The ontomystical argument revisited

I argue that Alexander Pruss’s ontomystical arguments should not be endorsed without further argumentative support of their premises. My specific targets are his claims that (i) Śamkara’s principle is true and (ii) the high mystics had phenomenal experiences of radical dependence and as of a maximally great being. Against (i), I urge a host of counterexamples. The only ways I can see for Pruss to respond to these counterexamples end up falsifying (ii). The key problem which leads to this conclusion is that Pruss needs a criterion for distinguishing phenomenal experiences from non-phenomenal experiences according to which the experiences of the high mystics were phenomenal experiences while the experiences of those persons I discuss in my counterexamples to Śamkara’s principle are not. There appears to be no such criterion. I suggest that the future of the ontomystical arguments lies in developing them as inductive rather than deductive arguments.     

The role of attribution of motivation in producing postsuppressional rebound

Three studies demonstrated that postsuppressional rebound (PSR) may be both reduced and enhanced by manipulating people's attributions about why they experience difficulty during suppression. Telling participants that suppression failures indicate a high motivation to use the suppressed construct produced more PSR than telling them that suppression failures indicate a low motivation to use the construct (Study 1). Telling participants that an external stimulus would make suppression easy produced more PSR than telling them that it would make suppression difficult (Study 2). Telling participants that suppressing a stereotype is difficult and unindicative of prejudice eliminated PSR (Study 3). These results support the notion that PSR occurs because people infer from the difficulty experienced during suppression and from suppression failures that they are motivated to use the suppressed construct.     

Spinoza's PSR as a Principle of Clear and Distinct Representation

It is argued first, that Spinoza's Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) is best seen as an auxiliary premise and not as an axiom of the Ethics; second, that Spinoza held the PSR to be a self‐evident truth that indicates a necessary condition for clearly and distinctly representing the existence or non‐existence of a thing; and third, that this interpretation of Spinoza's PSR explains the near absence of the PSR within the demonstrations of the Ethics as well as the importance of the principle in Spinoza's thought.     

A Pragmatic Case against Pragmatic Scientific Realism

Pragmatic Scientific Realism (PSR) urges us to take up the realist aim or the goal of truth although we have good reason to think that the goal can neither be attained nor approximated. While Newton-Smith thinks that pursuing what we know we cannot achieve is clearly irrational, Rescher disagrees and contends that pursuing an unreachable goal can be rational on pragmatic grounds—if in pursuing the unreachable goal one can get indirect benefits. I have blocked this attempt at providing a pragmatic justification for the realist aim of PSR on precisely the same pragmatic grounds—since there is a competing alternative to PSR, and the alternative can provide whatever indirect benefits PSR can offer while being less risky than it is, prudential reasoning favours the alternative to PSR. This undermines the pragmatic case for the realist aim of science since the instrumentalist alternative does not aim at the truth.     

The Principle of Sufficient Reason,the Ontological Argument and the Is/Ought Distinction

Kant's attack on metaphysics consists in large part in his attack on a principle that he names the Supreme Principle of Pure Reason. This principle, it is not often noticed, is the Principle of Sufficient Reason [PSR]. In interpreting this principle as such, I argue that Kant's attack on the PSR (and thereby his attack on dogmatic metaphysics as a whole) depends on Kant's claim that existence is not a first‐order predicate. If existence isn't what Kant calls a real predicate, the PSR is false. While this constitutes a powerful Kantian argument against dogmatic rationalism, it also poses a problem for Kant. For, as I argue, if the PSR is true, Kant's argument that existence isn't a first‐order predicate is false. In this sense, Kant's attack on the PSR is begging the question vis‐á‐vis radical metaphysicians (e.g. Spinoza). Concluding the paper I suggest relying on Kant's 'is'/'ought' distinction in avoiding this circularity, thereby reinforcing the Kantian critique.     

L’analyse des risques psychosociaux en ESAT parmi des travailleurs en situation de handicap (TSH) : éléments de réflexion

Unlike the mainstream world of labour, studies on psychosocial risks (PSR) in Establishments and Work Assistance Services (ESAT) among workers with disabilities are scarce. Given the adverse effects of the PSR on both these workers and on the work itself, it seems essential to focus specifically on the PSR in the context of ESAT. The paper shows that the application of different theoretical models of PSR from the mainstream environment to the ESAT is possible. The health at work for people with disabilities requires taking into account the disorders influencing the identification and the mobilization of resources and skills. Working conditions in ESAT allow health promotion if they are adapted to the specificities and needs of people with disabilities.     

Rationalism and Necessitarianism

Metaphysical rationalism, the doctrine which affirms the Principle of Sufficient Reason (the PSR), is out of favor today. The best argument against it is that it appears to lead to necessitarianism, the claim that all truths are necessarily true. Whatever the intuitive appeal of the PSR, the intuitive appeal of the claim that things could have been otherwise is greater. This problem did not go unnoticed by the great metaphysical rationalists Spinoza and Leibniz. Spinoza’s response was to embrace necessitarianism. Leibniz’s response was to argue that, despite appearances, rationalism does not lead to necessitarianism. This paper examines the debate between these two rationalists and concludes that Leibniz has persuasive grounds for his opinion. This has significant implications both for the plausibility of the PSR and for our understanding of modality.     

Positive Self‐regard and Claim to Leadership: Two Fundamental Forms of Self‐evaluation

The present article examines the common factor structure of various self‐evaluative personality constructs. Consistent with previous research, we found considerable redundancy between constructs. Two basic forms of self‐evaluation could be distinguished: Positive Self‐regard (PSR) reflects people's contentedness with themselves in comparison with their own standards. Constructs such as depression, self‐esteem and neuroticism have very high loadings on this factor. In contrast, Claim to Leadership (CTL) reflects the subjective conviction that one is called to take charge and lead others. This conviction is often called ‘narcissism’. PSR mainly reflects an intra‐personal kind of self‐evaluation, whereas CTL reflects an inter‐personal kind. Both forms of self‐evaluation independently predict intellectual self‐enhancement, but only one of them (PSR) also predicts self‐reported mental health. Moreover, the two forms of self‐evaluation are differentially associated with self‐reported and peer‐reported inter‐personal traits (Dominance and Affiliation). Finally, the concepts of ‘Grandiosity’ and ‘Vulnerability’ from narcissism research may easily be reframed in terms of CTL and PSR. The two‐dimensional framework may help overcome the conceptual confusion that exists around different forms of self‐evaluation and streamline the field for future research. Copyright © 2013 European Association of Personality Psychology     

Truthmakers and modality

This paper attempts to locate, within an actualist ontology, truthmakers for modal truths: truths of the form <Possibly, p> or <Necessarily, p>. In Sect. 1 I motivate the demand for substantial truthmakers for modal truths. In Sect. 2 I criticise Armstrong’s account of truthmakers for modal truths. In Sect. 3 I examine essentialism and defend an account of what makes essentialist attributions true, but I argue that this does not solve the problem of modal truth in general. In Sect. 4 I discuss, and dismiss, a theistic account of the source of modal truth proposed by Alexander Pruss. In Sect. 5 I offer a means of (dis)solving the problem.     

Without Reason?

The argument for modal collapse is partly responsible for the widespread rejection of the so‐called Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) in recent times. This paper discusses the PSR against the background of the recent debate about grounding and develops principled reasons for rejecting the argument from modal collapse.     

On an Insufficient Argument Against Sufficient Reason

In one of its versions, the principle of sufficient reason maintains that every true proposition has a sufficient reason for its truth. Recently, a number of philosophers have argued against the principle on the ground that there are propositions such as the conjunction of all truths that are 'too big' to have a sufficient reason. The task of this article is to show that such maximal propositions pose no threat to the principle. According to what is perhaps the most 'popular' version of the principle to sufficient reason (PSR), every true proposition has a sufficient reason why it is true. Peter van Inwagen formulates the principle as follows: 'for every truth, for everything that is so, there is a sufficient reason for its being true or being so.' Like many contemporary philosophers, however, he rejects the principle. My purpose here is to show that the main philosophical argument against PSR rests on a mistaken assumption. There is also a 'scientific' argument against PSR that turns on considerations of quantum indeterminacy; but that argument lies beyond the scope of this discussion.     

What could be caused must actually be caused

I give two arguments for the claim that all events which occur at the actual world and are such that they could be caused, are also such that they must actually be caused. The first argument is an improvement of a similar argument advanced by Alexander Pruss, which I show to be invalid. It uses Pruss’s Brouwer Analog for counterfactual logic, and, as a consequence, implies inconsistency with Lewis’s semantics for counterfactuals. While (I suggest) this consequence may not be objectionable, the argument founders on the fact that Pruss’s Brouwer Analog has a clear counterexample. I thus turn to a second, “Lewisian” argument, which requires only an affirmation of one element of Lewis’s analysis of causation and one other, fairly weak possibility claim about the nature of wholly contingent events. The final section of the paper explains how both arguments escape objections from supposed indeterminacy in quantum physics.     

“Do identity and distinctness facts threaten the PSR?”

Philosophical Studies - One conception of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) maintains that every fact is metaphysically explained. There are different ways to challenge this version of the...     

Spinoza and the problem of other substances

Most of Spinoza’s arguments for God’s existence do not rely on any special feature of God, but instead on merely general features of substance. This raises the following worry: those arguments prove the existence of non-divine substances just as much as they prove God’s existence, and yet there is not enough room in Spinoza’s system for all these substances. I argue that Spinoza attempts to solve this problem by using a principle of plenitude to rule out the existence of other substances and that the principle cannot be derived from the PSR, as many claim.

Abbreviation: PSR: Principle of Sufficient Reason     

Extending Conceptualization and Measurement of Narrative Engagement After-the-Fact: Parasocial Relationship and Retrospective Imaginative Involvement

Engagement with narratives and identification with narrative characters is usually conceptualized as occurring during the narrative experience itself. However, much involvement with a story world and narrative characters may occur retrospectively and imaginatively. The present study, using a cross-sectional survey quota-sampled to represent U.S. demographic norms, provides conceptualization and measurement of parasocial relationships (PSR) that is clearly retrospective and conceptually distinct from parasocial interaction (PSI). Moreover, we distinguish PSR from another concept introduced and operationalized here, retrospective imaginative involvement (RII), and provide evidence for validity of these measures. We compare them to the related concepts of transportability and boundary expansion, and assess fit using measurement models and confirmatory factor analysis, refining measurement on half the data set and confirming fit on the other half. We demonstrate predictive validity with respect to a measure of self-reported effects of narratives on beliefs and behavior, controlling for these various related measures, and also validate short versions of these measures for greater ease of research use     

Hume's refutation of the cosmological argument

Conclusion Let me summarize the results of this paper in a way that seems fitting to Hume's discussion of the cosmological argument. There are some philosophers who adopt the most stringent empiricist principles. Such men and women would reject any notion of necessity that is not analytic, and for this reason they would never admit a proof of the necessary existence of anything. Other philosophers, though empiricists, are not so dogmatic. They question the need for, not the coherence of, necessary existence. They believe that the material universe is nothing over and above the sum of its material parts and, thus, see no reason to conclude that a necessary being exists based on PSR. Still others are driven by a rationalist persuasion. They would gladly recognize the existence of almost anything provided it be proven by reason and argument. When they confront the cosmological argument they do indeed find it compelling but still see no reason to conclude that God, or any transcendent being, necessarily exists. The entity established need be nothing more than the universe itself. Therefore, as Hume has demonstrated, no philosopher need accept the conclusion of the cosmological argument.     

虚拟场景中不同客体朝向条件对内在参照系建立的影响

通过眼动记录和部分场景再认两种方法,探讨了虚拟建筑物对称场景中物体朝向统一、凸显两种条件对内在参照系建立的影响。结果发现:(1)场景中均为有朝向建筑物且朝向统一时,被试选择物体朝向与对称轴建立内在参照系的可能性没有差异;(2)场景中只有一个有朝向建筑物,其余均为无朝向物体时,即朝向凸显条件下,被试倾向于选择对称轴来建立内在参照系。物体朝向对内在参照系建立的影响作用具有局限性和不稳定性。     

A Church-Fitch proof for the universality of causation

In an attempt to improve upon Alexander Pruss’s work (The principle of sufficient reason: A reassessment, pp. 240–248, 2006), I (Weaver, Synthese 184(3):299–317, 2012) have argued that if all purely contingent events could be caused and something like a Lewisian analysis of causation is true (per, Lewis’s, Causation as influence, reprinted in: Collins, Hall and paul. Causation and counterfactuals, 2004), then all purely contingent events have causes. I dubbed the derivation of the universality of causation the “Lewisian argument”. The Lewisian argument assumed not a few controversial metaphysical theses, particularly essentialism, an incommunicable-property view of essences (per Plantinga’s, Actualism and possible worlds, reprinted in: Davidson (ed.) Essays in the metaphysics of modality, 2003), and the idea that counterfactual dependence is necessary for causation. There are, of course, substantial objections to such theses. While I think a fight against objections to the Lewisian argument can be won, I develop, in what follows, a much more intuitive argument for the universality of causation which takes as its inspiration a result from Frederic B. Fitch’s work (J Symb Logic 28(2):135–142, 1963) [with credit to who we now know was Alonzo church’s, Referee Reports on Fitch’s Definition of value, in: (Salerno (ed.), New essays on the knowability paradox, 2009)] that if all truths are such that they are knowable, then (counter-intuitively) all truths are known. The resulting Church–Fitch proof for the universality of causation is preferable to the Lewisian argument since it rests upon far weaker formal and metaphysical assumptions than those of the Lewisian argument.     

Le fonctionnement optimal psychologique : apports conceptuels et méthodologiques

In this study, we are operationalizing a new construct: the optimal psychological functioning (OPF). The dimensions of the construct are considered from a historical and a conceptual background then a heuristic approach is mobilized based on three precise rules and the tripartite conception of the mind, i.e. cognitive, affective and conative. The sample is made of 1066 French workers of age 18 to 60 originating from a diverse sociocultural and geographic background. The methodology relies on latent variable modeling. The results give rise to a bifactor structural equations modeling (Bi-ESEM) model with six domain-specific factors demonstrating a very good fit and high psychometric properties. Construct validity was tested against Keyes's positive mental health via the Mental Health Continuum Short Form (MHC-SF) (Keyes, 2002, 2005) and a construct on psychosocial risks (PSR). The OPF strongly, very significantly, and positively predicts positive mental health, while it negatively predicts absenteeism, presenteeism and turnover intentions.