Happiness Enrichment and Sustainable Happiness

Applied Research in Quality of Life - Sustainable happiness research has recently received renewed attention. Studies present exercises intended to enhance happiness. A comprehensive process by...     

Formalizing Happiness

The level of happiness of an individual who accepts the consequences of authoritative policy decisions is a clearly different concept from the utility that is delivered to the same individual by these policies and it depends on the whole range of elements that compose the political environment. This paper proposes a formal notion of happiness that is neither identical nor detached from the notion of utility. Our analysis focuses on how the introduction of new policies or new decision rules in the awareness of the society might influence the individual and the social level of happiness and, thereafter, the optimal policy choices of an ideology oriented authority. The main result indicates that a change in the policy (or decision rule) awareness on behalf of the society might lead to a direct alteration of the authority’s implemented policy. That is, if the society becomes aware of a "better" policy (in social terms) than the one implemented today, then the authority might need to implement something "better" for the citizens, even if this "better" policy assigns a lower utility level to the authority.     

Simmel on Happiness

The article gives an overview of Simmel's thought on happiness between the 1890s and 1918. The focus is on the effects of Simmel's general orientation towards the Lebensphilosophie, especially via his reception of Nietzsche. Throughout his writings Simmel displays a distance against traditional views of happiness as an aim of action. Within the framework of Lebensphilosophie happiness becomes a quality of essentially lived life (or, following Nietzsche, heightened life). As a consequence, Simmel's concept of happiness tends to emphasize connotations of felicity, and can therefore be interpreted as a modern, secularized variant of traditional beatitudo.     

幸福是什么

幸福概念深刻而复杂,我们可以在且个层次上把握幸福概念。首先,幸福是人生重大的快乐;进一步说,是人生重大需要和欲望得到满足的心理体验,是人生重大目的得到实现的心理体验;最终是达到生存和发展的某种完满的心理体验。     

什么是幸福

"幸福"是一种生活状态,一种人们对生活经验的主观感受,当然也是一种生活价值的评价.人们对幸福的感受与人们时幸福的追求和心理欲望是相辅相成的.从社会或人际的角度看,幸福是一种可以观察、可以评价的生活状态.创造幸福的过程是痛苦的,但同时享受创造过程本身就是一种幸福体验,要学会创造幸福,学会享受幸福,这种享受不是独享而需要分享.分享有两个好处,就个人来说,与人分享不仅更安全,也更有幸福感.就社会的角度来说,幸福的分享程度越广泛,说明这个社会越公平,秩序越好.国家和社会的发展目标要与公民的幸福目的一致.     

Happiness is Flextime

We study how work a schedule flexibility (flextime) affects happiness. We use a US General Social Survey (GSS) pooled dataset containing the Quality of Worklife and Work Orientations modules for 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, and 2014. We retain only respondents who are either full-time or part-time employees on payrolls. For flextime to be associated with greater happiness, it has to be more than just sometimes flexible or slight input into one’s work schedule, that is, little flextime does not increase happiness. But substantial flextime has a large effect on happiness–the size effect is about as large as that of household income, or about as large as a one-step increase in self-reported health, such as up from good to excellent health. Our findings provide support for both public and organizational policies that would promote greater work schedule flexibility or control for employees.     

Hedonism and Happiness

Hedonism is a way of life, characterised by openness to pleasurable experience. There are many qualms about hedonism. It is rejected on moral grounds and said to be detrimental to long-term happiness. Several mechanisms for this 'paradox of hedonism' have been suggested and telling examples of pleasure seekers ending up in despair have been given. But is that the rule? If so, how much pleasure is too much? An overview of the available knowledge is given in this paper. The relation between hedonism and happiness has been studied at two levels: that of the nation and the individual. At the national level average happiness is correlated with moral acceptance of pleasure and with active leisure. At the individual level it is similarly linked with hedonistic attitudes and also correlated with hedonistic behaviours such as frequent sex and use of stimulants. In most cases the pattern is linearly positive. The relation between happiness and consumption of stimulants follows an inverted U-curve, spoilsports and guzzlers are less happy than modest consumers. Yet, these data cannot settle the issue, since the observed relations may be spurious or due to the effects of happiness on hedonism rather than the reverse. Even if we can prove a positive effect of (mild) hedonism on happiness, there is still the question of how that gains balances against a possible loss of health. A solution is to assess the effect of hedonistic living on the number of years lived happily.     

Mill on Happiness

Abstract

In this paper, I argue against the standard interpretation of Mill as a hedonistic utilitarian, and argue instead that Mill holds a ‘eudaimonic’ conception of happiness. I begin by clarifying exactly what I mean by a eudaimonic conception of happiness, and then examine the textual evidence for this eudaimonic interpretation, as well as the evidence against the standard hedonistic interpretation. Naturally, a great deal of the paper will revolve around an analysis of Mill's Utilitarianism, but special attention will also be paid to On Liberty, reading it as a development of Mill's moral theory rather than a mere application of it.     

The Relationship Between Adult Happiness and Self-Appraised Childhood Happiness and Events

The primary purpose of the present research was to relate questionnaire-assessed self-reported childhood happiness and events to adulthood happiness in 387 nonclinical participants. Although childhood happiness and adult happiness were found to be significantly correlated (r = .28, p < .001), there was little relationship between reported adult happiness and reported specific childhood events and circumstances. Childhood events and circumstances, however, were much more highly correlated with childhood happiness (R = .64). Thirty-four percent of the persons who said they were unhappy or very unhappy as a child, but only 9% who said they were happy or very happy as a child, reported that they were unhappy or very unhappy as adults.     

The Rationality of Happiness

Abstract

In his recent book, Happiness: personhood, community, purpose, Pedro Tabensky answers the question of what happiness is. He develops an Aristotelian account of happiness that, he claims, is everyone’s maximally rational ideal. Much of the support for this claim rests on what Tabensky calls the method of critical introspection. This method involves introspecting on the kind of beings that we are and the kind of lives we can thus lead. If properly carried out, Tabensky claims, critical introspection will reveal to any individual that the active life of virtue is in fact the maximally rational ideal. I argue that two features of Tabensky’s account undermine this claim. The first is his account of the method of critical introspection itself. The second is his account of the nature and acquisition of virtue developed in his analogy between living and painting, and in his discussion of the eudaimon community. Tabensky’s account of critical introspection carried out at the general level of persons shows only that it works negatively to identify the kind of lives we could not lead as persons. It does not function positively to reveal that the maximally rational life for any person is the active exercise of virtue. Tabensky does suggest that the method carried out by particular individuals will reveal the kind of life they should be leading. However, it follows from Tabensky’s account of the nature and acquisition of virtue, I argue, that critical introspection can only reveal the active life of virtue to be the maximally rational ideal for those individuals who have had the right sort of upbringing in the right sort of community.     

Happiness is an Emotion

Accounts of happiness in the philosophical literature see it as either a judgment of satisfaction with one’s life or as a balance of positive over negative feelings or emotional states. There are sound objections to both types of account, although each captures part of what happiness is. Seeing it as an emotion allows us to incorporate both features of the accounts thought to be incompatible. Emotions are analyzed as multicomponent states including judgments, feelings, physical symptoms, and behavioral dispositions. It is shown that prototypical happiness contains all these components, and each is explicated. The concept of happiness, like the concepts of other emotions, is a cluster concept. The features of such concepts are made clear. Happiness is shown to be similar to other emotions in many respects, including the phenomenon of adaptation, the “paradox of happiness,” and the existence of both paradigm and borderline instances. The account allows us to capture all that was right in earlier accounts while avoiding objections to them.     

The Loreley of Happiness

Sara Ahmed has written a highly original book on happiness by not focusing on the content, but on the context in which the word happiness is used. Her chapters are titled Feminist Killjoys, Unhappy Queers, Melancholic Mirgants and Happy Futures. Ahmed convincingly shows that the pursuit of happiness may have unintended side-effects in different social contexts, and she has collected al lot of stories and ideas that provide a backbone for the book. The ideological critique provided by Ahmed would have been a lot stronger if she would have used data from empirical studies to judge her own ideas.     

Lay Theories of Happiness

Over 230 young people completed a battery of questionnaires measuring personality, self-esteem, and happiness as well as one developed specifically for this study on their theories of the causes of happiness. The 36 causes factored into six internally coherent and interpretable factors. Self-reported happiness, extraversion and sex were correlated with the lay theory factors. Four of the six factors were modestly (r < 0.20) correlated with the Oxford Happiness Inventory (OHI) scores. Path analysis, using the OHI as the dependent variable, showed self-esteem, extraversion and neuroticism direct predictors of happiness but that among the lay theories, only lay theories about optimism and contentment were direct predictors. Personality and demographic variables did predict the lay theories but the latter did not act as moderator or mediating factors between the former and happiness. The role and function of lay theories with respect to happiness are discussed.     

Happiness Prospers in Democracy

An econometric analysis of a happiness function, based on a surveyof 6,000 persons in Switzerland, indicates that:(1) the more developed the institutions of direct democracy, the happier the individuals are;(2) people derive procedural utility from the possibility of participating in the direct democratic process over and above a more favorable political outcome;(3) the unemployed are much less happy than the employed, independent of income;(4) higher income is associated with higher levels of happiness.The consideration of institutional differences in cross-regional data offers important new insights into happiness research.