When is a picture?

Philosophical discussions of depiction sometimes suffer from a lack of differentiation between several questions concerning the ‘nature’ of pictorial representation. To provide a suitable framework I distinguish six such questions and several levels on which one might want to proceed in order to answer some of them. With this background, I reconstruct Goodman's and Elgin's answer to the specific question: ‘What distinguishes the pictorial from the verbal or linguistic?’ I try to reveal some major motivations behind their system-oriented approach and to indicate some reasons why a strategy of this kind is to a certain extent mandatory to grasp the ‘nature of the pictorial’. The system-relative and functional character of depiction has to be captured by every adequate theory.     

When is motion 'motion'?

Examples of visual motion have become more and more abstract over the years, leading up to 'third-order' stimuli where direction is actually determined by the observer through top - down attention. But how far can this be pushed--are there motion stimuli that are yet more arbitrary and abstract? Actually, there is a broad class of 'conceptual motion' stimuli--things like a moving grating of faces, or a shifting pattern of words--that are perfect analogs to traditional 'perceptual motion' stimuli, solvable by the same motion computation and for which observers can readily make direction-of-motion judgments. Interestingly though, these do not produce a sensation of motion (among other automatic consequences of motion detection). Here we compare a luminance-based perceptual motion stimulus to a semantic-based conceptual motion stimulus to contrast the psychophysical hallmarks of these motion categories.     

Where is here? When is now?1

With a Kleinian perspective influenced by Betty Joseph, the author describes the distinctive ‘here and now’ of a psychoanalysis as the place and the time of the patient’s inner subjective world as it emerges in the work of patient and analyst. This psychoanalytic ‘here’ and ‘now’ is examined with clinical material from the analysis of Mr X; first, with an account of the way his analysis begins and then through a detailed session five years later.The author identifies Mr X’s problems with place and time, and how these change over the course of the analysis. He moves from sequestered dyadic relationships towards an Oedipal and family space, and from disconnection and timelessness to acquiring a sense of duration, of being in the present with a past and a future – all of which, the paper aims to show, has implications for technique.     

When is a Deleuzian becoming ?

Much has been written recently about the Deleuzian concept of becoming. Most of that writing, especially in feminist criticism, has drawn from the later collaborations with Guattari. However, the concept of a becoming arises earlier and appears more consistently across the trajectory of Deleuze's work than the discussion of specific becomings might lead one to believe. In this paper, I trace the concept of becoming in Deleuze's work, and specifically in the earlier works. By doing so, I hope to shed some light on the specific becomings that are the focus of the collaborative work with Guattari, and to deepen an understanding of the concept in general.     

When is cataphoric reference recognised?

Pronouns typically have explicit antecedents in the prior discourse otherwise processing difficulty is experienced. However, it has been argued [Gordon, P. C., & Hendrick, R. (1997). Intuitive knowledge of linguistic co-reference. Cognition, 62, 325–370; Gordon, P. C., & Hendrick, R. (1998). The representation and processing of co-reference in discourse. Cognitive Science, 22, 389–424] that when a pronoun appears in a preposed subordinate clause (as in, Before she began to sing, Susan stood up), incremental interpretation is suspended and no antecedent is immediately sought, since the pronoun cannot be resolved until the main clause is encountered. We report results from an eye-tracking study showing that on encountering a pronoun that has no prior antecedent (compared to cases where there is an explicit prior antecedent), readers experience immediate difficulty whether or not the pronoun appears in a preposed subordinate clause, suggesting that attempted incremental interpretation is not suspended in these cases.     

When is received social support related to perceived support and well-being? When it is needed

How do perceptions of being supported relate to the amount of social support received? Received and perceived support have generally been found to be only moderately related. Previous research has however focused on the amount of support received regardless of whether it was needed. We hypothesized that a measure of support received when needed would predict perceived support and well-being better than would an unqualified measure of received support. Study 1 found that correlations between received support and perceived support measures were, on average, twice as high when received support was measured as the proportion of times support was received when needed (average r = .54) than when it was measured as the number of times support was received (average r = .28). Similar results were found for correlations between received support and mental health which rose from r = .04 to r = .31 when need for support was considered. Study 2 replicated the strong relationship between support received when needed and both perceived support and mental health. Received support measures should be adapted to take the need for support into consideration in future investigation of these relationships. Social support interventions may only be beneficial if the recipient’s support needs are not already being met.     

When is a weight not illusory?

Weight illusions occur whenever some aspect of an object--such as its size, material or colour--arouses the expectation that its weight will be heavier or lighter than it actually is. The direction of the illusion normally contrasts with the expected weight. When objects are hidden from sight and lifted by strings they can provide no misleading cues, and a correct weight-expectation should be achieved after one or two trials. When a visible object has the same physical and apparent weight as a hidden object, it can be defined as non-illusory. Weighted tins and polystyrene blocks of various sizes were compared with hidden weights. Tins were found to be non-illusory when their density was about 1.7, and polystyrene blocks when their density was about 0.14.

Weight illusions may be due to a central scaling process which enables a wide range of weights to be estimated, different ranges being selected according to the expected value of the weight. If the selected range is inappropriate an illusion occurs. Changes in expected value could also allow for the operation of “weight-constancy” during changes in proprioceptive stimulation.     

When is a cognitive system embodied?

For cognitive systems, embodiment appears to be of crucial importance. Unfortunately, nobody seems to be able to define embodiment in a way that would prevent it from also covering its trivial interpretations such as mere situatedness in complex environments. The paper focuses on the definition of embodiment, especially whether physical embodiment is necessary and/or sufficient for cognitive systems. Cognition is characterized as a continuous complex process rather than ahistorical logical capability. Furthermore, the paper investigates the relationship between cognitive embodiment and the issues of understanding, representation and task specification.     

When is sociality congruent with self-care?

Kumar and Epley (2023) argue that people underinvest in spending time, effort, and money on other people, and that consumers' own well-being would improve from increased “sociality.” We pose two questions to enhance understanding of the relationship between sociality and efforts to benefit one's own well-being: (1) when will other-oriented consumption promote versus hinder consumers' own well-being, and (2) what leads consumers to embrace versus forego efforts to improve their well-being (i.e., self-care) that does not involve sociality? We propose that the degree to which the consumer is concerned about incorporating others' preferences, the magnitude of resources involved, and the temporal dynamics of consumption will be relevant factors in addressing these two questions. Future research to explore the proposed three factors and other factors will be important for consumers who seek to improve their well-being as well as marketers who seek to promote it.     

When is a Concrete Property Basic?

We more or less understand how composition works in the case of objects. We cement bricks together to build a wall. We stir together red paint and yellow paint to get orange paint. In both cases, one way or another, A = B + C. This paper examines composition in the case of concrete natural properties. It explains why property composition is so much less straightforward than object composition. Then it distinguishes strictly basic properties (like the mass of an electron), compositely basic properties (like the mass of a planet), and fully non-basic properties (like the saltiness of blood). It shows how strictly basic properties compose, or result in, compositely basic and fully non-basic properties, which differ from, yet depend for their natures on, the strictly basic properties they result from. It explains the characteristics and differences of these types of properties. It notes that the existence of compositely basic and non-basic properties grounds an argument for the genuine existence of composite properties as well as the composite objects they characterize. Finally, it defends the usefulness of these distinctions by identifying projects they assist, and by applying them both to mark off distinct metaphysical views too often conflated and to correct sundry metaphysical mistakes.     

When is an alternative possibility robust?

According to some, free will requires alternative possibilities. But not any old alternative possibility will do. Sometimes, being able to bring about an alternative does not bestow any control on an agent. In order to bestow control, and so be directly relevant qua alternative to grounding the agent's moral responsibility, alternatives need to be robust. Here, I investigate the nature of robust alternatives. I argue that Derk Pereboom's latest robustness criterion is too strong, and I suggest a different criterion based on the idea that what agents need to be able to do is keep open the possibility of securing their blamelessness, rather than needing to directly ensure their own blamelessness at the time of decision.     

Good to Bad or Bad to Bad? What is the relationship between valence and the trait content of the Big Two?

In this article we directly assessed the relationship between valence and relevant traits of the Big Two dimensions (i.e., communion and agency). Drawing on previous research, we expected that the relationship with valence would be less monotonous and more variable in direction across agency-related traits, compared to communion-related traits. In three repeated measures studies we assessed the perceived valence of each trait dimension on a continuum of seven points. Studies 1 and 2 defined each continuum verbally. In Study 3 each continuum was defined by facial features. Results across these studies show that valence is linearly and more consistently related with communion-related traits than with agency-related traits. Within agency, however, competence established a positive linear relationship with valence, whereas dominance showed a target-sensitive relationship with valence: quadratic in evaluation of trait concepts, and negative and linear in face evaluation. We discuss the implications of these data for Big Two-related research.     

When is it time to stop? When good enough becomes bad enough

This article draws on Winnicott’s concept of the good enough mother to discuss how to know whether a therapeutic situation is good enough to continue or bad enough to end. This dilemma is explored in terms of clinical syndromes, such as anorexia and pathological gambling, but focuses mainly on analyst-initiated endings, which are termed the ‘Casablanca dilemma’, based on an amplification of the ending of the film Casablanca. The author goes on to discuss such one-sided endings, drawing on interviews with 40 analysts and therapists about their clinical experience. A typology of bad enough endings is presented. The psychological differences between a good enough analysis as opposed to a bad enough one are explored through the ideas of Winnicott and Neumann.     

What's Bad About Bad Faith?

Abstract: Contemporary common sense holds that authenticity is an ethical ideal: that there is something bad about inauthenticity, and something good about authenticity. Here we criticize the view that authenticity is bad because it detracts from the wellbeing of the inauthentic person, and propose an alternative moral account of the badness of inauthenticity, based on the idea that inauthentic behaviour is potentially misleading.     

When is a counselor …?

A work experience project for low income adults is described. “Counselors” in this project were found to have little experience; little training in interviewing, statistics, psychological analysis, or other guidance and counseling techniques; and inadequate supervision. Results on aptitude tests were reported on the average 26 days after test administration. Occupational information was sadly lacking. The question is raised: When is a counselor… ?     

When and why is ease of retrieval informative?

In two experiments, we examined when and why ease of retrieval of information from memory affects behavioral frequency and attitudinal judgments. Overall, the results suggest that when the subjective experience of ease of retrieval is consistent with the expected ease of retrieval, the content of the information retrieved is used to make judgments. However, when there is a discrepancy between experienced and expected ease of retrieval, the subjective experience of ease of retrieval is used to make judgments. Ease of retrieval is more informative when the discrepancy between experienced and expected ease of retrieval cannot be attributed to task contingencies; when it can, ease of retrieval ceases to be informative.     

When is enough enough? We are only beginning

Sheridan (1995) presents the problem of the psychologist consulting to a medical residency program as an example of the difficulty one experiences in attempting to challenge, even from a data-based perspective, the calcification inherent in health systems and medical education in particular. This paper responds to her challenging questions, “How much should we get involved in changing health care and medical education, and at what level (local, national) should psychology intervene (if at all)?” It is suggested that psychologists pick up the challenge to bring about change, whenever possible, with the admonition—we are only beginning.