有关进化心理学局限性的理论思考

进化心理学是现代西方心理学的新取向之一。这一新取向吸引了众多的追随者,但是它自身的核心假设、方法论和认识论方面却存在着局限性。文章从三个方面分析了这种局限性：第一,进化心理学的核心假设是心理的模块性观点。依据这种观点,心灵由大量功能各异的心理模块组成,但是来自于心理学和生物学的研究都表明这种观点是缺乏科学依据的。第二,进化心理学从过去的角度理解现在,所依据的事实大多是推测性的,更多的是一种历史叙事,从方法论的角度来说,这种研究不具备可证伪性,不符合科学方法论的基本原则。第三,在认识论方面,进化心理学继承了社会生物学的传统,有意或无意地夸大了基因的作用,贬低了个体发展过程中其它因素,现代生命科学的研究已经证明了基因决定论的虚假性     

A dilemma for Heideggerian cognitive science

‘Naturalizing phenomenology’ by limiting it to the ontology of the sciences is problematic on both metaphysical and phenomenological grounds. While most assessments of the prospects for a ‘naturalized phenomenology’ have focused on approaches based in Husserlian transcendental phenomenology, problems also arise for non-reductive approaches based in Heideggerian existential phenomenology. ‘Heideggerian cognitive science’ faces a dilemma. On the one hand, (i) if it is directly concerned with the nature of subjectivity, and this subjectivity is assumed to be ontologically irreducible to its physical enablers yet still metaphysically dependent on them, then Heideggerian cognitive science will either leave that metaphysical dependence an unexplained instance of supervenience, or ground it in speculation about brute metaphysical laws that have an unclear relationship to the ontology of the sciences. On the other hand, (ii) if Heideggerian cognitive science is not directly concerned with the nature of subjectivity, but is instead merely aimed at the development of a Heideggerian phenomenological psychology, then it doesn’t fully address the ontological implications of phenomenology’s transcendental approach, and so, while it might succeed in explaining the realization of psychological phenomena scientifically, the existence of subjectivity will remain inexplicable based on the ontology of the sciences. Neither strategy succeeds in ‘naturalizing phenomenology’: (i) either rejects scientific naturalism, or makes its requirements trivial, while (ii) either rejects the transcendental dimension of phenomenology, or fails to address its ontological implications.     

Keeping quiet on the ontology of models

Stein once urged us not to confuse the means of representation with that which is being represented. Yet that is precisely what philosophers of science appear to have done at the meta-level when it comes to representing the practice of science. Proponents of the so-called ‘syntactic’ view identify theories as logically closed sets of sentences or propositions and models as idealised interpretations, or ‘theoruncula, as Braithwaite called them. Adherents of the ‘semantic’ approach, on the other hand, are typically characterised as taking them to be families of models that are set-theoretic, according to Suppes and others, or abstract, as Giere has argued. da Costa and French (Science and Partial Truth. OUP, Oxford, 2003) suggested that we should refrain from ontological speculation as to the nature of scientific theories and models and focus on their appropriate representation for various purposes within the philosophy of science. Such an approach allows both linguistic and non-linguistic resources to play their appropriate role (see also French and Saatsi, Philosophy of Science, Proceedings of the 2004 PSA Meeting, 78:548–559, 2006) and can be supported by recent case studies illustrating the heterogeneity of scientific practice. My aim in this paper is to further develop this ‘quietist’ view, and to indicate how it offers a fruitful way forward for the philosophy of science.     

Are the Questions of Metaphysics More Fundamental Than Those of Science?

When pursued naturalistically, metaphysics may seem forced to navigate a narrow path. So that it may be a worthwhile enterprise, it must have claim to discovery of a distinctive set of objective truths. Yet it must also avoid potential competition or conflict with the results of scientific theories. In response to this problem, some naturalistic metaphysicians have argued that properly understood, metaphysics is aimed at a set of truths distinct from those of science. Metaphysicians investigate a realm of truths more fundamental than those of even fundamental science. This paper examines what is required both in science and metaphysics for a theory to count as a fundamental theory. Several criteria are presented which suggest that metaphysics does not investigate a realm more fundamental than that of science.     

Visual illusions classified

Visual illusions provide evidence of perceptual processes, especially the use of knowledge about objects and the working rules for seeing. The classification of phenomena is necessary for any science because it facilitates induction and deduction. The phenomena of illusions are no exception. It is hoped that the tentative classification presented here may stimulate further research and raise new questions by revealing gaps in the conceptual structure of how perception proceeds. Finally, a speculation is offered for the functional use of sensations, the qualia of consciousness.     

Epistemic Rationality

Many epistemologists and philosophers of science, especially those with “naturalist” inclinations, argue that if there is to be any such thing as normativity or rationality in these domains, it must be instrumental—roughly, a matter of goal satisfaction—rather than something involving normative “oughts” that are independent of the satisfaction of our epistemic, cognitive, or other ends. This paper argues that while such an instrumental conception of epistemic rationality is perfectly respectable, even insofar as it concerns specifically epistemic ends, it cannot be the whole story about such normativity. Rather, it must be accompanied by a “categorical,” goal‐independent sort of normativity that cannot be reduced to instrumental rationality, both because instrumental rationality itself depends on a noninstrumental relationship between a belief/claim/theory and the evidence that renders it rational, and because the epistemic rationality of many beliefs is independent of the goals of their believers.     

Freestanding Psychology: The Only Way in Academic Health Centers

Psychology must assure that its programs, faculty and staff, clinical services, research enterprises, and training programs must be freestanding in Academic Health Science Centers and not organized within any other department except a freestanding Department of Psychology. Without this autonomy, it is argued, Psychology can never reach its full potential as a health care science and profession in hospital and academic health care center settings. This thesis is argued on the basis of issues of finances, credentialing and privileging, role modeling for psychologist trainees, the importance of Psychology's persona within the health science center and in the eyes of the public, and finally, academic freedom.     

A Euthyphronic Problem for Kitcher's Epistemology of Science

Philip Kitcher has advanced an epistemology of science that purports to be naturalistic. For Kitcher, this entails that his epistemology of science must explain the correctness of belief-regulating norms while endorsing a realist notion of truth. This paper concerns whether or not Kitcher's epistemology of science is naturalistic on these terms. I find that it is not but that by supplementing the account we can secure its naturalistic standing.     

Descartes as critic of Galileo's scientific methodology

Some philosophers of science suggest that philosophical assumptions must influence historical scholarship, because history (like science) has no neutral data and because the treatment of any particular historical episode is going to be influenced to some degree by one's prior philosophical conceptions of what is important in science. However, if the history of science must be laden with philosophical assumptions, then how can the history of science be evidence for the philosophy of science? Would not an inductivist history of science confirm an inductivist philosophy of science and a conventionalist history of science confirm a conventionalist philosophy of science? I attempt to resolve this problem; essentially, I deny the claim that the history of science must be influenced by one's conception of what is important in science — one's general philosophy of science. To accomplish the task I look at a specific historical episode, together with its history, and draw some metamethodological conclusions from it. The specific historical episode I examine is Descartes' critique of Galileo's scientific methodology.     

The War Between Faith and Fact

Is there a war going on between science and religion or not? The Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences and many other bridge-building advocates deny that a war must be fought between genuine science and authentic faith. Yet, a new book, Faith vs. Fact, by Jerry Coyne, launches a new attack against those with faith in God. This essay asks whether such an attack comes from genuine science or from scientism—a materialist ideology that claims rational science as its ally.     

Keeping things in perspective

Scientific realism holds that scientific representations are utterly objective. They describe the way the world is, independent of any point of view. In Scientific Representation, van Fraassen argues otherwise. If science is to afford an understanding of nature, it must be grounded in evidence. Since evidence is perspectival, science cannot vindicate its claims using only utterly objective representations. For science to do its epistemic job, it must involve perspectival representations. I explicate this argument and show its power.     

IS SCIENCE THE ONLY WAY TO TRUTH?

Abstract. In the context of contemporary life questions, especially that of world peace, this essay first develops the view that truth is essentially scientific truth. Although religion gives insights for living, as science encompasses more and more of human experience it reinforces and modifies religious truths with its own firm knowledge. However, because of several limitations, it is concluded that science alone cannot give a complete account of humanity and the universe. For our first beliefs and principles we must look to other kinds of truth, which are in accord with scientific truth but go beyond scientific method in their justification.     

Morally we Roll Along: (Optimistic Reflections) on Moral Progress

Changes over time in many large scale human practices such as science and technology seem best understood in terms of progress. Further, regarding such practices as slavery, we seem to have moved on and for the better, that is, to have progressed morally. But moral progress seems something different from other forms of progress. If possible at all, in what can it consist? Progress is understood as falling into three distinguishable categories; namely, progress as mere change, as change culminating in some end-state, and as change involving improvement or betterment. While scientific or economic progress seem of the last sort, moral progress is best understood as a hybrid of culminative change and improvement, a variety of progress labelled millenarian. Though there is an end towards which moral progress must tend, we do not know what it is. Further, moral progress must occupy a special superordinate and regulatory role regarding other progressive practices; that is, for moral progress to be possible, other progressive practices must come under the aegis of increasingly stringent moral regulation. This paper elaborates a model of moral progress, speculates upon signs of its presence, considers various relativist objections, and makes an exhortative plea for the need to have such a notion as a condition of the very possibility of moral progress.     

JOHN POLKINGHORNE AND BERNARD LONERGAN ON THE SCIENTIFIC STATUS OF THEOLOGY

On the basis of his acquaintance with theoretical elementary particle physics, and following the lead of Thomas Torrance, John Polkinghorne maintains that the data upon which a science is based, and the method by which it treats those data, must respect the idiosyncratic nature of the object with which the science is concerned. Polkinghorne calls this the “accommodation” (or “conformity”) of a discipline to its object. The question then arises: What should we expect religious experience and theological method to be like if they are accommodated to the idiosyncratic nature of God? Polkinghorne's methodological program is typical of postcritical positions in the theology‐science dialogue in holding that the fiduciary element in theological method is simply a species of the fiduciary element that is a de facto part of all knowing—in other words, theological method does not differ in fundamental kind from the methods of the natural sciences. But this program may contain the seeds of an alienation of theological method from the transcendence of God similar to the double self‐alienation of theology described by Michael Buckley in At the Origins of Modern Atheism. I contend that something like Bernard Lonergan's position on how the method of faith seeking understanding is related to the methods of the natural sciences is exactly the sort of thing that one should expect on the supposition of Polkinghorne's principle of accommodation, at least if the God who is the object of theological science is transcendent. The way in which the divine differs from all other objects ought to be disclosed or reflected in religious experience and theological method. Polkinghorne charts the course for an accommodated theology, but it seems to be Lonergan who is more intent on following it.     

Psychology's limits as a scientific discipline: A personal view

I provided a more personal view of Wachtel's (1980) article. I began by discussing the extent to which my own research program complied with his distinctive recommendations. After offering a different take on the impact of high productivity, I focused on (a) the negative effects of the quest for extramural funding and (b) the positive effects of a better balance between theoretical and empirical contributions. I then turn to some of my own theoretical and empirical studies of the place that theory has in successful science. This research suggests that theory only has a beneficial effect when it is integrative in function and when it is closely constrained by available data. I end with a speculation regarding the value of having theories that are maximally formal, even mathematical.     

Religion/Technology, Not Theology/Science, as the Defining Dichotomy

Science and religion are incommensurable: one cannot use centimeters to measure volume. Science's proper cognate is theology. Science and theology are human activities that are basically conceptual (partly fallible) frameworks for explaining experience. Religion and technology, by contrast, involve and control or limit human practice and experience : they involve "sensate" reality—people and things. The study of the interaction of these four terms (or any two) must use the terms more precisely.
Science as practiced today has become scientism , another theology. Technology is, without any doubt, the world's most powerful and fastest growing religion.
Minor squabbles among theologies, including science, must continue, but it is the tensions between technology and the established religions that will define this century. Battles on three fronts are already clear: the environment, globalization, and economic gaps. But whole–person healing, the replacement for high–tech reductionist modern medicine, is the most significant, because it will undermine science, which has hitched its wagon to this falling star.
The end of fundamental science is upon us, because it has been so successful. Science will be increasingly applications–driven, and it will be judged by results. Here, it has met its nemesis in wholeperson healing that incorporates integrative medicine. Scientists must now reconsider their role in society. It will not be easy to accept a humbler position. Moreover, the vague allusions to spirituality by scientists need a more authentic commitment to praxis in lifestyle.     

Is Moral Motivation Rationally Required?

The answer to the title question is “No.” The first section argues, using the example of Huckleberry Finn, that rational agents need not be motivated by their explicit judgments of rightness and wrongness. Section II rejects a plausible argument to the conclusion that rational agents must have some moral concerns. The third section clarifies the relevant concept of irrationality and argues that moral incoherence does not equate with this common relevant concept. Section IV questions a rational requirement for prudential concern and whether a requirement for moral concern would follow from it. Section V examines the rationality of amoralists and partial amoralists, and Sect. VI closes with speculation on why there might seem to be a rational requirement to be morally motivated.     

Backwards causation and the permanence of the past

Can a present or future event bring about a past event? An answer to this question is demanded by many other interesting questions. Can anybody, even a god, do anything about what has already occurred? Should we plan for the past, as well as for the future? Can anybody precognise the future in a way quite different from normal prediction? Do the causal laws and the past jointly preclude free action? Does current physical theory entail a consistent version of backwards causation? Recent articles on the problem of backwards causation have drawn attention to the importance of the principle of the fixity of the past: that the past is now fixed. It can be shown that the standard argument against backwards causation (the bilking experiment) simply builds in the assumption of past fixity. A fixed past deprives future events of past efficacy. This has naturally led to the speculation that by abandoning past fixity real power over the past may be possible. In this paper I show that in order to have an interesting thesis of backwards causation it is not enough simply to drop past fixity. More must go. In particular, to ensure what could be called future-to-past efficacy we must abandon two entrenched principles of permanence: the principle of permanent fixity, and the principle of permanent truth. The only alternative for backwards causal theorists is to embrace real contradictions in nature.     

Good science and good philosophy of science

I argue against the assumption that the influence of non-cognitive values must lead to bad science, opening the way for the thesis that non-cognitive values are compatible with good science. This, in turn, allows us to answer feminist questions, principally, How do gender politics influence science? without (1) having to reject the question a priori because theories of science assume that political values cannot influence good scientific work and (2) having made a case for the influence of gender politics upon a particular bit of scientific work, being put into the ludicrous position of saying that it is bad science after all, even though the relevant community of scientists say it is good. Nevertheless, moral and political neutrality is held to be a norm of good science and a tacit metaphilosophical norm governing good philosophy of science, viz., a good philosophy of science reveals and analyzes the morally and politically neutral production of good science. This metaphilosophical norm insures that the philosophy of science (1) is blind to the influence of non-cognitive values on good science if and when these are present and so (2) acquiesces in the moral or political arrangements supported by the science in question.