Concurrent validation of Hutt's Bender Gestalt screening method for schizophrenia, depression, and brain damage

The effectiveness of Hutt's Bender Gestalt scoring system in screening for schizophrenia, depression, and brain damage was investigated in a sample of mixed, psychiatric inpatients. Fifteen patients represented each diagnostic category. After an examination of each patient's Bender Gestalt protocol according to Hutt's criteria, it was found that the true positive and true negative success rates of the screening procedures for depression and brain damage were significantly higher than corresponding base rates. The Lacks Bender Gestalt screening method for brain damage was no more successful than the Hutt method in identifying true positives and true negatives. With the brain-damaged patients excluded, Hutt's screening procedures for both depression and schizophrenia resulted in significantly high rates of successful identification of true positives and true negatives. Moreover, these rates did not significantly differ from those determined by patients' Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) T scores on corresponding scales.     

Concurrent Validation of Hutt's Bender Gestalt Screening Method for Schizophrenia,Depression, and Brain Damage

The effectiveness of Hutt's Bender Gestalt scoring system in screening for schizophrenia, depression, and brain damage was investigated in a sample of mixed, psychiatric inpatients. Fifteen patients represented each diagnostic category. After an examination of each patient's Bender Gestalt protocol according to Hutt's criteria, it was found that the true positive and true negative success rates of the screening procedures for depression and brain damage were significantly higher than corresponding base rates. The Lacks Bender Gestalt screening method for brain damage was no more successful than the Hurt method in identifying true positives and true negatives. With the brain-damaged patients excluded, Hutt's screening procedures for both depression and schizophrenia resulted in significantly high rates of successful identification of true positives and true negatives. Moreover, these rates did not significantly differ from those determined by patients' Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) T scores on corresponding scales.     

Risk, Rights, and Restitution

In “Imposing Risks,” Judith Thomson gives a case in which, by turning on her stove, she accidentally causes her neighbor’s death. She claims that both the following are true: (1) she ought not to have caused her neighbor’s death; (2) it was permissible for her to turn her stove on. In this paper it is argued that it cannot be that both (1) and (2) are true, that (2) is true, and that therefore (1) is false. How this is so is explained, and the implications of this position regarding the relation between rights and duties is explored.     

Hesperus is Phosphorus, Indeed

Tobias Hansson Wahlberg argues in a recent article that the truth of “Hesperus is Phosphorus” depends on the assumption that the endurance theory of persistence is true. I argue that the premise Wahlberg’s conclusion is based upon leads to absurd consequences, therefore, nothing recommends it. As a consequence, “Hesperus is Phosphorus” has to be true, if it is true, regardless of which theory of persistence one is committed to.     

Quasi-miracles,typicality, and counterfactuals

If one flips an unbiased coin a million times, there are 2^1,000,000 series of possible heads/tails sequences, any one of which might be the sequence that obtains, and each of which is equally likely to obtain. So it seems (1) ‘If I had tossed a fair coin one million times, it might have landed heads every time’ is true. But as several authors have pointed out, (2) ‘If I had tossed a fair coin a million times, it wouldn’t have come up heads every time’ will be counted as true in everyday contexts. And according to David Lewis’ influential semantics for counterfactuals, (1) and (2) are contradictories. We have a puzzle. We must either (A) deny that (2) is true, (B) deny that (1) is true, or (C) deny that (1) and (2) are contradictories, thus rejecting Lewis’ semantics. In this paper I discuss and criticize the proposals of David Lewis and more recently J. Robert G. Williams which solve the puzzle by taking option (B). I argue that we should opt for either (A) or (C).     

P300 latency, but not amplitude or topography, distinguishes between true and false recognition

Two experiments are described in which the P300 component of the event-related potential was recorded during a modification of the Deese-Roediger-McDermott false-memory paradigm. P300 amplitudes and topographies were evaluated in both true recognition of previously presented (studied) words and in false recognition of associatively related, never presented (critical lure) words. P300 topography and amplitude did not appear to differ between true and false recognition. However, false recognition of critical lures produced substantially shorter P300 latencies than did the true recognition of studied words.     

Explanation, imagination, and confidence in judgment.

This article concerns a class of experimental manipulations that require people to generate explanations or imagine scenarios. A review of studies using such manipulations indicates that people who explain or imagine a possibility then express greater confidence in the truth of that possibility. It is argued that this effect results from the approach people take in the explanation or imagination task: They temporarily assume that the hypothesis is true and assess how plausibly it can account for the relevant evidence. From this view, any task that requires that a hypothesis be treated as if it were true is sufficient to increase confidence in the truth of that hypothesis. Such tasks cause increased confidence in the hypothesis at the expense of viable alternatives because of changes in problem representation, evidence evaluation, and information search that take place when the hypothesis is temporarily treated as if it were true.     

Freedom,foreknowledge, and betting

Certain kinds of prediction, foreknowledge, and future-oriented action appear to require settled future truths. But open futurists think that the future is metaphysically unsettled: if it is open whether p is true, then it cannot currently be settled that p is true. So, open futurists—and libertarians who adopt the position—face the objection that their view makes rational action and deliberation impossible. I defuse the epistemic concern: open futurism does not entail obviously counterintuitive epistemic consequences or prevent rational action.     

Badiou,Priest, and the Hegelian Infinite

Abstract

Hegel’s distinction between the bad and true infinites has provoked contrasting reactions in the works of Alain Badiou and Graham Priest. Badiou claims that Hegel illegitimately attempts to impose a distinction that is only relevant to the qualitative realm onto the quantitative realm. He suggests that Cantor’s mathematical account of infinite multiplicities that are determinate and actual remains an endlessly proliferating bad infinite when placed within Hegel’s faulty schema. In contrast, Priest affirms the Hegelian true infinite, claiming that Cantor’s formal mechanisms of boundary transcendence, such as ‘diagonalization’, are implicit in Hegel’s dialectic. While arguing that a clear dividing line can be drawn here between these two interpretations of the relationship between Hegel and Cantor, this paper also mounts a defence of the Hegelian true infinite by developing Priest’s suggestion that Cantorian diagonalizing functions are prefigured by Hegel’s dialectical overcoming of limits.     

Propositions,representation, and truth

Synthese - Theories of propositions as sets of truth-supporting circumstances are committed to the thesis that sentences or other representations true in all and only the same circumstances express...     

Free to be me: The relationship between the true self,rejection sensitivity,and use of online dating sites

Prior research (Blackhart et al., 2014) found that rejection-sensitive individuals are more likely to use online dating sites. The purpose of the current research was to explain the relationship between rejection sensitivity and online dating site usage. Study 1 examined whether true self mediated the relation between rejection sensitivity and online dating. Study 2 sought to replicate the findings of Study 1 and to examine whether self-disclosure moderated the relationship between true self and online dating in the mediation model. Results replicated those found by Blackhart et al. and also found that true self mediated the relationship between rejection sensitivity and online dating site usage. These findings suggest that rejection-sensitive individuals feel they can more easily represent their “true” selves in online environments, such as online dating sites, which partially explains why they are more likely to engage in online dating.     

False memories in children and adults: age,distinctiveness, and subjective experience

This study investigated developmental trends associated with the Deese/Roediger-McDermott false-memory effect, the role of distinctive information in false-memory formation, and participants' subjective experience of true and false memories. Children (5- and 7-year-olds) and adults studied lists of semantically associated words. Half of the participants studied words alone, and half studied words accompanied by pictures. There were significant age differences in recall (5-year-olds evinced more false memories than did adults) but not in recognition of critical lures. Distinctive information reduced false memory for all age groups. Younger children provided with distinctive information, and older children and adults regardless of whether they viewed distinctive information, expressed higher levels of confidence in true than in false memories. Source attributions did not significantly differ between true and false memories. Implications for theories of false memory and memory development are discussed.     

Knowledge,certainty, and assertion

Researchers have debated whether knowledge or certainty is a better candidate for the norm of assertion. Should you make an assertion only if you know it's true? Or should you make an assertion only if you're certain it's true? If either knowledge or certainty is a better candidate, then this will likely have detectable behavioral consequences. I report an experiment that tests for relevant behavioral consequences. The results support the view that assertability is more closely linked to knowledge than to certainty. In multiple scenarios, people were much more willing to allow assertability and certainty to come apart than to allow assertability and knowledge to come apart.     

教条悖论：行为心理学家的新挑战

在各种专业或私人情境中, 人们经常需要整合不同的意见来判断某一观点的对错。当观点的形式类似于将多个论点组合而成的逻辑公式(使用“且”、“或”等逻辑连接词)时, 容易产生教条悖论(doctrinal paradox)。即, 虽然整体意见支持该观点是正确的(或错误的), 但是分析这些整体意见中所包含的各个论点, 却会得到相反的结论。教条悖论是判断整合研究中关注的重要问题, 已在各科学领域引发大量的规范性研究。行为心理学家需在这个重要问题上开展系统研究。本文简要介绍了教条悖论及其过往研究, 总结已有的行为数据, 并指出未来行为研究的方向和视角。     

Positive Self-Statements: Power for Some, Peril for Others

ABSTRACT— Positive self-statements are widely believed to boost mood and self-esteem, yet their effectiveness has not been demonstrated. We examined the contrary prediction that positive self-statements can be ineffective or even harmful. A survey study confirmed that people often use positive self-statements and believe them to be effective. Two experiments showed that among participants with low self-esteem, those who repeated a positive self-statement ("I'm a lovable person") or who focused on how that statement was true felt worse than those who did not repeat the statement or who focused on how it was both true and not true. Among participants with high self-esteem, those who repeated the statement or focused on how it was true felt better than those who did not, but to a limited degree. Repeating positive self-statements may benefit certain people, but backfire for the very people who "need" them the most.     

Holding in Mind Conflicting Information: Pretending,Working Memory,and Executive Control

Preschoolers' recall of the true and pretend identities of an object in pretense was examined along with a battery of executive functioning and working memory tasks. We expected that children would retain separate identities, as well as a link between them, after observing episodes of pretense, and that memory for pretense would be related to executive functioning and working memory. Children (aged 37–59 months) recalled the true identity of an object better than its pretend identity. Children's recall of at least one identity was correlated with executive functioning and “dual” working memory tasks, independent of age and verbal ability. Memory for both identities was only correlated with executive functioning. The findings are generally supportive of the claim that children form separate representations of the true and pretend identities of objects. The results extend findings of well-established relations between false belief tasks and executive functioning and working memory.     

Relativism,realism, and subjective facts

Synthese - Relativists make room for the possibility of “faultless disagreement” by positing the existence of subjective propositions, i.e. propositions true from some points of view...