Victim sensitivity and the accuracy of social judgments

Recent theorizing on the relation between victim sensitivity and unethical behavior predicts that victim sensitivity is related to an asymmetrical focus on cues associated with untrustworthiness compared to cues associated with trustworthiness. This hypothesis and its consequences for the accuracy of social predictions are investigated in this article. In Study 1, participants rated the trustworthiness of 35 computer-animated faces that differed in their emotional expression. People high in victim sensitivity rated neutral and hostile faces more untrustworthy than people low in victim sensitivity, whereas no such effect was found for friendly faces. In Study 2, participants predicted the cooperativeness of 56 targets on the basis of minimal information. The accuracy of predictions was negatively related to victim sensitivity, and people high in victim sensitivity systematically underestimated targets' cooperativeness. Thus, the asymmetrical focus on untrustworthiness cues among victim-sensitive individuals seems to impair rather than improve their social judgments.     

Interpersonal orientation and the accuracy of personality judgments

Are those who are more invested in developing and maintaining interpersonal relationships able to provide more accurate judgments of others' personality characteristics? Previous research has produced mixed findings. In the present study, a conceptual framework was presented and methods were used that overcome many of the problems encountered in past research on judgmental accuracy. On four occasions, 102 judges watched a 12‐min videotaped dyadic interaction and described the personality of a designated target person. Judges' personality characteristics were described by self, parents, and friends. Results revealed that psychological communion was positively associated with judges' accuracy in rating targets' personality characteristics. In addition, whereas women were more communal and provided more accurate judgments than men, the relationship between communion and accuracy held after controlling for the effect of gender. Finally, preliminary findings suggested that interpersonally oriented individuals may sometimes draw on information about themselves and about stereotypical others to facilitate accurate judgments of others.     

Source misattributions may increase the accuracy of source judgments

Misattribution of remembered information from one source to another is commonly associated with false memories, but we demonstrate that it also may underlie memories that accord with past events. Participants imagined drawings of objects in four different locations. For each, a drawing of a similarly shaped object was seen in the same location, a different location, or not seen. When tested on memory for objects' origin (seen/imagined) and location, more false "seen" responses, but also more correct location responses, were given to imagined objects if a similar object had been seen, versus not seen, in the same location. We argue that misattribution of feature information (e.g., shape, location) from seen objects to similar imagined ones increased false memories of seeing objects but also increased correct location memories, provided the misattributed location matched the imagined objects' location. Thus, consistent with the source-monitoring framework, imperfect source-attribution processes underlie false and true memories.     

The accuracy of meta-metacognitive judgments: regulating the realism of confidence

Can people improve the realism of their confidence judgments about the correctness of their episodic memory reports by deselecting the least realistic judgments? An assumption of Koriat and Goldsmith's (Psychol Rev 103:490-517, 1996) model is that confidence judgments regulate the reporting of memory reports. We tested whether this assumption generalizes to the regulation of the realism (accuracy) of confidence judgments. In two experiments, 270 adults in separate conditions answered 50 recognition and recall questions about the contents of a just-seen video. After each answer, they made confidence judgments about the answer's correctness. In Experiment 1, the participants in the recognition conditions significantly increased their absolute bias when they excluded 15 questions. In Experiment 2, the participants in the recall condition significantly improved their calibration. The results indicate that recall, more than recognition, offers valid cues for participants to increase the realism of their report. However, the effects were small with only weak support for the conclusion that people have some ability to regulate the realism in their confidence judgments.     

Effects of aging on the magnitude and accuracy of quality-of-encoding judgments

Age invariance in monitoring associative learning has been the norm in numerous investigations concerning how accurately people predict future recall, predictions that are based partly on people's beliefs about forgetting. In this study, we obtained a measure of monitoring that is minimally influenced by beliefs about forgetting. Participants made quality-of-encoding (QUE) judgments by rating how well each item had been encoded. In 2 experiments, older and younger adults studied 60 paired-associate items; immediately after studying each one, they made a QUE judgment. Each item was presented at a 4-s or 8-s presentation rate. QUEs from both age groups were sensitive to the production of different strategies, presentation rate, and item characteristics. Reliable age differences in the correlation of QUEs and subsequent recall were found for related items but not for unrelated items. The outcomes indicate similar processes for generating QUE judgments by older and younger adults, but they also suggest the possibility of an age-related deficit in the accuracy of monitoring encoding in some experimental conditions.     

The structure of sensory events and the accuracy of time judgments

We investigated how does the structure of empty time intervals influence temporal processing. In experiment 1, the intervals to be discriminated were the silent durations marked by two sensory signals, both lasting 10 or 500 ms; these signals were two identical flashes (intramodal: VV), or one visual flash (V) followed by an auditory tone (A) (intermodal: VA). For the range of duration under investigation (standards = 0.2, 0.6, 1, or 1.4 s), the results indicated that both the marker length and sensory mode influenced discrimination, but no interaction between these variables or between one of these variables and standard duration was significant. In experiment 2, we compared, for each of four marker-type conditions (VV, AA, VA, AV; and standard = 1 s), intervals marked by two 10 ms signals with intervals marked by unequal signal length (markers 1 and 2 lasting 10 and 500 ms, or 500 and 10 ms). As in experiment 1, the results revealed significant marker-mode and marker-length effects, but no significant interaction between these variables. Experiment 3 showed that, for the same conditions as in experiment 2, perceived duration is not influenced by marker length and that the variability of interval reproductions does not depend on the perceived duration of intervals. The results are discussed in the light of a single-clock hypothesis: marker-length and marker-mode effects are presented as being non-temporal sources of variability associated mainly with sensory and memory processes.     

The role of individual differences in the accuracy of confidence judgments

Generally, self-assessment of accuracy in the cognitive domain produces overconfidence, whereas self-assessment of visual perceptual judgments results in underconfidence. Despite contrary empirical evidence, in models attempting to explain those phenomena, individual differences have often been disregarded. The authors report on 2 studies in which that shortcoming was addressed. In Experiment 1, participants (N= 520) completed a large number of cognitive-ability tests. Results indicated that individual differences provide a meaningful source of overconfidence and that a metacognitive trait might mediate that effect. In further analysis, there was only a relatively small correlation between test accuracy and confidence bias. In Experiment 2 (N = 107 participants), both perceptual and cognitive ability tests were included, along with measures of personality. Results again indicated the presence of a confidence factor that transcended the nature of the testing vehicle. Furthermore, a small relationship was found between that factor and some self-reported personality measures. Thus, personality traits and cognitive ability appeared to play only a small role in determining the accuracy of self-assessment. Collectively, the present results suggest that there are multiple causes of miscalibration, which current models of over- and underconfidence fail to encompass.     

Rich contexts do not always enrich the accuracy of personality judgments

We test the common assumption that information ‘rich’ contexts lead to more accurate personality judgments than information ‘lean’ contexts. Pairs of unacquainted students rendered judgments of one another's personalities after interacting in one of three, increasingly rich, contexts: Internet ‘chat’, telephone, or face-to-face. Accuracy was assessed by correlating participants' judgments with a measure of targets' personalities that averaged self and informant ratings. As predicted, the visible traits of extraversion and conscientiousness were judged more accurately than the less visible traits of neuroticism and openness. However, judgment accuracy also depended on context. Judgments of extraversion and neuroticism improved as context richness increased (i.e., from Internet ‘chat’ to face-to-face), whereas judgments of conscientiousness and openness improved as context richness decreased (i.e., from face-to-face to Internet ‘chat’). Our findings suggest that context richness shapes not only the availability of personality cues but also the relevance of cues in any given context.     

The "consistency" controversy and the accuracy of personality judgments

Areas of clear and acknowledged disagreement in the personality literature's “consistency controversy” are surprisingly difficult to pin down. The present essay suggests that one basic and real disagreement nowadays is the admissability of subjective judgments of personality as data: Personologists are willing to use them, and situationists are not. Situationists generally regard judgments as so influenced by error as to be essentially unusable, and instead prefer direct measurements of specific behaviors. The relative uses and limitations of global judgments and specific measures are considered. It is concluded that any position that judgments reflect “nothing but” error is untenable. It is further concluded that each sort of data has distinct uses and limitations, provides a check on the other, and is indispensable.     

Speed and accuracy in comparative judgments of line length

The paper presents an extension of Henmon’s (1906) finding that RT decreases as the difficulty of discriminating a difference between two line segments decreases. It is shown that, when an E RT deadline is imposed on the experimental task, RT remains constant with respect to changes in discrimination difficulty, but that correct response probability increases with increasing difference between two line segments. The data are examined in terms of current theories for the speed-accuracy trade-off.     

Different routes to metacognitive judgments: The role of accuracy motivation

The current research proposes that metacognitive difficulty affects product evaluation through two different routes—the feelings of ease-of-retrieval heuristic and the self-validation process. The findings across four laboratory experiments show that metacognitive difficulty can undermine product evaluation through the feelings of ease-of-retrieval heuristic among low-accuracy individuals, regardless of a perceived fit between expected and experienced difficulty. In contrast, the findings indicate that metacognitive difficulty can enhance (vs. undermine) product evaluation among high-accuracy individuals through the self-validation process when there is a perceived fit (vs. misfit) between expected and experienced difficulty. We suggest that individuals under high accuracy motivation are more likely than those under low accuracy motivation to draw less determined and more flexible interpretation of metacognitive difficulty in making their product evaluation.     

Estimating the weights for multiple attributes in a composite criterion using pairwise judgments

This paper presents a new methodology for estimating the weights or saliences of subcriteria (attributes) in a composite criterion measure. The inputs to the estimation procedure consist of (i) a set of stimuli or objects with each stimulus defined by its subcriteria profile (set of attribute values) and (ii) the set of paired comparison dominance (e.g., preference) judgments on the stimuli made by a single judge (expert) in terms of the global criterion. A criterion of fit is developed and its optimization via linear programming is illustrated with an example. The procedure is generalized to estimate a common set of weights when the pairwise judgments on the stimuli are made by more than one judge. The procedure is computationally efficient and has been applied in developing a composite criterion of managerial success yielding high concurrent validity.This methodology can also be used to perform ordinal multiple regression—i.e., multiple regression with an ordinally scaled dependent variable and a set of intervally scaled predictor variables. The approach is further extended to internal analysis (unfolding) using the vector model of preference and to the additive model of conjoint measurement.     

On being sad and mistaken: mood effects on the accuracy of thin-slice judgments

A series of studies explored how sadness impacts the accuracy of social judgments. In Study 1, induced sadness led to reduced accuracy in judgments of teacher effectiveness from brief samples of nonverbal behavior (thin slices). In Study 2, sad participants showed reduced accuracy in judging relationship type from thin slices as well as diminished judgmental efficiency. Study 3 revealed that higher Beck Depression Inventory scores were associated with diminished accuracy on the Profile of Nonverbal Sensitivity. Finally, Study 4 tested the possibility that sadness impairs accuracy by promoting a more deliberative information-processing style. As expected, accuracy was higher among participants in a sad mood condition who completed the judgment task while simultaneously performing a distracting cognitive load task.     

Analyzing the accuracy of probability judgments for multiple events: An extension of the covariance decomposition

The probability score (PS) can be used to measure the overall accuracy of probability judgments for a single event, e.g., “Rain falls,” or “This patient has cancer.” It has been shown previously how a “covariance decomposition” of the mean of PS over many occasions indexes several distinct aspects of judgment performance (J. F. Yates, Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 30, 132–156 (1982)). There are many situations in which probability judgments are reported for sample space partitions containing more than one event and its complement, e.g., medical situations in which a patient might suffer from Disease X, Disease Y, or Disease Z, or testing situations in which the correct answer to an item might be any one of alternatives (a) through (e). The probability score for multiple events (PSM) serves as a measure of the overall accuracy of probability judgments for the events in partitions of any size. The present article describes and interprets an extension of the covariance decomposition to the mean of PSM. The decomposition is illustrated with data from two contexts, medicine and education.     

The influence of instructions and terminology on the accuracy of remember–know judgments

The remember–know paradigm is one of the most widely used procedures to examine the subjective experience associated with memory retrieval. We examined how the terminology and instructions used to describe the experiences of remembering and knowing affected remember–know judgments. In Experiment 1 we found that using neutral terms, i.e., Type A memory and Type B memory, to describe the experiences of remembering and knowing reduced remember false alarms for younger and older adults as compared to using the terms Remember and Know, thereby increasing overall memory accuracy in the neutral terminology condition. In Experiment 2 we found that using what we call source-specific remember–know instructions, which were intended to constrain remember judgments to recollective experiences arising only from the study context, reduced remember hits and false alarms, and increased know hits and false alarms. Based on these data and other considerations, we conclude that researchers should use neutral terminology and source-specific instructions to collect the most accurate reports of the experiences of remembering and knowing arising from the study context.     

Visual awareness judgments are sensitive to accuracy feedback in stimulus discrimination tasks

In this study we tested the hypothesis that perceptual awareness judgments are sensitive to accuracy feedback about the previous action. We used a perceptual discrimination task in which participants reported their stimulus awareness. We created two conditions: No-feedback and Feedback (discrimination accuracy feedback was provided at the end of each trial). The results showed that visual awareness judgments are related to the accuracy of current and previous responses. Participants reported lower stimulus awareness for incorrectly versus correctly discriminated stimuli in both conditions; they also reported lower stimulus awareness in trials preceded by incorrect discrimination responses, compared to trials preceded by correct discrimination responses. This difference was significantly stronger in the Feedback condition, in which we also observed post-error slowing for PAS ratings. We discuss the relation between visual awareness and the effects of performance monitoring and interpret the results in the context of current theories of consciousness.     

A laser-based technique for measuring accuracy and distortion in judgments of linear dimensions

A new technique is described that permits precise measurement of accuracy and distortion in judgments of linear dimensions based on either perception or memory. This technique involves the use of a single laser beam and a reference line placed on a projection surface. By rotating a laser device, the distance between the reference line and the point created by the beam may be continuously varied. This procedure avoids unintentional distortion from misjudgment of standard metrics, while the semicircular movement required by this technique eliminates body-referenced estimation and some other potential confounds. Potential applications to research in visual perception, spatial memory, and body image are discussed.     

The influence of delaying judgments of learning on metacognitive accuracy: a meta-analytic review

Many studies have examined the accuracy of predictions of future memory performance solicited through judgments of learning (JOLs). Among the most robust findings in this literature is that delaying predictions serves to substantially increase the relative accuracy of JOLs compared with soliciting JOLs immediately after study, a finding termed the delayed JOL effect. The meta-analyses reported in the current study examined the predominant theoretical accounts as well as potential moderators of the delayed JOL effect. The first meta-analysis examined the relative accuracy of delayed compared with immediate JOLs across 4,554 participants (112 effect sizes) through gamma correlations between JOLs and memory accuracy. Those data showed that delaying JOLs leads to robust benefits to relative accuracy (g = 0.93). The second meta-analysis examined memory performance for delayed compared with immediate JOLs across 3,807 participants (98 effect sizes). Those data showed that delayed JOLs result in a modest but reliable benefit for memory performance relative to immediate JOLs (g = 0.08). Findings from these meta-analyses are well accommodated by theories suggesting that delayed JOL accuracy reflects access to more diagnostic information from long-term memory rather than being a by-product of a retrieval opportunity. However, these data also suggest that theories proposing that the delayed JOL effect results from a memorial benefit or the match between the cues available for JOLs and those available at test may also provide viable explanatory mechanisms necessary for a comprehensive account.