Phronesis, Poetics, and Moral Creativity

At least since Aristotle, phronesis (practical wisdom) and poetics (making or creating) have been understood as essentially different activities, one moral the other (in itself) non-moral. Today, if anything, this distinction is sharpened by a Romantic association of poetics with inner subjective expression. Recent revivals of Aristotelian ethics sometimes allow for poetic dimensions of ethics, but these are still separated from practical wisdom per se. Through a fresh reading of phronesis in the French hermeneutical phenomenologist Paul Ricoeur, I argue that phronesis should be viewed as at least in part poetic at its very core. That is, phronesis deals with the fundamentally tragic human situation of moral incommensurability, and it responds to this by making or creating new moral meaning. Such a poetics of practical wisdom helps phronesis stand up to significant and important critiques made of it by a range of modernists and post-modernists, pointing a way forward for some important contemporary moral debates.     

Macbeth,Throne of Blood,and the Idea of a Reflective Adaptation

Adaptations have varied relations to their source material, making it hard to formulate a general theory. Avoiding the attempt, we characterize a narrower, more unified class of reflective adaptations which communicate an active and sometimes critical relation to the source's framework. We identify the features of reflective adaptations which give them their distinctive interest. We show how these features are embodied in Akira Kurosawa's Throne of Blood, an adaptation with a radically shifted perspective on the relation between character and situation compared to its Shakespearean source. We identify some of the artistic choices through which this response to the source is conveyed, such choices being a characteristic feature of reflective adaptations.     

Play, agreement and consensus

In this paper I employ the analysis of play to clarify the distinction between an agreement and a consensus, and I argue that it is the conditions supplied by the playful process that enable us to partake in the recognition and creation of truth. Gadamer's hermeneutical truth, unlike propositional truth, speaks of the interpretive act whereby meaning is recognized. This interpretive recognition of meaning is described by Gadamer as an occurrence of interpretive play orgenuine understanding. Regarding Gadamer's conception of truth as modelled on agreement rather than consensus, I demonstrate that it is in the process of play that we achieve the making and maintaining of the conditions that are necessary for agreement, and that the nature of understanding is most clearly revealed by viewing it as a playful process.     

Embodied Methodologies,Participation, and the Art of Research

In this article, I make the case for scholarship potential at the overlap of art and research. Using the case of the psychological study of adolescence, I show that in order to produce findings of meaning from a critical psychological perspective, it is imperative to consider methodology and epistemology. With a focus on artistic embodied methodologies within participatory action research projects on adolescence, I explore how creative approaches can be an analytic process for knowledge production in the critical social sciences. I argue that the artistic approaches employed using embodied methodologies can be considered as a way to make meaning and that especially within participatory research, these approaches can strengthen validity. In response to the epistemological violence (Teo, 2010) of some conventional social psychological studies, participatory artistic embodied methodologies contribute to building liberatory knowledge and rigorous science.     

Knowledge and society

The question of the nature of our knowledge of society has recently been raised in an interesting form by Peter Winch in his monograph, The Idea of a Social Science, and debated in recent issues of Inquiry by A. R. Louch and Winch himself. In this paper I attempt to contribute to this discussion by attacking the problem of the nature of the empirical bases of social scientific knowledge, the main point in dispute between Winch and Louch. I try to construct an argument to show that in specifying the ‘data’ of social science, we have to introduce an element of ‘interpretive understanding’ which radically alters the meaning of the term ‘empirical base’ in social scientific contexts, thus supplementing Winch's argument in his reply to Louch. At the same time, my argument shows, I believe, that this view of the nature of social science does not lead to any arbitrary restrictions on the methods of research pursued by social scientists, as is sometimes imagined. What the argument leads to is the conclusion that our knowledge of society involves distinctive epistemological features that differentiate this kind of knowledge from the kind of knowledge we have in the natural sciences.     

The impact of social experience on neurobiological systems: illustration from a constructivist view of child maltreatment

In this article, I highlight the discipline of developmental psychopathology as an integrative framework that builds upon the historical underpinnings of a constructivist perspective. After presenting illustrative developmental psychopathology principles that I consider to be central to a constructivist view, I turn my attention to the role of experience on brain development. This serves as the entree into a discussion of research conducted with maltreated children on brain event-related potentials (ERPs) and the cognitive processing of emotional stimuli, neuroendocrine functioning, and acoustic startle. Each of these components of brain functioning serve to underscore how different neurobiological systems reflect the way in which individuals ascribe meaning to traumatic experiences. Research on child maltreatment, an “experiment of nature,” reveals that maltreated children actively construct their reality at both the biological and psychological levels of analysis, at least in part based on the meaning these children impute to their caregiving experiences.     

Flexibility of Labor, Well-Being, and Stress

After a short introduction into the changing nature of our society and organizations, we outline two kinds of flexibility of labor: qualitative flexibility, that is the degree to which people who work in or for a certain organization can and do perform different tasks, and quantitative flexibility, that is, varying the quantity of personnel and their working hours. Then, the different ways in which we organize our work and organizations are dealt with in terms of quantitative and qualitative flexibility. Next, we survey these ways of organizing on the degree to which they moderate the positive individual outcomes, or individual goals, of work. It can be concluded that quantitatively flexible work, besides some minor positive consequences, may have serious negative consequences for one's well-being, health, and personal development, while qualitative flexibility may have many more advantages, though it may lead to a devastating task overload. Last, we explore some ways to alleviate these negative effects.     

Individualism, Externalism and Idiolectical Meaning

Semantic externalism in contemporary philosophy of language typically – and often tacitly – combines two supervenience claims about idiolectical meaning (i.e., meaning in the language system of an individual speaker). The first claim is that the meaning of a word in a speaker’s idiolect may vary without any variation in her intrinsic, physical properties. The second is that the meaning of a word in a speaker’s idiolect may vary without any variation in her understanding of it. I here show that a conception of idiolectical meaning is possible that accepts the “anti-internalism” of the first claim while rejecting (what I shall refer to as) the “anti-individualism” of the second. According to this conception, externally constituted idiolectical meaning supervenes on idiolectical understanding. I begin by trying to show that it is possible to disentangle anti-internalist and anti-individualist strands of argument in Hilary Putnam’s well-known and widely influential “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’.” Having once argued that the latter strand of argument is not cogent, I then try to show that individualism (in the sense above) can be reconciled with perhaps the most plausible reconstruction of Putnam’s well-known and widely accepted “indexical” theory of natural kind terms. Integral to my defense of the possibility of an individualist externalism about idiolectical meaning are my efforts to demonstrate that, pace Putnam, there is no “division of linguistic labor” when it comes to the fixing the meanings of such terms in a speaker’s idiolect. The fact that average speakers sometimes need defer to experts shows that not reference, but only reliable recognition of what belongs in the extension of a natural kind term is a “social phenomenon.”

Wittgenstein (1958, 14).

     

Making Meaning: The Constructive-Developmental Approach to Persons and Practice

The constructive (in the sense of construing) and developmental (but throughout the lifespan) framework, whose conceptual roots lie in the work of Piaget, outlines the holistic personality process of systems of making meaning, systems that organize human thought, feeling, and action. In this article Kegan discusses and then applies the model—to a worker in a CETA program and to a psychiatric ward patient—elucidating the perspectives—on mental health and employability—it can open for practitioners.     

Grades of meaning

In this paper, I lend novel support to H. P. Grice’s account of speaker meaning (GASM) by blunting the force of a significant objection. Stephen Schiffer has argued that in order to make GASM sufficient, one must add restrictions that are psychologically impossible to fulfill, thereby making GASM untenable. In what follows, I explain the elements of GASM that require it to invoke these psychologically unrealizable restrictions. I then accept Schiffer’s criticism, but modify its significance to GASM. I argue that the problem that Schiffer notes is not a reason to reject GASM, but a reason to embrace it. GASM shows that meaning is best understood as an absolute concept—an unrealizable ideal limit. Taking some inspiration from contextualist theories of knowledge attribution, I argue that my version of GASM offers a useful contextualist account of meaning attribution. Hence, pragmatic theories of meaning and communication should not wholly exclude GASM from their theorizing, at least not for the reasons that are commonly given.     

Adverse childhood experiences,religious/spiritual struggles,and mental health symptoms: examination of mediation models

Emerging research has documented greater risk for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and depression among young adults with prior adverse childhood experiences (ACEs). Building upon prior findings, we hypothesised that religious/spiritual (R/S) struggles may serve as an intervening pathway through which accumulation of ACEs impacts mental health symptom severity in this population. Young adults (N?=?458) were recruited from a southeastern university to complete an online self-report survey that assessed for ACEs, lifetime trauma exposure, R/S struggles, PTSD and depressive symptomatology. Bivariate correlations yielded significant positive relationships between ACEs and all six types of R/S struggles, depression, and PTSD. Additionally, when accounting for non-childhood trauma exposure, the mediational analyses indicated an indirect effect of struggles with ultimate meaning on the well-establish association between ACEs and mental health symptoms. Clinical implications (such as the importance of fostering meaning making), study limitations, and future research directions are discussed.     

Wonder,Mystery, and Meaning

Abstract

This paper explores the connection between wonder and meaning, in particular ‘the meaning of life’, a connection that, despite strong intrinsic connections between wonder and the (philosophical) search for meaning has not yet received any sustained attention. Does wonder ‘merely’ inspire our search for meaning, or does it also point the way towards meaning? In exploring this question I first engage with Hannah Arendt, then examine the suggestion (by Josef Pieper and Rachel Carson, among others) that the meaning wonder points us to lies in connecting us with the mystery of existence. Can there be meaning in mystery, or is wonder––as a state of being lost for words in the face of mystery––rather antithetical to meaning? This discussion leads to the idea, emphasized in recent writing on wonder, that wonder (also) depends on the meaning we ascribe to things. In the final section I discuss wonder as a potential source of meaning in life, then return to the question whether it can also point towards a deeper meaning of life. I conclude that no purely rational justification can be given for this view, but that this need not detract from the importance of wonder in our lives.     

The Myth of Reverse Compositionality

In the context of debates about what form a theory of meaning should take, it is sometimes claimed that one cannot understand an intersective modifier-head construction (e.g., ‘pet fish’) without understanding its lexical parts. Neo-Russellians like Fodor and Lepore contend that non-denotationalist theories of meaning, such as prototype theory and theory theory, cannot explain why this is so, because they cannot provide for the ‘reverse compositional’ character of meaning. I argue that reverse compositionality is a red herring in these debates. I begin by setting out some positive arguments for reverse compositionality and showing that they fail. Then I show that the principle of reverse compositionality has two big strikes against it. First, it is incompatible with all theories of meaning on the market, including the denotationalism favored by neo-Russellians. Second, it explains nothing that is not already explained by its venerable predecessor, the principle of (forward) compositionality.     

Sound as affect: Difference,power and spatiality

This article considers what happens when sound is understood as affect. It begins by recounting a minor event in which sound moved my body. I use this as a starting point for defining sonic affect as the vibrational movement of bodies of all kinds, moving away from anthropocentric notions of sound based on human perception. The vibration of bodies can be understood as a ‘base layer’ of sound, which may activate or accrue layers of feeling, significance and meaning, but which is not reducible to them. Developing this conceptualisation of sonic affect, I argue that: (i) there are repeating affective tendencies of sound, but these unfold differently in context; (ii) sonic affect exercises power over bodies, sometimes by combining with meaning; and (iii) sound propagates affect through space in distinctive ways, some of which I discuss. These arguments are grounded in numerous examples, reflecting the variety of both sound and affect.     

Personal construct theory and mental health

Although it has been an illusive and controversial concept, mental health is likely to continue to have currency in the presently high-profile debates on health and health education. In this article, I consider the manner in which personal construct theory deals with the concept of mental health. I suggest that an augmentation of the mode of construing called perspectivism provides a sound and workable idea of mental health. That augmentation is provided from the study of mentalities, in particular the idea of egalitarian mentality.     

Blacks,Jews and the racial imagination in the writings of Sephardim in the long seventeenth century

This essay explores facets of the Sephardic racial imagination. Early Modern Catholic Iberian discourse generally scorned Jews and linked them, implicitly and sometimes explicitly, with denigrated Africans, or Blacks. Marginalized and often persecuted, conversos and Sephardim of the sixteenth through the eighteenth century resorted to hegemonic discourse about Blacks to construct their own identity. Central to Sephardic discourse about Blacks was its redemptive logic. In both Iberian Catholic and northwest-European Protestant colonial spheres, conversos and Sephardim sought through anti-Blackness to identity themselves (and hopefully for others to identify them) as members of the dominant White culture and ruling class, their religious otherness aside.Some of the material presented here comes from Jonathan Schorsch, Jews and Blacks in the Early Modern World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003). Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own, for which I gratefully acknowledge the help of Hazel Gold, Viviana Grieco and Julia R. Lieberman. In order to convey the meaning of the often overwrought Baroque style of the Spanish originals, my translations are of necessity sometimes rather loose. I would also like to thank Yosef Kaplan, Lisa Moses Leff, Julia R. Lieberman and Kenneth Stow for their valuable comments on earlier versions of this essay.     

The three meanings of meaning in life: Distinguishing coherence,purpose, and significance

Despite growing interest in meaning in life, many have voiced their concern over the conceptual refinement of the construct itself. Researchers seem to have two main ways to understand what meaning in life means: coherence and purpose, with a third way, significance, gaining increasing attention. Coherence means a sense of comprehensibility and one’s life making sense. Purpose means a sense of core goals, aims, and direction in life. Significance is about a sense of life’s inherent value and having a life worth living. Although some researchers have already noted this trichotomy, the present article provides the first comprehensible theoretical overview that aims to define and pinpoint the differences and connections between these three facets of meaning. By arguing that the time is ripe to move from indiscriminate understanding of meaning into looking at these three facets separately, the article points toward a new future for research on meaning in life.     

Struggle with ultimate meaning: Nuanced associations with search for meaning,presence of meaning,and mental health

Struggle with ultimate meaning reflects concerns about whether one’s life has a deeper meaning or purpose. We examined whether this construct could be distinguished from presence of meaning in life and search for meaning. In two US samples – a web-based sample (N = 1047) and an undergraduate sample (N = 3978) – confirmatory factor analyses showed that struggle with ultimate meaning loaded on a factor that was distinct from but related to presence (negatively) and search (positively). Moderated regression analyses showed that people with low levels of presence combined with high levels of search for meaning were particularly likely to struggle with ultimate meaning. Additionally, when compared to presence and search, struggle with ultimate meaning related more strongly to depressive symptoms than presence or search. These results suggest that struggle with ultimate meaning represents a distinct component of how people grapple with meaning that has implications for mental health.     

Wittgenstein,Theories of Meaning,and Linguistic Disjunctivism

This paper argues that Wittgenstein opposed theories of meaning, and did so for good reasons. Theories of meaning, in the sense discussed here, are attempts to explain what makes it the case that certain sounds, shapes, or movements are meaningful linguistic expressions. It is widely believed that Wittgenstein made fundamental contributions to this explanatory project. I argue, by contrast, that in both his early and later works, Wittgenstein endorsed a disjunctivist conception of language which rejects the assumption underlying the question that such theories seek to answer—namely, the assumption that the notion of a meaningful linguistic expression admits of non‐circular analysis. Moreover, I give two arguments in favor of the view I ascribe to Wittgenstein: one based on later Wittgenstein's discussion of meaning skepticism and one based on considerations concerning the identity of linguistic expressions.