Impression Management Behavior in Assessment Centers: Artificial Behavior or Much Ado About Nothing?

Candidates’ assertive impression-management (IM) behaviors affect performance ratings during selection interviews, a finding that has caused some concern about selection interviews’ objectivity and accuracy. Similar effects have been proposed for assessment centers, yet research on IM in assessments centers is rare and inconclusive. This study uses trait-activation theory (Tett &; Guterman, 2000 Tett, R. P. and Guterman, H. A. 2000. Situation trait relevance, trait expression, and cross-situational consistency: Testing a principle of trait activation. Journal of Research in Personality, 34: 397–423. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) to predict how assertive IM-behaviors emerge and influence performance ratings during assessments centers. Results showed that candidates’ ingratiation behaviors related to observer ratings on the conceptually related AC-dimension cooperation, whereas self-promotion behaviors related to ratings on the dimensions leadership and planning. Furthermore, assertive IM behaviors during the assessment center construct-related validity and correlated significantly with candidates’ performance in non-evaluative situations. Consequently, assertive IM behaviors in personnel selection may pose less of a threat than frequently assumed but may partially reflect a behavioral manifestation of candidates’ underlying interindividual differences.     

(Not) Thinking about you: Differences in victims’ and perpetrators’ self-focus after interpersonal and intergroup transgressions

We tested the hypothesis that, following a transgression, victims and perpetrators differ in their focus of attention. In three studies (total N = 740), we manipulated participants’ social role (victim vs. perpetrator) in a hypothetical scenario (Studies 1 and 2) and in a perceived real conflict (Study 3) in an interpersonal (Studies 1 and 2) and an intergroup (Study 3) context. Results from all studies confirmed that victims show a stronger self-focus than perpetrators. Moreover, results suggest victims’ higher self-focus as a predictor of willingness to reconcile. Participants’ self-focus mediated the effect of social role on reconciliation intentions as a single mediator (Study 2), or in sequence with their motivation to consider the other party's needs (Study 3). Overall, the present research suggests that victims and perpetrators differ in their focus of attention, and that this difference has important theoretical and practical implications for reconciliation between individuals and between groups.     

Dworkin’s Unity of Value: An Interpretation and Defense

Res Publica - Ronald Dworkin’s unity of value thesis underlies his influential moral, political, and legal thought. This essay presents an interpretation of the unity thesis designed to...     

Unity with(in) Plurality: Rawls’s Idea of Public Justification Reinterpreted

Abstract

This paper explores and interprets Rawls’s idea of public justification by analysing the types of reasons that citizens use when engaged in public justification of a political conception of justice. In particular, I focus on the distinction between “consensual” and “distributive” modes of justification. Some critics have argued that Rawls is unclear whether he is relying on “consensual” or “distributive” forms of reasoning; others argue that Rawls shifts inconsistently between them. I attempt to clarify this puzzle. I show that consensual and distributive modes of public reasoning are not mutually exclusive to each other. On the contrary, they are introduced as necessary components of public justification in Rawls’s theory. Thus, his model is consensual-cum-distributive. I also suggest some reasons why this model can better account for the liberal idea of pluralism, and how it offers a more realistic moral and political psychology, giving the account greater epistemic virtue than its alternatives.     

Narrating a Fantasmatic Unity: On the Contemporary Sinophone Discourse of China’s Civilizational Subjectivity

A powerful discourse centered on China’s civilizational subjectivity has emerged in the Sinophone intellectual world since the early 2000s. Among many promoters of this intellectual trend, Gan Yang, together with his slogan of the “fusion of three traditions,” is indeed most influential. This study employs Lacanian psychoanalytic technics to tackle Gan Yang’s thesis, treating the latter not just an object for textual analysis, but more deeply (and fruitfully), that for psychoanalysis. The findings of the study reveal the presence of a fantasmatic structure framing and guaranteeing Gan’s (sharply inconsistent) vision of China’s civilizational subjectivity. Such fantasmatic formation can be referred to as the “Great Dragon fantasy”—a fantasy about China’s civilizational unity and glory.     

Gemmules and Elements: On Darwin’s and Mendel’s Concepts and Methods in Heredity

Inheritance and variation were a major focus of Charles Darwin’s studies. Small inherited variations were at the core of his theory of organic evolution by means of natural selection. He put forward a developmental theory of heredity (pangenesis) based on the assumption of the existence of material hereditary particles. However, unlike his proposition of natural selection as a new mechanism for evolutionary change, Darwin’s highly speculative and contradictory hypotheses on heredity were unfruitful for further research. They attempted to explain many complex biological phenomena at the same time, disregarded the then modern developments in cell theory, and were, moreover, faithful to the widespread conceptions of blending and so-called Lamarckian inheritance. In contrast, Mendel’s approaches, despite the fact that features of his ideas were later not found to be tenable, proved successful as the basis for the development of modern genetics. Mendel took the study of the transmission of traits and its causes (genetics) out of natural history; by reducing complexity to simple particulate models, he transformed it into a scientific field of research. His scientific approach and concept of discrete elements (which later gave rise to the notion of discrete genes) also contributed crucially to the explanation of the existence of stable variations as the basis for natural selection.     

On time and ready to go: An analysis of commuters’ punctuality and energy levels at work or school

The strain of the daily commute can negatively impact performance at work. This study differentiates how various modes influence commuters’ punctuality and energy levels at work and school. The data for this study come from the 2013 McGill Commuter Survey, a university-wide survey in which students, staff and faculty described their typical commuting experience to McGill University, located in Montreal, Canada. Ten multilevel mixed-effects logistic regressions are used to determine the factors that impact (1) a commuter’s feeling of being energized when he or she arrives at work or school and (2) his or her punctuality. Our results show that weather conditions and mode of transportation have significant impacts on an individual’s energy at work and punctuality. The models indicate that drivers have the lowest odds of feeling energized and the highest odds of arriving late for work. Cyclists, meanwhile, have the highest odds of feeling energized and being punctual. Overall, this study provides evidence that satisfaction with travel mode is associated with higher odds of feeling energized and being punctual. With these findings in mind, policy makers should consider developing strategies that aim to increase the mode satisfaction of commuters. Encouraging the habit of commuting by bicycle may also lead to improved performance at work or school.     

Strange-but-true: a (quick) new argument for contextualism about ‘know’

A powerful objection to subject-sensitive invariantism (SSI) concerns various ‘strange-but-true’ (or “embarrassing”) conditionals. One popular response to this objection is to argue that strange-but-true conditionals pose a problem for non-sceptical epistemological theories in general. In the present paper, it is argued that strange-but-true conditionals are not a problem for contextualism about ‘know’. This observation undercuts the proposed defence of SSI, and supplies a surprising new argument for contextualism.     

God − Moore = Ramsey (A Reply to Chalmers and Hájek)

Famously, Frank P. Ramsey suggested a test for the acceptability of conditionals. Recently, David Chalmers and Alan Hájek (2007) have criticized a qualitative variant of the Ramsey test for indicative conditionals. In this paper we argue for the following three claims: (i) Chalmers and Hájek are right that the variant of the Ramsey test that they attack is not the correct way of spelling out an acceptability test for indicative conditionals. But there is a suppositional variant of the Ramsey test which is still stated in purely qualitative terms, which avoids the problems, and which looks correct. (ii) While the variant of the Ramsey test that Chalmers and Hájek criticize is not correct, it is still a good approximation of a correct formulation of the Ramsey test which may be usefully employed in various contexts. (iii) The variant of the Ramsey test that Chalmers and Hájek suggest as a substitute for the deficient version of the Ramsey test is itself subject to worries similar to those raised by Chalmers and Hájek, if it is given a non-suppositional interpretation.     

On Being Happy and Mistaken on a Good Day: Revisiting Forgas’s (1998) Mood-Bias Result

Forgas (1998) reported “on being happy and mistaken,” finding that a happy mood increased the fundamental attribution error (FAE) compared to a sad mood. However, the standard attitude-attribution paradigm used by Forgas might contain demand characteristics, to which happy people might be especially susceptible. In addition, Goldenberg and Forgas (2012) showed that a happy mood decreased a form of the FAE. Using the questioner-contestant paradigm, we replicated Forgas’s result, but only when participants were already having a “good day.”     

I’m Only Kidding: On Racist and Ethnic Jokes

Toward the end of his book Jokes, perhaps the best known philosophical treatment of the subject, Ted Cohen includes a notorious joke about a group of young Black men who are deterred from committing a gang rape by being thrown a basketball. This is a joke that perplexes Cohen and that he admits plays into stereotypes that presuppose the mindless obsession of Black youths with basketball as well as their unbridled sexuality. He agrees that the joke is morally bad and that it would be a better world without it. But he denies that its evil compromises its alleged funniness. He writes: “Wish that there were no mean jokes. Try remaking the world so that such jokes will have no place, will not arise. But do not deny that they are funny. That denial is a pretense that will help nothing.” In this paper, I want to challenge the claim that the moral defectiveness of a joke, especially a racist joke, cannot ever compromise its capacity to be funny.     

Political Inequality and the ‘Super-Rich’: Their Money or (some of) Their Political Rights

The ability of very wealthy individuals (or, as I will call them, the ‘super-rich’) to turn their economic power into political power has been—and remains—an important cause of political inequality. In response, this paper advocates an original solution. Rather than solving the problem through implementing a comprehensive conception of political equality, or through enforcing complex rules about financial disclosure etc., I argue that we should impose a choice on the super-rich. The super-rich must choose between (i) forfeiting the things that make them super-rich, i.e., pay a 100 % tax on their wealth above a certain level, or, (ii) they must forfeit some of their political rights. These rights include entitlements to fund political parties; to stand for office; and to work or volunteer for political parties. The right to vote, though, is not limited. I defend my proposal against non-consequentialist and consequentialist objections. I also argue that it avoids two problems that many attempts to reduce political inequality face; these are the political egalitarian’s dilemma and the problem of political equality’s relative moral importance.     

Epistemicism and Nihilism about Vagueness: What’s the Difference?

In this paper I argue, first, that the only difference between Epistemicism and Nihilism about vagueness is semantic rather than ontological, and second, that once it is clear what the difference between these views is, Nihilism is a much more plausible view of vagueness than Epistemicism. Given the current popularity of certain epistemicist views (most notably, Williamson’s), this result is, I think, of interest.