Reaching the Limits of Secularization? Turkish‐ and Moroccan‐Dutch Muslims in the Netherlands 1998–2006

This research note focuses on Muslim minorities living in a secular context, the Netherlands. The question is whether mosque attendance among Turkish‐ and Moroccan‐Dutch changed between 1998 and 2006, testing mechanisms of religious decline and religious vitality. Elaborating on previous research of the same Muslim groups, this study examines a longer time span and adds contextual‐level explanations. Whereas previous research reported a linear trend towards secularization over time and over generations, in recent years the trend has become more complex. The revival of religious attendance among the second generation is most striking. Forces of secularization such as educational attainment and generational replacement gradually lose their predictive power. Over time, processes of secularization are therefore not inevitable.     

The Limits of Secularization? The Resurgence of Orthodoxy in Post‐Soviet Russia

The collapse of the Soviet Union ended a long period of state repression of religion, facilitating a possible religious revival in Russia. Despite evidence of increasing levels of Russian Orthodox identification in the 1990s, however, the debate over whether post‐Soviet Russia is an exception to secularization trends elsewhere continues. We address this debate by examining trends in Orthodox identification and church attendance and their impact on conservative moral values, as well as the basis of religiosity in age cohorts, using a seven‐wave national, stratified random sample survey covering 1993–2007. The analysis indicates continued growth in Orthodox self‐identification, increased church attendance, and an increasingly strong association between religiosity and conservative morality over this time period. Moreover, signs of religious revival are most pronounced among the cohort of people who came to maturity after communism ended. The resurgence of Orthodoxy in Russia provides a robust exception to secularization trends in Western Europe.     

Deconfessionalisation in the Netherlands, 1964–1992

Using data from 1098 national Dutch surveys, this paper explores trends in the influence of religious denomination on votes for confessional political parties in the Netherlands from 1964 to 1992. The broad question is whether confessional voting has declined over this 29‐year period; the narrow issue is whether the declines vary with religious denomination and time. Logit analysis of the overall effect allows a downward trend in the influence of denomination. The most spectacular decays occurred in the 1960s and 1970s, among Catholics and Rereformed Protestants. Many of the shifts slowed down appreciably in the late 1970s and subsequently abated in the mid‐1980s. Possible explanations for these findings are discussed.     

Religious Change over the Generations in an Extremely Secular Society: The Case of Sweden

The main argument of this paper is that religious change caused by modifying supply in the religious market takes time due to intergenerational value change. Unlike previous research, this study suggests that not only do religious agents on the supply side need time to adjust, but that the time lag is probably even greater among individuals on the demand side of the religious market. Using time series data, the study demonstrates that, despite shrinking church attendance, interest in religious concepts such as “salvation” has increased in the generations born after 1970 in Sweden. Describing the transformation of the Swedish religious market from a regulated religious monopoly before 1970 to an increasingly deregulated and competitive religious supply since 1970, the study explains this revival in religious interest on the part of generations whose formative years were after 1970. As these generations replace previous generation with less religious interest, religious interest is rising in the Swedish population. The conclusion holds even when controlling for period and lifecycle effects, as well as alternative explanations of religious change such as increased migration and the existential security thesis.     

Is Religious Attendance Bottoming Out? An Examination of Current Trends Across Europe

The purpose of this research note is to summarize the available data on trends in religious attendance across 24 European countries to determine whether a base level has been reached in some countries. We focus on the changes observed in the period 1990–2012. After critically assessing the data quality of the recent European Social Survey (ESS) and European Values Study (EVS), we present four different methods of assessing current trends. First, we assess intercohort differentials, an indicator previously used extensively. We then look at trends in young people's rates of attendance, followed by trends of the postwar cohorts born in 1950–1981. We proceed to an appraisal of individual life‐course variations by looking at attendance as a child and young adult. A compilation of these indicators shows that they often do not fully agree on whether there is growth, decline, or stability. To generalize, the high‐attending Catholic countries are more likely to exhibit religious decline, whilst a few ex‐communist countries are seeing sustained growth. The most secular countries seem to be generally stabilizing in the 5–20 percent range for attendance rates of the postwar generations.     

Religiosity and Financial Crises in the United States

The farm crisis in the United States in the 1980s had profound effects on rural, agricultural regions of the country, but almost no impact on urban and suburban areas. At the same time, the 2007–2008 housing crisis impacted almost all metropolitan areas, but was much more deeply felt in certain states, such as California, Arizona, Nevada, and Florida. I use a difference‐in‐differences methodology and find that religiosity as measured by religious attendance, prayer frequency, and religious intensity increased significantly in areas impacted by the farm crisis for those who worked in agriculture, and by the housing crisis for those who worked in housing‐related industries. Chen describes increased religiosity in Indonesia following the 1998 financial crisis, and this article demonstrates a similar response to severe financial distress in the United States. This increase is not due to a lower opportunity cost of time, as those who are currently employed have higher levels of attendance than those who are not. I hypothesize that the increased religiosity results from religious institutions’ ability to provide public goods, both financial and emotional, in the form of community support.     

Religious Attendance and Happiness: Examining Gaps in the Current Literature—A Research Note

Two major gaps exist in research examining the positive association between religious attendance and happiness. First, scholars have argued that this association may be because of people's perceived relationship with God or the social cohesion one experiences with other parishioners, but scholars have not studied both pathways simultaneously. Using nationally representative cross‐sectional data (General Social Survey), I first examine the influence of one's perceived relationship with God and one's perceived social cohesion within the religious community on happiness. One's perceived relationship with God is more strongly associated with happiness than is social cohesion. Second, scholars overwhelmingly use religious attendance as the independent variable, with happiness as the dependent variable. Using two waves of data from a nationally representative panel study (National Survey of Families and Households), I then examine the relationship between religious attendance and happiness over time, finding that religious attendance has a greater effect on happiness than happiness has on religious attendance.     

Is Religious Service Attendance Declining?

Weekend attendance at conventional religious services remains the most common form of social religious action in American society. Debates about secularization, discussions of congregations as sites of political skill-building and mobilization, and research on religion's contributions to stocks of social capital often rely partly on claims about trends in religious service attendance. Yet, existing evidence does not definitively establish whether attendance at religious services declined in American society from the 1950s to the present. We examine the trend in religious service attendance between 1990 and 2006. Evidence from several sources converges on the same answer: weekly attendance at religious services has been stable since 1990. However one reads the evidence about trends between World War II and 1990, the recent past has been a time of stability. This has important implications for theories of religious change.     

Changing patterns of religious affiliation,church attendance and marriage across five areas of Europe since the early 1980s: trends and associations

This study draws on three waves of the European Values Survey (conducted between 1981 and 1984, between 1989 and 1993, and between 1999 and 2004) across five countries for which full data are available (Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Northern Ireland, Spain, and Sweden) in order to address five research questions. Question one examined changes in religious affiliation. Across all five countries, the proportions of the non‐affiliated increased. Question two examined changes in church attendance. Across all five countries, the proportions of the non‐attenders increased. Question three examined changes in marital status. Across all five countries the proportions of the population checking the category ‘married’ declined, although in Spain the decline was marginal. Question four examined the association between religious affiliation and being married. The religious affiliated were more likely to be married than the non‐affiliated. Question five examined the association between church attendance and being married. Weekly attenders were more likely to be married than the non‐attenders. Overall these data support the close association between religion and marriage across five European countries (where there are very different religious climates) and support the hypothesis that changing religious values and changing family values go hand‐in‐hand.     

How Many Americans Attend Worship Each Week? An Alternative Approach to Measurement

Opinion polls indicate that over 40 percent of Americans attend worship services each week. However, attendance counts in several North American counties and Roman Catholic dioceses suggest that worship attendance may be much lower. In this article a new measurement strategy is used to estimate total weekly worship attendance. First, using a variety of resources we develop an estimate of the total number of religious congregations in the United States by religious family. Contrary to many published sources, the total number of congregations is estimated at just over 330,000. Second, using known population values and sample-based attendance counts we develop estimates of average weekly worship attendance for religious congregations by religious family. The resulting totals suggest that fewer than 22 percent of Americans attend worship services each week. This lower level of attendance provides further evidence that Americans tend to overreport worship participation and are less religiously active than the polls show.     

Religion and society in present‐day Albania

Albania is the only European country with a majority Muslim population (with the arguable exception of Bosnia). In this age of religious prejudice and in view of the terrible policies of ethnic cleansing in its neighbouring countries, Albania's religious climate has remained remarkably tolerant. The intermingling of religions is epitomized by Albania's national hero Skanderbeg who was born an Orthodox, lived as a Muslim, and died a Catholic. The most extreme demands were made on Albania's people of faith during a 23‐year period of state‐proclaimed atheism. A widespread revival of all religions after 1991 is generally thought to be in similar proportions to those at the start of the century. As we near its close, we can only hope that interaction between religious groups continues to remain peaceful and tolerant.     

Religion and Subjective Well‐Being Across Religious Traditions: Evidence from 1.3 Million Americans

I examine the relationship between religious service attendance and two domains (cognitive and affective) of subjective well‐being using Gallup Daily Poll data, which has a sample size over 1.3 million. I find that religious attendance is positively associated with both domains of subjective well‐being in all religious traditions examined, including non‐Christian traditions and “religious nones.” The strength of the association varies significantly across the traditions: stronger among Christian groups—particularly among the groups that are, on average, more observant—than among non‐Christian religions or “religious nones.” The stronger association among the observant groups is partly due to the lower level of well‐being among nonattendees in those groups than nonattendees in less observant groups. I also find that the association is stronger among individuals who consider religion an important part of life than among those who do not. Finally, my findings suggest that religious service attendance is equally strongly related to both domains of subjective well‐being.     

Religious Attendance Buffers the Impact of Unemployment on Life Satisfaction: Longitudinal Evidence from Germany

This research used longitudinal data from the German Socio‐Economic Panel Study (SOEP) to examine whether religious attendance buffers the impact of unemployment on life satisfaction. Fixed effects models following 5,446 individuals up to three years after the transition to unemployment yielded two central findings. First, higher frequency of religious attendance was associated with smaller drops in life satisfaction. Second, only those who attended religious services on a weekly basis adapted to unemployment. These results suggest that religious attendance on a weekly basis can mitigate the psychological impact of unemployment.     

Examining Trends in Muslim Self‐Identification and Mosque Attendance Among People of Turkish and Moroccan Descent in the Netherlands, 1997–2009

This study examines the extent to which Muslim self‐identification and mosque attendance have changed in the period 1997–2009 among people of Turkish and Moroccan descent in the Netherlands. Mainly trendless fluctuations are found. Overall, Muslim self‐identification seems to very slightly increase and mosque attendance seems to very slightly decrease. We examined the extent to which factors that are important according to theories and previous research explain or enlarge these differences over time. The factors about which we hypothesize are largely unable to explain differences over time in Muslim self‐identification and mosque attendance.     

Parental Divorce,Parental Religious Characteristics,and Religious Outcomes in Adulthood

Parental divorce has been linked to religious outcomes in adulthood. Previous research, however, has not adequately accounted for parental religious characteristics, which may render the association spurious and/or moderate the relationship. Many studies also do not consider subsequent family context, namely, whether one's custodial parent remarries. Using pooled data from three waves of the General Social Survey, we examine the nature of the relationships among parental divorce, subsequent family structure, and religiosity in adulthood. Growing up in a single‐parent family—but not a stepparent family—is positively associated with religious disaffiliation and religious switching and negatively associated with regular religious service attendance. Accounting for parental religious characteristics, however, explains sizable proportions of these relationships. In fact, after accounting for parental religious affiliation and service attendance, growing up with a single parent does not have a significant effect on religious service attendance. Parental religiosity also moderates the relationship between growing up with a single parent and religious service attendance: being raised in a single‐parent home does have a negative effect on religious service attendance among adults who had two religiously involved parents. There is modest evidence of this moderating relationship for other religious outcomes. Implications of these findings are discussed.     

Intergenerational Religious Mobility in Contemporary China

This study illustrates intergenerational religious mobility with the case of Chinese society. Using the quasi‐symmetric log‐linear model to separate structure mobility from exchange mobility, we examine the variation in religious identities between the reform era generation and their parents. Structure mobility results suggest that the encompassing social reform over the past decades in China has encouraged the structural growth of Islam and Christianity across generations, but traditional Chinese religions bear remarkable intergenerational disadvantages. Moreover, religious nones are growing across generations, at least relative to traditional Chinese religions. Exchange mobility findings indicate that individuals whose parents follow traditional Chinese religions are very likely to “convert” to Christianity. However, children of religious nones do not necessarily remain irreligious, possibly undermining the structural advantages of religious nones in the future. Finally, a comparison between cohort and period effects drives us to conclude that the major social force underpinning the revival of Chinese religion in the reform era is generational replacement instead of an increasingly religious transition of “old” generations.     

Does Religiousness Increase with Age? Age Changes and Generational Differences Over 35 Years

We examine aging patterns and generational trends in religion using 35 years of survey data from 420 four‐generation families and in‐depth interviews with a subset of 25 families. Results indicate the importance of three time‐related effects on religiosity: individual aging and religious development over the life course; cohort influences; and effects of historical trends in religion. Results indicate an overall aging effect with an upward drift in religious intensity and strength of beliefs over the adult lifespan, though religious attendance remains generally stable over adulthood until it drops in late life. Growth curves show that the oldest generations (G1 and G2) display a “retirement surge” in religiosity. Trajectories of change for G3s and G4s reflect both lifecycle and cohort effects. Qualitative analysis provides insight concerning the generational differences identified in the survey, suggesting two trends: (1) from older‐ to later‐born age groups, spirituality becomes increasingly decoupled from religion; (2) conceptualizations of the divine show a shift from a God who is primarily transcendent (“out there”) for the G1s to one that is more imminent and personal in the G4s.     

Individual Religiosity,Moral Community,and Drug User Treatment

Some scholars have suggested that individual religiosity inhibits deviant behavior. Others have suggested that behavior is more responsive to the influence of religiously‐oriented moral communities than to the religiosity of individuals. Still others have suggested that non‐religious moral communities, such as sports teams or self‐help recovery groups, are just as effective as religious moral communities. The current article examines the associations between addicts' reductions in drug and alcohol use and religiosity, increase in church attendance, and increase in addiction self‐help recovery group attendance, following participation in publicly funded treatment programs. Results indicate that increase in self‐help recovery group attendance and church attendance were independently associated with reduction in alcohol use. Only increase in church attendance was significantly associated with reduction in cocaine use. Self‐assessed religious conviction was not associated with changes in drug use.     

From Religious to Consumption‐Related Routine Activities? Analyzing Ireland's Economic Boom and the Decline in Church Attendance

Using Ireland, which experienced an economic boom in the mid 1990s, as a case study, the negative association between economic growth and religious practice is examined by testing two competing hypotheses. Secularization theory argues that the cultural changes that accompany economic growth lead to a decline in religious values. As religious values diminish, so does attendance at religious services. An alternative explanation is that economic growth increases individual purchasing power and therefore consumption‐related behavior. Consumption supplants religion by providing alternative intermediaries (symbols, infrastructures, and practices) for social behavior, but only marginally affects religious values. Using data from the 1988 to 2005 International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), analyses show that the economic boom in Ireland was clearly associated with a decline in religious attendance, while religious values remained stable. Thus, in Ireland the consequences of economic growth deviate from the predictions of secularization theory and therefore support the consumption argument.