The death of Philosophy: a response to Stephen Hawking

Abstract

In his 2010 work, The Grand Design, Stephen Hawking, argues that ‘… philosophy is dead’ (2010: 5). While not a Philosopher, Hawking provides strong argument for his thesis, principally that philosophers have not taken science sufficiently seriously and so Philosophy is no longer relevant to knowledge claims. In this paper, Hawking’s claim is appraised and critiqued, becoming a meta-philosophical discussion. It is argued that Philosophy is dead, in some sense, due to particular philosophers having embarked on an intellectual path no longer in keeping with the ancient definition of Philosophy. Philosophy as the seeking of wisdom necessarily includes the consideration of findings of other intellectual pursuits, including physical and natural science. While Philosophy has justifiably evolved through its long history, is it unrecognisable in the terms by which it historically defined itself? Seeking consistency, Hawking is critiqued for appearing to practise ‘dead’ Philosophy. Indeed, Hawking’s appeal to multiverse theory and his core discussion of the metaphysical problem of being are philosophical. The question of the death of Philosophy has contemporary relevance for the discipline which is particularly under threat for its survival in the academy, oftentimes assumed to be irrelevant.     

What’s Really at Issue with Novel Predictions?

In this paper I distinguish two kinds of predictivism, ‘timeless’ and ‘historicized’. The former is the conventional understanding of predictivism. However, I argue that its defense in the works of John Worrall (Scerri and Worrall 2001, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 32, 407–452; Worrall 2002, In the Scope of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, 1, 191–209) and Patrick Maher (Maher 1988, PSA 1988, 1, pp. 273) is wanting. Alternatively, I promote an historicized predictivism, and briefly defend such a predictivism at the end of the paper.     

Social anxiety and post-event processing among African-American individuals

Background: Social anxiety is among the most prevalent psychiatric conditions, yet little attention has been paid to whether putative cognitive vulnerability factors related to social anxiety in predominantly White samples are related to social anxiety among historically underrepresented groups.

Design: We tested whether one such vulnerability factor, post-event processing (PEP; detailed review of social event that can increase state social anxiety) was related to social anxiety among African-American (AA; n?=?127) persons, who comprise one of the largest underrepresented racial groups in the U.S. Secondarily, we tested whether AA participants differed from non-Hispanic White participants (n?=?127) on PEP and social anxiety and whether race moderated the relation between PEP and social anxiety.

Method: Data were collected online among undergraduates.

Results: PEP was positively correlated with social anxiety among AA participants, even after controlling for depression and income, pr?=?.30, p?=?.001. AA and White participants did not differ on social anxiety or PEP, β?=??1.57, 95% CI: ?5.11, 1.96. The relation of PEP to social anxiety did not vary as a function of race, β?=?0.00, 95% CI: ?0.02, 0.02.

Conclusions: PEP may be an important cognitive vulnerability factor related to social anxiety among AA persons suffering from social anxiety.     

Mental Health,Culture and Spirituality: Implications for the Effective Psychotherapeutic Care of Australia's Ageing Migrant Populations

SUMMARY

In this essay, attention is given to discussing the notions of and influences of culture, mental health and spirituality. Research shows that people who came to Australia either as immigrants or refugees are at risk of suffering a disproportionate incidence of mental problems relative to the rest of the Australian population. Older male immigrants are particularly at risk. A key variable influencing the mental health of immigrants/refugees in Australia is the social conditions in which they live. Another largely unrecognised variable influencing mental health is spirituality. The extent to which the expression of spirituality promotes mental health and healing, however, will depend on cross-cultural perceptions of what spirituality is, and how it influences mental health, illness and recovery. Whatever the perceptions of spirituality, it is important to understand that its roots are cultural, and its influence is on meaning construction. Meaning construction, in turn, is itself culturally mediated and framed. Given this, it is crucial that culture-what it is and how it influences human experience-is understood by health professionals if they are to be able to provide meaningful and therapeutically effective care to culturally diverse people and their mental health problems. A central aim of this essay is to facilitate this understanding.     

Cassirer’s enlightenment: on philosophy and the ‘Denkform’ of reason

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the way in which Cassirer implicitly commented on current issues in his historical studies, proposing a case study on his monograph The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, published in November 1932. It begins with a general overview of a few famous and a few neglected instances of Cassirer’s position-takings through historical studies, before discussing briefly the context in which this monograph was written and examining how the Enlightenment is presented in the monograph from 1932. The paper claims that at the centre of Cassirer’s engagement with the Enlightenment was his concern with the autonomy of reason. The way in which Cassirer elaborated on this further shows that his defense of the Enlightenment was not just directed against the threats of totalitarian politics, but also had the aim of clarifying the nature of philosophy and its place in culture. This, however, the paper concludes, does not refute the notion that Cassirer was concerned with current politics when writing The Philosophy of the Enlightenment. The point is rather that he comprehended philosophy as political just in virtue of its exercising the autonomy that characterizes reason.     

Uncommon Schools: Stanley Cavell and the Teaching of Walden

Thoreau’s Walden is a text that has been misinterpreted in various ways, one consequence of which is a failure to appreciate its significance as a perfectionist and visionary text for education. This paper explores aspects of what might be called its teaching, especially via the kind of teaching that is offered by Stanley Cavell’s commentary, The Senses of Walden. Walden is considered especially in the light of its conception of language as the “father-tongue” and of the ideas of continual rebirth and departure that are associated with this. References to teaching and learning abound in the book, but it is Thoreau’s specific reference to the need for “uncommon schools” that provides a focus for the present discussion. Paul Standish is Professor of Philosophy of Education at the University of Sheffield. His recent books include The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Education (2003), co-edited with Nigel Blake, Paul Smeyers and Richard Smith. He is Editor of the Journal of Philosophy of Education and Co-editor of the online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy of Education.     

Pushing the Monstrous to the Edge of the World; Shaking the Nightmare off the Chest: Hans Blumenberg and Walter Benjamin’s Philosophies of Myth

Abstract

This paper explores the philosophies of myth of Walter Benjamin and Hans Blumenberg. It defends the thesis that both approaches to myth, despite their differences, bring the longer, more ambiguous, legacy of the history of the human species into relation with the more familiar history of logos (a history of thinking). They do this by maintaining a distinction between myth as it probably first emerged, namely as a way of controlling human anxieties and vulnerabilities that arose as a consequence of the pragmatic, material conditions of the pre-historical world, and myth as the vast array of orally transmitted traditions left to history. In the case of both thinkers, this dichotomy illuminates myth, not as one category of human expression, but as a representation of the deeper vulnerabilities experienced by human beings, and the concerted, collective (largely failed) attempts to overcome them. Philosophy’s task in the face of a longer, darker history of the species, is a vigilant negotiation with the human frailties that might see its work undone.     

Are There Algorithms That Discover Causal Structure?

There have been many efforts to infer causation from association byusing statistical models. Algorithms for automating this processare a more recent innovation. In Humphreys and Freedman[(1996) British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47, 113–123] we showed that one such approach, by Spirtes et al., was fatally flawed. Here we put our arguments in a broader context and reply to Korb and Wallace [(1997) British Journal for thePhilosophy of Science 48, 543–553] and to Spirtes et al.[(1997) British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48, 555–568]. Their arguments leave our position unchanged: claims to have developed a rigorous engine for inferring causation from association are premature at best, the theorems have no implications for samples of any realistic size, and the examples used to illustrate the algorithms are indicative of failure rather than success. The gap between association and causation has yet to be bridged.     

A (Post)Foundational Approach to the Philosophy of Science: Part II

Summary  This is a sequel to my paper, “Searching for a (Post)Foundational Approach to Philosophy of Science”, which appeared in an earlier issue of this Journal [Ginev 2001, Journal for General Philosophy of science 32, 27–37]. In the present paper I continue to scrutinize the possibility of a strong hermeneutics of scientific research. My aim is to defend the position of cognitive existentialism that combines the advocacy of science’s cognitive specificity and the rejection of any form of essentialism. A special attention will be paid to the notion of the thematizing project of scientific research.     

Beyond the Biomedical Paradigm: Generating a Spiritual Vision of Ageing

SUMMARY

The time has come to enlarge our understanding of what an ageing older person truly is. What is called for is an approach to ageing and its multiple processes that moves beyond an empirical research model, which is limited to a positivistic focus on the bio-medical and social conditions of ageing. The spiritual dimension of the individual as well as the physical and social need to be acknowledged and valued in any definition of human existence. A segmental approach to the ageing process can only result on a reductionistic, one-dimensional caricature of the older person. There is an imperative need for the inclusion of the spiritual dimension in the study of ageing and its meaning. By issuing a call for a new wholistic paradigm that moves beyond the bio-medical model, and understanding the personhood is affirmed which includes a person's capacity to find meaning in life, indeed, even in ageing, suffering and dying.     

Book reviews

Paul Ricoeur. Freud and Philosophy: An Essay On Interpretation (trans. Denis Savage). New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970. Pp. 1–551. Indexed. $15.00.

Keith Campbell. Body and Mind. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1970. Pp. vi, 150. Indexed. $1.45 (paper).

D. J. O'Connor. Free Will. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1971. Pp. 1–150. Indexed. $1.45.

Dwight van de Vate, Jr. (ed.). Persons, Privacy, and Feeling: Essays in the Philosophy of Mind. Memphis: Memphis State University Press, 1970. Pp. vii, 140. Indexed. $5.00.     

Leaping Ahead of Heidegger: Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity in Being and Time

Abstract

This article challenges Honneth’s reading of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right in The Pathologies of Individual Freedom: Hegel’s Social Theory (2001/2010). Focusing on Hegel’s method, I argue that this text hardly offers support for the theory of mutual recognition that Honneth purports to derive from it. After critically considering Honneth’s interpretation of Hegel’s account of the family and civil society, I argue that Hegel’s text does not warrant Honneth’s tacit identification of mutual recognition with symmetrical instances of mutual recognition, let alone his subsequent projection of symmetrical forms of mutual recognition onto the various spheres of the Philosophy of Right as a whole. I conclude by indicating an alternative way in which Hegel’s text might be used to understand contemporary society.     

History,philosophy, and science teaching: A brief review

School science education is currently the subject of much debate. Historians and philosophers of science should play a role in this debate. Since the late nineteenth century there has been a persistent, if minor, tradition arguing for the incorporation of historical and philosophical dimensions in the teaching of school science. With the current crisis in science teaching, there are encouraging signs that more attention is being paid to this tradition. What is required is much greater collaboration between philosophers, historians, and science educators, particularly in the training of teachers.This article is a shortened version of my 1988, A Role for History and Philosophy in Science Teaching, inEducational Philosophy and Theory 20 (2). All references are to the following History, Philosophy, and Science Teaching: A Bibliography.This special number ofSynthese is part of a large international project on the place of history and philosophy in science teaching. Special issues ofEducational Philosophy and Theory, Interchange, andStudies in Philosophy and Education are being produced. An international conference on the subject will be held at Florida State University in November 1989. Details of the journals and the conference can be obtained from the author.The project commenced while the author was on leave at Florida State University in 1987. It began with a gracious invitation from Jaakko Hintikka to guest edit this number, and was furthered with the support and encouragement of David Gruender. I thank them both, and also the Philosophy Department for its hospitality. Special appreciation is due to the nearly 30 authors who have contributed papers to the project. I hope that their efforts will re-open the needed dialogue between historians, philosophers, and science educators.     

Beyond community analysis: A response to Dr Borg

Abstract

Medicine, psychology, and psychiatry are not only modes of scientific knowledge or professional practice, but also means of social control that participate in regulating behavior. The “re-pathologizing” of psychiatry during the past 25 years bears witness to an anthropological mutation that reduces the human being to the sum of his or her conduct. In order to get to this “medico-economic” civilization of the subject, postmodern psychiatry has needed to deconstruct and reconstruct its normative landscape for the benefit of “fickle” notions and “behavioral disorders,” at the expense of the concept of “psychological suffering.”     

Kant and analytic methodology

Don Garrett, Cognition and Commitment in Hume's Philosophy, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. xiv + 270, Hb £40.00 ISBN 0–19–509721–1     

Hypothetico-Deductivism: Incomplete But Not Hopeless

Alleged counter-examples deployed in Park (2004) [Erkenntnis 60: 229–240] against the account of selective hypothetico-deductive confirmation offered in Gemes (1998) [Erkenntnis 49: 1–20] are shown to be ineffective. Furthermore, the reservations expressed in Gemes (1998) [ibid] and (1993) [Philosophy of Science 62: 477–487] about hypothetico-deductivism (H-D) are retracted and replaced with the conclusion that H-D is a viable account of confirmation that captures much of the practice of working scientists. However, because it cannot capture cases of inference to the best explanation and cases of the observational confirmation of statistical hypotheses, it is concluded that H-D cannot supply a complete theory of confirmation.     

Living by the manual: Ego-oriented social character – pathogenic effects of globalization

Abstract

According to Erich Fromm and a relational psychoanalytic approach, changing economic and social requirements always impact human beings and their psychic structure. Because globalization leads particularly to a blurring of boundaries and limitations, the formation of a new character orientation that is driven to construct reality anew without limitations can be observed as a reaction in progress. The pathogenic effects of globalization can be studied through the analysis of this new character formation and the uncovering of repressed, unconscious feelings that characterize the new personality type, especially in regard to their sense of identity, their way of relating to others, and their de facto loss of ego strength – in contrast to the enacted “ego unlimited.” Finally, some aspects of transference and countertransference, as well as some particular defense reactions with which we psychoanalysts are confronted in the treatment of patients suffering from the pathogenic effects of globalization, will be discussed.     

Toward a New Pragmatist Politics

In A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy, I launched a pragmatist critique of Deweyan democracy and a pragmatist defense of an alternative view of democracy, one based in C. S. Peirce's social epistemology. In this article, I develop a more precise version of the criticism of Deweyan democracy I proposed in A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy, and provide further details of the Peircean alternative. Along the way, some recent critics are addressed.     

AI,ME AND LEWIS (ABELIAN IMPLICATION,MATERIAL EQUIVALENCE AND C I LEWIS 1920)

C I Lewis showed up Down Under in 2005, in e-mails initiated by Allen Hazen of Melbourne. Their topic was the system Hazen called FL (a Funny Logic), axiomatized in passing in Lewis 1921. I show that FL is the system MEN of material equivalence with negation. But negation plays no special role in MEN. Symbolizing equivalence with → and defining ∼A inferentially as A→f, the theorems of MEN are just those of the underlying theory ME of pure material equivalence. This accords with the treatment of negation in the Abelian l-group logic A of Meyer and Slaney (Abelian logic. Abstract, Journal of Symbolic Logic 46, 425–426, 1981), which also defines ∼A inferentially with no special conditions on f. The paper then concentrates on the pure implicational part AI of A, the simple logic of Abelian groups. The integers Z were known to be characteristic for AI, with every non-theorem B refutable mod some Zn for finite n. Noted here is that AI is pre-tabular, having the Scroggs property that every proper extension SI of AI, closed under substitution and detachment, has some finite Zn as its characteristic matrix. In particular FL is the extension for which n = 2 (Lewis, The structure of logic and its relation to other systems. The Journal of Philosophy 18, 505–516, 1921; Meyer and Slaney, Abelian logic. Abstract. Journal of Symbolic Logic 46, 425–426, 1981; This is an abstract of the much longer paper finally published in 1989 in G. G. Priest, R. Routley and J. Norman, eds., Paraconsistent logic: essays on the inconsistent, Philosophica Verlag, Munich, pp. 245–288, 1989). Meyer was supported in this work as a Visiting Fellow in the College of Engineering and Computer Science, ANU.