Exaggeration in memory: Systematic distortion of self-evaluative information under reduced accessibility

The tendency to exaggerate specific information about oneself can stem from reconstructive memory processes that are distinct from motivated self-enhancement or self-presentation. While exaggerations sometimes reflect these motives, they also result from attempts to reconstruct one’s past. Three studies examined test scores as they became less accessible in memory. Study 1 provided a real-world illustration, demonstrating reduced accessibility and increased exaggeration of SAT scores over time. Two experiments utilized test scores randomly assigned in a controlled laboratory setting. Increased exaggeration was observed following distraction (Study 2), and after a one-week delay (Study 3). Distortions in scores reported were consistent with beliefs about the self, rather than uniformly self-serving. Under reduced accessibility, exaggeration was predicted by beliefs about achievement (Study 1) and subjective perceptions of test performance (Study 2). Study 3 manipulated perceived performance. Positive performance feedback caused greater exaggeration under reduced accessibility, whereas negative feedback reduced the tendency to exaggerate.     

Recognition and evaluation of emotional prosody in individuals with generalized social phobia: a pilot study

Studies using facial emotional expressions as stimuli partially support the assumption of biased processing of social signals in social phobia. This pilot study explored for the first time whether individuals with social phobia display a processing bias towards emotional prosody. Fifteen individuals with generalized social phobia and fifteen healthy controls (HC) matched for gender, age, and education completed a recognition test consisting of meaningless utterances spoken in a neutral, angry, sad, fearful, disgusted or happy tone of voice. Participants also evaluated the stimuli with regard to valence and arousal. While these ratings did not differ significantly between groups, analysis of the recognition test revealed enhanced identification of sad and fearful voices and decreased identification of happy voices in individuals with social phobia compared with HC. The two groups did not differ in their processing of neutral, disgust, and anger prosody.     

Generalizability of carry-over effects in the emotional Stroop task

The emotional Stroop task has been the most widely used task to examine attentional bias to emotionally salient stimuli. In one format of this task, words are presented to participants in a mixed randomized or quasi-randomized sequence. Using a mixed smoking Stroop task, we have previously demonstrated that smokers are slower to respond to words which follow smoking-related words than words which follow neutral words. Here we show that this carry-over effect is present in heroin addicts-but not control subjects-in a heroin Stroop task, and in normal subjects in a stress Stroop task. Thus, the effect generalizes to other populations. In addition, an examination of the studies that have collected data from both mixed and blocked formats provides converging evidence for the presence of carry-over effects. We discuss the implications of the carry-over effect for research using the emotional Stroop task.     

Practice makes perfect: Training the interpretation of emotional ambiguity

The interpretation of emotionally ambiguous words, sentences, or scenarios can be altered through training procedures that are collectively called cognitive bias modification for interpretation (CBM-I). In three experiments, we systematically manipulated the nature of the training in order to discriminate between emotional priming and ambiguity resolution accounts of training effects. In Experiment 1 participants completed word fragments that were consistently related to either a negative or benign interpretation of an ambiguous sentence. In a subsequent semantic priming task they demonstrated an interpretation bias, in that they were faster to identify relatedness of targets that were associated with the training-congruent meaning of an emotionally ambiguous homograph. We then manipulated the training sentences to show that interpretation bias was eliminated when participants simply completed valenced word fragments following unrelated sentences (Experiment 2), or completed fragments that were related to emotional but unambiguous sentences (Experiment 3). Only when participants were required to actively resolve emotionally ambiguous sentences during training did changes in interpretation emerge at test. Findings suggest that CBM-I achieves its effects by altering a production rule that aids the selection of meaning from emotionally ambiguous alternatives, in line with an ambiguity resolution account.     

Vigilance for threat: effects of anxiety and defensiveness

Eysenck’s (1997) theory that attentional biases for threat vary as an interactive function of trait anxiety and defensiveness was tested using a visual probe task. Two stimulus exposure conditions were used to explore a secondary issue concerning attentional allocation over time. Results indicated that, among high trait anxious participants, only those with low levels of defensiveness showed vigilance for threatening faces presented for 500 ms. They also showed an attentional preference for neutral faces, relative to happy faces, irrespective of exposure condition. This pattern was reversed in high trait anxious participants with high levels of defensiveness, who showed an attentional bias towards happy faces (relative to neutral faces) under both exposure conditions. The findings are discussed in relation to their implications for (a) the significance of measures of defensiveness for the conceptualization of high trait anxious individuals, and (b) the status of anxiety-related biases at different stages of information processing.     

Attentional bias towards emotional facial expressions in survivors of dating violence

This study identified components of attentional bias (e.g. attentional vigilance, attentional avoidance and difficulty with disengagement) that are critical characteristics of survivors of dating violence (DV). Eye movements were recorded to obtain accurate and continuous information regarding attention. DV survivors with high post-traumatic stress symptoms (DV-High PTSS group; n = 20) and low post-traumatic stress symptoms (DV-Low PTSS group; n = 22) and participants who had never experienced DV (NDV group; n = 21) were shown screens displaying emotional (angry, fearful and happy) faces paired with neutral faces and negative (angry and fearful) faces paired with happy faces for 10 s. The results indicate that the DV-High PTSS group spent longer dwelling on angry faces over time compared with the DV-Low PTSS and NDV groups. This result implies that the DV-High PTSS group focused on specific trauma-related stimuli but does not provide evidence of an attentional bias towards threatening stimuli in general.     

The effect of emotional context on cognitive inhibition and attentional processing in dissociative identity disorder

In light of previous research, the current study tested the hypothesis that dissociative identity disorder (DID) would be characterised by effective cognitive inhibitory functioning when tested in a neutral context, but weakened inhibition when tested in an emotionally negative context. Using a negative priming task (i.e. the flanker task) to assess inhibitory ability 11 DID, 11 depressed, and 11 general population participants were tested in the two differing experimental contexts. The contexts were manipulated by instructions and word stimuli, and following the completion of this task participants completed the Dissociative Experiences Scale and the Schizotypal Personality Scale. DID participants displayed a greater degree of self-reported anxiety in the negative context and as expected displayed a reduction in inhibition in this context but not in the neutral context. The degree of negative priming for the depressed and general population samples remained stable across contexts as did their anxiety levels. The DID sample displayed slower response times to negative compared to neutral words but this attentional bias was not evident for the two comparison groups. The relationship between increased arousal, inhibitory functioning, dissociation and information processing in DID is discussed.     

Jumping to interpretations: social anxiety disorder and the identification of emotional facial expressions

A small body of research suggests that socially anxious individuals show biases in interpreting the facial expressions of others. The current study included a clinically anxious sample in a speeded emotional card-sorting task in two conditions (baseline and threat) to investigate several hypothesized biases in interpretation. Following the threat manipulation, participants with generalized social anxiety disorders (GSADs) sorted angry cards with greater accuracy, but also evidenced a greater rate of neutral cards misclassified as angry, as compared to nonanxious controls. The controls showed the opposite pattern, sorting neutral cards with greater accuracy but also misclassifying a greater proportion of angry cards as neutral, as compared to GSADs. These effects were accounted for primarily by low-intensity angry cards. Results are consistent with previous studies showing a negative interpretive bias, and can be applied to the improvement of clinical interventions.     

When Photographs Create False Memories

ABSTRACT— Photographs help people illustrate the stories of their lives and the significant stories of their society. However, photographs can do more than illustrate events; in this article, we show that photographs can distort memory for them. We describe the course of our "false-memory implantation" research, and review recent work showing that photographs can sometimes increase—while other times decrease—false memories. First, we discuss research showing that a doctored photo, showing subjects taking a completely fictitious hot-air-balloon ride, can cultivate false memories for that experience. We hypothesize that the photograph helps subjects to imagine details about the event that they later confuse with reality. Second, we show that although photographs are indeed powerful sources of influence on memory, they are not necessarily as powerful as narrative. In fact, in certain circumstances, photographs might constrain imagination. Third, we discuss research showing that true photographs can also cultivate false memories. Finally, we present recent work showing that photographs can create false memories for current events.