to think seriously about the necessity and nature of a `same in the different' behind the competing paradigmatic world-experiences. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

THE COMMUNITY VIEW REVISITED

Abstract: Joining a vast Wittgensteinian anti‐theoretical movement, John Canfield has argued that it is possible to read the claims that (1) “language is essentially communal” and (2) “it is conceptually possible that a Crusoe isolated from birth should speak or follow rules” in such a way that they are perfectly compatible, and, indeed, that Wittgenstein held them both at once. The key to doing this is to drain them of any theoretical content or implications that would put each claim at odds with the other. I argue here, first of all, that it is not possible to detheorize both (1) and (2) and still hope to say anything illuminating about the nature of language. In fact, Canfield himself does not succeed in detheorizing both (1) and (2) but ends up trivializing (1) and leaving (2) with quite a bit of theoretical content. I further argue, however, that this is getting the matter the wrong way around. Contra Canfield et al., it is only when we recognize this that we can appreciate how radical and innovative Wittgenstein's claims about language really are.     

从科学革命的视角看《中医内科学》教材的结构性范式

为中医内科学的理论革新建立哲学基础,满足当今医学实践的需要,借用范式理论,着重于对现行《中医内科学》教材的“结构性范式”进行哲学考察。《中医内科学》教材的“结构性范式”本质上是以证素为核心的病机语言体系和以二分法为特征的分析逻辑体系。原有的《中医内科学》范式已不能适应当代中医实践复杂性的要求,故有必要对其进行“科学革命”。革命的重点在于：保留“多维度”的思维,引导“二分法”向“层次论”转变,并且抛开“中西”意识形态的成见,践行医学的“西体中用”以弥补自身的不足。

     

Kant's transcendental idealism and contemporary anti‐realism

This paper compares Kant's transcendental idealism with three main groups of contemporary anti‐realism, associated with Wittgenstein, Putnam, and Dummett, respectively. The kind of anti‐realism associated with Wittgenstein has it that there is no deep sense in which our concepts are answerable to reality. Associated with Putnam is the rejection of four main ideas: theoryindependent reality, the idea of a uniquely true theory, a correspondence theory of truth, and bivalence. While there are superficial similarities between both views and Kant's, I find more significant differences. Dummettian anti‐realism, too, clearly differs from Kant's position: Kant believes in verification‐transcendent reality, and transcendental idealism is not a theory of meaning or truth. However, I argue that part of the Dummettian position is extremely useful for understanding part of Kant's position – his idealism about the appearances of things. I argue that Kant's idealism about appearances can be expressed as the rejection of experiencetranscendent reality with respect to appearances.     

Cognitive science and epistemic openness

Recent findings in cognitive science suggest that the epistemic subject is more complex and epistemically porous than is generally pictured. Human knowers are open to the world via multiple channels, each operating for particular purposes and according to its own logic. These findings need to be understood and addressed by the philosophical community. The current essay argues that one consequence of the new findings is to invalidate certain arguments for epistemic anti-realism.     

Models and fictions in science

Non-actual model systems discussed in scientific theories are compared to fictions in literature. This comparison may help with the understanding of similarity relations between models and real-world target systems. The ontological problems surrounding fictions in science may be particularly difficult, however. A comparison is also made to ontological problems that arise in the philosophy of mathematics.

The ‘Platforms’ for Comparing Incommensurable Taxonomies: A Cognitive-Historical Analysis

This paper examines taxonomy comparison from a cognitive perspective. Arguments are developed by drawing on the results of cognitive psychology, which reveal the cognitive mechanisms behind the practice of taxonomy comparison. The taxonomic change in 19th-century ornithology is also used to uncover the historical practice that ornithologists employed in the revision of the classification of birds. On the basis of cognitive and historical analyses, I argue that incommensurable taxonomies can be compared rationally. Using a frame model to represent taxonomy, I show how rational comparisons were achieved in the historical case through compatible contrast sets and attribute lists. Through analyzing the cognitive processes of classification and concept representation, I further explain how rival taxonomies in the historical case could be rationally compared on ‘platforms’ rooted in such cognitive mechanisms as relational assumptions and preferences for body parts in conceptual processing. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Recent Debates Over Structural Realism

Summary  In recent years Structural Realism has been revived as a compromise candidate to resolve the long-standing question of scientific realism. Recent debate over structural realism originates with Worrall’s (1989) paper “Structural Realism: The best of Both Worlds”. However, critics such as Psillos contend that structural realism incorporates an untenable distinction between structure and nature, and is therefore unworkable. In this paper I consider three versions of structural realism that purport to avoid such criticism. The first is Chakravartty’s “semirealism” which proceeds by trying to show that structural realism and entity realism entail one another. I demonstrate that this position will not work, but follow Chakravartty’s contention that structural realism need not imply that scientific knowledge can only be of mathematical structure. I advance from this conclusion to sketch a version of structural realism that is consistent with recent deflationary approaches to the scientific realism question. Finally, I consider a third approach to structural realism Ladyman’s “metaphysical structural realism” which tries to avoid the difficulties of earlier versions by taking structure to be ontologically primary. I show that the deflationary approach to structural realism undermines the rationale behind Ladyman’s approach.     

Jung's mediatory science as a psychology beyond objectivism

In this paper, the author argues that Jung's non-objectivist--yet scientific--epistemology and his empirical/hermeneatic methods of inquiry situate him within a psychological tradition that, in many respects, began with William James and, today, is finding expression in the work of many non-Jungian cognitive scientists. In an effort to encourage dialogue between Jungians and scholars within related intellectual traditions, the author presents evidence from the corpus of Jung's work that demonstrates that, like William James, Jung intentionally rejected the absolutist claims of objectivism and the opposite position on 'anything goes' relativism, emotivism, or subjectivism. Instead, Jung forged a path that led to the meta-psychological position similar to internal realism (Putnam 1981) or experientialism (Lakoff 1987) and to a theoretical psychology that gave a central place both to unconscious cognitive structure and to imagination. This he labelled a 'mediatory science'. The psychological theories developed within this mediatory science framework represent an early articulation of key constructs that are currently used by a number of cognitive scientists seeking to understand how we make sense of experience.     

Folk theory of social change

People have a folk theory of social change (FTSC). A typical Western FTSC stipulates that as a society becomes more industrialized, it undergoes a natural course of social change, in which a communal society marked by communal relationships becomes a qualitatively different, agentic society where market‐based exchange relationships prevail. People use this folk theory to predict a society's future and estimate its past, to understand contemporary cross‐cultural differences, and to make decisions about social policies. Nonetheless, the FTSC is not particularly consistent with the existing cross‐cultural research on industrialization and cultural differences, and needs to be examined carefully.     

Sport as strategic action: A Habermasian perspective

The purpose of this paper is to explore the moral status of sport through a conceptual structure borrowed from Jürgen Habermas's philosophy and social theory. Habermas distinguishes between communicative and strategic action as two ways in which social action may be coordinated. While the former relies on the building of mutual understanding between social agents, the latter entails one agent manipulating others, as if they were mere objects to be treated instrumentally. In an initial model of sporting practice, it is suggested that sport primarily involves strategic action and in particular encourages the undermining of one's opponent's autonomy. This model is subject to criticism, by scrutinising Habermas's interpretation of the Wittgensteinian notion of a language game, and thus the relationship between communicative language-use and strategic games playing. It will be suggested that games playing has more in common with language-use than Habermas acknowledges, thereby opening up a space for genuinely communicative and expressive action within sport. In conclusion, it will be suggested that the moral significance of sport lies in the fact that its communicative and expressive potential can only be exercised against the moral threat of the dominance of strategic action.     

利他主义:从社会生物学到社会科学

对自然界和人类社会中广泛存在的利他行为,社会生物学在动物行为研究的基础上提出几种假说,并把它推进到人类行为领域,由此引发与其他学科,尤其是社会科学众多解释模式之间的争论。造成分歧的主要原因不仅是利他行为本身的复杂性和多样性,更主要的是不同学科范式之间,以及这些范式所秉承的研究传统和学科目标之间的差异。对利他行为合理的科学解释必须放弃由于学科分割而造成的门户之见,把客观现象的人为分裂重新整合起来。这种学科间的整合不同于以往意义上研究方法的交叉与互补,而是要在“生物——社会”层面建立一个关于人类行为的全新的理论架构。     

Understanding the Immediacy of Other Minds

In this paper we address the epistemological debate between emerging perceptual accounts (PA) of knowing other minds and traditional theory of mind (ToM) approaches to the problem of other minds. We argue that the current formulations of the debate are conceptually misleading and empirically unfounded. Rather, the real contribution of PA is to point out a certain ‘immediacy’ that characterizes episodes of mindreading. We claim that while the intuition of immediacy should be preserved for explaining the nature and function of some cognitive processes of mindreading, the notion of immediacy should apply for describing a particular epistemic attitude and not a particular type of epistemic access. We draw on Wittgenstein's discussions of one's relation to other minds to elaborate our claims and to move the epistemological discussions beyond stalling debates between ToM and PA.     

The relationship between relational models and individualism and collectivism: evidence from culturally diverse work groups

Relational models theory (Fiske, 1991 ) proposes that all thinking about social relationships is based on four elementary mental models: communal sharing, authority ranking, equality matching, and market pricing. Triandis and his colleagues (e.g., Triandis, Kurowski, & Gelfand, 1994 ) have suggested a relationship between the constructs of horizontal and vertical individualism and collectivism and Fiske's relational models. However, no previous research has examined this proposed relationship empirically. The objective of the current study was to test the association between the two frameworks in order to further our understanding of why members of culturally diverse groups may prefer different relational models in interactions with other group members. Findings from this study support a relationship between Triandis' constructs and Fiske's four relational models and uphold Fiske's ( 1991 ) claim that the use of the relational models is culturally dependent. As hypothesized, horizontal collectivism was associated with a preference for equality matching and communal sharing, vertical individualism was related to a preference for authority ranking, and vertical collectivism was related to a preference for authority ranking and communal sharing. However, contrary to expectations, horizontal individualism was not related to a preference for equality matching and market pricing, and vertical individualism was not associated with market pricing. By showing that there is a relationship between Triandis' and Fiske's frameworks, this study closes a gap in relational models theory, namely how culture relates to people's preferences for relational models. Thus, the findings from this study will enable future researchers to explain and predict what relational models are likely to be used in a certain cultural context.     

个体主义/集体主义的影响因素:生态视角

个体主义/集体主义是衡量文化的重要维度。两者的价值取向有所区别,前者关注自我的独特性,而后者关注自我与他人的关系。近年来研究者发现了众多影响个体主义/集体主义的新因素并构建了理论。这些理论中有4个理论非常具有代表性:现代化理论、气候-经济理论、传染病理论以及大米理论。其中后3个理论从远因的角度来对个体主义/集体主义的成因进行了探讨,为研究者探究个体主义/集体主义成因提供了新思路。未来个体主义/集体主义影响因素的研究可以用多种测量方法综合的方式或者从基因的角度来进行探索。