Why ‘Is’ Must Entail ‘Ought’

I argue below for the view that non-moral truths entail moral ones. I first argue that moral claims do have truth values which are objectively true or false. I then argue that this objectivism does not entail non-relativism. I produce a simple possible worlds argument for the entailment view. I then give some examples where p entails q but many intelligent people have thought it does not, and where it does not, but many intelligent people have thought that it does. I also try to evaluate a somewhat neglected argument by Hume. In the final section, I further consider some moral and meta-moral opinions.     

From ‘Is’ to ‘Ought’ in Moral Epistemology

Many philosophers claim that no formally valid argument can have purely non-normative premises and a normative or moral conclusion that occurs essentially. Mark Nelson recently proposed a new counterexample to this Humean doctrine:All of Dahlia's beliefs are true.Dahlia believes that Bertie morally ought to marry Madeleine. Bertie morally ought to marry Madeleine.I argue that Nelson's universal premise has no normative content, that Nelson's argument is valid formally, and that Nelson's moral conclusion occurs essentially and not vacuously. Nonetheless, I show that Nelson's argument faces a more fundamental problem if it is used in moral epistemology. An argument that appeals to a moral authority, such as Dahlia, might justify some moral belief out of a contrast class that does not include extreme views like moral nihilism; but it begs the question against moral nihilism, since one cannot be adequately justified in believing the conjunction of its premises without depending on assumptions that moral nihilists would deny. Thus, arguments like Nelson's can accomplish something important in moral epistemology, but their use is strictly limited.     

‘Is’–‘Ought’ Derivations and Ethical Taxonomies

Hume seems to claim that there does not exist a valid argument that has all non-ethical sentences as premises and an ethical sentence as its conclusion. Starting with Prior, a number of counterexamples to this claim have been proposed. Unfortunately, all of these proposals are controversial. Even the most plausible have a premise that seems like it might be an ethical sentence or a conclusion that seems like it might be non-ethical. Since it is difficult to tell whether any of these counterexamples are genuine, we need a taxonomy that sorts out ethical sentences from non-ethical ones. We need to know the difference between an ‘Is’ and an ‘Ought’. In the first part of the paper, I establish the need for a taxonomy. I consider some of the most influential ‘Is’–‘Ought’ derivations. These include proposals by Prior and Searle. I argue that each proposal has a premise whose status as ethical or non-ethical is difficult to determine. In the second part of the paper, I consider taxonomies proposed by Karmo and Maitzen. I argue against both taxonomies. I end with the claim that we need a taxonomy of ethical sentences and that none of the current proposals are adequate.

Mismatches between ‘Scientific’ and ‘Non-Scientific’ Ways of Knowing and Their Contributions to Public Understanding of Science

As differentiation within scientific disciplines increases, so does differentiation between the sciences and other ways of knowing. This distancing between ‘scientific’ and ‘non-scientific’ cultures reflects differences in what are considered valid and reliable approaches to acquiring knowledge and has played a major role in recent science-oriented controversies. Scientists’ reluctance to actively engage in science communication, coupled with journalists’ reliance on the norms of balance, conflict, and human interest in covering scientific issues, have combined to exacerbate public mistrust of science on issues like the measles-mumps-rubella (MMR) vaccine. The failure of effective communications between scientists and non-scientists has hindered the progress of both effective science and effective policy. In order to better bridge the gap between the ‘scientific’ and ‘non-scientific’ cultures, renewed efforts must be made to encourage substantive public engagement, with the ultimate goal of facilitating an open, democratic policy-making process.     

There is no ‘Is’ of constitution

I defend the view that ordinary objects like statues are identical to the pieces of matter from which they are made. I argue that ordinary speakers assert sentences such as ‘this statue is a molded piece of clay’. This suggests that speakers believe propositions which entail that ordinary objects such as statues are the pieces matter from which they are made, and therefore pluralism contradicts ordinary beliefs. The dominant response to this argument purports to find an ambiguity in the word ‘is’, such that ‘is’ in these sentences means the same as ‘constitutes or is constituted by’. I will use standard tests for ambiguity to argue that this strategy fails. I then explore and reject other responses to the argument.     

Is ‘human action’ A category?

It seems to have been taken for granted that we all know what a human action is. However in attempting to draw from what philosophers have said about actions the necessary clues as to their distinguishing features, one finds little to discourage the idea that there is no way of distinguishing one category of occurrences, human actions, from the complex of different sorts of things which happen. From this I am tempted to conclude that there is no category of human action. But before drawing such a conclusion an ancient but terrible question must be faced: What sorts of things happen in the world ? This ancient question is faced but not answered. It is brought up because the failure to find a satisfactory answer to the question, Is human action a category? is a failure even to find a satisfactory assumption about what kind of reference the term ‘human action’ is supposed to have.     

What Is ‘Real’ in Probabilism?

This paper defends two related claims about belief: first, the claim that, unlike numerical degrees of belief, comparative beliefs are primitive and psychologically real; and, second, the claim that the fundamental norm of Probabilism is not that numerical degrees of belief should satisfy the probability axioms, but rather that comparative beliefs should satisfy certain constraints.     

Moral dilemmas,disjunctive obligations,and Kant's principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’

In moral dilemmas, where circumstances prevent two or more equally justified prima facie ethical requirements from being fulfilled, it is often maintained that, since the agent cannot do both, conjoint obligation is overridden by Kant's principle that ought implies can, but that the agent nevertheless has a disjunctive obligation to perform one of the otherwise obligatory actions or the other. Against this commonly received view, it is demonstrated that although Kant's ought-can principle may avoid logical inconsistency, the principle is incompatible with disjunctive obligation in standard deontic logic, and that it entails paradoxically that none of the conflicting dilemma actions will in fact occur. The principle appears to provide the only plausible safeguard against deontic antinomy, but cannot be admitted because of its collision with considered moral judgments.     

‘Knowing all this just makes it harder’: Psychodynamic Ideas on the Frontline

This paper was given as the fifth Annual Ellen Noonan Counselling Lecture on 12 July 2011 and retains some of the spoken style of the lecture. The theme pursues an aspect of Ellen Noonan’s thinking, in that she always valued equipping students with learning they could take back into the workplace rather than purely training clinicians. The paper addresses both the usefulness and potential difficulties of providing front-line workers with psychodynamic insight. It might appear self-evidently worthwhile to offer staff in the caring and educational professions greater understanding of the roots and meaning of the difficulties faced by their clients and of the dynamics involved in working with them. This paper, while stressing the immense value of such awareness, looks at what can be problematic about it, both for staff and their employing agencies. It also describes ways of addressing such issues, both at an individual and organisational level.     

Is ecology an ‘alternative’ natural science?

This article discusses whether ecology represents an alternative type of natural science, that is normatively committed. Central questions are:-how man and human action are integrated into the subject matter of ecology;-whether evaluative concepts like health are incorporated into the conceptual structure of ecology; and-whether ecology transcends the image of natural knowledge as control of nature.It is concluded that all hypotheses of ecology being inherently judgmental in character must be rejected.Like all the healing arts, ecology is through and through judgmental in character. It cannot be value-neutral.... What violates the natural harmony must be condemned; what enhances it be endorsed.... Ecology is the closest our science has yet come to an integrative wisdom. It, not physics, deserves to become the basic science of the future.     

Is Mencius' doctrine of ‘extending affection’ tenable?

In his doctrine of ‘extending affection’ (tui en), Mencius holds that one can transform particular consanguineous affection into universal humane love by the way of ‘taking this heart here and applying it to what is over there’. Through a critical analysis of the text of the Mencius, it is attempted to argue that although this doctrine can combine the two mainstays of Confucian thought, i.e., filiality and humaneness, into an integrated unity, it is not tenable within the Confucian framework in the light of the fundamental spirit of Confucianism, especially in the light of the principle of ‘love with distinctions’ advocated by Mencius himself, which definitely gives consanguineous affection the supreme position in human life.     

‘强攻’难敌‘智取’

在某单位的分房办公室里,一场唇枪舌战正激烈地展开。“交战”的一方是素有“善辨王”之称的职工罗良,另一方则是该单位的分房工作人员王珏。“86年原单位曾为我调过房,这是事实,但没有分过房。咱分房方案明明规定:1985年以来,原单位曾分过房,因转让、出售、子女结婚等原因造成的住房困难,此次分房不予解决。我虽把调过的房转让给我妹,但也不属於分房方案规定之列。因为我是调过房,而不是分过房。”罗良口齿伶俐,一串串“连珠炮”不停地开火:     

Is that all there is?

I take issue with two suggestions of Joel Feinberg's: first, that it is incoherent to suppose that human life as such is absurd, and, second, that a particular human life may be absurd and yet saved from being tragic by being fulfilled. I also argue that human life as such may well be absurd and I consider various responses to this.     

Some Forms of Collectively Bringing About or ‘Seeing to it that’

Journal of Philosophical Logic - One of the best known approaches to the logic of agency are the ‘stit’ (‘seeing to it that’) logics. Often, it is not the actions of an...     

Is Historical Epistemology Part of the ‘Modernist Settlement’?

Bruno Latour, as part of his advocacy of science studies urges us to move beyond what he calls ‘the Modernist Settlement’ that, among other things, separated science from politics and subject from object. As part of this project he has frequently called for the abolition of epistemology, including quite specifically the historical epistemology/epistemological history of Gaston Bachelard and Georges Canguilhem. Pierre Bourdieu, on the other hand, deploys the resources of historical epistemology, to dismiss Latour’s science studies. After examining the charges against historical epistemology and their rebuttal, I rule in favor of the defense. However, I also suggest that Latour raises genuine concerns about how to equip ourselves to tackle problems such as those associated with climate change; these are problems that require engagement with the politics of nature, with the politics of the sciences of nature and with the epistemological challenges associated with the need to deploy multiple disciplines in the service of complex, practical, policy-relevant problem solving.     

Defining ‘Dead’ in Terms of ‘Lives’ and ‘Dies’

What is it for a thing to be dead? Fred Feldman holds, correctly in my view, that a definition of ‘dead’ should leave open both (1) the possibility of things that go directly from being dead to being alive, and (2) the possibility of things that go directly from being alive to being neither alive nor dead, but merely in suspended animation. But if this is right, then surely such a definition should also leave open the possibility of things that go directly from being dead to being neither alive nor dead, but merely in suspended animation. I show that Feldman’s own definition of ‘dead’ (in terms of ‘lives’ and ‘dies’) does not leave this possibility open. I propose a new definition that does.     

Sibley on ‘Beautiful’ and ‘Ugly’

Abstract

Frank Sibley's ideas have been particularly influential among contemporary philosophers interested in aesthetics. Most studies, however, have focused only on his earlier works. In this essay, I explore Sibley's account of the adjectives ‘beautiful’ and ‘ugly’, paying particular attention to three papers that have only recently been published and that have not yet received adequate attention. In particular, I discuss his account of the adjective ‘beautiful’, which relies on the controversial notion of an aesthetic ideal. In addition, I discuss an account of how aesthetic judgements may change in relation to our coming to know the kind of object being judged and whether, as Sibley maintains, ‘beautiful’ and ‘ugly’ are asymmetric in the sense specified by the author.