Knowledge,Truth and Plausibility

From antiquity several philosophers have claimed that the goal of natural science is truth. In particular, this is a basic tenet of contemporary scientific realism. However, all concepts of truth that have been put forward are inadequate to modern science because they do not provide a criterion of truth. This means that we will generally be unable to recognize a scientific truth when we reach it. As an alternative, this paper argues that the goal of natural science is plausibility and considers some characters of plausibility.     

知识的“德”与“真”

西方知识论中的"知识"指的是"科学知识",即"真理"。西方知识论哲学和中西伦理道德学说的运思方式截然不同,它们具有不同的本质属性,属于不同的领域。如果任由西方知识论哲学以逻辑理性解构中西伦理道德学说的基础(诸如西方的宗教信仰或中国的儒家信仰),就会导致社会道德水平大滑坡。而这一点尚未引起中国学界的足够注意。事实上,中国学界在引入西方知识论哲学的过程中,应该立足于中国文化,认真进行"对接"问题的研究,以求在吸收西方知识论哲学精华的同时,规避其对中国社会可能造成的危害。可能的途径之一是创建一种整体意义上的"知识论"。这种"整体知识论"可以将中国伦理学说和西方科学知识论纳入同一体系,有效地规范它们的研究领域和互动关系,并为伦理道德学说保留科学知识论无法干预的空间。     

Encountering Dissimilar Views in Deliberation: Political Knowledge,Attitude Strength,and Opinion Change

Conversing with diverse points of view stands as the central tenet of deliberative democracy, yet empirical evidence has suggested mixed outcomes related to perspective change as a result of deliberative encounters. I propose a difference‐driven model that suggests individual predispositions moderate the processing of dissimilar views when changing policy preferences. My analysis is based on a random sample of over 400 voters at a California‐wide deliberative event, where participants discussed proposals for reforming the state politics. I find that encountering more and different arguments transforms policy attitudes. Yet it is more difficult for people to change their minds on issues about which they hold strong beliefs. Some evidence suggests that different psychologies are at play for people who enter deliberation with substantial or weak political knowledge and for those who deliberate while holding strong or moderate prior opinions. Well‐grounded strong opinions are resistant to change, while well‐grounded moderate opinions are persuadable in deliberative groups. Uninformed positions can become entrenched in like‐minded groups, yet they can be adjusted once participants deliberate with dissimilar views, especially opinions that are held strongly without good informational ground. The findings urge deliberative forums that introduce participants to diverse perspectives to foster a considered public opinion.     

Virtuous Choice and Parity

This article seeks to contribute to the discussion on the nature of choice in virtue theory. If several different actions are available to the virtuous agent, they are also likely to vary in their degree of virtue, at least in some situations. Yet, it is widely agreed that once an action is recognised as virtuous there is no higher level of virtue. In this paper we discuss how the virtue theorist could accommodate both these seemingly conflicting ideas. We discuss this issue from a modern Aristotelian perspective, as opposed to a purely exegetic one. We propose a way of resolving what seems to be a major clash between two central features of virtue ethics. Our proposal is based on the notion of parity, a concept which recently has received considerable attention in the literature on axiology. Briefly put, two alternatives are on a par (or are ‘roughly equal’) if they are comparable, although it is not the case that one is better than the other, nor that they are equally good. The advantages of applying the concept of parity to our problem are twofold. Firstly, it sheds new light on the account of choice in virtue theory. Secondly, some of the criticisms that have been mounted against the possibility of parity can be countered by considering the notion of choice from a virtue theory perspective.     

Virtuous Condonation

Abstract

Moral philosophers have mostly condemned the condonation of a bad act as being close to complicity in wrongdoing or, at best, as indicative of a lax moral conscience. I argue, in contrast, that condoning a wrongful act is sometimes not only permissible but positively virtuous. After considering the nature of condonation, I describe a range of circumstances in which it may be an appropriate response to wrongdoing, expressing such virtues as compassion and mercifulness, tolerance of human frailty, a love of amity, and a proper respectfulness for others’ autonomy as moral agents.     

Epistemic Friction: Reflections on Knowledge, Truth, and Logic

Knowledge requires both freedom and friction. Freedom to set up our epistemic goals, choose the subject matter of our investigations, espouse cognitive norms, design research programs, etc., and friction (constraint) coming from two directions: the object or target of our investigation, i.e., the world in a broad sense, and our mind as the sum total of constraints involving the knower. My goal is to investigate the problem of epistemic friction, the relation between epistemic friction and freedom, the viability of foundationalism as a solution to the problem of friction, an alternative solution in the form of a neo-Quinean model, and the possibility of solving the problem of friction as it applies to logic and the philosophy of logic within that model.     

Capability and Deliberation

This paper explores the role of deliberation in the context of the capability approach to human well-being from the standpoint of the individual doing the reflecting. The concept of a ‘strong evaluator’ is used develop a concept of the agent of capability. The role of values is discussed in the process of deliberating, particularly the nature of and difference between prudential values and intrinsic values. Some consideration is given to the limits and constraints on deliberation and finally a brief example of deliberation is considered—that of occupational choice.     

Temptation and Deliberation

There is a great deal of plausibility to the standard view that if one is rational and it is clear at the time of action that a certain move, say M₁, would serve one’s concerns better than any other available move, then one will, as a rational agent, opt for move M₁. Still, this view concerning rationality has been challenged at least in part because it seems to conflict with our considered judgments about what it is rational to do in cases of temptation that share the structure of Warren Quinn’s self-torturer case. I argue that there is a way to accomodate our considered judgments about the relevant cases of temptation without giving up the standard view or dismissing, as in some way rationally defective, the concerns of the agents in the relevant cases. My reasoning relies on the idea that, at least in some cases, whether an action serves one’s concerns well depends on what action(s) or course(s) of action it is part of. In the final section of the paper, I explain how this idea sheds light on an important source of frustration in collective decision-making.     

Advisors and Deliberation

The paper has two goals. First, it defends one type of subjectivist account of reasons for actions—deliberative accounts—against the criticism that they commit the conditional fallacy. Second, it attempts to show that another type of subjectivist account of practical reasons that has been gaining popularity—ideal advisor accounts—are liable to commit a closely related error. Further, I argue that ideal advisor accounts can avoid the error only by accepting the fundamental theoretical motivation behind deliberative accounts. I conclude that ideal advisor accounts represent neither a substantial departure from, nor a substantial improvement upon, deliberative accounts.     

The Virtuous Fall

The medieval Church's concern with moral reform contributed to the emergence of a genre of literature in the thirteenth century dedicated to the vices and virtues. Inspired by monastic and scholastic traditions, treatises such as Laurent d'Orléans's Somme le roi encouraged the avoidance of sin and provided the faithful with a moral taxonomy that ultimately ensured their access to heaven. Marguerite Porete's Mirror of Simple Souls and Meister Eckhart's Discourses of Instruction challenge this virtue‐centered approach to salvation. Relying on their shared claim that the fall of the just man is in fact a virtue, this essay argues that their moral theology is grounded not on the a posteriori act of penance needed for salvation, but on the a priori consent of the will. This alternative view of moral life finds support in previous strands of the Christian tradition, and in particular in Peter Abelard's theory of intentionalism.