Mind and Matter: A Physicist's View

Physics explores a universe of wonderful order, expressed in terms of beautiful mathematical equations. Mathematics itself is understood to be the exploration of a realm of noetic reality. Science describes matter in terms of concepts with mind-like qualities. The psychosomatic nature of human persons is best understood in terms of a dual-aspect monism, in which matter and mind are complementary aspects of a unitary being. The new science of complexity theory, with its dualities of parts/whole and energy/information, offers modest resources for the speculative exploration of this idea. The intrinsic unpredictabilities present in nature afford the metaphysical opportunity to consider dissipative systems as exhibiting top–down causality.     

一个维特根斯坦主义者眼中的框架问题

框架问题的核心命意乃是：在对智能体的行动进行表征之时,如何能够在有效地表征出行动的效果之时,避免对于其非效果的表征？对于符号主义路数的人工智能研究来说,框架问题的确非常棘手,因为它的存在使得对于行动的知识刻画必须引入大量的框架公理,并由此使得系统的计算负荷剧增。从历史上看,人工智能界赖以解决这个问题的基本路径主要有两条。第一条是诉诸于＂关于惯性的常识律＂或缺省逻辑,即在行动表征中预设：没有被表征式牵涉到的＂世界其余部分＂都将保持惯性。另一条路径则采纳了海耶斯的＂素朴物理学＂表征方案,即试图把日常物理学知识全部用谓词逻辑公理化,让系统自动推算出哪些动作会导致哪些结果。本文将论证,这两条道路其实都走不通。在此基础上,本文将从维特根斯坦的《论确定性》中寻找灵感,建立一个关于信念网动力学模型——在这个模型中,某些知识节点的激发只会导致某些与之毗邻的节点的激发,因此,对于特定问题求解路径的表征,就能够避免对于一个更大范围内的知识网络的牵涉。框架问题也有望借助于这个模型得到解决。最后,我将利用＂非公理推演系统＂（NARS）为这个模型提供一种尽量逼真的工程学模拟。     

A Wittgensteinian Solution to the Sorites

I develop a solution to the Sorites Paradox, according to which a concatenation of valid arguments need not itself be valid. I specify which chains of valid arguments are those that do not preserve validity: those that pass the vague boundary between cases where the relevant concept applies and cases where that concept does not apply. I also develop various criticisms of this solution and show why they fail; basically, they all involve a petitio at some stage. I criticise the conviction that if every short argument in a long concatenated argument is valid, so is the long argument: it is, I argue, the result of an unjustified generalisation from the case of arguments that do not employ vague concepts (as in mathematics) to arguments that do employ them. My approach is Wittgensteinian in its “leaving everything as it is,” in its claiming that the “beginning” has been searched too far back (see paper's epigraph) and in its claim that the paradox was generated by a misapplication of a partial picture of the behaviour of arguments. I conclude my paper by comparing and contrasting my approach to the few precedents found in the vagueness literature and by answering a few additional objections that were raised there.     

Self-Knowledge and Rationality

The topic of this article is the dependency or, maybe, the interdependency of rationality and self-knowledge. Here two questions may be distinguished, viz. (1) whether being rational is a necessary condition for a creature to have self-knowledge, and (2) whether having self-knowledge is a necessary condition for a creature to be rational. After a brief explication of what I mean by self-knowledge, I deal with the first question. There I defend the Davidsonian position, according to which rationality is, indeed, a necessary condition for self-knowledge. In addition, I distinguish two aspects of rationality which I call basic and local rationality. After that I concentrate on the second question for the remaining larger part of this article. Here I proceed in two stages: first I examine whether self-knowledge is necessary for basic rationality, and then whether it is necessary for local rationality.

---

Self-Knowledge and Rationality

There have been several recent attempts to account for the special authority of self-knowledge by grounding it in a constitutive relation between an agent's intentional states and her judgments about those intentional states. This constitutive relation is said to hold in virtue of the rationality of the subject. I argue, however, that there are two ways in which we have self-knowledge without there being such a constitutive relation between first-order intentional states and the second-order judgments about them. Recognition of this fact thus represents a significant challenge to the rational agency view.     

Russellian and Wittgensteinian Atomism

One difference between Russell's logical atomism in The Philosophy of Logical Atomism and Wittgenstein's in the Tractatus is that Russell's doctrine is explicitly epistemological, whereas Wittgenstein's is not; another difference is that Wittgenstein gives an a priori argument for the doctrine of logical atomism whereas Russell gives no such argument. I argue that these two differences are instructively connected: Russell's focus on epistemology prevents him from being able to give a motivated argument for the truth of logical atomism. Furthermore, I argue that this is not just a contingent failure of Russell's system: no primarily epistemological atomism can avail itself of Wittgenstein's style of a priori argument for the truth of atomism. An important suggestion of the argument, illuminating with respect to the subsequent history of analytic philosophy, is that Russell's logical atomism already contains the seeds of verificationism in a nascent form, whereas Wittgenstein's atomism has no tendency toward verification.     

Introspection and Authoritative Self-Knowledge

In this paper I outline and defend an introspectionist account of authoritative self-knowledge for a certain class of cases, ones in which a subject is both thinking and thinking about a current, conscious thought. My account is distinctive in a number of ways, one of which is that it is compatible with the truth of externalism—the view that the contents of subjects’ intentional states are individuation-dependent on factors external to their minds. It is thus decidedly anti-Cartesian, despite being introspectionist. My argument proceeds in three stages. A virtue of the position I develop is that the epistemic features on which it is based also apply to sensations and to non-episodic intentional states, to the extent that one has authoritative knowledge of them. However, despite the appeal to analogies with observable properties of objects of perception, the account is not a ‘perceptual’ model of such knowledge in the sense that those such as Shoemaker, Burge and others have in mind. Because the features on which the analogy is based are abstract and general, they are not tied to cases of observation alone. Those who appeal to such phenomena as ‘intellectual experience’ (Burge, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 96, 91–116, 1996) or ‘intellectual intuition’ (Bealer, Philosophical perspectives, Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 29–55, 1999) in their accounts of authoritative self-knowledge may well appeal to such features. This, amongst other factors, distinguishes the position from other introspectionist ones in a way that makes it immune to standard objections to perceptual models of self-knowledge.

---

孤独症个体的记忆与自我知识

本文从语义记忆-情景记忆角度综合了孤独症的记忆研究,探讨了孤独症个体的记忆特性。研究结果表明,孤独症个体的情景记忆(episodic memory)存在选择性损伤,特别是高机能孤独症个体的情景记忆测验的成绩会依材料的呈现方式和意义相关程度等表现出不同程度的损伤。同时,他们的语义记忆(semantic memory)相对完好,但和正常对照组语义记忆成绩之间的差异会随材料的性质而变化,这种差异并不显著。根据自我知识的存储方式以及孤独症的记忆特性,孤独症个体情景记忆中的自我知识丧失,语义记忆中所存储的自我知识则保存完好。孤独症个体虽然不能回忆与个人特质有关的个人行为,但是能回忆基于这些行为的关于自我的概括性知识。孤独症个体理解别人心理的能力严重受损,然而他们反映自己心理特性和状态的能力保持完好。     

Self-Standards and Self-Discrepancies. A Structural Model of Self-Knowledge

A model of self-knowledge is proposed which summarizes and integrates a few distinctions concerning self-standards and related self-discrepancies. Four types of self-standards are distinguished (i.e. ideal, ought, undesired and forbidden selves) and a hierarchical organization of these standards is postulated. There is a basic contrast between positive and negative standards at the higher level of the hierarchy, whereas Higgins’ distinction between ideals and oughts is found at the lower level. Every self-standard is analyzed in terms of two types of self-discrepancies. Many previous studies explored discrepancies between self-standards and the actual self, i.e. the perceived actualization of standards. The present study proposed that discrepancies between self-standards and the can self are a second type of discrepancy that should be included in structural models of self-knowledge. The can self consists of self-beliefs referring to capabilities and potentials; thus, this additional type of discrepancy reflects the perceived attainability of standards. Consequently, the present study explored a set of eight self-discrepancies, i.e. both the perceived actualization and the attainability of four self-standards. In order to assess the intercorrelations among these eight self-discrepancies, participants (N?=?404) completed a newly developed online measure. CFA modeling confirmed the postulated two-level hierarchy of self-standards. The reasonability of including discrepancies between self-standards and the can self in the structural model of self-knowledge was also confirmed.     

从心理理论与执行功能的关系看孤独症

孤独症是一种病因未明的广泛性发展障碍,它的诊断主要基于患者的行为表现。针对这些行为特点,研究者们提出了心理理论缺失说和执行功能障碍说。但是,有研究表明孤独症患者并不是在所有的心理理论任务和执行功能任务上都存在障碍。所以,单纯地采用心理理论缺失说或执行功能障碍说都不能完整解释孤独症症状。一般来说,心理理论缺失的孤独症个体,同时也伴有执行功能障碍。近年来,大量的研究结果发现,心理理论与执行功能确实存在紧密联系。然而,目前对它们关系的考察主要集中在学龄前儿童的错误信念理解和抑制控制上。心理理论与执行功能都分别包含许多成分,它们彼此的关系可能会在不同年龄段发生变化。因此,研究者需要进一步探查不同年龄段,不同心理理论任务与执行功能不同成分与范式之间的关系,并将这种关系应用于临床实践,帮助诊断和培训孤独症个体。