幼儿心理理论水平及其与抑制控制发展的关系

本研究通过经典的错误信念任务首先考察了3与4岁幼儿心理理论的发展水平;然后通过抑制控制任务探讨了幼儿心理理论发展水平与抑制控制能力发展的关系。结果表明,3、4岁在完成错误信念任务时有显著的年龄差异;通过错误信念任务的幼儿在抑制冲突的得分显著地高于没有通过错误信念的幼儿;而且除了他人的错误信念,幼儿在其他错误信念上的水平与抑制冲突成绩有显著的相关。     

幼儿说谎行为的发展及其与说谎认知的关系

该研究考察了3~5岁幼儿违规后说谎的人数及其年龄特征,同时探讨了说谎行为与说谎概念理解、道德评价之间的关系。研究结果表明,即使是3岁儿童,违规后出现说谎的人数至少在一半以上,但4、5岁儿童在说谎的人数上要显著地多于3岁儿童。在说谎/说真话概念理解与道德评价的发展上,年龄间差异显著,从3岁至5岁逐渐达到成熟水平。研究结果没有发现是否说谎与说谎认知之间的关系,即在说谎/说真话的概念理解与道德评价上,说谎组儿童与没有说谎组儿童没有显著的差异。     

儿童欺骗的情境依赖

采用竞争游戏的方式研究3～6岁儿童在外显和隐蔽情境里的欺骗。结果表明4、5岁儿童行为上的隐蔽欺骗和错误信念理解显著相关;3岁儿童语言上的外显欺骗（说谎）和错误信念理解显著相关;各年龄段儿童行为上的外显欺骗和错误信念理解没有显著相关。和Cartson（1998）的研究结果不一致的是,本研究中4、5、6岁儿童的隐蔽欺骗人数显著超过外显欺骗人数。结果提示,语言上的外显欺骗（说谎）不仅和儿童的执行功能有关,还可能和欺骗时的情境压力有关。     

7~9岁儿童二级错误信念和失言理解的发展

采用二级错误信念任务、失言理解任务分别考察了90名7-9岁学龄儿童心理理论的发展。结果表明,7岁组儿童在二级错误信念和失言理解任务上的成绩与8岁组、9岁组存在显著差异,但8岁组和9岁组儿童之间没有显著差异,提示8岁可能是个体心理理论发展的又一个转折点。三组被试在二级错误信念理解上的成绩显著高于失言理解任务上的成绩,在控制年龄后,他们在两种心理理论任务上的成绩显著相关。另外,失言任务中三种心理状态理解的得分两两相关。综合以上结果,在学龄期,心理理论仍有质的发展,且心理理论的信念、情绪和意图等核心概念仍然相互关联。     

学前儿童的“心理理论”在不同ToM任务中的发展特点

考察了72名3～5岁儿童在三个改造过的经典错误信念任务中的表现,结果显示,大部分4岁儿童能够正确认识自我错误信念;大部分5岁儿童能够正确认识他人错误信念;大部分3～4岁儿童的自我错误信念认识显著好于他人（真人和玩偶）错误信念认识,5岁时这两种认识才没有显著差异;学前儿童对真人与玩偶错误信念的认识没有显著差异;学前儿童对“意外地点”任务和“意外内容”任务中错误信念问题回答的一致性较高,而对“外表—真实”任务的回答与前两种任务的一致性较低。     

学前儿童欺骗及欺骗策略发展的研究

选取130名学前儿童,采用“找钱币”欺骗任务和标准误信念任务,研究学前儿童欺骗及欺骗策略的发生、发展。结果发现:随年龄增长,采用“破坏证据”和“说谎”欺骗策略的人数呈下降趋势,采用四种联合策略的人数则呈上升趋势;即使3岁儿童也能出示“破坏证据”和“说谎”这两种行为主义的欺骗策略,但“制造虚假痕迹”的心理主义欺骗策略在4岁以后才开始出现;3岁、6岁儿童的误信念理解与欺骗策略不相关,而4岁和5岁儿童的则相关。     

幼儿说谎认知的年龄特征及其与心理理论水平的关系

研究探讨了3～4岁幼儿说谎认知的年龄特征,并在此基础上考察了说谎的概念理解水平与道德评价之问的关系,及说谎认知与心理理论水平的关系。结果表明：3岁和4岁幼儿在说谎和说真话概念的判断上年龄差异显著,在对说谎的道德评价上,年龄差异不显著;幼儿心理理论与说谎概念的相关显著,4岁组的心理理论与道德评价的相关显著。     

特定句法提示对3－4岁儿童错误信念理解的影响

通过在错误信念任务中,为儿童提供关于错误信念表征的特定句法,考察这种句法理解对儿童的错误信念理解成绩是否有促进作用。124名3-4岁幼儿参加实验,每个年龄组幼儿随机分配到零级提示,一级提示和二级提示等三个句法提示条件组,并完成4个错误信念任务。结果发现,一级提示条件和二级提示条件下的错误信念理解成绩显著高于零级提示条件下的错误信念理解成绩,而一级和二级两种提示条件之间没有显著差异。句法提示对不同的错误信念任务的影响是相同的,对错误信念的预测问题和解释问题的影响模式是一致的。表明对错误信念表征的特定句法提示,有效促进了儿童的错误信念成绩,提示这种句法结构可能有助于儿童的错误信念理解     

道德情绪判断、错误信念与行为问题的关系——损人情境中幼儿反应的一项研究

运用投射性情境故事和Rutter量表(教师问卷)研究了204名幼儿对损人情境的道德情绪判断、错误信念水平、行为问题及其关系。结果表明:(1)男性幼儿的违纪行为显著高于女性,神经症行为得分在不同年龄之间差异达到显著性水平。(2)随年龄增长,对成功损人者之情绪判断为积极的人数会减少、而判断为消极的人数会增加,对失败损人者之情绪判断为消极的居多、而对成功损人者情绪判断为积极的为主。(3)幼儿已经基本能完成道德情境中的错误信念任务,当接受别人的"错误"表扬时会产生积极情绪。(4)未完成错误信念任务儿童的神经症得分显著高于完成者,对成功损人者之情绪判断为积极的儿童的神经症得分显著高于判断为消极者。     

学前儿童心理理论及欺骗发展的关系研究

本文采用两种标准心理理论任务和两种欺骗任务,以3~6岁儿童为被试,探讨了学前儿童心理理论与欺骗发展的关系,得出如下结论:(1)在不同的误信念任务中,学前儿童的表现不一致;但仍存在一般发展趋势:3岁儿童不能通过误信念任务,4、5岁是儿童误信念发展的关键时期.(2)3岁儿童不能拥有隐藏意图的欺骗能力,4岁儿童拥有隐藏意图的欺骗能力.(3)3岁儿童能说谎,但假装无知的欺骗直到6岁才出现.(4)误信念理解与隐藏意图的欺骗存在相关,但与说谎和假装无知不存在相关.     

Reliability and generalizability of an acted-out false belief task in 3-year-olds

The current study tested the reliability and generalizability of a narrative act-out false belief task held to reveal Theory of Mind (ToM) competence at 3 years of age, before children pass verbal standard false belief tasks (the “Duplo task”; Rubio-Fernández & Geurts, 2013, Psychological Science). We conducted the task across two labs with methodologically improved matched control conditions. Further, we administered an analogue intensionality version to assess the scope of ToM competence in the Duplo task. 72 3-year-olds participated in a Duplo change-of-location task, a Duplo intensionality task, and half of them in a matched verbal standard change-of-location task, receiving either false belief or matched true belief scenarios. Children performed at chance in the false belief Duplo location change and intensionality tasks as well as in the standard false belief task. There were no differences to the standard task, and performance correlated across all three false belief tasks, revealing a rather unified competence and no task advantage. In the true belief conditions of both Duplo tasks, children performed at ceiling and significantly different from the false belief conditions, while they were at chance in the true belief condition of the standard task. The latter indicates that a pragmatic advantage of the Duplo task compared to the standard task holds only for the true belief scenarios. Our study shows that the Duplo task measures the same ToM competence as the standard task and rejects a notion of earlier false belief understanding on the group level in 3-year-old children.     

‘Theory of mind’ development of Pakistani children: Do preschoolers acquire an understanding of desire,pretence and belief in a universal sequence?

Research on “theory of mind” (TOM) suggests that a grasp of the mind develops universally and sequentially, but both these claims require testing in different cultural groups. Study 1, involving 72 preschoolers, showed the expected developmental transition on false belief tasks; 3 year olds were below statistical chance, while 4 year olds were at chance, representing a lag behind Western children. The same pattern of at chance (pretence, desire and belief) and below chance performance (false belief) was replicated in study 2 with 77 preschoolers (3–5 years) and corroborated the lag identified for some Asian countries. This deficient and varied timing of TOM performance is consistent with theories (social constructivist) supporting the role of social factors in TOM development. Moreover, significant inter-task correlations corroborate the need to broaden the research focus beyond false belief tasks.     

幼儿对心理状态的认识

本研究探讨３—５岁儿童对自身和他人心理状态认识的发展过程．借助图片和玩具结合四种作业任务,对１９１名儿童进行了实验和短期追踪实验。结果表明：３岁儿童尚不能对心理状态作出认识,４岁半左右是儿童认识心理状态的转折期,到５岁末能完全把握自身和他人的心理状态．在四项作业任务中,儿童通过的先后次序为他人误念判断和他人未知判断、现象一实在区分、表征变换．这一方面与儿童的认知发展趋势有关,另一方面也与实验的情景和材料有关．     

5～8岁儿童二级信念-愿望推理能力的发展

该研究依据信念(正确-错误)和愿望(接近-回避)对儿童的二级信念-愿望推理能力进行了细分,并据此设计了四个二级信念-愿望任务,探讨了480名5～8岁儿童在四个任务上的表现。结果发现,对儿童而言,不同的二级信念-愿望任务的难度不同,由易到难的顺序依次为:二级真实信念接近愿望、二级错误信念接近愿望、二级真实信念回避愿望、二级错误信念回避愿望。     

How language relates to belief,desire, and emotion understanding

Two experiments examined syntax and semantics as correlates of theory-of-mind (ToM). In Experiment 1 children’s language was examined at 3 years of age in relation to ToM at 3, 3.5, 4, and 5.5 years. Semantics predicted unique variance in later belief understanding but not desire understanding. Syntax did not explain unique variance in belief or desire. In Experiment 2 two measures of syntax and a measure of semantics were used with 65 3–5-year-olds. The syntax measures tested children’s understanding of word order and embedded clauses. They were related to false belief, but contrary to some predictions, were also related to emotion recognition. Performance on language control tasks with low syntactic demands correlated equally well with false belief. In both experiments performance on the syntax and semantics tasks was highly inter-correlated. We argue that ToM is related to general language ability rather than syntax or semantics per se.     

True or false: do 5-year-olds understand belief?

In 3 studies (N = 188) we tested the hypothesis that children use a perceptual access approach to reason about mental states before they understand beliefs. The perceptual access hypothesis predicts a U-shaped developmental pattern of performance in true belief tasks, in which 3-year-olds who reason about reality should succeed, 4- to 5-year-olds who use perceptual access reasoning should fail, and older children who use belief reasoning should succeed. The results of Study 1 revealed the predicted pattern in 2 different true belief tasks. The results of Study 2 disconfirmed several alternate explanations based on possible pragmatic and inhibitory demands of the true belief tasks. In Study 3, we compared 2 methods of classifying individuals according to which 1 of the 3 reasoning strategies (reality reasoning, perceptual access reasoning, belief reasoning) they used. The 2 methods gave converging results. Both methods indicated that the majority of children used the same approach across tasks and that it was not until after 6 years of age that most children reasoned about beliefs. We conclude that because most prior studies have failed to detect young children's use of perceptual access reasoning, they have overestimated their understanding of false beliefs. We outline several theoretical implications that follow from the perceptual access hypothesis.     

Children's counterfactual inferences about long and short causal chains

Recent findings on counterfactual reasoning in children have led to the claim that children's developing capacities in the domain of ‘theory of mind’ might reflect the emergence of the ability to engage in counterfactual thinking over the preschool period (e.g. Riggs, Peterson, Robinson & Mitchell, 1998 ). In the study reported here, groups of 3- and 4-year old children were presented with stories describing causal chains of several events, and asked counterfactual thinking tasks involving changes to different points in the chain. The ability to draw successful counterfactual inferences depended strongly on the inferential length of the problem, and the age of the children; while 3-year-olds performed above chance on short inference counterfactuals, they performed below chance on problems involving longer inference chains. Four-year-old children were above chance on all problems. Moreover, it was found that while success on longer chain inference problems was significantly correlated with the ability to pass tests of standard false belief, there was no such relationship for short inference problems, which were significantly easier than false belief problems. These results are discussed in terms of the developmental relationships between causal knowledge, counterfactual thinking and calculating the contents of mental states.