More on understanding in the social sciences

A central mistake in Rolf Gruner's recent article on understanding in the socia sciences in ferreted out, and consideration of it is used both to analyse Gruner's interpretation of understanding and to sketch a more adequate interpretation. The mistake is in distinguishing meanings and facts. The analysis suggests that Gruner was forced to see understanding both as a special kind of explanation and at the same time as no explanation. The sketch offers a distinction of three senses of ‘understanding’ — as identification of a certain kind of subject matter, as explanation of it, and as a subjective feeling consequent upon such explanation.     

Indeterminacy in the social sciences

It is maintained that a principle of indeterminacy exists in the social sciences which bears some resemblance to the Heisenberg principle in the realm of physics. In the social sciences, however, the principle is grounded not on physical interference, but on the capacity of human beings to alter their behavior on the basis of changing conceptions of their social condition, and so the contention of writers like Nagel ‘that no distinct principle of explanation is involved’ must be rejected. The paper concludes with a brief consideration of the causes of social indeterminacy, which suggests that the phenomenon is ineradicable.     

Reasoning in the social sciences

In 1981, A. C. Crombie identified six styles of scientific thinking in the European tradition that constitute our ways of reasoning in the natural sciences. In this paper, I try to show that these styles constitute reasoning in the social sciences as well, and that, as a result, the differences between reasoning about the physical world and about human beings are not so different as some interpretevists have supposed.     

Understanding in the social sciences and history

Understanding in its widest sense is the aim of all rational knowledge. A distinction can be made between interpretation (leading to the understanding of meanings) and explanation (leading to the understanding of facts). The view that in the social sciences facts and meanings are the same is criticized. In respect of the specific understanding of human and social facts empathetic and rational understanding are distinguished and some of the difficulties pointed out inherent in both, in particular with regard to testability. On the other hand, it is found that a purely behaviouristic approach, although possible, would not be completely satisfactory, so that in spite of all difficulties the social sciences (history included) cannot do without specific understanding, as a heuristic device as well as an aim.     

Why the social sciences are irreducible

Synthese - It is often claimed that the social sciences cannot be reduced to a lower-level individualistic science. The standard argument for this position (usually labelled explanatoryholism) is...     

A commentary on the symposium: The use of history in the social sciences curriculum

The use of history in the social science curriculum leads to a deepened understanding of the respective disciplines of anthropology, education, sociology, political science, psychology, and history of science. The use of history in the social sciences also leads to extradisciplinary interests in history, philosophy, and literature. Some highlights from a symposium and from the recent literature are discussed.     

Fractional designs: A simulation study of usefulness in the social sciences

Fractional designs can be extremely useful in social science research, especially when a large number of factors is involved. Reluctance for the use of fractional designs seems to be warranted for two reasons: (1) In the social sciences, the amount of measurement error is often large, which may decrease the power, and (2) higher order interactions are assumed to be nonsignificant, which is difficult to guarantee without sufficient research. This simulation study shows the effects of measurement error and assumption violations under various conditions. It is concluded that fractional designs handle measurement error gracefully and that they are as powerful as a full design when equal degrees of freedom are available. Significant interaction effects can cause serious problems, especially in situations with low or intermediate measurement error, and can lead to erroneous conclusions. Only when estimated confounded effects are clearly not significant, the chance of a wrong decision is reasonably small. Therefore, fractional designs are especially warranted for the exclusion of irrelevant factors. However, we note pitfalls in the use of Version 1.0 of the program Trail Run from SPSS, Inc., to implement the procedures.     

A symposium on the use of history in the social sciences curriculum: An introduction

A symposium on the use of history in the social sciences curriculum was held at the 1980 annual meeting of the History of Science Society. It was part of a continuing series of symposia on pedagogical topics sponsored by the Committee on Undergraduate Education of the Society. Here a brief introduction is given to the three papers and the commentary presented on that occasion and published in this issue of this journal.     

II. Understanding in the social sciences revisited

Rolf Gruner's article on the role of understanding in the social sciences casts rational understanding as the aim of the social sciences. Even though he opts for a non‐controversial methodology for the social sciences, his view still commits the social sciences to seeking the reproduction of reality rather than the explanation of it.