Fabrication deflation? The mixed effects of lying on memory

This study explored what happens when participants lie in order to convince others that false stories are true. Participants' memories were assessed by comparing their likelihood ratings for the events before and after lying about them. Results showed that most participants rated the events as less likely to have happened after lying about them. Therefore, the most common result of lying seems to be a strengthening of, not a distortion of, the truth. This decrease in likelihood rating for the statement lied about is termed ‘fabrication deflation’. In both studies, however, there were 10–16% of the participants who indicated maximum belief that the lie item was true. Whether this increase in likelihood rating for a lied about event is evidence of memory creation or the triggering of an actual memory is discussed. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Adults also have difficulty recalling one instance of a repeated event

Some forms of abuse, such as domestic violence, tend to occur repeatedly. Although memory for repeated events has received considerable empirical attention, most of this research has used a child sample. Experiments that have examined adult repeated‐event memory tend to use vastly different methodological paradigms to that used for children. To investigate whether the same pattern of findings emerge with young adults, we adapted the methodological paradigm used in child repeated‐event experiments. In this experiment, 41 undergraduate students experienced one, or multiple similar events. All participants were then interviewed about the same event. Participants who had experienced a single‐event were more likely to report correct details than those who had experienced a repeated event. Repeated‐event participants were more likely to report general details. These results have implications for the methodological paradigm which is used to examine adult memory for a recurring event.     

Biography becomes autobiography: distorting the subjective past

This work addresses whether creating a biographical sketch for a fictional adolescent can increase confidence that one personally experienced these details in adolescence (memory distortion) and whether susceptibility to such distortion (depends on whether adolescence is considered part of one's subjective past or subjective present. We divided the subjective past and present using the point at which a person experienced the last life event that changed his or her personality significantly. We operationalized the subjective past as events associated with the period before the last life-changing event and the subjective present as events associated with the period after that event. Participants' confidence in their own autobiographical memory increased after they wrote a brief story about a fictional character. This increase occurred only for those who considered adolescence to be part of their subjective past. These results indicate that subjective time (in addition to objective time) may be a valuable factor in determining who is susceptible to memory distortion. We discuss these findings in terms of familiarity attribution and source monitoring.     

Fabrication inflation increases as source monitoring ability decreases

The current research looked at the effects of lying about a false childhood event on the liar's memory for the event. Participants attempted to convince researchers that false events had actually happened to them. In Experiment 1, participants showed a Fabrication Inflation Effect in that they were more likely to increase their beliefs in the lied-about events than control events. Individual differences such as scores on the Dissociative Experience Scale, frequency of lying, and self-reported feelings of discomfort while lying were related to rates of fabrication inflation. In Experiment 2, participants also showed fabrication inflation and were more likely to inflate their likelihood ratings when the lie was created during a separate session from the posttest. Results from both studies support the idea that Source Monitoring failures may cause participants to increase their likelihood ratings of lied-about events. These results suggest that intentional lying may lead some participants to increase their beliefs in their own fabrications. Applications to the legal field are discussed.     

Episodic memory development: theory of mind is part of re‐experiencing experienced events

Two experiments with 3½‐ to 6½‐year‐old children showed that theory‐of‐mind development is associated with the growth of episodic memory. Episodic memory was assessed by manipulating informational conditions such that they permit or prevent the formation of episodic memories in terms of re‐experiencing the recalled event. Only experienced events, e.g. seeing how one puts a picture of a frog into a box, can be remembered by re‐experience. Events known through indirect information cannot be re‐experienced, e.g. putting pictures into the box when blindfolded and being later shown on video what was on these cards. Children were also tested on a battery of theory‐of‐mind tasks assessing their understanding of the origins of knowledge. There was a significant interaction in both experiments showing that recall of directly experienced items improved in relation to indirectly presented items the higher children's theory‐of‐mind scores. The discussion suggests that episodic memory development is specifically linked to the growing ability to introspect an ongoing experience and interpret it as representing an actual past event. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Taking care of business? Grateful processing of unpleasant memories

In this study we investigated the impact of grateful processing on bringing closure to unpleasant emotional memories. After recalling an open memory, participants were randomly assigned to one of three writing conditions. For three sessions, participants wrote about neutral topics, the unpleasant event itself, or positive consequences from the event from their open memory that they felt they could now be grateful for. Results showed a significant effect of writing condition, and the pattern of means were as predicted: those in the grateful condition showed more memory closure, less unpleasant emotional impact, and less intrusiveness of the open memory than the other writing conditions. Grateful reappraisal of unpleasant memories may help individuals emotionally process these events, thus bringing emotional closure to these incidents. This might be one reason that grateful people tend to be happy people.     

Liars are perceived as more credible than truth-tellers who recall a repeated event

Recurring forms of abuse like domestic violence are unfortunately common. When an individual makes an allegation about their experience, however, there is rarely additional evidence to corroborate their claim. The veracity of the allegation is thus likely to be a central concern in subsequent proceedings. This experiment explored evaluator's perceptions of adults who were lying, or truthfully recalling a repeated event. In this experiment, participants observed a filmed interview of a speaker recalling an event they had experienced once, or a speaker recalling one instance of an event that they had experienced multiple times. Alternatively, some participants viewed an interview of a speaker who was lying about the event. Repeated-event speakers were perceived as less credible than both single-event speakers and liars. It is important that future research investigates ways to reduce the negative effect that the nature of memory for a repeated event has upon speakers' perceived credibility.     

Modeling human memory phenomena in a hybrid event memory system

Human event memory stores an individual’s personal experiences and produces their recollections with varying degrees of accuracy. To model this capacity, we recently developed a hybrid event memory system that combines aspects of the two main theories proposed in the philosophical literature. We aim to model a complete range of human event memory phenomena – successful remembering, misremembering, and confabulation – using this framework. In this paper, we review our hybrid event memory system and present empirical results from a remembering experiment we conducted using this system. The results show that our system successfully models the full range of human event memory usage and errors.     

The many faces of lying

In this paper the author explores the psychic functions of lying and draws on Glasser's (1979) notions of self-preservative and sadistic violence to identify three selfobject configurations. Each of these is associated with specific anxieties to which the lie offers an apparent solution. The first configuration is sadistic lying. Here the intent is to attack and triumph over the duped other. The lie allows the object to be controlled and humiliated. This gratifies the self by reversing an earlier humiliation. The second and third configurations are both forms of self-preservative lying, where the lie may be best conceived as a symptom of hope (Winnicott, 1985). In the second configuration, the object is felt to be unavailable or inscrutable. The lie may be used to create an attractive self that will elicit the object's love, admiration and concern. In this way, the lie serves to eliminate doubt about the object's intentions towards the self. In the third configuration, the object is felt to be intrusive, and the dyadic relationship is overpowering. Here the lie can represent an attempt to insert a third into the relationship.     

Young children's self‐benefiting lies and their relation to executive functioning and theory of mind

It is well established that children lie in different social contexts for various purposes from the age of 2 years. Surprisingly, little is known about whether very young children will spontaneously lie for personal gain, how self‐benefiting lies emerge, and what cognitive factors affect the emergence of self‐benefiting lies. To bridge this gap in the literature, we situated children between 2 and 4 years of age in a zero‐sum game where children must lie to their opponent if they wanted to win a desirable reward. We found that the majority of young children did not lie even when they experienced personal losses repeatedly. However, some children spontaneously lied during the game; as the game progressed, more children lied. Further, we found that children's theory of mind understanding and executive functioning in terms of a combination of inhibitory control and cognitive flexibility had significant positive and unique correlations with how frequently children lied for personal gain. The present results taken together with the existing findings regarding children's lies for self‐protection and politeness purposes suggest that the act of lying begins early in life. Further, its emergence and development are influenced by children's specific cognitive abilities in the domains of theory of mind understanding and executive functioning.

Highlights

• The study investigated whether very young children will spontaneously lie for personal gain.
• This study used a zero‐sum game to elicit children's self‐benefiting lies. Results showed the majority of young children did not lie, and it is related to children's theory of mind understanding and executive functioning.
• The act of lying begins early in life, and its emergence and development are influenced by children's specific cognitive abilities in the domains of theory of mind understanding and executive functioning.

     

“You and your best friend Suzy put Slime in Ms. Smollett’s desk”: Producing false memories with self-relevant details

Rates of false memory reports vary markedly in the published literature. In an effort to explain these differences, the present study investigated the effects of including different types of details in a false narrative upon subsequent false memory formation. Participants were assigned to one of four conditions in which the inclusion of self-relevant and/or specific details in a false event (putting a toy in a teacher's desk) was manipulated. Participants engaged in a standard memory recovery procedure over three interviews, involving recall for three true and one false event Upon completion, 68.2% of participants in self-relevant groups were judged as having created memories or images about the false event, as compared with 36.4% in non-self-relevant groups. Subjective ratings of memory intensity were higher for self-relevant groups, and self-relevant participants were less likely to correctly guess the false event. These findings indicate that including self-relevant details in suggested childhood events increases the likelihood that such events will be accepted as false memories.     

The effect of question expectedness and experience on lying about intentions

In recent years researchers have started to focus on lying about intentions (Granhag, 2010). In the present experiment participants were interviewed about their forthcoming trip. We tested the hypothesis that liars (N=43) compared to truth tellers (N=43) would give fewer details to unexpected questions about planning, transportation and the core event, but an equal amount or more detail to expected questions about the purpose of the trip. We also tested the hypothesis that participants who had previously experienced the intention (i.e., they had made such a trip before) would give more detail than those who had never experienced the intended action. The unexpected question hypothesis was supported, whereas the previous experience effect only emerged in interactions. The benefit of using different types of questions for lie detection purposes is discussed.     

Is Lying Bound to Commitment? Empirically Investigating Deceptive Presuppositions,Implicatures, and Actions

Lying is an important moral phenomenon that most people are affected by on a daily basis—be it in personal relationships, in political debates, or in the form of fake news. Nevertheless, surprisingly little is known about what actually constitutes a lie. According to the traditional definition of lying, a person lies if they explicitly express something they believe to be false. Consequently, it is often assumed that people cannot lie by more indirectly communicating believed-false claims, for instance by merely conversationally implicating them. In this paper, we subject this claim to an empirical test. In a preregistered study of 300 participants, we investigate how people judge cases of implicit deceptions that would usually be excluded by the traditional definition of lying (i.e., conversational implicatures, presuppositions, and nonverbal actions). Our results show that people do in fact consider it possible to lie by indirect means, suggesting that people have a broader concept of lying than is usually assumed. Moreover, our findings indicate that lie judgments are closely tied to the extent to which agents are perceived as having committed themselves to the believed-false claims they have communicated. We discuss the implications of our results for the traditional definition of lying and propose a new commitment-based definition of lying that can account for the findings of our experiment.     

Mnemonic emotion regulation: a three-process model

Emotion regulation comprises attempts to influence when and how emotions are experienced and expressed. It has mostly been conceived of as proactive (e.g. situation selection) or reactive (e.g. attentional distraction), but it may also be retroactive and involve memory. I term such past-oriented activity mnemonic emotion regulation and propose that it involves increasing or decreasing access to or altering the characteristics of a memory. People may increase access to a memory and make it more likely that it will be retrieved in the future, for example by rehearsing a pleasant memory. They may decrease access to a memory and make it less likely that intrusions will be experienced in the future, for example by repeatedly trying to stop an unpleasant memory from being retrieved. Finally, people may alter the characteristics of a memory and change its content or context, for example by replacing a negative impression with a productive interpretation. I discuss how mnemonic emotion regulation may be instigated (e.g. via elaborate rehearsal) as well as the different motives (e.g. hedonic motives) people may have for engaging in regulation. Also, I discuss possible benefits of, variations in, and improvements of mnemonic emotion regulation.     

Event plausibility does not determine children's false memories

In this paper we ask how the plausibility of an event affects the likelihood that children will develop a false memory for it. Over three interviews 6-year-olds and 10-year-olds were shown two true photos and two false photos—a plausible and less plausible event—and reported what they could remember about those events. Children also rated their confidence that the events happened, and how much they could remember about the events. By the final interview, within each age group, there were no differences in children's confidence ratings for the two false events. In addition, within each age group, the rate of false memories was the same for each event; across age groups, younger children developed more false memories than older children.     

The relation between verbal and visuospatial memory and autobiographical memory

The basic-systems approach (Rubin, 2005, 2006) states that autobiographical memory is supported by other cognitive systems and argues that autobiographical memories are constructed from interactions between cognitive systems, such as language, vision and emotion. Although deficiencies in one or more of the basic systems influence the properties of autobiographical memories, little is known about how these cognitive abilities and autobiographical memory are related. To assert whether participants with stronger cognitive abilities also perform better on autobiographical memory tests, participants who completed verbal and visuospatial memory tests also recorded one personal event, which they recalled after a certain interval. Participants who performed well on the verbal memory tests also had better retention for the personal event, providing support for the basic-systems approach to autobiographical memory and preliminary support for the view that people have more memories from adolescence and early adulthood because the memory system works optimally in these lifetime periods.     

The Role of the Self in False Memory Creation

Summary

People will create false memories of childhood experiences. In this article, the research that demonstrates the creation of false memories is first described. Three processes that may be involved in memory creation are then outlined. First, individuals must accept a suggested event as plausible. Second, they construct an image and narrative of the false event. Third, they incorrectly attribute the source of the event to personal memory rather than external suggestion. We argue that the self plays a role in each of these processes. In addition, because memories are important components of the self, when memories change, the self changes as well.     

Imagination and Memory

A growing body of literature shows that imagining contrary-to-truth experiences can change memory. Recent experiments are reviewed to show that when people think about or imagine a false event, entire false memories can be implanted. Imagination inflation can occur even when there is no overt social pressure, and when hypothetical events are imagined only briefly. Overall, studies of imagination inflation show that imagining a counter-factual event can make subjects more confident that it actually occurred. We discuss possible mechanisms for imagination inflation and find that, with evidence supporting the involvement of both source confusion and familiarity in creating inflation, the primary mechanism is still to be determined. We briefly review evidence on individual differences in susceptibility to inflation. Finally, the widespread use of imagination-based techniques in self-help and clinical contexts suggests that there may be practical implications when imagination is used as a therapeutic tool.     

Empirically Investigating the Concept of Lying

Lying is an everyday moral phenomenon about which philosophers have written a lot. Not only the moral status of lying has been intensively discussed but also what it means to lie in the first place. Perhaps the most important criterion for an adequate definition of lying is that it fits with people’s understanding and use of this concept. In this light, it comes as a surprise that researchers only recently started to empirically investigate the folk concept of lying. In this paper, we describe three experimental studies which address the following questions: Does a statement need to be objectively false in order to constitute lying? Does lying necessarily include the intention to deceive? Can one lie by omitting relevant facts?