Shame and Guilt—Do They Really Differ in Their Focus of Evaluation? Wanting to Change the Self and Behavior in Response to Ingroup Immorality

Shame and guilt are often theorized to differ on a self versus behavior focus. However, we propose that this is not true when taking a group perspective. In our field study, 196 communal participants were confronted with historical ingroup immorality. Results showed that participants who were old enough to have understood what happened in that time-period felt more guilt and shame than did those who were too young. Partly due to their ingroup anger, shame motivated an intention to change the ingroup self and behavior. In contrast, partly due to personal anger, guilt motivated an intention to change personal self and behavior. This suggests that the distinction between shame and guilt are not as clear-cut as previous research have assumed.     

Ebola,Team Communication,and Shame: But Shame on Whom?

Examined as an isolated situation, and through the lens of a rare and feared disease, Mr. Duncan's case seems ripe for second-guessing the physicians and nurses who cared for him. But viewed from the perspective of what we know about errors and team communication, his case is all too common. Nearly 440,000 patient deaths in the U.S. each year may be attributable to medical errors. Breakdowns in communication among health care teams contribute in the majority of these errors. The culture of health care does not seem to foster functional, effective communication between and among professionals. Why? And more importantly, why do we not do something about it?     

Response to Abrusán,Shaw, and Elbourne

In my book Category Mistakes (OUP 2013), I discuss a range of potential accounts of category mistakes and defend a pragmatic, presuppositional account of the phenomenon. Three commentators discuss the book: Márta Abrusán focuses on a comparison between my book and Asher’s Lexical Meaning in Context, suggesting that Asher’s theory has the advantage of accounting not only for category mistakes, but also for additional phenomena such as so-called ‘coertion’ and ‘co-predication’. I argue that Asher’s account of all three phenomena is deficient, and, moreover, that it is far from clear that the latter two phenomena are related to that of category mistakes. James Shaw challenges two of my arguments against the MBT view. I respond to these challenges. Paul Elbourne provides a novel argument in support of my account of category mistakes, involving multi-sentence discourses and ERP experiments. I show that it is not entirely straightforward for my account to explain this data, but that his argument does ultimately provide support for my view.     

Multiple Cultures,Multiple Selves,and Analytic Influence: A Response to Goldin’s “The Storied Self”

Using a dynamic systems contextual model, I expand Daniel Goldin’s ideas about narrative and the “storied self.” I identify two issues that are key to the development of a coherent life story: first, the identification and integration of the multiple psychic self-states and external cultures with which and in which people live, and second, the meeting and melding of important minds in the person’s environment.     

Absent Aspects,Possible Perceptions and Open Intersubjectivity: A Critical Analysis of Dan Zahavi’s Account of Horizontal Intentionality

The aim of this narrow-focused text is to argue against the claim that the appresentation of unperceived features of objects that is implied in perceptual intentionality presupposes a reference to perceptions other subjects could have of these objects. This claim, as it has been defended by Dan Zahavi, rests upon an erroneous supposition about the modal status of the perceptual possibilities to which the perceived object refers, which shall not be interpreted as effectively realizable but as mere de jure possibilities, perceptions that could have been realized in principle, but that are maybe beyond one’s reach considering one’s concrete factual powers and opportunities. Horizontal intentionality is better accounted for in terms of perceptions that one could have had because of one’s embodied character and the always open possibility of occupying another position with respect to the object. This modal ubiquity which is inherent to one’s being-in-space is what supports the field of de jure possibilities that is implied in horizontal intentionality. The co-presence of the parts and features one does not perceive from here is a counterpoint to one’s being-possibly-there.     

The Simulated Self – Fiction Reading and Narrative Identity

Philosophia - How do participating in a work of fiction and imagining a fictional world intertwine with the reader’s life? I develop an account that explores the relation between fiction...     

“Delayed Response” as Tested by three Methods and its Relation to Other Learning Situations

The so-called “nervous habits” of 198 students were assessed by time-sampling 22 movement categories. Concentration of manipulatory behavior in the head and hand areas suggested that the stimulation generated by these activities is of some importance. Compared to men, women showed less facial manipulation and less leg and foot movement, but compensated, particularly by more nail-biting and manicure. Category scores did not have significant linear correlations with either Extraversion or Neuroticism scores on the Eysenck Personality Inventory (EPI). This may be due to idiosyncrasies in movement patterns.     

Entitlement to Self‐Knowledge and Brute Error

Abstract

I discuss Burge’s argument that our entitlement to self‐knowledge consists in the constitutive relation between the second‐order review of thoughts and the thoughts reviewed, and defend it against Peacocke’s criticism. I then argue that though our entitlement to self‐knowledge is neutral to different environments, as Burge claims, the consideration of Burge’s own notion of brute error shows that Burge’s effort to reconcile externalism and self‐knowledge is not successful.     

“Abyss Calls Out to Abyss”: Oedipal Shame,Invisibility, and Broken Identity

The article derives from the experience of a double self or double reality. The abysses are often those of contradictory values and ideals, and with that opposite contents of shame or guilt, or the conflict between the sense of a deep inner hell that often is unspeakable and unnamable and that of a hollow and empty appearance. Absoluteness of judgment and its correlate, soulblindness toward the other, are the opposite to the empathy into the inner reality of the other. Soulblindness by the others creates massive shame in us. These dynamics are presented in a detailed case study.     

Comments on “Shame and Shame Dynamics” Special Issue,Edited by Benjamin Kilborne

The American Journal of Psychoanalysis -     

Attending to emotions is sharing of emotions – A multidisciplinary perspective to social attention and emotional sharing. Comment on Zahavi and Rochat (2015)

Attending to bodily expression of emotions plays an important role in the human social world. It provides subjects with valuable information, constructs opportunities to act, and importantly, as Daniel Stern pointed out, it is involved in the constitution of the direct experience of others. Whether mutual or one-sided, these direct experiences, in which the subject can share the perspectives and attitudes of other subjects, always comprise one person’s bodily expression of emotions that is available to another person. In this article I suggest that attending to other subjects’ expressed emotions involves a special (social) mode of attention and emotional sharing. This suggestion challenges Dan Zahavi’s view that confines the sharing of emotions solely to reciprocal experiences.     

Diminishing Returns to Income, Companionship – and Happiness

From philosophical and intuitive sources, I find three goods that should serve as ultimate ends in assessing a high quality of life: subjective well-being, human development, and justice. With acknowledged plural ends (we use them whether we acknowledge them or not), each takes its value from its scarcity relative to the other two – a version of diminishing marginal utility. Contrary to economists' belief that income (together with leisure) is the source of all utility, evidence shows that companionship, which does not pass through the market, has higher utility and contributes more to well-being than does income. But if money income has diminishing marginal utility, so does this competing good, companionship. With arguments drawn from the meaning of happiness, I show that happiness, too, may have diminishing marginal utility and that often it must rely for its hedonic and social value on such other goods as human development and justice.     

Response to MacIntosh’s Review and Discussion of the Psychoanalytic Couple Therapy Journal Literature: A Self Psychological,Intersubjective Perspective

ABSTRACT

After expressing my appreciation to Heather MacIntosh and highlighting her article’s significant contributions to the field, I comment briefly on some of the implications of her methodology and findings. I then elaborate on her summary of the history of the application of self psychology (Kohut, 1971) and intersubjective systems theory (Stolorow, Brandshaft, and Atwood, 1987) to couple therapy, highlighting the key contributions of both theories and describing the current state of the field.